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 ABSTRACT 
The area of media assistance is not a widely known part of the Development Aid sector, even though 
it has been in existence since after World War II and has grown significantly since then as part of the 
development agenda.  Media Assistance has been included in the strategies of Western and non-
Western donors as part of their overseas Aid programmes in many regions, supporting journalism 
and media with the objectives of contributing to accountability, transparency, governance and 
ultimately, democracy.  This thesis examines the impact on the Media Assistance sector of the 
arrival of digital technologies into the ‘information ecosystems’ in which it operates.  Whereas 
historically in Media Assistance, broadcast media and the press have been the preferred (or 
available) media for achieving development objectives, digital technologies such as mobile phones 
and social media are radically altering the landscape of Media Assistance.  In Africa, where mobile 
phones are heralded as a “gift to development”, donors have been exploring the potential of these 
tools to achieve their development objective. As a consequence, the area of ICTs for Development 
(ICT4D) has flourished.   At a time when the narrative in the western media has been of an “Africa 
Rising” and of techno-determinism, this research asks whether these digital technologies are indeed 
being used to achieve Media Assistance objectives in practice.  If they are being integrated into 
media development programmes – or even replacing media development programmes - to what level 
of success? To answer this question, the thesis focuses on two countries in East Africa – Kenya and 
Tanzania – and interviews 40 stakeholders working in media assistance in these countries.  The 
research finds that in fact many projects continue to use traditional methods. This is due to issues 
such as the digital divide, technical literacy, and continuing preference for traditional media by 
wider populations in these countries. Furthermore, the study notes that the virtual public sphere 
facilitated by the internet is not accessible to all, nor is it an ideal public sphere.  Finally, citizens of 
these countries, the research finds, do not necessarily use these technologies for participation or 
accountability ends.  Thus, despite widespread diffusion of technologies such as mobile phones in 
both these countries, there is still an important role for traditional media development approaches to 
achieve donor objectives in the new information ecosystem. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
It is no exaggeration to say that the world of media has changed dramatically in the 
past two decades.  Technology has changed how people consume and interact with 
media.  Innovations in communications technology have changed the way in which 
information is produced and shared. Where once the audience passively listened or 
watched news, today end users – the audience – now create media, comment, 
participate, interact, discard.  Academic debates talk of a communications revolution 
that has changed human relationships, “between individuals, between government and 
citizens and even between states” (Voltmer and Sorensen, 2016:19). 
This thesis is an investigation into the field of media assistance in two Sub-Saharan 
countries and the possible impact these changes in media technologies have had on 
this sector.  Media assistance, as will be explained in more detail below, focuses on 
supporting media institutions and media systems, journalists and media organisation 
so that they can better fulfil their democratic role as the fourth estate, as public sphere 
and a watchdog on power.  
The central question of this thesis asks:  
RQ1: is media assistance still relevant given the digital transformation in the 
media and communications environment?  
How have digital technologies impacted on media assistance in practice?  Has this 
communications revolution rendered media assistance obsolete? And what is the 
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potential for digital technology to achieve the goals and objectives of donors of media 
assistance?   
   
In order to answer these broad aims, this thesis puts forward the following research 
sub-questions:  
RQ1a. What is Media Assistance and how does it relate to the policy aims of its 
donors?   
RQ1b. What are media assistance donor goals and what are the methods by which the 
sector addresses these objectives? 
RQ1c. Is there evidence to show that media makes a positive contribution to donor 
goals? 
The Media Assistance sector is a little-known part of the international aid sector and is 
founded on certain assumptions about media’s positive role in society and democracy. 
Also known as ‘Media Development’, Kumar describes it as “assistance designed to 
promote robust, independent media”  and  adds that “such assistance is based on an 
underlying assumption that independent media contributes to the building of 
democracy and economic development” (Kumar, 2006:1).  
This thesis provides a critical introduction to these assumptions and gives a history of 
the sector in order to contextualise the issues raised.  Often, these goals have centred 
on improving standards of journalism and building capacity in media systems with the 
aim of strengthening democratic institutions.  This is pertinent because if media 
assistance projects have been successful to date, then it will be of further interest 
whether digital technologies can do any better to achieve the same goals.  Therefore, 
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the thesis includes an historical evaluation of whether media development has been 
successful in its goals.   The research also looks at the methods the sector uses in 
projects to address these objectives. 
 Related to media’s link to democracy are theories that explore media’s relationship to 
development, and these will also be examined. The research contextualises media 
assistance within the larger Aid/Development industry as it is situated in this industry 
and funded by the international aid donors to achieve certain objectives.  Who these 
donors are and what their objectives are will be examined as they have been the main 
driver for media development in the past decades.   
There is considerable debate amongst international actors, and academia, on how ICTs 
and digital media might contribute to democracy and development. For instance, there 
are optimistic (some might say utopian) views of what ICTs can do for development 
goals such as freedom of expression and participation.  The thesis therefore 
investigates the literature on whether ICTs and digital media impact positively on 
democracy and whether they can replace the role of traditional media and journalism 
in media development practice. Thus, their potential contribution for achieving donor 
objectives will be assessed. So, the thesis also examines: 
RQ1d. How do digital technologies (or ICTs) relate to development? Furthermore, 
what is the relationship between ICT in Development and Media Development (or 
Media Assistance)? 
As the research is focused on the Sub-Saharan African countries of Kenya and 
Tanzania, the thesis looks at the current state of journalism and media in these 
countries and the political economy of the media systems there. To address whether 
media assistance is still relevant in these two profile countries, the thesis queries: 
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RQ2.  Have digital technologies impacted on the relevance of media assistance in 
the chosen case study countries? 
In order to answer this, this thesis puts forward the following research sub-questions: 
RQ2a. What are the characteristics of the current media and information environment 
in the selected case studies of Kenya and Tanzania? 
This will give a picture of what the weaknesses of the media systems are and audience 
needs in these countries. The research can then assess whether digital media can better 
address the needs of Kenya and Tanzania’s media systems in media assistance 
interventions. To do this it looks at: 
RQ2b. What are the characteristics of current media development practice in a modern 
East African context?  
RQ2c. Have ICTs impacted on the practice of media assistance in the chosen case 
studies? 
This question reviews current projects undertaken in the region and through primary 
research with those working directly in the practice of media development assesses the 
potential of digital technologies to address both individual project and broader 
development goals. 
Through the primary research, the thesis examines the extent to which media 
development organisations have adopted a digital agenda on the ground in Kenya and 
Tanzania, the reasons underpinning such adoption and with what effect.  
In so doing, the research examines: 
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 The nature of media assistance projects taking place in Kenya and Tanzania 
 Whether digital technologies are being used to address project goals 
This will help address the question of what the strengths and weaknesses of digital 
technologies are compared to traditional media development approaches for achieving 
donor goals.  It will therefore address: 
RQ2d. What is the rationale for a continuing emphasis on traditional media methods? 
 
As noted, the arrival of new media or digital media has changed the dynamic of the 
relationship between media and development, and subsequently the landscape for the 
media development sector. It has been called transformative for consumers but it has 
also altered the ways media businesses are run and even threatens their existence. The 
internet has impacted on the traditional media economic model and many well-known 
media outlets, especially newspapers, have closed.  Many are struggling with finding 
successful business models for the digital age, both in Africa and elsewhere.  
As the old revenue model comes under pressure, journalism standards have suffered in 
some places, with an emphasis on the bottom line and survival rather than support for 
balanced coverage and good investigative journalism.  The new economic model has 
also meant a decline in the number of journalists employed. At the same time, citizen 
journalism and user generated content (UGC) means readers can get different sides to 
a story.  Digital technologies have disrupted the news space and media has become 
more fractured as a result of the explosion of choices available to media consumers.   
This research examines whether these technological changes have affected the role of 
media assistance, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. It asks whether new digital 
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technologies have the potential to achieve media assistance goals such as transparency 
and accountability and good governance.  If so, does it render traditional media 
development approaches redundant?   
The research adopts a practice-based perspective and therefore investigates whether 
media development NGOs in Kenya and Tanzania are changing the structure and form 
of the projects on the ground as a result of the growth in these technologies.  The 
thesis garners the views of those working directly on the ground as to the potential of 
digital technologies for their project goals. If digital technologies can better address 
the needs of the media systems and audiences, it will be reflected in these projects 
which are trying to strengthen and bolster the media sector and media environment in 
the respective target countries. 
In answering the above questions, the research will critically examine the broader 
field of media development and assistance, identify changes and tensions experienced 
in the sector and the trends likely to affect it in the future. As such, it contributes new 
knowledge to the study of transformations within the international media landscape 
brought about by digitalisation and how this has impacted on the field of media 
development.   
First, however, the thesis offers a clarification of the meaning of media development 
as deployed in this thesis.  
 
What is Media Development? 
The discipline of media assistance (also known as media development, and used 
interchangeably) is a complex and not widely understood area of international aid and 
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the first priority is to clarify it here.  ‘Media development’1 is a part of the 
international aid sector that focuses on using media to improve the quality and 
availability of information to audiences and citizens in developing and transitional 
countries.   The field of ‘media development’ aims to improve the quality of news and 
content and news delivery to citizens, by supporting free and independent media, and 
enhancing media systems.   
The importance of a free media in supporting democratic development is often 
acknowledged both in academic literature and in the policy statements of development 
agencies (Norris and et al, 2010; DFID, 2008). There is wide-ranging consensus 
around the idea that the evolution of a free and plural media is essential for holding 
government to account and enabling an informed citizenry (Islam, 2006; Norris, 
2006).  This relationship between media and democracy will be examined further in 
later chapters as it is the basis for much media development work. 
For the purpose of this research, ‘Media Development’ is understood as a sub-division 
of the international Aid industry which focuses on media and journalism as a catalyst 
for development objectives.   
According to the Centre for International Media Assistance (CIMA) website, the term 
media development refers to “evolution and change in the fields of news media and 
communications. Such change relates to a range of institutions, practices, and 
behaviours including the rule of law, freedoms of expression and press, education 
systems for journalists, business environments, capacities of journalists and managers, 
 
1 Inverted commas are used to here to differentiate Media Development, as a division within the 
overseas aid sector and an industry in itself, from media development which could be just understood as 
development of media over time.  
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as well as support for a diversity of views in society” (“What is Media 
Development?,” n.d.).   
So, in this research, media development is understood as the collective term given to 
activities that are undertaken to strengthen journalism, media systems and enhance the 
public sphere in developing and transitional societies. These activities are meant to be 
catalysts for this change. And very often with the intention that it will contribute to a 
strengthening of democracy. 
As such, media development activities can include improving the capacity or skills of 
media outlets, training of journalists, creating networks for the support of journalists, 
revising or refreshing journalism education in third-level institutions, and providing 
equipment for better quality reporting. Larger and more ambitious projects can 
involve transforming previous state broadcasters to a public service model. 
The organisations within this sector who implement these media development projects 
on behalf of the funders or sponsors are called Media Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs)  or are also referred to as Media Assistance Organisations 
(MAOs) (Drefs and Thomas, 2015) 
The major donors in international media assistance include both governmental 
overseas aid departments and also the multi-lateral agencies such as the United 
Nations.  The largest funders are the United States government overseas aid 
programme (USAID), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the 
European Union, through agencies such as European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR) and the European Endowment for Democracy. The French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Global Affairs Canada, the Government of Norway (NORAD), Japan 
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International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and 
the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) are also considerable 
donors (Angaya Juma and Myers, 2018; Kalathil, 2017; Kalathil and Cauhape-
Cazaux, 2015). 
Multi-lateral organisations such as the World Bank, UNESCO, UNDP and UN 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) are also significant 
contributors.  
In addition to these governmental agencies, media assistance is also supported by a 
large group of foundations and philanthropic organisations. These include the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the John 
S. & James L. Knight Foundation, the Mac Arthur Foundation, the Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Open Society Foundations. 
More recent private donors include Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Jigsaw 
(formerly Google Ideas), Knight Foundation, Omidyar Network (eBays Pierre 
Omidyar) and the Skoll Foundation (eBays Jeff Skoll) who emanate from Silicon 
Valley. 
It has been suggested that philanthropists who come from the world of digital 
technology have sought to create new models of philanthropy that emphasise the roles 
and principles of digital media.  Anne Nelson claims “vast new fortunes have been 
made in the field over the past decade, and some of these are now creating new 
models of philanthropy that display a keen interest in the role of digital media in the 
world” (Nelson, 2012).  This may impact on the tools being prioritised in development 
projects and this is the subject of later discussion. As Nelson argues “the Gates 
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Foundation may not have invented “media for development,” but in recent years it has 
undoubtedly helped to set the agenda” (Nelson, 2012).  
Different generations of donors also correspond to different eras of regional emphasis. 
In the post-war period, the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation played a 
central role in the creation of the Marshall Plan (1948-1952) to rebuild European 
economies and institutions, including the news media. In the aftermath of the 1989 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Open Society Institute and other foundations 
contributed substantial funds into an effort to help the former Soviet bloc countries 
transition to a democratic free-market system (Nelson, 2012).  
In terms of geography, the new generation of tech-based foundations devotes most of 
its international attention to Africa and India. Interestingly, both regions are also 
considered among the most dynamic markets for digital media, which makes them 
“fertile ground for experimentation in media and development” (Nelson, 2012).  
So, whereas historically media assistance efforts and interventions have focused on 
traditional print and broadcast media, more recently digital technology has gained 
more attention as tools in development projects.  
 
Media development vs. Media for development  
In addition to its low profile within the aid sector, media development is often 
confused with ‘media for development’, otherwise known as ‘Communication for 
development’ (C4D). The distinction is qualified here. As noted by Cauhaoe-Cazaux 
and Kalathil (2015), ‘media for development’ is 
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the employment of media and communication in order to promote or facilitate 
development goals, for example, when media is used to organize health campaigns or 
to promote human rights.  In these cases, media is more an instrument than a target   
 
But with Media development projects they stress: “The main purpose of these projects 
or programs is to strengthen the quality, sustainability, and/or independence of the 
news media.  Media organizations are the main “direct” beneficiaries of these projects 
and frequently the counterparts” (Kalathil and Cauhape-Cazaux, 2015: 7-8). 
Scott (2014) refers to media development as “donor-led initiatives designed to 
develop the media sector within a specific country or region. … these include efforts 
aimed at promoting  independence, plurality, professionalism, capacity, an enabling 
environment, economic sustainability and media literacy” (Scott, 2014: 4).  He argues 
that the distinction between media development and M4D projects is that the focus in 
media development is on developing the media, rather than using the media as “a 
mechanism for achieving other development outcomes”.  Or as Geertsema-Sligh notes 
“in media development, the focus is on the development of the media themselves, and 
not on the message communicated through the media” (Geertsema-Sligh, 2019: 2439). 
Scott also explains that with media development activities, the media are understood 
as “more an institution, acting upon and in concert with many institutions in 
society…. Media are implicated, not necessary in individual behaviour change of 
collective empowerment but in aspects of democracy, good governance and economic 
growth” (Scott, 2014:6).  
‘Media for Development’ or Communication for Development (C4D) is using media 
as an outlet to broadcast, transmit and communicate information to individuals in the 
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developing world which will be of benefit in their lives or increase knowledge of their 
rights. Very often this is done in the form of radio or TV programmes, often soap 
operas and dramas, but can also take the form of direct educational shows or 
humanitarian programming.   
Of note is that many of the radio and TV programmes produced as content during 
media development projects have become very popular, winning large audiences and 
local media awards. The BBC Media Action hospital soap opera “Taste of Life” TV 
programme in Cambodia was set in a nursing college and tried to change attitudes and 
behaviour around HIV and AIDS. It was broadcast twice a week on the country's most 
watched station, TV5 and the state broadcaster, TVK.   Another TV soap opera, 
“Jasoos Vijay” set at the same time in India, was also an award-winning thriller series 
about an HIV-positive detective.  The programme communicated key messages about 
HIV and AIDS and in the last series, it reached more than 70 million people across 
India. 
With C4D or M4D approaches, the media are seen as instruments for changing 
individual norms and behaviours.   The defining features of M4D interventions are 
that they use mass media, in particular radio, for information provision and are used 
for cultivating attitudes. This approach has been characterised by a narrow definition 
of development associated with behaviour change rather than “broader social change 
involving tackling social structures and the root causes of poverty” (Manyozo, 2012: 
110). 
Interestingly, it is estimated that USAID spends four times more on C4D-related 
projects than it does on media development (Cary and D’Amour, 2013). 
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Origins of the Sector 
Despite much focus in the literature relating to media aid being on the post-Cold War 
period, the origins of international media assistance can be traced back earlier to 
Europe during the post-World War II years.  Media Development, as a concept, first 
took shape during this period. 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the U.S. government joined forces with 
European agencies in the reconstruction of Europe. Their reconstruction plan included 
efforts to re-establish a viable news media following the defeat of Nazism (Glossner, 
2010; Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008; Kaplan, 2012).  
One of the immediate priorities for the Allies after 1945 was to break up the existing 
Nazi structures. Radio was targeted in particular, because it had been used as a 
propaganda tool during the Third Reich. The Allies were keen to re-establish radio as 
independent from the state, to act as a critical voice and to try to prevent extremism 
ever taking hold again.    
Khabyuk and Kops (2010) noted how public service broadcasting was strongly 
promoted in Germany by the Allies against “undemocratic political influences in the 
media.. in the democratic Germany that they wanted to install”.  The authors suggest 
that Germans were lucky to be forced to accept a broadcasting concept that, in 
retrospect has been a central factor in the stability of post-war Germany (Khabyuk and 
Kops, 2011:128).  
The Allies wanted the German public broadcaster to represent the whole of society 
and reflect a range of views and political opinions. In West Germany, public service 
broadcasting was based on French, British and American models, notably the BBC.  
Local journalists were trained in Western news practices, “objective reporting  .. its 
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respect for the truth, and its high journalistic standard” (Nelson, 2012).   Independence 
from the state and political objectivity were of central importance and remain the 
hallmark of public service broadcasting in Germany (Kaase, 2000).   
The idea of political re-education after the period of totalitarian Nazi rule was a core 
element in the Allied restructuring of Germany, and thus the mass media played a 
large role in their plans.  In his book, The History of U.S. Information Control in Post-
War Germany,  Warkentin (2016) described how the US occupation forces established  
new media outlets “to attempt the mass re-education of an entire nation” (Warkentin, 
2016:xii) .  
According to Kaplan, this resulted in a more diverse media: 
The machinery of fascist propaganda was dismantled, and new broadcast media were 
instructed in independent news production. Newspapers were created with mixed 
editorial boards, free of party control. These efforts were especially effective in 
Germany, where a vibrant and politically diverse media culture flowered within a 
decade of the Nazis’ defeat   (Kaplan, 2012:12). 
 
Post-war Germany is a notable case in the study of media development and provides a 
template for future media development and its link to democratic reform.  Nelson 
noted that “within a decade, the West German news media was noted for both quantity 
and quality, and the United States discovered media development as a tool for 
democratization” (Nelson, 2012).  Independent media was thus understood as integral 
tool for the promotion of democracy. 
Tellingly, media development work was later to be compared to a “Marshall Plan of 
the Mind”.  The European recovery plan funded by the Allies after World War II was 
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called ‘The Marshall Plan’ after General George Marshall.  Whilst its primary aim 
was to get the economies of Europe back on their feet again, its secondary aim was to 
protect against the spread of communism (Cox and Kennedy-Pipe, 2005).  
In 1992, the BBC World Service established a department to undertake training of 
journalists in the former Soviet Union and called it 'BBC Marshall Plan of the Mind 
Trust” (MPM) (later called BBC Media Action).  In naming the BBC unit after the 
Marshall plan, there was recognition that media could be another tool for 
reconstruction toward democracy, the free market, and protection against other 
regimes (Gerrish, 2014).  And it is for this reason that international donors have been 
funding media assistance activities for decades.   
 
Funding for media development 
And so, in the past half century, development donors and agencies and private 
foundations have engaged in activities designed to influence the form, structure, and 
practices of media in countries around the world for their development goals.  What is 
the scale of this investment? 
Cauhapé-Cazaux and Kalathil (2015) found that Overseas Development Assistance 
(ODA) from OECD countries devoted to media support (averaged over the period 
from 2006 to 2012) show an annual disbursement of U.S. $377 million.   In 2012, the 
disbursements were close to U.S. $441 million, representing 0.40% of total sector 
allocable ODA.  These figures are for total media support; support for media 
development (mainly independent media) represents a smaller percentage (Kalathil 
and Cauhape-Cazaux, 2015).  
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Source: OECD-DAC database: 2012 ODA disbursements in constant prices2.  
Figure 1:  ODA allocated to media support in USD million (2006–2012) and percentage of 
total sector allocable ODA 
 
Of note is that the biggest providers of development cooperation for media assistance 
were the United States, Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the EU institutions. In 2015, for 
instance, the US contributed $65million for media development activities (Kalathil, 
2017). 
While supporting media, not all the donors have the same priorities and do not follow 
the same strategies. A detailed analysis of the type of project supported reveals a 
difference among the donor priorities.  Japan gives media infrastructure priority, while 
Germany has invested strongly in public diplomacy.  In the area of media 
 
2 These results are based on the estimation that all ODA allocated under the CRS purpose codes “media 
and free flow of information” (15153) and “Radio, television and print media” (22030) have to be 
considered media support. 
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development support, the United States provides the most aid by far (Kalathil and 
Cauhape-Cazaux, 2015).   
However, these are not the only donors and in some African countries for instance, 
they are definitely not the dominant ones. The Scandinavian countries, Denmark, and 
the Netherlands are very much involved in media development and have a different 
approach to democracy and media assistance. These donors have different media 
systems in their home countries, with European countries more aligned to the public 
service broadcasting model than the US. 
Myers notes that most of the Western European donors have “well-articulated, rights-
based justifications for supporting media development” (Myers, 2009:9). 
Certainly though, with reference to dollars contributed, the USA is by far the biggest 
donor historically and that is why much of the literature on media development and 
assistance refers to its policies. Kaplan (2012) found that the United States was the 
largest national source of funding for media development, at 46 percent of the total 
(Kaplan, 2012) and the model it promotes in its media assistance programmes is the 
liberal free market model of the press. 
 
Rationale for Media Development  
As noted, media development activities, as this thesis understands the term, first 
appeared in the aftermath of World War II and were enlisted to help improve media 
systems and standards of journalism as countries moved towards democracy, or away 
from autocracy.  As Kumar alluded to earlier, donors hoped that by fulfilling the role 
of Fourth Estate and providing a forum for public discussion, independent media and 
journalism would contribute to democracy.   
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Media assistance efforts would create media that “when allowed financial and 
editorial independence”, would hold state authorities accountable and nurture 
democracy by encouraging an “open but respectful exchange of ideas and opinions” 
(Kumar, 2006:1). 
This is highlighted by the fact that most media development projects have historically 
been funded under the democracy programmes of the international and bi-lateral 
donors.  Media development is expected to produce better journalists, better media 
organisations, and better media systems. And these media systems are designed to 
produce, or at least contribute to, the development of democracy. 
Academic and policy research has recognised the role independent media plays in the 
process of improving democratic governance.  For example, after evaluating decades 
of data on press freedom and political development, Karlekar and Becker (2014) 
found that a healthy press sector is highly correlated with broader political freedoms. 
Taking a closer look at countries that experienced sharp increases or decreases in 
political freedom, the researchers found that press freedom is often a lead indicator for 
the direction a country’s political system is headed; it usually indicates an acceptance 
of other individual freedoms also (Karlekar and Becker, 2014).   
Evidence as to the potential benefits of media development programmes is varied but 
media freedom is often seen as central to transparent governing. For instance, 
Amartya Sen, the Economics Nobel Laureate, said: "There has never been a famine in 
any country that has been a democracy with a relatively free press. I know of no 
exception" (Sen, 2011:343).  He held that famines can only occur if nobody is allowed 
to criticise policy decisions, government action, inaction or corrupt practices that lead 
to crop failures and food shortages.   
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Stromberg found that better informed citizens are more likely to vote, which in turn 
encourages politicians to be responsive (Strömberg, 2004).  And Besley and Burgess 
found that having an informed and politically active electorate strengthens incentives 
for government responsiveness ( Besley and Burgess, 2001). 
In research by Internews, an American media NGO, it was found that countries with a 
“free press”3 are less dependent on foreign aid, provide a better environment for 
businesses and are more likely to be democratic and have much stronger democracies 
overall, than countries without a free press.  The research claims that broad-based 
economic growth and political stability seem to be strongly connected to the presence 
of a free and independent press (Susman-Peña, 2012). 
Norris’s (2006) well-known study explored the role of the free press in strengthening 
good governance, democracy and human development.  She found that freedom of the 
press contributes positively towards democratic governance.  She argues that the news 
media is most effective in strengthening the process of democratisation, good 
governance, and human development where “journalists function as watch-dog over 
the abuse of power (promoting accountability and transparency), as a civic forum for 
political debate (facilitating informed electoral choices), and as an agenda-setter for 
policymakers (strengthening government responsiveness to social problems)” (Norris, 
2006:4). 
Norris’ study focused in particular on how a free press and independent media can 
strengthen the public sphere, by mediating between citizens and the state, facilitating 
 
3 A measure on the Press Freedom Index produced annually by Freedom House, an US based NGO that 
conducts research and advocacy into democracy, political freedoms and human rights. 
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debate about the major issues of the day, and informing the public about political 
issues and government actions.  
UK academic James Curran (2002) agreed that independent media not only provides a 
channel of communication between government and governed but that “above all the 
media provide a forum for debate in which people can identify problems, propose 
solutions, reach agreement and guide the public direction of society” (Curran, 
2002:225). 
According to the US Department of State, democracy depends upon a knowledgeable 
citizenry whose access to information enables it to “participate as fully as possible in 
the public life of society and to criticise unwise or oppressive government officials or 
policies”  (Cincotta, 2013:6).    
Gunther and Mughan (2000) have called mass media the “connective tissue of 
democracy” and  Linz (1975) listed freedoms of association, information, and 
communication as essential components of democracy (Gunther and Mughan, 2000; 
Linz, 1975). 
Studies such as these highlight how independent media might play an important role 
in democracy, facilitating debate, improving governance and reducing corruption, in 
turn increasing economic efficiency and stability.   
Consequently, justifications for media development, or media assistance, as part of 
their aid spending are usually expressed by donors in terms of promoting these goals - 
accountability, good governance, citizen participation - in developing and transitional 
countries.   
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As former World Bank president James Wolfensohn claimed, “to reduce poverty, we 
must liberate access to information and improve the quality of information. People 
with more information are empowered to make better choices” (World Bank Institute 
2002:14).   
In supporting these projects, media assistance donors believe that media will play an 
important monitoring role in a democracy that enables citizens to hold their 
governments and elected officials accountable (Juma and Myers, 2018).   Figure 2 
outlines this Media development Theory of Change as deployed in this thesis. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Media Development Theory of Change 
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The model suggests that media assistance methods and activities, such as those 
outlined here, will contribute to a stronger media sector, a strengthened fourth estate 
and an enhanced public sphere. These in turn contribute to more reliable information 
being available for citizens, further educating them about issues relevant to them and 
stimulating discussion which can empower citizens to hold those in power to account.  
This process will in theory result in increased participation in public life, improved 
accountability and thus better governance.  
As noted by Von Kaltenborn-Stachau, “media can play a powerful role in shaping and 
influencing public debate and opinion. By giving a voice to the otherwise voiceless, 
media brings marginalized actors into the public sphere and allows them to influence 
the public debate and to pressure policymakers to act” (Von Kaltenborn-Stachau, 
2008:21). 
Scavo and Snow argue “where citizens feel that they have the right, the opportunity 
and the mechanisms to demand action or justification, they are empowered as active 
participants in the decisions that affect their lives” (Scavo and Snow, 2016:47).  A 
functioning, independent media assists these goals in that is provides information, 
stimulates discussion and enables people to interact directly with decision-makers.   
On balance, there are those who question whether media development projects do in 
fact result in better journalists and media systems (Coman, 2000; Gross, 2003; 
Ognianova, 1995). And a number of scholars have criticised the hidden agendas of 
Western media assistance funders.   They argue that the activities of ‘democracy 
promoting’ organisations are usually strongly tied to the interests of capitalism and/or 
US geo-strategic ambitions (Gills, 2000; Saltman, 2006; Taylor, 2002 in Barker, 
2008).   
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Barker noted how democracy has become a ‘legitimising force’ for American foreign 
policy “helping fuel the myth that America is a benign and democratic leader of 
international affairs”.  He argues that American or British foreign policy protects the 
interests of powerful elites who want to protect the status quo at home and expand 
their (profitable) interests overseas (Barker, 2008:1).   
Furthermore, he contended that ‘countries of greater geostrategic value seemed to 
need more “democratisation, for example, both Afghanistan and Iraq have roughly the 
same population but ‘oil rich Iraq received 20 times more American media 
development assistance per year than war-ravaged Afghanistan, one of the poorest 
nations on earth” (Barker, 2008:15). 
These concerns over media development in the context of democracy promotion will 
be addressed later with regards to the evaluation of media development interventions 
and their impact, in particular with regards to the media systems of the post-Soviet 
States.   
 
Evolution of Media Assistance  
Although the template was set during the post-War period, it was the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Communist regimes of the Soviet Bloc in the 
immediate aftermath that was the more significant moment in the history of the sector.   
With the huge political changes following the collapse of communism, and the 
disruption to the flow of financial support from USSR, there was a transformation of 
media systems in many regions (Kumar, 2006).  The trend for many countries was the 
shift from government control to private ownership. Media change often happened 
hand in hand with social and political change. In post-communist Eastern Europe, for 
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example, media freedom was often “the first sign that the old communist system was 
truly dead and a new, free system had begun” (May and Milton, 2005: 140) 
It was in this context that media development gained traction, as western donors saw it 
as a cornerstone to their liberalisation policies.  Their objective was to promote 
democracy and open up new markets.   
Early media development projects tended to be solely training for journalists, for 
example, in post-communist Europe and Russia.  As the sector grew with more 
funding from international donors, the projects became more multi-faceted and had 
more elements in addition to training. They might then include the production of news 
programmes or reviewing the local journalists’ code of practice or updating the 
curricula of local university journalism faculties. 
Working with the regulatory environment within programme countries also became a 
large part of the media development projects when it became obvious that training 
journalists would be futile if the media was not permitted to carry out its role properly.  
So projects started working towards encouraging the right “enabling environment” 
(Price and Krug, 2002)  -  that is, media-specific laws, policies and institutional 
structures which support free and independent media. 
As noted, media is frequently discussed in the context of its vital contribution to 
public debate, the public sphere, and democracy.  But the media does not and cannot 
operate successfully without the other institutions of a democracy functioning 
properly.  In their 2002 study on the ‘enabling environment’, Price and Krug 
questioned what the political and cultural conditions are that make laws effective and 
useful in achieving a media structure that serves to bolster democratic institutions.   
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They looked at considerations such as the separation of powers, independence of the 
judiciary, and establishment of reliable regulatory bodies.  They called these the 
broader set of enabling factors for the media.  Larger societal issues such as the state 
of the economy, the extent of demand for information, and the extent of ethnic and 
political pluralism are also contributing factors to whether an environment can support 
media freedom. 
Price and Krug concluded that although free and independent media may organically 
arise in a mature democracy, artificial steps are necessary in many transition contexts. 
They argued that shaping a functioning democratic society required many stages and 
that the formation of media law and institutions is one of the most vital (Price and 
Krug, 2002). 
Price and Krug warned that whilst laws that support independent media are necessary 
for the development of civil society, they alone do not guarantee how media will 
function. For free and independent media to work, the community in question must 
also value the role that the media play.  They claimed: 
Taking laws off the shelf of another society and plugging them into the processes of 
transition will certainly, alone, be insufficient. The public acts of drafting and 
debating media laws can be enacted as a drama, a teaching drama that educates the 
citizenry in the role that the media can play. The process might encourage a rise in 
consciousness about the value and functioning of free speech and its operation in the 
society  (Price and Krug, 2006: 97). 
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The authors concluded: “Reform is most effective, or perhaps only effective, when it 
includes efforts to develop a public culture that is supportive of the media sector” 
(Price and Krug, 2006).  
This is important here because media development projects often try to establish and 
support independent media outlets but sometimes this is done in environment that may 
not be conducive to its long-term survival.   Programmes that focus on supporting an 
independent media sector must take into account the economic and legal realities of 
the media environment.  Regardless of the number of journalistic support 
programmes, a low functioning economy and a weak advertising market provide little 
revenue for independent media operators. Thus, media development programmes have 
increasingly focused on the business side of news media outlets including personnel 
and financial management as well as marketing and audience research skills in order 
to strengthen media outlets’ capacity to sustain themselves.   
A regulatory structure that is supportive of freedom of speech and independence of 
media is also desired. Thus, donors also support progammes that focus on the media-
enabling infrastructure such as revising existing laws, training lawyers, judges and 
legislators in media law, assisting advocates for media freedom, and providing 
training in international laws and standards.  
So, although media development projects may have started out as relatively 
straightforward journalism training programmes, very few projects in the current day 
focus solely on training media professionals and setting up new media outlets; they 
now aim to provide support for the wider media environment that includes media law 
reform, strengthening supporting institutions such as independent media councils and 
building a strong media infrastructure in a given country. 
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Another area of support has been for journalism education and curriculum revision in 
universities.  Many journalism faculties in developing countries remain teaching the 
theory of journalism exclusively, while others teach only ‘tradecraft’ without proper 
foundation in ethics and other studies (Hume et al., 2007). Often programmes merge 
the teaching of public relations with journalism, without the journalists’ mission as 
independent watchdogs holding the powerful accountable.  Media Assistance to 
universities aims to improve educational curriculum, improve technical capacities and 
enhance the expertise of the faculty.  
Thus, as a result of increased donations and interest in the sector, media development 
projects have now morphed into large scale training and communication plans with 
budgets in the millions.   
Furthermore, increasingly the lines are blurred between media development and media 
for development (M4D) where projects have training and capacity building activities 
combined with content development and production of programmes for development 
ends.   
Media development projects can take the form of journalism training plans which 
include creating public broadcasting messages or news reports on important issues.  
Sometimes they provide life-saving information in emergency situations; say in a 
famine, or to improve various health issues, such as sexual and reproductive health, 
child and maternal health and preventing infectious diseases.  Many of these projects 
contain training components, with journalists being trained in production and 
journalistic values in addition to producing content, very often with development 
messages. 
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What this means is that some projects now unconsciously merge ‘media development 
support’ and ‘media for development’ approaches.  What has evolved in practice is 
that projects now often contain both elements.  Scott (2014) calls these “media 
development hybrids”. 
As Myers highlighted in a report for the Centre for International Media assistance: 
With such a broad set of activities, it is almost impossible not to let the definition of 
“media development” spill over into the use of “media for development” and thence 
into the realm of communications for social or behavioral change—or using media for 
“intended outcomes.”   
Take, for instance, a grant for a women journalist’s group, who run their own 
activities (such as annual general meetings, benevolent fund for members, internal 
capacity building) and who produce radio programmes aimed at educating market 
women about elections.  This is a project that supports media as a sector in itself, and 
that supports media as a tool for education and development. These are the sorts of 
overlaps that make it difficult for donor organizations to categorize and quantify their 
media efforts  (Myers, 2009:8). 
 
Thus, these ‘media development hybrids’ make it difficult to define projects as solely 
M4D or media development.  This is part of the change taking place within the sector 
as the data from this research will also reveal. 
Therefore, although initially this thesis’ specific objective was to critically explore 
changes to media assistance due to digital technologies, it is more difficult to separate 
the two – ‘media development’ and ‘media for development’ - particularly in the 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa where there has been more focus on M4D projects 
for food security, education and health objectives.   
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Warren Feek (2008) argues the distinction between the two areas is “false and 
distracting” and should be abandoned altogether.  He argues that this adds 
unnecessary confusion and detracts from the status of the broader field of 
communication and media for development.  
On the other hand, Jo Weir (in Alcorn et al., 2011) has argued that the distinction 
between the two terms is important and should be preserved stating that: “there is a 
huge difference between media development and media for development and those 
two terms are often confused…. It sometimes blurs the lines between journalism and 
advocacy” (Alcorn et al., 2011:12).  
Regardless of this distinction, the model which is being promoted is the based on the 
western liberal model of journalism, and this itself is not without its own challenges or 
controversy. 
 
Pressures on the Media Development Model  
Traditionally in media assistance, western donors were promoting a media system 
based on their own media in their home country. For instance, during the 1990s US 
donors were proposing a liberal, free-market model to the post-Soviet States.   
Due to the largely western origins of funding and technical support, numerous media 
development initiatives build on the western concepts of free press and democracy. As 
a result, media development activities “emphasise the universalisation and 
globalization of western experiences and approaches in deliberative democracy” 
(Manyozo, 2016:3). 
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This approach has been questioned by media scholar James Miller who noted 
“unprecedented international efforts to codify and inculcate Western-style news 
reporting and editing” in places quite different from American newsrooms and 
classrooms, with “nothing like the journalistic or political-cultural history of North 
America and Western Europe” (Miller, 2011:39).  
Media scholars such as Hallin and Mancini (2004) and Curran and Park (2000) have 
debated the problem of the universal application of the Western model of journalism 
to other regions. And whether it is wise to try and transplant one model upon another 
has been treated with scepticism (LaMay, 2008). 
Another reason to question the exportation of this model is that the traditional 
business model in newspapers and broadcasting in the West no longer seems to be 
working. In recent years there has been a crisis in the western media model, due to 
falling advertising revenues, a failing business model and competition from alternative 
news sources.  Many western countries’ news industries have suffered at the hands of 
harsh economic conditions and technological disruption. Western news agencies that 
only recently “set the global agenda are now struggling to survive under hostile 
market conditions” (Nelson, 2013: 32). 
U.S. networks have closed many of their foreign bureaus and global broadcasters such 
as CNN and the BBC are cutting staff and international reporting. International 
broadcasters, including the Voice of America, the BBC World Service, and Deutsche 
Welle, are “under increased pressure to defend their services” (Nelson, 2013:32). 
In this environment, other governments have been expanding their media outside their 
borders. For instance, China is making increasingly large contributions to media in 
Africa in recent years. Central China Television (CCTV) opened its third international 
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bureau in 2012 in Nairobi, with programming in English, Chinese, and Swahili and 
oversees dozen bureaus across the region. The Xinhua news agency has 28 bureaus on 
the African continent as of 2018 and in 2012 launched a China African news service 
(McKenize, 2012).  
Admittedly, both China and the USSR were involved in media development since 
before the fall of the Berlin Wall.  For instance, China has been engaged with media 
support in some African nations since the 1950s (Wu, 2012) and the USSR gave 
massive amounts of aid for several decades during the Cold War (some $26 billion in 
1986 alone).  
But Russia and China’s activities in the international media sector are now growing 
again and this presents a challenge to the traditional media development model. As 
noted by Satter:  
The push by Russia to influence the media among its near neighbors ….. poses a 
major challenge to the international media development community, which over the 
past two decades has spent hundreds of millions of dollars trying to help build 
sustainable and independent media institutions in the former Soviet space  (Satter, 
2014:5). 
 
The narrative is changing from the dominance of the west, and Western donors 
insistence on linking development aid with democratic developments (Street et al., 
2012).   
To give some further context to media development in the current day, it should be 
noted that there is also a decline in support for western liberal democracy itself.  
Having been heralded as “the triumph of the West, of the Western idea… evident first 
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of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism” 
(Fukuyama, 1989:1) there has been a democratic recession in recent years.   
According to the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama, the fall of the Berlin 
wall signalled the ‘End of History’, as his famous work was titled. He claimed, 
somewhat optimistically, that western liberal democracy was the end point of 
humanity's sociocultural evolution and the final form of human government 
(Fukuyama, 1992).  
Fukuyama wasn’t saying that history itself was finished but was referring to the 
growth of a kind of universal consensus on the justness or the rightness of the 
principles of liberal democracy.  He noted also that liberal principles in economics – 
the “free market” – seemed to have spread and produced unprecedented levels of 
material prosperity (Fukuyama, 1992).   
Samuel Huntington disagreed with this in his 1993 book The Third Wave of 
Democratisation, which noted the global trend that had seen more than 60 countries 
throughout Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa undergo some form of 
democratic transitions since Portugal's "Carnation Revolution" in 1974.  He countered 
that the widespread Western belief in the universality of the West's values and 
political systems was naïve and that continued insistence on democratisation and such 
‘universal’ norms would only antagonise other civilisations.    
Huntington warned about the potentially disastrous effects of an arrogant democratic 
imperialism and insisted that promoting democracy and modernisation abroad ‘means 
more war, not less’ (Kurtz, 2002). 
33 
 
In reality, despite Fukayama’s optimism for liberal democracy, since the fall of the 
Soviet Union the process of global democratisation has slowed down.   Since then, the 
state of freedom has been situated somewhere between stagnation and decline.  In 
2019, Freedom in the World, an index of global freedoms, declined for the thirteenth 
consecutive year (Freedom House, 2019).  
As Micheal Abramowitz, President of Freedom House wrote in his essay, Democracy 
in Crisis, ‘political rights and civil liberties around the world deteriorated to their 
lowest point in more than a decade in 2017, extending a period characterized by 
emboldened autocrats, beleaguered democracies, and the United States’ withdrawal 
from its leadership role in the global struggle for human freedom’ (Abramowitz, 
2018:1).   
He added that even in the developed West, “the world’s most powerful democracies 
are mired in seemingly intractable problems at home, including social and economic 
disparities, partisan fragmentation, terrorist attacks, and an influx of refugees that has 
strained alliances and increased fears of the “other” (ibid). 
So, in the years since media assistance first emerged as a tool for democracy, 
democracy promotion has experienced a crisis of purpose.  This is noted in the 
pushback from a number of non-democratic governments that are actively resisting 
democracy assistance and also in a “growing questioning by people in many parts of 
the world of the value and legitimacy of the concept of democracy promotion itself” 
(Carothers, 2008:133). 
The efforts by the United States and its partners to impose a democratic 
transformation of Iraq and Afghanistan created questions over the legitimacy of 
Western democracy promotion.  The status of the United States as a symbol of 
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democracy and human rights has been further damaged by the election of President 
Donald Trump. 
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues that under President Trump, 
U.S. democracy has reached “its lowest ebb of at least the past forty years”.  It 
laments that if the United States continues its present course, “it will end up stranded 
on the side-lines, or even on the wrong side, of the global democratic struggle, 
precisely at a time when that struggle is more acute than at any time in modern 
history” (Carothers and Brown, 2018)  
Thus, democracy no longer enjoys an unchallenged place on the international scene as 
the only political system viewed as successful and credible.  Larry Diamond calls it 
the “democratic recession” (Diamond, 2015:1). 
So, although liberal theorists argue that media liberalisation usually results in 
democratisation, since the fall of the Soviet Union the process of global 
democratisation has seemingly slowed down, or in some cases has been reversed.   
Freedom House4  noted, in its latest available data, that global press freedom fell to its 
lowest level in over 14 years  in 2017 and only 13 percent of the world’s population 
enjoys a Free press—that is, 'a media environment where coverage of political news is 
robust, the safety of journalists is guaranteed, state intrusion in media affairs is 
minimal, and the press is not subject to onerous legal or economic pressures' 
(Freedom House, 2017:25).  
 
4 Freedom House may be wedded to a specific notion of press freedom.  For example Noam Chomsky 
and Edward S. Herman have criticized the organization for excessively criticizing states opposed to US 
interests while being unduly sympathetic to regimes supportive of US interests (Chomsky and Herman, 
1994). 
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Paradoxically, this decline in press freedom has occurred against a backdrop of 
increasingly diverse news sources and platforms.   Even though there has been 
exponential growth in mobile phones and internet connectivity across the world, “the 
creation of high quality, independent media is still a distant dream for most 
developing countries” (Nelson, 2014). 
So, despite the optimism of the Western donors about what societal changes that their 
model of media liberalisation might bring for democracy and development, ‘thing 
haven’t come out as they should’ (Coman, 2000:50).   
For instance, in Africa, media liberalisation often resulted in media ownership by a 
few powerful individuals, most often with political allegiances. 
In this environment of increased pressure on the traditional journalism business model 
and from online news sources, there has been a collapse in trust in journalism itself.  
The Edelman Trust Barometer in 2017 found that trust in media has fallen 
‘precipitously’ and is at an all-time low in 17 countries. The study found also that 
“trust has been so corroded that we now trust leaked information much more than 
traditional news sources; and algorithms over human editors” (Edelman, 2017:5).   A 
report on the news business from the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 
based on data in 40 countries across six continents, found an increasing number of 
people saying they actively avoided the news – no less than 32% (Hölig and 
Hasebrink, 2018). 
 
Foley noted, “what is now more apparent is that when we talk of democratic 
journalism, Western standards or the Anglo-Saxon model it is increasingly the case 
that no one knows what they mean anymore… The ideal, pushed mainly, but not 
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exclusively by US agencies, is in trouble itself because it hardly exists” (Foley, 2006: 
9). 
 
The trend of increasing “fake news” competing for audience attention should be noted 
also.  Wardle and Derakhshan call this “information disorder”  and argue that 
“contemporary social technology means that we are witnessing something new: 
information pollution at a global scale” (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017: 4).   As 
McNair notes in his book Fake News: Falsehood, Fabrication and Fantasy in 
Journalism: 
 
The capacity of the digitised, networked information space – what I refer to as the 
globalised public sphere – to disseminate news and information of all kinds… has 
coincided with a particular political moment where journalistic objectivity and 
professionalism are under challenge from state and non-state actors as never before  
(McNair, 2017: i). 
 
These are some of the challenges that the media development sector has met in recent 
years in a fast-changing environment.  As noted, sceptics question the media 
assistance model, or whether there is a model at all, and what the legacy of media 
assistance is (Fog, 2004; LaMay, 2008; Rhodes and Lange, 2007).  The question 
arises again whether promoting this model in the developing world is the right way 
forward?   This thesis questions whether it is still relevant in the current political and 
technological landscape.   
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New Technologies and Media Development 
The introduction of new technologies to the media production cycle has also impacted 
the media development sector.  Kaufman reports that the traditional focus on 
journalism training is at least partly being replaced by an increasing focus on ICT 
provision. Support for ICT grew from virtually 0 per cent to 17 per cent of media 
development assistance between 2002 and 2008  (Kaufman, 2012).  And so, the sector 
now increasingly overlaps with Information Communication for Development 
(ICT4D).   
Mottaz (2010) reported that “nearly every U.S. media development grant encourages – 
and often requires – the incorporation of digital components” (Mottaz, 2010: 10).  By 
incorporating digital technology, such projects also implicitly take on digital 
communication methods such as interactivity and social media communication. 
Digital technologies such as mobile phones and social media have been heralded for 
creating new spaces for public discussion across societies, new platforms for news and 
journalism, new direct avenues for communication with those in power and new 
opportunities to hold those in power accountable.   
Proponents of using ICTs in development talk of the positive contribution that 
technology can make to engagement and participation and thus accountability and 
governance (Heeks 2009; Castells, 2008).  Technology has indeed increased citizen 
participation in crowd-sourcing and government service delivery reporting in some 
countries with services such as YouGov in the UK and Ushaihidi in Kenya.  ICTs 
have also contributed positively in humanitarian assistance projects and health 
development projects for increasing effectiveness and speed of communication 
processes and programmes.  
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There is evidence certainly that the technology is being used, to varying degrees, by 
citizens to contribute to news-making and information exchange in influential ways 
(Mabweazara 2011; Moyo, L. 2011), as the data will reveal later.  This research 
project investigates whether digital technologies can likewise assist in addressing 
donor goals such as accountability, transparency, participation and good governance 
that have traditionally been addressed by media development methods.    
If this is the case, as the techno-optimism would suggest, it would question whether 
established media development methods - such as supporting journalism training, 
bolstering traditional media outlets for a stronger public sphere and strengthening 
institutional capacity of media organisations - are outdated.  As Puddephatt and 
Oesterlund note: 
What donors did twenty years ago, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
dictatorships throughout the world, is unlikely to be appropriate today. Many of the 
issues, of course, remain the same – such as how to ensure balanced content from a 
variety of independent sources - but there are new stakeholders, new technologies, 
new patterns of access, and new patterns of control.... It follows that the modalities for 
support to media development and freedom of expression need to be changed and 
modified  (Puddephatt and Oesterlund, 2012: 5). 
 
This thesis will thus critically evaluate the overlap of the field of ICT4D as applied to 
media development activity.  It will investigate the potential of digital technologies for 
achieving media development goals in the focus countries.  Theoretical debates on the 
contribution that ICTs can arguably make to development and governance will be 
examined further in the Chapter 3. 
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This section has given a picture of the tensions and pressures the media assistance 
sector has experienced in the recent past. It has outlined the global political and 
technological context in which media assistance now takes place.  Much has changed 
since it first emerged as a tool for democracy promotion.  As such, it is a most 
interesting time in which to investigate the role and relevance of media assistance.   
The next section will briefly introduce the research site from where the data is 
collected and recent trends on the African continent in relation to new digital 
technologies. 
 
Recent developments in Africa  
In recent years the narrative of Africa has changed. According to some ‘Africa is on 
the rise’, with GDP and social indicators telling a story of improvement in people’s 
standard of living (Severino and Ray, 2007).  In the Western media, articles discuss 
growing populations, new businesses and Africans taking charge of their 
development.  While the world’s economy was recovering from the global financial 
crisis, many African countries have been enjoying a boom.   
One factor that has been suggested as contributing has been the take-up of information 
and communications technologies (ICTs) and, in particular, the growth of mobile 
phone communications.  In 2011, Time Magazine wrote how “mobile phones are 
transforming Africa” calling Kenya “Silicon Savannah”5.     
What is widely acknowledged is the huge growth in mobile phone adoption and 
penetration rates that equal the West.  The growth has been remarkable: in 2000, there 
 
5 Alex Perry, Time Magazine, Silicon Savannah: Mobile Phones Transform Africa, June 30 2011 
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were about five million mobile phone subscriptions in Africa. In 2019, there are 
nearer 950 million (ITU, 2019).   
Some authors (Alzouma, 2005; Steinmueller, 2001) suggest African countries are 
‘leapfrogging’ economic growth stages through the adoption of cellular and internet 
technologies, and without the need for landlines and related infrastructure.    
Mobile technology has been able to bypass the infrastructural constraints that have 
hindered the old land-line technology in Africa, thereby leapfrogging theoretical 
stages of development or modernisation (Akpan-Obong et al., 2010).    
Jeffrey Sachs, the leading American development economist based at Columbia 
University, New York, called mobile phones ‘a gift for development’ and heralded an 
‘end to poverty’ (Sachs, 2006) .   
The high penetration rates of mobile phones in many African countries means that it is 
bringing information to those who previously lived in ‘media dark’6 areas.  Kenyans 
and Tanzanians, the case study countries for this research, are embracing mobile 
media enthusiastically and this is illustrated by anecdotes of African consumers 
literally breaking down doors to lay their hands on a coveted device (Southwood, 
2009).   
For example, in Kenya, mobile penetration rates are now over 100 per cent (CCK, 
2018); and 99 per cent of new internet connections in Kenya are on mobile phones, as 
opposed to computers.  The penetration rate reflects the fact that some individuals 
now possess more than one phone.  
 
6 This is a term used by Media Development agencies to describe areas and communities that have no 
or very limited access to any media at all such as radio, TV and newspapers..  
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There are several reasons for the exponential growth rate of the cell phone. The 
comparatively lower cost of acquisition of the cell phone and stand-alone technology 
make it more affordable by resource-poor people predominant in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Akpan-Obong et al., 2010).  In Africa, mobile phones are “almost always the 
cheapest and quickest way to communicate” (Etzo and Collender, 2010: 659).   
Interview participants whom this researcher met in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam 
predicted that in the next few years in Kenya, almost everyone in the country will 
have a mobile phone and many of these with an internet connection.  That would 
make universal mobile access, which would change the lives of locals on a huge scale. 
Ten years ago, outside the urban areas most Kenyans had little means of 
communicating with each other across large distances.   With this widespread change 
in access to even a phone call people can now get information which was only 
recently inaccessible.  
South African academic Herman Wasserman notes that “although Africa might not 
yet be as media-saturated as the Global North, one can increasingly say that Africans 
do not live WITH media, but IN media” (Wasserman, 2011: 11). 
The internet is growing as an important, and alternative, platform for political debate 
and mobilisation around issues in East Africa.   There has been sharp growth in 
blogging and engaging in forums in this new virtual public space.  For example, in 
Tanzania, Jamiiforums7 has been described as an “amazing cathartic tool where even 
disgruntled politicians in East Africa go and upload sensitive documents” (Rhodes, 
2015, in interview).   
 
7 Jammiforums is a popular political forum in Tanzania  
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But the continued existence of the digital divide must be noted.  Etzo and Collender 
believe that  instead of being a force only for social good, that “mobile phones are not 
socially neutral tools, but can entrench or exacerbate unequal gendered or classed 
power relations” (Etzo and Collender, 2010: 660).  
In Africa, there exists a strong correlation between gender and ICT use, partly the 
result of females’ low access to education in developing countries.  In Sub – Saharan 
Africa, a woman is 23 percent less likely to own a mobile phone than a man – this 
divide is lower than in the Middle East and South Asia (Murthy, 2011a).  
Alzouma warns that technology can “contribute to widening the gap between those 
who possess everything and those who do not. They can become a tool for excluding 
poor and illiterate people” (Alzouma, 2005: 352).  Meinrath and Zimmerman argue 
mobile connectivity does not ‘lift all boats’ (Meinrath and Zimmerman, 2012).  
The recent data shows that the wider African continent is embracing mobile phones; 
Africans are connecting in increasing numbers with the internet, and with each other. 
However, this research discovered that they are not necessarily subscribing to The 
New York Times online nor engaging actively with the political system.  The digital 
divide continues to be an issue even in the so-called utopian world of mobile 
technology.  
Ogan et al. caution that “the introduction of ICTs into the discourse of development 
has caused some scholars to forget that technology cannot provide a magic multiplier 
effect to the poorest of the poor” (Ogan et al., 2009: 656). 
This research focuses in particular on two neighbouring countries in East Africa – 
Kenya and Tanzania – and they will be examined in more detail in Chapter 5.  What is 
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of relevance here is the positive narratives in respect of the African continent in the 
past decade and how many of them are linked to ICT use and the proliferation of 
digital technologies.  
 
This Research: Media Assistance and Digital Technologies 
The potential of technology to address development problems in Africa, and 
elsewhere, has become a focus for international donors and it has spawned a new area 
of the Development sector – Information Communication Technology for 
Development (ICT4D).   New technologies are being merged into traditional 
development work and new niches are appearing on the back of the growth in mobile 
phones and internet to achieve objectives around health, poverty reduction, food 
security.   Many development programmes now start with ‘M’ or ‘E’: M-Health, M-
Education, E-Government and E-learning.   
This sector overlaps with this research thesis also as the fields of Media Development, 
Media for Development and ICT4D become increasingly merged due to technology.  
Whereas media development started out with individuals accessing information in 
print and broadcast, now increasingly target groups for projects are also using ICTs. 
Media assistance organisations are exploring whether to use these new technologies to 
improve on what their traditional media projects used to do for freedom of expression, 
accountability and governance.    
Whereas historically media assistance efforts were directed towards supporting media 
institutions, journalists and organisations to provide new and plural sources of news, 
the internet, mobile phones and social media can arguably provide these platforms 
now. 
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Donors have for years been supporting projects under democracy promotion 
programmes that support accountability, good governance, and participation.  For 
them technology looks very appealing – a method that can potentially engage citizens, 
especially through their mobile phones, in reporting abuses of power in their own 
locales, or possibly participate more in election processes.   
Indeed, studies have found low participation in between elections as a challenge for 
African democracies. In fact, respondents complain of a wide gap between citizens 
and their political representatives (Afrobarometer, 2002).  The same organisation 
found that political and civic engagement by African youth is declining and is 
particularly weak among young women (Lekalake and Gyimah-Boadi, 2016). 
As a result, many new technology initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa are springing up, 
financed by international funders such as the United Nations, the UK Department for 
International Department, the Swedish International Development Cooperation, or 
other private foundations such as Omidyar Network, and are increasingly focused on 
citizen engagement and reporting. As corruption and mismanagement of government 
funds is a key issue for those involved in African development, these organisations 
hope to use technology to address these societal problems. 
Figure 3 outlines these assumed links and compares respective theories of change 
between media development and ICTs and donor goals. 
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Figure 3. Theories of change Media development, ICTs and donor goals. 
 
It is difficult to ignore the widespread claims that new technologies have the capacity 
to transform international development. There is much activity in the African region 
to get more people online and connected.   Initiatives such as internet.Org by 
Facebook – which aims to bring the internet to everyone in Africa – and Google’s 
Project Loon, which wants to beam the internet to the African continent from a 
network of balloons travelling on the edge of space, create excitement around the 
ICT4D sector. Internet.Org says “the more we connect, the better it gets”.   
There are enthusiastic debates within media studies on the benefits of digitisation and 
social media on people’s lives, and on democracy. This thesis critically explores such 
utopian claims of the enormous benefit of digital technology for development. The 
research will reveal whether more traditional media assistance still remains relevant in 
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the context of this digitalisation and the noted geo-political changes in the media 
development landscape. 
 
Outline of the Thesis 
The current Chapter 1, Introduction, has surveyed the background to the media 
development sector and its relationship to democracy and democracy promotion. It 
has contextualised the research subject historically and portrayed the current 
environment for media assistance support.  It has outlined the stimulus for the research 
question – the Africa Rising narrative and cyber-optimism in relation to African 
development.  
In Chapter Two, the research examines in more depth the academic literature on 
media development. The chapter provides readers with an introduction to the 
ideological foundations of the media development industry which is drawn from 
different strands:  theories of media and democracy and the role of media in society; 
the liberal theory of the press and modernist theories of the media and development.  
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere is explored and critiqued, as it significant in 
media development work. 
Theories of the role of media in development have progressed with time, as 
demonstrated by Sieberts (1963)’ and MacBrides’(1980) theories of media and 
modernisation.   Opposing theories of media imperialism are examined. In Chapter 
Two, these interrelated theories are discussed and assessed with relation to media 
development and the model with which most of this work is undertaken. This chapter 
then looks at historical evaluations of whether media assistance has been successful 
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with interventions in transitional countries of the post-Soviet Bloc countries and in 
Africa. 
Chapter Three: As noted, Media Development overlaps with Communications for 
Development and now ICT for Development and the confluence of these is explored 
further in this chapter.  The concept of ‘development’ and theories of development are 
critically reviewed and evidence as to whether aid efforts in development actually 
work.    This chapter critically evaluates theories and debates in relation to new 
technology in development and assesses cyber-utopian claims to its effectiveness.  
The potential of the new virtual space as public sphere will be assessed and the 
contribution of ICTs to recent development in Africa will be assessed.   
In Chapter Four the methods used to address the research question are outlined. The 
central question of this thesis is whether digital technologies can achieve media 
development goals in Sub-Saharan Africa. Have ICTs rendered traditional media 
development interventions obsolete? In order to address this, the thesis outlines a 
series of sub-questions relating to media development practice. The views of 
practitioners within the industry were garnered as to whether these ICTs are effective 
at addressing their project goals.   
To address the question of the potential of digital technologies in current media 
development practice in East Africa, the primary research and data collection is 
organised in two main parts:  firstly, in-depth profiles of the two case study countries, 
Tanzania and Kenya setting out the context for the research sites, and secondly, 
primary qualitative research in the form of face-to-face interviews which were 
conducted in the field with stakeholders in the media development sector.   
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The case studies provide an opportunity to assess the media, political, social and 
technological environments in which media development currently takes place and 
examines how citizens of Kenya and Tanzania are using media and digital technology 
today.  Interview data examines the extent to which digital technologies are employed 
by international media assistance programmes in Kenya and Tanzania to achieve 
donor objectives.  Stakeholders also contribute insights as to their potential for their 
work. 
These methods will thus address the question of what type of media development 
activity is being carried out in the region and whether digital technologies are being 
put to use by practitioners as part of their programmes.  
In Chapter Five, the study presents the first part of the data and introduces the 
country case studies (Kenya and Tanzania). The chapter starts with a brief look at the 
history of development and journalism on the African continent.  Primary and 
secondary data sources are used to draw a more detailed profile of these two countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The historical and social context for media development and 
also the current media landscape in both these countries is outlined.  Then a more 
detailed picture of the current media systems in both countries is presented.   
This chapter assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the media systems in Kenya and 
Tanzania, including the enabling environment, and the changes that have occurred due 
to the growth of digital technologies in Kenya and Tanzania including present-day 
journalism practice.  The chapter gives context to the research site, the kind of issues 
addressed by media development interventions and additionally the information needs 
of citizens and audiences in these countries.  
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In Chapter Six, the findings from the primary research data collection are presented.  
The face to face interviews that took place in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam in 2014 and 
2015 are analysed and synthesised according to important themes that will reveal the 
findings and address the research question.  The data tackles issues of media 
development donors and their activities in the region, current media development 
projects being implemented and the extent to which they are employing digital 
technologies.   
Examples of development projects are presented and analysed, which bring to life 
current media development activity in Kenya and Tanzania and illustrates the extent to 
which digital technologies are being utilised in projects.  This chapter analyses the 
success or failures of this adoption of digital technologies with regard to attainment of 
media development objectives.   
Chapter Seven synthesises and expands on the themes developed in the findings 
chapter and further addresses the question of whether digital technologies have 
impacted on the practice of media assistance in the region.   
Successes in the incorporation of ICTs in media development projects are presented 
and discussed with a detailed analysis of where they have enhanced or positively 
contributed to projects goals. 
The Africa Rising trope is critiqued as is why ICTs are proposed as solutions to media 
development needs. The thesis also considers the source of this techno-determinism.  
Issues which limit the potential of digital technologies are also discussed in particular 
with reference to engaging citizens and participation using ICTs.  The continued 
popularity of radio is revealed and also the limitations of the new virtual public sphere 
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are discussed within an East African context and whether the ideal of participation for 
all through technology is a reality.   
One issue that arises from the data is the persistence of the digital divide in the region 
despite increasing access to newer forms of communication and information. This is 
due to cost, access, and technical literacy amongst other factors and impacts on the 
extent of their use in media development projects.  
In the concluding Chapter Eight, the research questions are reiterated and the 
evidence is summarised.  It is argued that media assistance is not redundant and 
traditional media development approaches are still needed.  The theoretical framework 
is revisited and tested.  
In this final chapter the thesis presents conclusions to the research.   The limitations of 
the research are discussed.  The pace of technology growth presents an obvious 
limitation to the current work.  As mobile information and communication 
technologies become ever more prevalent and connectivity is enhanced, the potential 
benefits for media development goals need to be continually assessed.  The wider 
implications of unregulated online content in particular for democratic processes is 
also subject to regulatory change and this is a further factor that needs to be taken into 
account. 
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Figure 4. Research Map  
 
Finally, the research discusses the role media development can play in the future.   
Media development focuses on getting reliable information to people - many of them 
in Africa and living in media dark areas – and connecting with those who cannot 
normally get news and information without the assistance of donors.  Working at 
strengthening media institutions is and is likely to continue to be an important part of 
this process.  
But media development is not solely about reaching these individuals with 
developmental messages, or to better inform them of their rights for example, but also 
about engaging citizens, fostering better civic and political engagement, bringing 
people into the public sphere, to participate in public debate and bring people from 
differing sides of the political and economic spectrum together.   It is helping them to 
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‘join the conversation’, representing views of the whole of society, reflecting a range 
of views and political opinions and as such contribute to a healthier democratic 
sphere.   
Even with the traditional journalism training projects, this was ultimately what the 
objectives were – yes improved content for better accountability, governance and 
democracy, but you cannot really achieve democracy unless you are connecting with 
people across all levels of society, and bringing them into the national debate, the 
public sphere.    
Have digital technologies changed this? The central question this research thesis asks 
is whether digital technologies can achieve donor goals in the same way as traditional 
media assistance methods, and whether media assistance is still relevant. 
This thesis argues that it is not just relevant but possibly more important than ever and 
there is a continuing need for media assistance as traditionally defined. This is because 
the internet and digitisation have not necessarily resolved issues such as governance 
and accountability, nor the information needs of citizens of the countries under 
review.  
As a recent report by the BBC finds, “the internet is not keeping everyone informed, 
nor will it: it is, in fact, magnifying problems of information inequality, 
misinformation, polarisation and disengagement” (Parkinson, 2015: 3).   
In a post-truth global environment in which it is difficult to differentiate factual news 
from ‘fake news’ or disinformation, media assistance can contribute to supporting 
reliable, factual and independent news media. 
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By examining media development practice in East Africa, it is revealed that 
established media assistance approaches are indeed still relevant. Furthermore, the 
thesis underlines the central role that media development can serve in the current geo-
political and technological landscape.   
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review Part 1 
 
 
 
 
A history and overview of media development 
The central question this thesis addresses is whether media assistance is obsolete. It 
investigates the extent to which digital technologies are in use in media development 
programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa and whether they have the same potential to 
achieve donor goals as ‘traditional’ media development approaches.  In answering 
this, the thesis will also uncover whether media development has fundamentally 
changed in its mission and whether its founding principles are still valid.   
This chapter critically reviews these founding principles. The Media Development 
sector is founded on certain assumptions about media’s positive role in society and 
democracy and the donors contribute to projects based on this relationship.  As ‘media 
development’ is often funded under democracy promotion programmes, the chapter 
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provides an overview of the literature concerned with media’s role in democracy and 
the ideology motivating this area of international aid.   
The literature is drawn from different strands:  theories of media and democracy and 
the role of media in society; public sphere theories; modernist theories of the media 
and societal development.  These theories are discussed and critically assessed with 
regard to media development and the model with which most of this work is 
undertaken.   The aim of this literature review chapter therefore is to contextualise the 
practice of ‘media development’ within an appropriate academic and theoretical 
context.  
This chapter additionally reviews historical evaluations of media development work to 
better understand whether media development has been successful in its goals. An 
evaluation is important because if media development projects have been successful to 
date then it will be of further significance whether digital technologies can do any 
better to achieve the same goals. 
This review chapter, and the next, also examine the body of literature concerning the 
relationship between media and development and societal transformations (for it is a 
transformation of some sort that the projects in question are attempting).  It will 
explore the concept of development, particularly in Africa and address what is the 
potential of new media or Information Communication Technology (ICT) in 
development.   
The body of literature examines what Powers and Arsenault have called the media’s  
“potential use as a tool with which to achieve and facilitate broader economic, social, 
and political development aims and objectives” (Powers and Arsenault, 2010:6).  
These theories will frame the investigation of whether media assistance is still 
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relevant, and whether newer digital technologies have the same positive relationship 
as media for democracy and development.   
 
Historical Context 
‘Media Development’ emerged as a tool for democracy promotion in the period after 
World War 2 and continued during the post-war reconstruction phase in Europe and 
throughout the Cold War.  Miller (2009) noted that media development during the 
Cold War was “unavoidably influenced by the political self-interests of North 
America and Western Europe, which were then engaged in a ‘war of ideas’ with the 
USSR” (Miller, 2009:12).   
At that point in time democracy may have seemed like the ideal end-game to the 
citizens of the former Soviet Union. After years of government propaganda and 
limited freedoms, they had an appetite for freedom of expression and a more open 
public sphere. 
With the fall of the Iron Curtain, a key priority in the region for the international 
community was end state ownership of media and to transform it into an independent 
media. The “media development” sector mobilised to transform the former state 
broadcasting outlets and roll out more independent sources of news in the post-Soviet 
states (Harvey, 2006; Kumar, 2006; Hume, 2004).  
In response to the end of Soviet rule, Western countries (particularly the United States 
in its endeavour to establish liberal democracy in the region) launched media 
initiatives to upgrade journalistic, technical, and management skills and to foster an 
environment supportive of a free press (Kumar, 2006).   
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Journalists in these countries were trained by Western journalists in standards of 
journalism such as fairness and impartiality, balanced news reporting, accuracy and 
ethics.  The rationale was that an independent and free press would hold new leaders 
to account, promote transparency and accountability and cement the transition to 
democracy. 
Hume devised the term “media missionaries” for the journalists and media workers who 
then flocked to the Post-Soviet states. She recounted how: 
When the Communist barricades collapsed in 1989, hundreds of Americans rushed to 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics to spread the gospel of democracy. 
Among them were some of America’s most altruistic journalists, who hoped to midwife 
a newly independent press (Hume, 2004:9). 
 
This group of journalists later earned the unappealing moniker ‘parachute professors’, 
due to the short-term training they delivered without any local knowledge or context 
(Ognianova, 1995).  As soberly described in her paper:  
In general, the schedule of the "parachute professor" has consisted of landing at the 
capital's airport, giving a talk (in some cases advice not at all relevant to the country's 
media system) and generous promises soon to be broken, then leaving with no intent 
to return. This scenario has left bitterness and has undermined the credibility of North 
American journalism educators among East-Central European journalists (Ognianova, 
1995:3).  
 
Nevertheless, numerous aid agencies located to Eastern Europe contributing 
significant amounts of money to help develop independent media and encourage full 
58 
 
democratic transitions.  This was when “media development” started to gain traction, 
as more funding was made available from international donors such as the USA and 
UK, hoping to democratise the post-Soviet states.  Opportunities were also seen to 
create a liberal free market for the press and its products. 
And so, although the template for media development work can be discerned in the 
post WWII years, it is really during this period of huge political change, between 1989 
and 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, that it 
became a more well-funded and recognised feature of international development 
assistance (Harvey, 2006; Hume, 2004).   
Kumar noted that “the former Soviet Union and its satellites served as laboratories 
wherein the international community and its local partners refined different media 
development strategies and programmes” (Kumar, 2006). 
Hume has estimated that at least $600 million was spent by the US Government in the 
post-Soviet States in the decade after 1989 (Hume, 2004).   
 
Theoretical Assumptions 
The support that international donors gave to the Media Development sector was 
based on their belief that the media could contribute to their policy objectives.  Often, 
media development projects were undertaken to establish or support democracy in 
countries in transition, or to encourage an open, uncensored and egalitarian public 
sphere. 
It was understood, and still is, that media can contribute in its ‘watchdog role’(Curran 
and Seaton, 2003; Norris and et al, 2010); demanding accountability of leaders, 
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combating corruption, increasing transparency, as a platform for freedom of 
expression or opening up the public debate and participation.  This section will look at 
studies and evidence that explore these attributes and the underlying rationale for 
‘Media Development’.  
The research thesis is focused on the media development sector, and much of the 
support and funding (but not all) for the sector comes from donors’ democracy 
promotion and governance objectives. The research question addresses whether digital 
technologies can achieve these same objectives, asking those who work in media 
development practice whether they could replace traditional and legacy media in 
development programmes.  Reviewing what the literature says of the relationship 
between media, democracy and governance will help clarify whether that is a realistic 
prospect. 
 
Theories of the role of media in society 
With all the hype about ICTs – connectivity, citizen journalism, participation and 
other much lauded characteristics – it is pertinent to ask what has been the role of 
traditional media in society? This will facilitate understanding of whether ICTs can or 
should replace ‘old’ media in these development projects.  Examining elements of 
media theory in this section will illustrate the extent to which the role of media in 
society has been theorised in academic literature.  
Prior to the mid-20th century, there had been little scholarly interest in the mass 
media. Hardt observed  
It was not until the 20th century that journalism and the mass media became subjects 
of scholarship in the US in any significant way….. It was in general agreement 
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however that if the conditions of freedom were maintained then the consequences of 
mass communication were relatively automatic  - an invisible hand leading the will of 
individuals to the maximization of social good (Hardt, 1979:11) 
 
The role of the press in a democracy was subject of a debate in the 1920s between 
Walter Lippman and John Dewey after a massive public relations campaign was used 
by the government to build support for the United States' participation in the First 
World War (Dewey, 1927; Lippmann, 1923).   Both Lippman and Dewey recognised 
that the press had a crucial role in democracy, with Lippman seeing the press as a 
group that should evaluate the policies of government and present well-informed 
conclusions about these key debates to the public, and Dewey viewing the press as a 
necessary instrument of democracy that should engage citizens in understanding for 
themselves the central questions of our times.  Its role was both to inform and engage. 
Another study, the report of the Hutchins Commission, was formed in the midst of 
World War II to inquire into the proper function of the media in modern democracies.  
Written by the Head of the Chicago University, Robert Maynard Hutchins, “A Free 
and Responsible Press” claimed that “the mass media were the single, most powerful 
influence in modern society” (Hutchins, 1947:vii).  The report argued that the media 
should serve the public, and in order to do so, should remain free of government 
interference (ibid). Hutchins stressed the independence of media from government 
control to fulfil its role. 
A later work that built on the Hutchins Theory of Social Responsibility was Siebert et 
al’s Four Theories of the Press (1963).  An important study and the first well-known 
attempt to formally clarify the link between mass media and the societal development, 
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Siebert’s Four Theories divided the world into three camps: the free world of liberal 
democracy, the Soviet totalitarian sphere and authoritarian societies. They suggested 
that media systems reflect the prevailing political philosophy of the society in which 
they operate (Siebert et al., 1963).   
According to Siebert, Peterson and Schramm the authoritarian state system requires 
direct governmental control of the mass media. This system is especially easy to 
recognise in pre-democratic societies, where the government consists of a very limited 
and small ruling-class. The media in an authoritarian system are not allowed to print 
or broadcast anything which could undermine the established authority.  
Siebert also explains the libertarian theory, which is also called the free press theory. 
In contrast to the authoritarian theory, the libertarian view proposes that the individual 
should be free to publish whatever he or she likes. Its history traces back to the 17th 
century, deriving from the work of thinkers such as Milton, Locke, Mill, and Jefferson 
who asserted that human beings inevitably choose the best ideas and values. In the 
libertarian system, attacks on the government's policies are fully accepted and even 
encouraged.  Journalists and media professionals ought to have full autonomy within 
the media organisation.  
The third model, the Soviet theory is closely tied to a specific ideology; that of the 
communist system Siebert traces the roots of this theory back to the 1917 Russian 
Revolution. The media organisations in this system were not intended to be privately 
owned and were to serve the interests of the working class.   
The final theory was the social responsibility theory. In this model, the media had 
certain obligations to society. These obligations were expressed in the words 
"informativeness, truth, accuracy, objectivity, and balance". Siebert claimed that the 
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goal of the social responsibility system is that media as a whole is pluralised, 
reflecting the diversity of society as well as access to various points of view (Skjerdal, 
1993).   
At the time, Siebert et al.’s four theories were hailed by many mass media researchers 
as the most appropriate categories to describe how different media systems operate in 
the world and Their analysis was viewed as a landmark study for the next forty years.  
Journalists Ralph Lowenstein and John Merrill wrote: "Almost every article and book 
dealing with philosophical bases for journalism has alluded to this book commented 
on it, or quoted from it. It has definitely made an impact" (Lowenstein and Merrill, 
1990:163). 
However, later, scholars criticised the four theories, calling them biased because they 
omitted the mass media of the so-called Third World (McQuail, 1987).  Many nations 
in the third or developing world do not fit into any of Siebert’s four camps.  Curran 
noticed that Siebert had little exposure to media systems in the Third World but this 
“lack of knowledge about other countries need not get in the way of confident global 
generalisation” (Curran, 2002:167).  Skerdjal argues that Siebert’s model was 
outdated and too simplistic to be useful in contemporary media research (Skjerdal, 
1993). 
To counter this shortcoming, a model of mass media systems in developing countries 
appeared in 1980. The ‘MacBride report’: Many Voices, One World, was named after 
its chair, the Irish jurist, Sean McBride.  Supported by UNESCO, its aim was to 
analyse communication problems in modern societies, and to suggest a kind of 
communication order to diminish these problems and to address the media imbalance 
between north and south.  Among the problems the report identified were 
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concentration of the media, commercialisation of the media, and unequal access to 
information and communication in first and developing world countries.  Although the 
MacBride report was written almost four decades ago, these are themes that will 
reappear in this current research as the data is analysed. 
The ‘MacBride Report’ called for the creation of a New World Information and 
Communication Order (NWICO) to improve access to media, development, and 
technical assistance for poorer countries, with the aim of fulfilling human rights (the 
right of all people to participate in communication and the duty of the media to expose 
violations of human rights) (Hamelink, 1997). 
While the report had strong international support, it was condemned by the United 
States and the United Kingdom as an attack on the freedom of the press - by putting 
an organisation run by governments at the head of controlling global media - and both 
countries withdrew from UNESCO in protest. 
Sean MacBride had anticipated this reaction, acknowledging: “protests against the 
dominant flow of news from the industrialised countries were often construed as 
attacks on the free flow of information’ (MacBride, 1980: xxi).  But for the first time a 
study had addressed media systems in developing countries.  
 
Modernisation and Media Imperialism 
Other research on how media contributes to society and development included the so-
called modernisation theories of 1960s. This approach was based on the idea that that 
the introduction of modern media and communications systems and practices were 
essential prerequisites of modernity (e.g. development towards an American or 
European model) (Curran and Park, 2000).  
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Implicit in this thinking was the presumption that the goal of development should be 
to propel traditional or indigenous cultures towards modernity and that traditional 
practices and institutions that were not modern stood in the way of development.  
The theory assumes that, with assistance, "traditional" countries can be brought to a 
stage of development in the same manner more developed countries have attained. 
According to Törnquist, modernisation was the application to developing countries of 
the Industrial Revolution that took place in Europe from the mid-18th to the mid-19th 
Century (Törnquist, 1999).    
Early modernisation theories assumed a simple relationship between the spread of 
access to modern forms of mass communications, economic development, and the 
process of democratisation.  The basic idea of this theory was that “underdeveloped” 
societies should aim to replicate the political, economic, social and cultural 
characteristics of modern, developed, Western societies.  And that also included their 
media and communications systems.  
For example, in the 1960s, Daniel Lerner proposed how a modern communication 
system supposedly contributes to the transition from ‘tradition’ to modernity.   He 
argued that exposure to modern media extends people’s horizons and encourages them 
to want more out of life. Consequently the ‘connection between mass media and 
political democracy is especially close” (Lerner, 1963:342). 
Modernisation theory talked of ‘the construction of western-style political and social 
institutions as indicators of progress… Local media were expected to emulate Western 
patterns of behaviour and contribute to the construction of democracy’ (Miller, 
2009:10).   
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Thus, modernisation theory called for expansion of mass media to poorer countries in 
order to promote western lifestyles and the market economy. In this book, 
Communications and Political Development, Pye claimed that: ‘the basic processes of 
political modernization and national development can be advantageously conceived as 
problems in communication’ (Pye et al., 1963:8). 
Critics of modernisation argue however that it promotes a system in which poorer 
countries are exploited by richer countries as long as they continue to follow “closer 
integration into the world market” (Scott, 2014:30).  They claim also that the 
expansion of western media and business corporations promoted capitalist and 
consumerist values and eroded local cultures. 
For example, critics of modernisation theory, Paul Baran and Andre Gunder Frank, 
argued that underdevelopment was in fact a consequence of the expansion of 
capitalism (in Park, 1998).  
Herbert Schiller similarly claimed that far from promoting self-sufficiency, the 
‘modernisation’ of a third world country” encouraged their dependency within an 
“exploitative system of global economic relations” (Schiller, 1998:17).  Furthermore, 
according to Schiller, American aid programmes to developing countries, and the ‘free 
flow of information’ policies promoted by the American state, assisted the American 
media industry in its drive to achieve international dominion (Schiller, 1969).   
Mattelart and Friere further argued that the Western media companies were the real 
beneficiaries of media modernisation programmes; their dominance grew while poorer 
countries often faced intensified inequality and dependency (Mosco, 1996). 
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Despite criticism of the modernisation paradigm and although it is now considered an 
outdated way of thinking about media and development, Powers and Arsenault claim 
that “the roots of this paradigm are still evident in much current thinking about media 
development” (Powers and Arsenault, 2010:2). 
For instance, in a detailed analysis of media development literature between 1960 and 
1989, Fair (1989) found that the modernisation paradigm continued to dominate 
contemporary discussion on media’s contribution to development and media’s ability 
to influence audiences in target countries (Fair, 1989).   
Interestingly, Manyozo (2012) describes media development practice as an 
“instrument of modernisation” (Manyozo, 2012:149).  He argues that the action of 
consolidating market-friendly models of media systems in the global South 
“contributes to an overdependence on external aid, reinforces minority power 
structures within the country and ultimately services transnational/corporate interests” 
(Manyozo, 2012:149).   
The ideas of the modernisation theorists remained dominant throughout the 1960s, but 
theories of media imperialism then emerged in opposition to the prevailing 
modernisation agenda of the time.  
The media imperialism approach evolved in an attempt to deal with those questions 
which earlier models had ignored.  Boyd-Barrett (1977) described media imperialism 
as “the process whereby the ownership, structure, distribution or content of the media 
are…subject to substantial external pressures from the media interests of any other 
country or countries, without proportionate reciprocation of influence by the country 
so affected” (Boyd-Barrett, 1977:117).  The media imperialism model views the 
media as an obstacle to meaningful and well-balanced socio-economic progress.    
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For instance, Robert McChesney suggested that US and Western corporate control 
over international media and communications systems were central aspects of neo-
colonialism that kept much of the third world “incapable of genuine self-
determination” (Foster et al., 1997:11). 
McChesney was a leading proponent in the political economy study of media which 
focuses on the role media play in democratic and capitalist societies where the 
primary goal is profit, not the public interest. His focus was whether media systems 
promote or undermine democratic institutions and practices.  
McChesney found that the processes of global media mergers had concentrated 
control in the hands of a few multinational corporations, which were unaccountable to 
the public, and reducing the diversity of news media outlets (McChesney, 2008).   
These mergers and the resulting concentration of media ownership has meant a 
globalisation of media ownership, with a very small number of giant global 
corporations owning and controlling media in all parts of the world.  McChesney 
argues that these anti-democratic trends are “eroding the public sphere both at national 
and global levels” (McChesney, 1999). 
While this globalisation has led to foreign investment in developing nations, this 
investment does not always translate into greater diversity of content and often has the 
effect of reducing domestic programming in favour of imported programming (Price 
and Krug, 2002).  Thussu argues these massive media conglomerates have taken an 
active role in promoting privatisation and free market policies that they see as 
beneficial to their operations (Thussu, 2000).  
68 
 
Mano (2009) argues “neo-liberal media globalisation is like a second more subtle 
form of colonialism which affects individuals, communities and nations with a more 
powerful force” (Mano, 2009:294) 
Furthermore, Norris and Zinnbauer (2002) found that the globalisation of media 
sources has not increased the strength of democracies, and Minderhoud found that, in 
the case of Africa, “the opening up of the radio market to private parties can and has 
shown to produce undemocratic outcomes in Africa” (Minderhoud, 2009:2).   
What this review highlights is the research showing that that the widening of public 
access to newspapers, radio and television as a result of globalisation, liberalisation 
and free market policies may be insufficient in itself to result in democracy and 
development.  As Ogan et al (2009) argue in their global review of literature on 
communication and development “because of the appeal of the modernization 
paradigm, there is a tendency to forget that it cannot work” (Ogan et al, 2009:14) 
These theories of modernisation, globalisation of media and imperialism relate to this 
research question not only in relation to the impact on developing countries of 
traditional media, but also with regards to new technologies such as mobile phones 
and social media platforms.   
In the next section, further attributes of the role of media in society shall be examined 
in terms of their potential link to development. 
 
The Public Sphere 
Definitions of media development and media assistance very often include reference 
to freedom of expression and freedom of the press.  One of the most important 
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determinants in whether a media can establish and maintain its independence is the 
level of freedom of the press.  
Liberal theorists from John Milton to John Stuart Mill have argued centuries ago the 
existence of a unfettered and independent press is essential in the process of 
democratisation, by contributing towards the right of freedom of expression, thought 
and conscience, strengthening the responsiveness and accountability of governments 
to citizens, and providing a public platform and channel of political expression. 
UK academic James Curran argues that ‘the first condition of a decent society is some 
kind of common discussion, in public, of the realities of that society’ (Curran and 
Seaton, 2003:386).   
The importance of freedom of expression is reflected by its wide recognition in 
international law at the global and regional level.  The right to freedom of expression 
is protected in all significant international and regional human rights treaties, 
including Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and 
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).     
Jurgen Habermas famously described this space where freedom of expression 
manifests itself in the public domain as the ‘Public Sphere’ - a space for 
communicating information and sharing points of view.  He described it as “a 
discursive arena that is home to citizen debate, deliberation, agreement and action” 
(Villa 1992:712).   
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere is significant as the media is frequently 
discussed in the context of its contribution to public debate and democracy and as a 
result it is central to media development.  Its particular relevance for this research 
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stems from the fact that media development projects frequently try to establish or 
strengthen democratic spaces that are independent or free of the state.   
 
Habermas 
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere had its origins in the new civic society that 
emerged in eighteenth century Europe.  Driven by a need for open arenas where issues 
of common concern could be exchanged and discussed - accompanied by growing 
rates of literacy and access to literature - a separate domain from ruling authorities 
started to evolve across Europe.   
Habermas depicted a space that emerged to a public who previously had no public 
arena for free discussion of civil life.  The public sphere consisted of organs of 
information and political debate such as newspapers and journals, as well as 
institutions of political discussion such as political clubs, literary salons, pubs and 
coffee houses, meeting halls, and other public spaces where socio-political discussion 
took place (Kellner, 2000).  Habermas noted  
In its clash with the arcane and bureaucratic practices of the absolutist state, the 
emergent bourgeoisie gradually replaced a public sphere in which the ruler’s power 
was merely represented before the people with a sphere in which state authority was 
publicly monitored through informed and critical discourse by the people (Habermas, 
1962:11) 
 
His ‘public sphere’ presupposed freedoms of speech and assembly, a free press, and 
the right to freely participate in political debate. The key feature of his public sphere 
was its separation from the power of both the church and the government.    
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Habermas’s study of the public sphere centred on the idea of political participation as 
the core of democratic society, a feature reflected in media development projects that 
attempt to draw wider society into national conversation and discussion, including 
minority groups and different social classes, to represent the view of whole of society 
and give them a voice in the public sphere.   
It should be noted how Habermas’ public sphere evolved as a result of economic 
developments and increased literacy of the population at the time.  Economic 
developments were vital in the evolution of a public forum for free expression of 
political thought.  
Scholars have noted that probably only a few Western bourgeois societies have 
developed any public sphere at all in Habermas's sense, and “while it is salutary to 
construct models of a good society that could help to realise agreed upon democratic 
and egalitarian values, it is a mistake to overly idealize and universalize any specific 
public sphere as in Habermas's account” (Kellner, 2000:267).   
Habermas's critics (Calhoun, 1992; Fraser, 1990; Schudson, 1994) have challenged 
his concept of the public sphere and argue that he idealised the earlier bourgeois 
public sphere by presenting it as a forum of rational discussion and debate when in 
fact certain groups were excluded and participation was thus limited.  For instance, 
Mary Ryan notes that Habermas neglects women's public spheres (in Calhoun,1992).  
This is repeated in the public spaces today where often groups such as women and 
minorities have no voice. 
Nevertheless, Habermas' key work “The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere” (1962) has been very influential and has provoked discussions of liberal 
democracy, civil society, public life, and social changes in the twentieth century. 
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According to Kellner, few books of the second half of the twentieth century have 
been so seriously discussed in “so many different fields and continues, almost 
forty years after its initial publication, to generate such productive controversy 
and insight” (Kellner, 2000:259). 
This popularity is explored by Lunt and Livingstone in their 2013 article ‘Media 
studies fascination with the concept of the Public Sphere’. They talk about the 
“rise and rise of the concept of public sphere” within media studies and they claim 
that it is “with ambivalence that media scholars have continued to work with the 
concept of the public sphere” (Lunt and Livingstone, 2013:1,5).  Nonetheless, 
many adopt the pragmatic view that Habermas’ concept of the public sphere 
establishes a “good starting point, a framework against which to test one’s ideas 
and assumptions” (Lunt and Livingstone, 2013:5). 
Despite Habermas’ public sphere being labelled an idealised space, it is one which 
many media development projects attempt to replicate.  The public sphere perspective 
is important in media development therefore because media is supposed to fulfil this 
idealised role.   
Kalathil observed that “the overarching theme, at least as far as the media-
development world is concerned is the rise of a pluralized, diverse and multi-
mediated  public sphere, with individuals, groups, corporations, governments and 
other entities freely comingling to influence public opinion” (Kalathil, 2008:12). 
However, the public sphere can be corrupted due to its environment.  Kellner (2000) 
notes that Habermas's account of the structural transformation of the public sphere, 
despite its limitations, illustrates the increasingly important functions of the media in 
politics and everyday life and the ways that corporate and other interests have 
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“colonised this sphere, using the media and culture to promote their own interests” 
(Kellner, 2000:268). 
Habermas’ work is an important analysis of what can happen to the media when 
exposed to the realities of a free market and the difficulties of maintaining 
independence from corporate or government pressure.   
In a similar way, media development works towards objectives of establishing 
independent media organisations and strengthening the media sector in developing 
countries, to provide platforms for national discussion and debate.  This is usually in 
the context of a free market for media products.  As will be explored more in later 
chapters, these markets can often be dominated by political, corporate or elite interests 
and this has implications for journalism and the health of the public sphere. 
There are other elements of the potential role media can serve in society which 
underpin media development work, such as its watchdog role and as a check on 
government and those in power.  
 
The Fourth Estate 
In addition to its role as public sphere for discussion, the media is often referred to as 
the ‘Fourth Estate’, where the press serves as a complement and balance to the three 
branches of power: legislative, executive and judicial.  The first use of the term was 
by Edmund Burke in 1787 during a debate in parliament, when he articulated how the 
media is regarded as one of the classic checks and balances on government and those 
in power (Schultz, 1998). 
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The reason it is felt to be central to a functioning democracy is for its potential to hold 
government to account.  In its ‘watchdog’ role, the news media is understood to 
promote government transparency, accountability, and public scrutiny of decision-
makers in power. 
Curran confirmed that “the principal democratic role of the media, according to 
traditional liberal theory, is to act as a check on the state” (Curran, 2002:217).  
Brunetti and Weder (2003) found that there is less corruption in nations with a free 
press. The reason, they argue, is that journalists’ roles as watchdogs promote the 
transparency of government decision-making process, and thereby expose and hinder 
misuse of public office, and financial scandals (Brunetti and Weder, 2003).     
Independent journalists can act as an important channel for decision-makers, helping 
to make governments more responsive to the needs of the people. Besley and Burgess 
(2001) showed that regions with higher levels of newspaper circulation proved more 
active during an emergency in responding to food shortages. The reason, they offer, is 
that political leaders learn about local problems more accurately and in a timely 
fashion when journalists function as an intermediary by reporting living conditions at 
the grassroots (Besley and Burgess, 2001).     
Amartya Sen argued that the accountability mechanisms in democracies are 
particularly important in averting disasters; in their absence, for example he said 
major ecological damages can go unchecked. For instance, between 1959-61 China 
had the world’s worst famine of the 20th century which killed many millions of people 
and went unreported.   “During that terrible calamity the government faced no 
pressure from newspapers, which were controlled and none from opposition parties, 
which were absent” (Sen, 1999:143).   
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In his book Development as Freedom (1999) Sen claimed that post-Independence 
India, with a much lower average availability of food for the poor than China, largely 
avoided such disasters because Indian democracy, with its free press and vigorous 
opposition parties, has been politically quicker in averting threats of famines and 
starvation deaths.  He explained: 
The working of democracy and other political rights can even help to prevent 
famines and other economic disasters.  Democratic governments have to win 
elections and face public criticism and have strong incentives to undertake 
measures to avert famines and other catastrophes.  Authoritarian rulers, who are 
themselves rarely affected by famines tend to lack the incentive to take timely 
preventative measures (Sen, 1999:16). 
 
These studies show therefore how a free press may be linked to transparency, 
accountability and furthermore, good governance. Media can help raise public 
awareness about corruption, its causes and possible remedies.    
Guseva et al., (2008) tried to understand the connections between “indicators of 
environments conducive to media freedom and independence” and indicators of 
human development, poverty reduction and good governance.  They found that press 
freedom was found to be positively correlated with governance (Guseva et al., 
2008:3).  
This emphasises how these elements are often interlinked: governance, press freedom 
and democracy.  Zambian academic Francis Kasoma (1995) maintained that it was no 
accident that the three countries in Africa that have upheld democratic governance - 
namely Botswana, Senegal and Mauritius - are also the countries that have 
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consistently maintained a free and independent press (Kasoma, 1995).   He noted also 
that democracy has been slower in coming in countries where a free press has been 
completely inactive.   
It is as a result of this type of evidence that many donor agencies and governments 
now see efforts to promote freedom of expression and with that assisting governance 
as a fundamental part of their international development work, along with more 
established efforts to provide emergency food or material aid8. 
But media does not operate in isolation. In her 2002 study, Harvard academic Pippa 
Norris analysed 135 countries to evaluate under what conditions the media positively 
influenced democratic governance. She found two elements that are required for 
media systems to positively impact democratic governance:  “both independence and 
access are required” (Norris and Zinnbauer, 2002:3).  If citizens cannot access the 
press (as a result of say, cost or literacy issues) or journalists are not free to write what 
they wish, then the power of the media is restricted.   
Norris further maintained that “policies which eradicate limits on the freedom 
information and communication, whether due to state censorship, intimidation and 
harassment of journalists, or due to private media oligopolies, have important 
consequences for those seeking to strengthen transitions from autocracy” (Norris, 
2006:75).   
 
8 . Details of a sample of these projects can be found here  
NORAD: https://norad.no/en/front/funding/norhed/projects/building-capacity-for-a-changing-media-
environment-in-uganda/ 
UNESCO: https://en.unesco.org/programme/ipdc/ 
UK DFID: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-aid-open-societies-a-vision-for-a-
transparent-world 
German BMZ: : 
http://www.bmz.de/en/issues/freedom_of_opinion_press/deutsches_engagement/index.html 
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This suggests that the media does not and cannot operate successfully without the 
other institutions of a democracy functioning properly.  The so-called fourth estate 
cannot fulfil its role without the complementary support of the other pillars of society, 
what Price and Krug call the “enabling environment”.    
This is important in media development work because no matter how successful a 
project is in concept, if the environment cannot support independent journalism or 
media organisations, they will struggle to live up to their potential democratic role.  
This was found to be the case in media development during democratic transitions in 
1990s and continues to be a challenge for media development today. 
 
Evaluating Media Assistance 
At this point, having discussed the link between media and democracy and 
development, and the ideological underpinning of the sector, it is of value to look at 
whether past media development projects have achieved their stated goals and 
objectives. Of particular interest will be the outcomes of those projects that were 
implemented in the aftermath of the Cold War, when media development came to 
prominence.  This will provide a guide as to whether established media development 
can live up to its promise so to speak. This will further guide assessment of whether 
digital technologies can fulfil the same role in trying to achieve development goals 
such as accountability, transparency and strengthening of democracy. 
To date, a large proportion of the evaluation of media development has been done 
through studies of transitional countries, in particular the post-communist countries of 
Eastern Europe.  Kumar claims that “the former Soviet Union and its satellites served 
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as laboratories wherein the international community and its local partners refined 
different media development strategies and programmes” (Kumar, 2006:5). 
There are interesting findings that are worth reviewing here to see what have been the 
strengths and weaknesses of media development interventions in the past, what have 
been the outcomes and whether ICTs will be able to perform the role any better. 
 
Democratic transitions in Eastern Europe 
As noted, with the collapse of one-party states in the former Soviet Union in 1990s 
and the wave of democratic elections that followed, new governments and political 
parties emerged ostensibly committed to more democratic and open government and 
explicitly to more open media.   
There was pressure from donors to liberalise media both as a concerted attempt to 
invest in good governance and democracy and as part of a trend to open markets. 
In many of these media assistance interventions working to transform or strengthen 
the media sector, the aim was to distance the press from the governing party’s (or the 
elites) influence and establish a more independent and plural media environment for 
democratic ends.  
Studies emphasise the vital role of the mass media in transitions from autocracy, for 
instance in Germany, and later in Georgia’s ‘Rose’ revolution (Mitchell, 2009).  
McFaul (2005) argues that in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine the presence of the 
independent media was one of the key components of successful transitions from post-
communist states (McFaul, 2005). 
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The positive relationship between the growth of the free press and the process of 
democratisation is also thought to be reciprocal. Kulikova (2008) found that greater 
freedom of press and more independent press systems are indicative of greater overall 
democratisation. On the other hand, more democratic transitional countries have 
higher degrees of press freedom and media independence (Kulikova, 2008). 
Yet, studies of transitional countries and in particular the post-communist countries of 
Eastern Europe in the 1990s have shown interesting elements about the nature of 
media change in these countries. Coman notes how “the feeling that ‘things haven’t 
come out as they should’ emanates from many studies or essays dedicated to post-
communism” (Coman, 2000:50).   
De Smaele gives a perspective on events at the time: 
When the communist world collapsed, the corresponding media model was declared 
history as well. At first sight, it was fully replaced by the western model in the same 
way as the society was reorganized according to western principles. On a closer look, 
however, western influence seems to be restricted primarily to the market area. The 
reshaping of the media system into a pluralist and independent Fourth Estate, the 
transformation of the journalistic community into an autonomous professional group 
dedicated to a public service ideal and the redefinition of the audience into a group of 
citizens all failed to occur  (De Smaele, 1999:1). 
 
Although there was large investment in media development at that time, Sparks and 
Reading argue that only politicians benefited from the new post-Communist media 
(Sparks and Reading, 1994). They claim that, “in terms both of structure and 
personnel, the media show singularly little transformation and what there has been is 
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best understood as a mechanism for ensuring social continuity in the face of political 
change” (Sparks and Reading, 1998:106). 
Despite the investment and best intentions of media donors, political elites tried their 
best to bring the press, radio and television under their control, recognising the 
potential power of media.  Jowitt (1993) claims that “in Eastern Europe one sees a 
novel evolutionary phenomenon: survival of the first, not simply the fittest.  Former 
party cadres are exceptionally well placed to successfully adapt themselves – and their 
families – to changes in the economic and administrative order” (Jowitt, 1993: 296).   
Following liberalisation of the media market, the press became the battlefield of 
financial groups, linked to different political and governmental clans (De Smaele, 
1999).  Through the media outlets they owned, controlled or influenced, they helped 
create a highly partisan and politicised media and journalism in the first decade of 
post-Communism (ibid).  
Colin Sparks observed that while media trainers attempted to create newspapers like 
the New York Times and broadcasters like the BBC in Eastern Europe, what emerged 
mostly were newspapers that were highly partisan and broadcasters remained more 
aligned with the state than the people.  There was significant continuity in personnel 
between the old regime and the new, and the shift to a market economy was a “highly 
political process” (Sparks and Reading,1998:174). He refers to it as “elite continuity” 
(Sparks, 2018). 
Furthermore, financial obstacles were a hurdle for the development of an independent 
media sector.  In Central and Eastern Europe, independent news media were unable to 
make capital investments or pay adequate salaries without the support of donors.  
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They were often burdened by fines or taxes, and could not afford to invest in staff 
training or development.   
Thus, media outlets that had survived in the worst of political and social conditions in 
Soviet states then had to succeed financially against competition from a variety of 
other outlets.   Craig LaMay called it “the tyranny of the market" (LaMay, 2001:15). 
In his book “Exporting Press Freedom”,  LaMay claims that “the central dilemma is 
economic, between the need to find adequate and diverse sources of revenue while 
also providing a high-quality editorial product” (LaMay, 2008:5).  Very often in 
developing countries maintaining a diverse source of revenue for media outlets is a 
challenge. 
What became apparent in post-Soviet States therefore, was that the free market 
business model may not be the holy grail of journalism.  In fact, Zaller (1999) found 
"for every set of cases in which I am able to make plausible comparisons, higher 
levels of market competition are associated with lower levels of news quality" (Zaller, 
1999:1). 
Fog (2004) argues that free market forces exclude broad social interests from 
participating in the main media and it leads to concentration of media ownership.  
While moderate competition may increase diversity, it has been found that ‘excessive 
competition may lead to decreased diversity’ (Fog, 2004). 
Hence, after the early enthusiasm following liberalisation of media in the region, what 
occurred instead was the “erosion of the public sphere and the transformation of what 
were a series of government monopolies into a series of private oligopolies” (Deane, 
2005:182). 
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Democratic transitions in Africa 
The collapse of communism also had implications for media systems much further 
away than just the neighbouring Soviet satellites.  For instance, in Africa, there was 
extensive liberalisation of media during the decade following the fall of the Berlin 
wall.  Countries which had been tied in with the Soviet Bloc “made steps towards 
multi-party democracy” and a free market (Myers, 2014:6). 
The press played an important role in forcing autocratic African regimes to press for 
democracy (Shaw, 2009).  Calls for governance reforms from citizens of these 
countries, and international donors, brought in a new era of competition for political 
leadership.  Between 1989 and 1994, as a consequence of external and internal demand 
for democratic change, 41 out of 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa underwent 
significant political reform, and, in many cases, the first competitive elections in a 
generation (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994).   
Many autocratic leaders began to loosen their own grip on their countries’ media.   
These countries introduced legislation, giving local media “the freedom it lacked in 
previous decades….after years of muffled expression” (Myers, 2014:4).   
For instance, in Benin, military role was overturned in 1991 and the broadcasting 
sector was subsequently opened up. Similar patterns of media liberalisation emerged 
in Uganda and Mali in 1991, Nigeria and Cote D’Ivoire in 1992 and in Tanzania 
following the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1992.  The period has been 
called Africa’s “democratic rebirth” (Kasoma, 1995:1) and the “springtime of media 
proliferation in Africa” (Myers, 2014:1).  
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Myers maintains that “almost every country in sub-Saharan Africa has seen an 
enormous rise in the numbers and diversity of private and independent newspapers 
and TV and radio channels” (Myers, 2014).   
However, studies suggest that the process has not been smooth.  Indeed, Minderhoud 
(2009) found that  
introducing media liberalisation whilst simultaneously introducing multi-party 
politics, in a country context where identity politics play an all-determining role in 
defining the social contract between state and society, where poverty, deprivation and 
international marginalisation persists, and where formal democratic institutions are 
weak or not yet institutionalised ….. has shown to produce undemocratic outcomes in 
Africa” (Minderhoud, 2009:2).   
 
According to Linz and Stepan, few African political systems have so far developed 
into institutionalised, consolidated democracies – where democratic institutions and 
rules have become ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996:2). 
On the contrary, Ocitti (1999) asserts that the “appearance and formalisms of 
procedural democracy” have also masked a more profound pattern of declining press 
freedom on the continent, as African governments, under the pretext of constitutional 
rule, “have resorted to the enactment of suppressive laws against an increasingly 
critical media” (Ocitti, 1999).  He found that many of the impediments that the 
African media faced in the 1960s and 1970s are still alive today and “marks a reversal 
of the little that has been achieved politically since the beginning of the nineties” 
(Ocitti, 1999:30). 
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With regards to media development interventions during this period, the African 
Media Development Initiative (AMDI) – a research program that assessed key media 
changes and foreign support to the media in seventeen African countries – found 
“substantial evidence [for]: non-sustainable and short-term approaches to projects; 
disconnected programs; unnecessary competition amongst donors; and, consequently 
wasted investment of donor funds” (AMDI, 2006:15). 
In the same way that the “media missionaries” plan to export the western model of 
journalism to the post-Soviet states was not an unmitigated success, it has been 
suggested for example that problems within African media exist because of the 
western media model, i.e., free speech and private market forces.  Authors such as 
Berger (2002), Nyamnjoh (2005) and Shaw (2009), believe that a reason for many of 
the problems with African Media are due to the fact that they are expected to act 
according to a neo-liberal paradigm which is not suited to the continent.    
Nyamnjoh (2005) argues that western media programmes, instead of acknowledging 
local conditions, decreed that ‘aspiring journalists in Africa must, like containers, be 
dewatered of the mud and dirt of culture as tradition and custom, and filled afresh with 
the tested sparkles of culture as modernity and civilization’ (Nyamnjoh, 2005:3).  He 
described this model further as: 
A journalism of mimicry, bandwagonism and self-debasement, where African 
creativity and originality are crushed by the giant compressors of the One-Best-Way, 
as the Euro-centric assumptions and indicators of humanity, creativity and reality are 
universalised with the insensitive arrogance of ignorance and power (Nyamnjoh, 
2005:3).  
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Thus, while the western liberal model of journalism, which media assistance 
programmes promote, exports values of objectivity and neutrality, some scholars feel 
that the African audience is not as keen on these values. Shaw claimed “the middle 
ground position, or objectivity, that is unique to the Western liberal democracy model, 
was, and still remains, an unpopular option” (Shaw, 2009:20).   
He further argues that “the African model of journalism lays emphasis on the 
community (civil society), or communities (civil societies), the Western Liberal model 
emphasises the individual” (Shaw, 2009:20). 
Kasoma lamented ‘the tragedy facing African journalism is that the continent’s 
journalists have closely imitated the professional norms of the North’ (Kasoma, 
1996:95). 
Thus, many scholars have expressed discontent with Western influence in African 
journalism. They argue that Western media practices applied in the African context 
arguably reinforce neo-colonialism (Banda, 2008), suppress people participation 
(Shaw, 2009) and are generally seen to be at odds with African philosophy (Blake, 
2009; Jimada, 1992; Okigbo, 1987 quoted in Skjerdal, 2012:637).   
Hence, it’s suitability to Africa is ‘questionable’ (Berger, 2002).  Minderhoud argues 
that  
The reality of ‘substantial democratic reversals’ (Puddington 2009:101), both in Africa 
and elsewhere in the world, frequently challenges media’s assumed positive democratic 
contribution…….Media’s democratic role – such as expressed by leading development 
actors – overlook the many, oft interdependent, challenges countries face in processes 
of democratisation and development  (Minderhoud, 2009:7). 
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The fact that this western model is the one promoted by media assistance training 
projects, for better or worse, prompts a closer examination of the model. 
 
The Media Development Model 
Despite the evidence reviewed in this chapter pointing to the positive contribution that 
media can make to democracy and development, in the implementation of these media 
development projects, the process can be complex.   
In the evaluation literature, authors frequently touch on an important issue with 
Western media development projects:  the model of journalism.   A large part of 
media development work has focused on providing support to train journalists in 
the developing world in western standards of journalism and create privately 
owned, independent media.   “Media developers often tried to sell a U.S. “liberal” 
model of journalism - based on impartiality and facts” (Hume, 2011:22). 
Mihai Coman argues, with regards to transitions in post-Soviet states, “that the 
source of crisis resides in the liberal media system, with its market battles, political 
struggles, ethical challenges and professional pressures” (Coman, 2000:54).  
The rationale of donor organisations has been that having many different private 
media companies operating in any one country is the best way to build democracy 
and to provide access and voice to citizens.      
But critics argue that these projects are misguided in trying to replicate an Anglo-
Saxon model of journalism and Western media systems in their programmes.    
Miller contends that  
Journalism training in countries donors judge to be in transition to democracy–post-
communist, post-colonial, post-autocratic, post-conflict, less developed–is very much 
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a Western project. Sometimes couched in the language of universal human rights, 
such as freedom of expression, the export of Western press practices, idealized social 
roles, and ethical claims raises fundamental questions that donors seem rarely to 
address (Miller, 2009:13). 
 
Media scholars such as Hallin and Mancini (2004) and Curran and Park (2000) have 
similarly addressed the problem of the universal application of the Western model of 
journalism to other regions. In ‘Comparing Media Systems’, Hallin and Mancini 
(2004) argue that ‘the literature on the media is highly ethnocentric, in the sense that it 
refers only to the experience of a single country, yet is written in general terms, as 
though the model that prevailed in that country were universal’ (Hallin and Mancini, 
2004:2).  
They noted that ‘the liberal model has become the dominant model throughout the 
world: it serves as normative model for practitioners everywhere” (Shaw, 2009:507).  
In this model, journalists are expected to give neutral, impartial and objective reports 
and fulfil their social responsibility to the people (Hallin and Mancini, 2005).  This 
liberal model is most aligned to the template being promoted in media development 
programmes and the authors call for a re-thinking of journalism theory and practice to 
reflect local conditions from one society to another.  
Estonian journalism professor Epp Lauk (2005) argues that the belief that 
transitioning countries would follow the Anglo-American journalism paradigm has 
not happened for many reasons.  These countries are ‘in permanent flux, 
simultaneously fighting legacies of the past and searching for successful ways of 
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building up the states based on the rule of law, as well as civil societies’ (Lauk, 
2005:208). 
In the United States, the laws relating to freedom of the press, developed over 200 
years, have for the most part been respected by power elites and the public, 
notwithstanding the attacks on the media by President Trump and his followers.  
Development in newly democratic nations has lasted only a few decades at most, and 
the Western “liberal” model of fact-based, impartial journalism competes with other 
styles of journalism–both old and new–for the public’s attention (Hume, 2011).   
Some suggest that a western-like ideology could not be transplanted to Eastern Europe 
and other developing countries because of huge cultural and ideological differences 
(De Smaele, 1999; LaMay, 2001).  The idea that Africa needs a journalism standard 
which differs from that of the rest of the world – and particularly from the West – has 
gained popularity among media scholars, although some question the viability of a 
journalism model unique to Africa (Strelitz, 2005; Tomaselli, 2011; in Skjerdal, 
2012).   
For instance, Kasoma (1996) has argued that African journalists should turn to the 
continent’s own values instead of imitating the norms of the North, which in his view 
had only led to media-driven selfishness and divisionism (Kasoma, 1996).  Kasoma 
(1996) proposed ‘Afriethics’ as a basis for African journalism practice, but was 
criticised by colleagues from all over the continent who claimed that his ideology was 
based on a ‘romantic reconstruction of the pre-colonial’ (Nyamnjoh, 2005:91). 
Merrill (2002) argued the idea that the media elsewhere conform to Western media 
structures is ‘not only an arrogant and ethnocentric one but also betrays a stultified, 
intellectual view of reality. Cultures are different; the values that shore up such 
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cultures are different. Stages of national development are different, Citizens 
expectations are different’ (Merrill, 2002:18). 
Furthermore, according to the media development model, to propose that the media in 
Africa could follow the same change model as the media in post-communist Europe 
would be simplifying the process of media assistance and reform.   ‘The maxim “one 
size does not fit all”’ is ideal here (Kumar, 2009:1).  Media Assistance takes place in 
dynamic environments, with different histories, cultures and politics, to suggest the 
interventions can have the same democratic outcomes would be naive.  
At its root, media assistance after the Cold War took place in contrasting political 
environments and economic contexts.  In post-communist Europe there was a ready 
consumer group, hungry for media products, and a populace that might be able to 
afford the abundance of media products that the free market brought.  In Africa there 
was also widespread liberalisation, but media assistance took place in an environment 
where, despite a dynamic media sector, the majority of the consumer populace have 
extremely limited means to purchase media products and thus support the long term 
financial viability of media organisations. 
Media development projects, when at their best, take place after rigorous country 
context and needs analysis, and a review of the political economy of the programme 
countries.  Baseline audience research is conducted so that the appropriate media is 
used to achieve project objectives.  In this way, each media development project 
differs from another, and it would be challenging to transplant one model from 
country to country.  
Marguerite Sullivan from the Centre for International Media assistance (CIMA), 
which is funded by the US National Endowment for Democracy, agrees that 
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Establishing independent media in a country where they do not exist, or strengthening 
them in a country where they are weak, is no simple task. Required is an intricate 
structure with many interdependent parts… Picture a stool with strong supporting 
legs—professional journalists, a supportive legal environment, economically 
sustainable media, and news literate citizens and public officials. Take away a 
supporting leg, and the stool becomes unstable and is in danger of collapsing  
(Sullivan, 2008:3). 
 
The literature reviewed here suggests one cannot copy media systems from one 
country to another and there is no ideal media development model.  La May 
questioned whether ‘exporting press freedom’ was in fact possible at all to differing 
media ecosystems (1997).   
This echoes James Miller’s observation that “the large-scale exportation of 
mainstream Western journalistic ethics and practices today brings to mind Marshall 
McLuhan's famous admonition against driving into the future while looking in the 
rear-view mirror” (Miller, 2011:3).  In addition to weakness in the model, journalistic 
values in the North are also under attack via social media and accusations of creating 
‘fake news’. 
Lauk (2008) suggested that in the future, altruistic journalism developers might have 
to take “very different directions” to accommodate the different cultures of the 
countries they are trying to help.  She suggests “digitisation may provide the unifying 
influence for journalists that the Anglo-American model failed to be….. not because 
of global standards about journalism and technology, but because of the internet’s 
ubiquity and speed” (Lauk, 2008:209). 
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There have been successful media development interventions of course but the 
literature highlights that media development projects are incredibly complex and 
layered and these complexities may not be anticipated at the conceptual stage.  
Evaluation of long-term impact is also difficult.   
Stremlau (2019) argues for greater focus and greater sensitivity to local contexts, and 
urges media assistance organisations to avoid a “blank slate” approach (Stremlau, 
2019).  
The evidence presented in this section illustrates the argument for using media in 
development and to achieve donor development goals.  It shall be seen whether using 
ICTs for the same media development objectives is any less complicated, or whether 
as Lauk suggested, digitisation will be the solution for global journalism. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the academic literature relating to the media assistance sector 
and its potential benefits for democracy and development.  The literature suggests that 
the relationship is not simple.  This stems from the debate about the ideal role of 
media in society and the diversity of countries, societies, and cultures that bring 
different experiences and outcomes to the process of establishing independent or new 
media systems. 
Historical theories of media and modernisation and theories around the concept of the 
public sphere were examined. It was noted that media development projects have 
often worked towards the creation of new or improved spaces for debate and dialogue 
in society. 
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As shall be discussed further in the following chapter, the term ‘Public Sphere’ has 
gained renewed importance with the spread of new communication technologies. The 
internet in particular is considered by some to provide unprecedented opportunities for 
exchanging information among a large number of people and across borders (Castells, 
2008).      
The thesis investigates whether digital technologies have the potential to achieve goals 
such as those discussed in this chapter – accountability, transparency, good 
governance and democracy.  If yes, does this leave media assistance outmoded and 
irrelevant?  
The literature surveyed in this chapter examined the evidence showing traditional 
media’s usefulness in achieving donor development goals such as those above. The 
next chapter will look at digital technologies’ potential to address the same issues.  
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Chapter 3  
Literature Review: Part 2 
 
ICTs and Development on the African continent 
 
In chapter 2, the literature on democracy, development and media was reviewed to 
historically contextualise media assistance.  Media Development, the focus for this 
research, operates within a wider sector of overseas development assistance, so this 
chapter will examine further the concept of ‘development’ in the broader context of 
overseas aid.  
The emergence of the internet and the huge growth of mobile technologies in the past 
decade, especially in Africa, has influenced discussions about foreign aid and 
development.  Encouraged by the fast growth in ICTs, and especially mobile phones, 
grant-making foundations and multilateral agencies have formed task forces and 
departments devoted to ICTs for international development.  Policymakers, academics 
and development practitioners have hailed the technologies as the vehicle for Africa’s 
renaissance (Tedre et al., 2009; Yusuf et al., 2009).  
The potential of ICTs for dissemination of news and access to information has thus 
changed the environment in which media development NGOs now implement their 
projects. This chapter will therefore investigate the growth of ICTs and in particular 
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mobile phones on the African continent and what this means for development. This 
chapter will address the following issues which arise in the literature  
 What does the concept of “development” mean? And what are the current 
arguments for and against foreign development aid?  
 What is the current landscape for development, and media development, in Africa, 
in particular with regard to the growth of its most popular ICT – the mobile 
phone? 
 What is the evidence that ICTs can contribute to the objectives of foreign aid and 
democracy promotion such as accountability, participation and good governance? 
 
Addressing the above questions will contextualise the research question in its African 
setting and give a deeper picture of where the research is situated.  It will advance the 
investigation into digital technologies, development assistance and media support in 
Sub-Saharan Africa in the present day.  
The chapter will therefore examine the case for using digital technologies for 
development and media assistance in an increasingly technological environment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  Claims relating to ICTs positive contribution to development 
will be evaluated and the concepts of techno-determinism and cyber-optimism 
critically investigated.  This will help address whether ICTs have potential to 
contribute to the same objectives as media assistance, thereby assessing its ongoing 
relevance.  
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Defining Development  
As this research thesis explores the potential of digital technologies to achieve media 
development objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is pertinent to look further at what 
the concept of ‘development’ actually means, especially in an African context.  For 
instance, does ‘development’ equate to GDP growth rates or does it involve a visible 
change in the lives of the population of a country?   The reality is that there could still 
be widespread poverty in grassroots populations even when a country is perceived to 
have attained good levels of economic growth 
The literature acknowledges that what is understood by the term ‘development’ is 
complex and subjective (Leftwich, 2005).  Thomas argues that “alternative meanings 
of ‘development’ are ‘hotly contested” (Allen et al., 1992:1).    
For donors supporting the projects under discussion, their funds are being used for 
stated objectives, as outlined in their project strategy documents, and their 
understanding of what constitutes development presents one perspective. The concept 
of development as used in this thesis is informed by diverse academic fields 
– anthropology, sociology, economics and politics – each with emphasis on particular 
features of development. This contributes to the challenge of getting a conclusive 
definition of ‘development’.  
Furthermore, the concept of international development is a relatively recent one. 
Thomas wrote that “poverty is an age-old concern but ‘development’ has only become 
an important concept…. since the end of the Second World War” (Thomas, 2000:1).  
As noted, following World War II there was a need for reconstruction in Europe and 
elsewhere and the launch of the Marshall Plan was a first step in creating a plan for 
international development. This plan combined humanitarian goals with political and 
economic goals. 
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Economic historian, Walt W Rostow, was one of the most influential scholars in 
development writing around that time and his book in 1960, The Stages of Economic 
Growth focused on the economic system, showing the factors needed for a country to 
reach the path to modernisation. Rostow outlined “five stages of growth” which 
involve a traditional society going through a period of industrialisation which would 
lead to a ‘take-off’ in mass-consumption, followed by profit generation and finally 
sustained growth (Rostow, 1960).   
As noted with regard to modernisation, the idea that the underdeveloped could be 
‘developed’ through the transfer of particular technologies was advanced by Lerner in 
1958 and later supported by writings of Schramm (1964) and Rogers (1962). In his 
book, The Passing of Traditional Society, Lerner attempted to correlate development 
with other variables such as literacy, urbanisation and media consumption and 
political development. Rogers proposed that media could be a ‘magic multiplier’ for 
development by fostering transmission of messages between the developers and 
‘developees’ (Berger, 2005:3-4). 
In his book Development as Freedom, Sen (1999) argued that development should be 
judged by its impact on people, not only by changes in their income but more 
generally in terms of their choices, capabilities and freedoms.  He said that 
development should be concerned about the distribution of these improvements, not 
just the simple average for a society (Sen, 1999).  Prior to this, many economists had 
focused on income as the main measure of well-being.  Sens’ ‘capabilities approach’ 
focused on an individuals’ capability of achieving the kind of life they have ‘reason to 
value’ (Sen, 1999). 
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Thus, development can mean different things in different contexts; it can mean 
modernisation (as previously noted), economic growth (Rostow, 1960) or expansion 
of personal freedoms (as with Amartya Sen, 1999). 
In more recent decades, the idea of good governance has gained momentum in 
development debates (Abrahamsen, 2000).   According to the 1989 World Bank 
report, Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth, good governance starts 
with rejecting past development models (World Bank, 1989) and it seeks to have a 
greater awareness of the social and cultural values of civil society (ibid).  
Owen Barder, Director of the Centre for Global Development in UK, proposes that 
“development also carries a connotation of lasting change…. development consists of 
more than improvements in the well-being of citizens, even broadly defined: it also 
conveys something about the capacity of economic, political and social systems to 
provide the circumstances for that well-being on a sustainable, long-term basis” 
(Barder, 2012). 
More recently, ‘participation’ has become an important emphasis in the development 
sector (Leal, 2007). Leal notes that “somewhere in the mid-1980s, participation 
ascended to the pantheon of development buzzwords, catchphrases and euphemisms” 
(Leal, 2007:89).  Past failures could be explained by its “previous top-down, blueprint 
mechanics, which were to be replaced by more people-friendly, bottom-up 
approaches” (Leal, 2007:91).  
However, despite a shift in development thinking from a purely economic perspective 
to a more socially and politically inclusive one, a Western perspective still dominates 
the field. Ayers (2006) argues that the neo-liberal ideology of the 1990s which is 
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characterised by economic and trade liberalisation continues to prevail in development 
discourse (Ayers, 2006).  
These theories are significant for the research question because the meta-objective of 
media assistance is ‘development’. A media project could be centred on strengthening 
of the media sector or increased citizen participation in any given country, yes, but 
usually it is in the context of a larger goal or vision of development from the funders.   
For western donors then this vision has very often been the promotion of democracy 
and the free market.   
Kumar (2004) admitted that USAID’s media assistance was unashamedly a tool of forei
gn policy: “Independent media building has served U.S. national interests.  In many 
countries, support to independent media created political space that enabled the US to 
pursue specific foreign policy goals” (Kumar, 2004: xiii). 
Craig LaMay (2008) concurs that much of the emphasis in democracy projects is to 
open up free markets for western corporations: “US Government understand foreign 
assistance as a way to create markets economies and open markets abroad” (LaMay, 
2008:41).   
However, when media development projects are undertaken and funded by various 
international donors, with varying foreign policy goals, it can often be articulated in 
different ways as to the outcome actually expected.  
For instance, China has become a recent donor of note in the African region. Myers 
(2009) claims that “China has a very different motive for funding a radio station in 
Africa from, say, The Netherlands. The former is for influence, commercial self-
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interest and possibly propaganda. The latter is for the sake of more liberal – some 
would say “enlightened” –goals” (Myers, 2009:9).  
For Myers to refer to China as a “media development donor” is somewhat 
complicated however, as the media development field traditionally emphasises 
concepts that are contrary to the Chinese media model system: freedom of the press, 
journalist and media outlet independence, and the importance of the media in holding 
governments to account.   
However, ranked 10th among contributors to direct media assistance, providing 
roughly $18 million in 2008 (Myers, 2009) it is certainly a presence of interest in 
African media development. 
And although USA and United Kingdom have been two of the larger contributors to 
media assistance overall, in some African countries they are not the dominant ones. 
According to O’ Malley, France, Germany and the European Union were the largest 
supporters of Media development in Africa in 2016 (O' Malley, 2018) and have a 
different approach to democracy and media assistance.   
Regardless of motivation or ideology, it is worthwhile to examine whether efforts in 
overseas development have been successful and a worthwhile use of donor funds. It is 
important to examine whether development efforts have been successful historically 
as this will determine whether a new approach has more potential, for instance 
possibly using technological solutions for achieving donor objectives.  
Having considered historical evaluations of media assistance in Chapter 2, the next 
section reviews literature evaluating the effectiveness of foreign aid. 
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Evaluating Foreign aid  
The efficacy of development aid and whether it should be undertaken in the first place 
continues to be a matter of debate for scholars and policy makers. Economists such as 
Peter Bauer and Milton Friedman argued in the 1960s that aid is ineffective and Bauer 
called it  ”an excellent method for transferring money from poor people in rich 
countries to rich people in poor countries” (Muehlenberg, 2009).  
Development interventions have been accused of actively worsening poverty and 
inequality.  Dr Paul Schaffer (2012) states that “process of modernity, in particular 
industrialisation, urbanisation, and the weakening of communal ties, have led to a 
massive increase in new forms of poverty that have been worsened by schemes of 
development such as poverty reduction strategies” (Shaffer, 2012:1772). 
Dambisa Moyo (2010) argues that “the problem is that aid is not benign – its 
malignant. No longer part of the potential solution, its part of the problem – in fact aid 
is the problem” (Moyo, 2010: 47). 
Dr Simon Reid-Henry, a senior fellow at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, argues 
that the overall effect of modernisation for some societies was “the replacement of 
traditional poverty by a more modern form of misery” (Reid-Henry, 2012).  Andrews 
(2009) concluded that although billions in official aid still flows from donor 
governments to recipient governments, foreign aid has failed to erase poverty 
(Andrews, 2009).   
In the past decade, the opposing sides in this debate have come to be embodied by the 
clash of the two personalities of William Easterly, a well-known America economist 
specialising in development, and Jeffrey Sachs, economist and director of The Earth 
Institute at Columbia University.  Their debate began in the pages of the New York 
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Review of Books in 2005, when Easterly asked “Can we in the West end poverty 
elsewhere?” 
Sachs, author of The End of Poverty (2005) believed the answer is yes, and that the 
solution is international Aid.   He claimed that extreme poverty in rural Africa (and 
elsewhere) is not attributable to corruption or other aspects of flawed governance, but 
to a lack of sufficient funds.  "The focus on corruption and governance is 
exaggerated," he wrote in The End of Poverty, "Africa's governance is poor because 
Africa is poor”(Sachs, 2005:312, 198). 
Easterly took the opposite view.  He claimed that nations cannot be “airlifted into 
prosperity” by outsiders, “even if their surname is Clinton”, and foreign aid often does 
more harm than good (Barker, 2013).  Easterly argued 
To Professor Sachs, African poverty is just a technical problem that “the world’s 
leading practitioners” can solve if only these experts are given enough money for their 
“proven strategies.” This reveals a remarkable naiveté about the roots of poverty. 
Poverty in Africa is the outcome of much deeper factors such as political elites who 
seek mainly to protect their own position, dysfunctional institutions like corruption 
and lack of property rights, and a long history of exploitation and meddling from 
abroad ….It takes breath-taking hubris to assert that this mess can be fixed for the tidy 
sum of $75 billion (Easterly, 2007).    
 
Recently, Bill Gates has directly addressed this debate.  Gates has emerged as a 
considerable donor in media development in Africa in recent years through the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation (although much of this is for Communication for 
Development projects). 
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In his annual letter in 2014, entitled: “3 Myths that block progress to the poor”, Gates 
targeted the so-called myth that foreign aid does not work:  “What we see over time is 
people living longer, getting healthier, and escaping poverty, partly because of 
services that aid helped develop and deliver. I worry about the myth that aid doesn’t 
work. It gives political leaders an excuse to try to cut back on it—and that would 
mean fewer lives are saved, and more time before countries can become self-
sufficient” (Gates, 2014).  
These arguments are pertinent to the media development sector because there are 
those who also question government funds, and tax dollars, being spent on supporting 
media projects and systems in faraway countries and whether doing so is a worthwhile 
target for aid funds.   
Current day media development takes place in a setting where the justifications for 
undertaking aid are frequently challenged. Western donors want to know their money 
is being well spent and implementers want to learn from past mistakes.    
Yet, the media development industry itself struggles to produce real evidence of the 
impact of its projects.  Mosher claims that “the media development field lacks a clear 
evidence base that illustrates the impact and significance of its activities, training 
programs, and advocacy work” (Mosher, 2009:7).   
Projects that involve Media for Development (M4D) and Communication for 
Development (or C4D) have more success in producing results and evaluations of 
their impact because they can measure audience, reach and behaviour change.  
But, with ‘media development’ projects - meaning media sector reform, media 
industry trainings, regulatory change or projects aiming to enhance participation or the 
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public sphere - it is much more problematic to prove impact and success.  Democracy, 
Governance or improvements in journalism quality - these are long-term variables 
which are also effected by other changes in the socio-political environment, so often it 
is challenging to show whether improvements in a measure are due to the media 
assistance intervention (Noske-Turner, 2017).    
Mosher argues “that media matter is not such a hard case to support, but exactly how 
it matters and what it actually does, in the context of development, whether by 
contributing to the health of the economy, polity, or society, has been the focus of 
considerable debate” (Mosher, 2009:7).  
Thus, definite conclusions on the impact of media development programmes have 
been difficult. 
 
The growth of mobile technologies on the African continent 
The central tenet of this research thesis asks whether digital technologies can 
contribute to the same objectives as traditional media in media assistance projects in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  As noted, the upsurge of mobile phone use in Africa has sparked 
a rise in interest in these ICTs and how these might be applied to development.  The 
mobile phone has been celebrated for bringing information and news to people of all 
levels of income at a much faster rate than other developing nations before it 
(Poushter and Oates, 2015).  According to some, no technology has transformed 
Africa in recent years as much, and as rapidly, as the cellular phone (Alozie, 2007; 
Bailard, 2009). 
This section will therefore examine the impact of the growth in ICTs and in particular 
mobile phones on Africa, and what potential they offer for development.  
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The growth in penetration and use of the mobile phone has been described as 
‘revolutionary’ and ‘transformational’ for the African continent. According to the 
International Telecommunication Union, no technology has ever seen such a rapid rate 
of adoption as mobile phones, and the developing world is leading the way (Tyler, 
2010).   
Indeed, as at 2003 there was one main telephone line per 100 inhabitants and 2.8 
mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in the region, a penetration rate of 2.8%. By 
the end of 2018, there was a penetration rate of 44% (GSMA Intelligence, 2018).  
Penetration rates are much higher for some individual countries such as Kenya and 
Tanzania.  For instance in Kenya, there is now a mobile phone penetration rate of over 
100 percent (CCK, 2018).   
What is unique about the mobile phone and its suitability for the African environment 
is the combination of the affordability of hardware, the affordability of service, its 
portability due to its small size and light weight, and its power efficiency.  Akpan-
Obong found that the comparatively lower cost of acquisition of the cell phone and its 
stand-alone technology make it more affordable for resource-poor people predominant 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (Akpan-Obong et al., 2010).  De Bruijn claims mobile phones 
have become part and parcel of the communication landscape in urban and rural areas 
of Africa (De Bruijn, 2009).    
The availability of pre-paid subscriptions (prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa) and 
services such as M-Pesa9 make the mobile phone a particularly attractive ICT for 
Africans.  While prepaid tariffs tend to be more expensive (per minute) than billed 
 
9 M-Pesa, the mobile phone–based money transfer service launched by Kenya’s mobile network 
operator Safaricom, is perhaps the most successful and profitable digital innovation in Africa so far.  
The system processed around 6 billion transactions in 2016 (Monks, 2017).   
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tariffs they are frequently chosen “because they are often the only payment method 
available to low-income users who might not have a regular income and will thus not 
qualify for a postpaid” plan. Indeed, about 95% of cell phone users in Africa use pre-
paid services (in Akpan-Obong et al, 2010:5). 
Payment services via mobile phones such as M-Pesa have positioned countries such as 
Kenya at the forefront of mobile financial services. CNN claimed “in some ways, 
they're really leaping ahead of us” (Voight, 2011). 
This concept of leapfrogging has been used again and again to describe how Africa is 
not following the usual path of development as conceived by traditional modernisation 
theories (Akpan-Obong et al., 2010; Fong, 2009; Nkwae, 2003).  One of the reasons is 
that Africa has been able to leap a stage of development by avoiding the costly 
infrastructure of telephone landlines and going straight to mobile communications.   
Southwood (2009) describes how mobile technology has been able to bypass severe 
infrastructural constraints that have hindered the old land-line technology on the 
continent.  As Southwood noted “Africa was considered a difficult place to do 
business and an even harder place to make money” (Southwood, 2009: xv).   He 
observed that before mobile phones: 
Fixed line phones were provided by a monopoly provider and were not well resourced 
or energetic about connecting customers. Waiting lists for new subscribers could be 
ten years. The absence of instant communications provided many excuses for things 
undone and little incentive for action (Southwood, 2009:xv).  
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Southwood (2009) refers to this reshaping of life in Africa as ‘less walk and more 
talk’.  In his book of the same name he describes the changes in daily life that the 
phone has been a catalyst for: 
A son wants to talk to his mother in a neighbouring village – it’s a two day walk each 
way. 
A plumber makes house calls all morning only to return to his shop to pick up 
messages for the afternoon. 
A rural farmer wants to know what crop prices are in the market to see when best to 
sell his crops – he has to take a day out to visit the market only to find out that the 
prices are too low midweek. 
This was Africa before mobile phones arrived: a lot of walking and not much talking. 
(Southwood, 2009: xiv). 
 
So, it appears the mobile phone has become the ICT of choice for Africans.  Mobile 
service is now relatively cheap to acquire and the technology on basic feature phones 
is user-friendly enough that one does not require any particular level of sophistication 
to use it. This is especially relevant for sub-Sahara’s largely illiterate populations10.   
Thus, mobile phones are said to becoming essentials for many Africans.  “People 
might not have shoes, but they have a cellphone” wrote Peskin (Peskin, 2011:20).    
Indeed, Africans in the region are making real sacrifices to finance their cell phone. A 
study by Crandall et al., found that at least 20 per cent of respondents, who were 
 
10 UNESCO statistics show that the literacy rate for sub-Saharan Africa was 65 % in 2017. In other 
words, one third of the people aged 15 and above were unable to read and write 
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living on less than US$2.50 per day, felt it was necessary to make real sacrifices to 
recharge their mobile credit.  In the majority of cases, that meant buying less food, at 
least once a week. New clothes, bus fares, utility bills and even soap were sometimes 
sacrificed to sustain their mobile phone (Crandall et al., 2012). Other research has 
found that some users are willing to spend up to a quarter of their household income 
on mobile phone charges (De Carvalho et al., 2011) and to go without food in order to 
stay informed and entertained (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007).  
The reason they are willing to do this is because a mobile phone helps them to 
improve their lives in the long term through “better access to information and 
resources…..  Access to information has become as vital as water and electricity” 
(Powell III, 2012:11).   
The New America think-tank argues that “mobile phones provide those living in 
poverty with an opportunity to be their own problem solvers, business entrepreneurs 
and aid workers. Connectivity and creativity have transformed mobile phones from a 
technology device into a tool of economic empowerment” (Tyler, 2010). 
Jeffrey Sachs enthusiastically claimed that mobile phones had been a gift for 
development. In an article for The Guardian newspaper he argued “extreme poverty is 
almost synonymous with extreme isolation, especially rural isolation. But mobile 
phones and wireless internet end isolation, and will therefore prove to be the most 
transformative technology of economic development of our time” (Sachs, 2008).    
There are many testimonies of the beneficial day to day uses of mobile technology in 
Africa. Most people will have by now seen the ubiquitous image of the Masai farmer 
in traditional costume as he appears to be transacting day to day business on this 
mobile phone. 
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For example, in Senegal, information available through mobile phones enabled 
farmers to double the prices of their crops and herders in Angola to locate their cattle 
through GPS (global positioning system) technology (in Fong, 2009).  Providing 
market price information in the fisheries or agricultural sectors creates better 
functioning markets and gets rid of intermediaries (Kuriyan et al., 2008).  
Thus, there is great optimism about the potential of mobile connectivity for the 
African continent as it is seen as having the potential to increase economic 
productivity.  Yonazi claims “the value of a mobile phone is higher in Africa than 
elsewhere” (Yonazi et al., 2012:13).  ICTs directly contribute around 7 per cent of 
Africa’s GDP, which, is higher than the global average. That’s because, in Africa, 
mobile phones are also “substitutes for many other types of service, such as financial 
credit, newspapers, games and entertainment” (Yonazi et al., 2012:28). 
The economic impact of mobile telephony in Kenya was assessed by the Global 
Mobile Tax Review11 who claimed the industry contributed about $3.6 billion to the 
country’s gross domestic product.  It has also made a significant contribution to 
employment, with an estimated 250,000 people employed by the industry in 2011 
(Deloitte LLP, 2011).  This is arguably through improved information flows, reducing 
travel time and costs, and improved business efficiency.   
This section has noted the enthusiasm for the mobile phone, which has resulted in 
development agencies, funders and NGOs looking at these technologies to assist 
development and aid programmes.  The next section will review the evidence, if any, 
that these new technologies can have a positive effect on development in Africa. 
 
11 An annual report produced by the GSM Association which analyses consumption profiles, prices 
and taxes 
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ICT for Development in Africa 
In recent years, the fields of ICT for Development (ICT4D) and Mobile For 
development (M4D) have thus moved centre stage in the development field.   
Banda maintained that the introduction of new media technology in Africa in the 
1990s “sparked celebratory, almost utopian bliss in its proponents. It was 
accompanied by the hype about the continent’s possibility of “leapfrogging” some 
stages of development, as though the whole process of development had been 
rendered less problematic” (Banda et al., 2009:1).     
In their research into the area of ICTs in development, Ogan et al (2009) found that 
there has been an upsurge in the use of the ICT paradigm within development 
discussions and its use as a ‘holy grail’.  They found more than half of all journal 
articles addressing the topic of communication and development between 2004 and 
2007 focused primarily on ICTs (Ogan et al, 2009).   
Heeks (2009) noted that “the digital technologies of the 1990s were new tools in 
search of a purpose.  Development goals were new targets in search of a delivery 
mechanism.  That these two should find each other and fall in love was not 
unexpected.   They had a baby called "ICT4D", born in a flurry of publications, 
bodies, events, programmes and project funding”  (Heeks, 2009:3).   
Many authors (Castells, 2000; Mansell, 1994; Mansell & When, 1998; Negroponte, 
1996) have compared the development of ICTs to changes brought about by the 
printing machines or the invention of writing. Bedi (1999) noted ‘proponents attribute 
a wide and almost impossible array of positive effects to ICTs’ (Bedi, 1999:3).  These 
include economic growth, agricultural and industrial productivity, efficiency of public 
administration, and participation in democracy.    
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These studies show the discussions that are taking place in more recent years with 
regards to development in Africa.  The idea behind the techno-optimism is that more 
and better information and communication helps development.    
As noted, in recent years, technology companies have also entered the media 
assistance space supporting media development projects through their foundations 
(such as the Gates Foundation and Omidyar Foundation). Their media projects focus 
on technology solutions for development problems and they increasingly contribute to 
the discourse on aid.  
However, the distinction should be made between the apparent economic benefits that 
mobile technologies can bring for African nations and the political ones.  Whilst this 
chapter attests to the positive impact that these ICTs are having on the lives of citizens 
of some countries in Africa, this does not mean that they are having the same impact 
on the political arena, on participation and on the public sphere.  
 
This difference is important because this research asks whether new digital forms of 
media can add to or replace older traditional and legacy forms of media in media 
development projects.  And if the goal of these projects is better governance, 
accountability, transparency and democracy, it is still debatable whether ICTs have 
the same impact on these objectives.   
For instance, Groshek (2009) found that internet diffusion had a positive impact on 
democratisation across 152 countries, whilst Nisbet et al (2012) examining the 
relationship between internet penetration, individual internet use, and citizen demand 
for democracy across 28 countries, found no correlation (Groshek, 2009; Nisbet et al., 
2012).  
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The next section will examine these claims of the potential for ICTs to contribute to 
governance and democracy on the African continent  
 
Digital technology and Political Change 
With the growth of digital technologies in Africa, claims are now being made about 
the democratising power of new media.  ICTs, it is thought, might facilitate direct 
participation of people in political decision-making, making possible the rise and 
visibility of public opinion as a way of influencing the political process and thus 
making leaders more concerned and responsive to public opinion.   
Sika et al (2014) note that “ICTs are now widely accepted to be powerful tools with 
which to combat many of the challenges that African countries face, including 
governance” (Sika et al., 2014:9).    
The use of mobile phones and the internet, for example through Twitter or Facebook, 
might allow people to follow decision-making processes and discuss issues of 
common concern (Castells, 2007; Mäkinen and Kuira, 2008).  
ICTs are viewed by some as a way to promote democratic governance, and cultural 
and political resistance against dictatorships. From this perspective, access to ICTs is 
seen as aiding the democratic process in Africa (Grossman, 1995). 
Referring to digital technologies and social media platforms as “liberation 
technology”, Diamond (2008) has  argued that “through expanding economic 
freedom, civic mobilization, and the development of ‘liberation technology,’ even 
seemingly entrenched regimes…could well become democracies within a generation” 
(Diamond, 2008). 
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Much of the excitement around new technologies extols the potential contribution of 
digital technologies and social media platforms to the development of civil society and 
practices of citizenship.   
Howard has argued that new communication technologies have become the 
“infrastructure for sharing and learning about diverse views and for new approaches to 
political representation and participation” (Howard, 2011:40).  Braskov and Obregon 
(2012) claim that new media provide greater opportunities for engagement and 
participation of individuals and communities (Braskov and Obregon, 2012).  
This cyber-optimism is of relevance because many media development projects have 
objectives to improve governance, participation and accountability and ICTs are now 
being proposed as a solution to these goals in Africa, and elsewhere. There are a 
proliferation of ICT for Accountability initiatives taking place in the region and this is 
based on a paradigm which assumes increased citizen engagement through ICTs, 
which could furthermore result in increased accountability (Fung et al., 2010; Sika and 
Sambuli, 2014; Tettey, 2002)  
But, the effectiveness of new media technologies to bring about social change is 
contested. When it comes to Africa, the contribution of ICTs, of which mobile phones 
form a part, to development and democracy has been questioned in a number of 
sources (Hahn and Kibora, 2008). Tetteys’ research into ICT use in Africa found that 
even though “a lot more people are getting a lot more information… this does not 
translate into a significant expansion in the numbers and categories of those who 
engage in, and hence influence, the direction of politics on the continent” (Tettey, 
2001:133).  Alozie et al (2011), maintain that in Africa “the effect of ICTs on political 
development can neither be certified as revolutionary, nor can they be codified as 
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panacea” and that “ICTs may not be the ‘magic bullet’ for political development in 
sub-Saharan Africa” (Alozie et al., 2011:1,19).    Christensen (2011) is similarly 
sceptical about the liberating powers of digital technology and has explicitly criticised 
Diamond’s term ‘liberation technology’ as “excessively techno-utopian.” He is critical 
of aid donors in the global North and how they have been “quick to declare social 
media key tools in the battles over freedom of speech rights and democratic change in 
developing nations … despite the lack of evidence” (Christensen, 2011:234).   
For instance, during the Arab risings in North Africa, leaders of social movements 
were seen to use ICTs to mobilise public opinion, organise mass protests and publicise 
concerns and demands locally and globally. This led to it being named Revolution 2.0.    
However, years after the so-called Arab Spring, authoritarian control has resurfaced.  
So, the role of ICTs (often in the form of social media) and their promise to create 
revolution and regime change is questionable.  Buccianti and el-Richani (2015) note 
that “in the years since the uprisings, it has become clear that the democratising 
potential of social media for the region may have been overstated” (Buccianti and el-
Richani, 2015:5). 
Indeed, even where communication technologies contribute to mass protest and the 
strengthening of social movements, of course there is no guarantee that such protests 
and movements will necessarily be successful and result in regime change.   
Evgeny Morozov noted that in Iran “as the Green Movement lost much of its 
momentum in the months following the election, it became clear that the Twitter 
Revolution so many in the West were quick to inaugurate was nothing more than a 
wild fantasy” (Morozov, 2011:5). 
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In his book, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (2011) Morozov 
expresses scepticism about the power of the technology to bring about democratic 
change. He argues against the notion that the internet is essentially liberating, dubbing 
this notion “cyber-utopianism”.  On the contrary, Morozov refers to the internet’s 
alternative potential to be used by authoritarian regimes for surveillance, repression, 
propaganda, and control of the digital media space, claiming that belief in a new 
public sphere that would undermine oppressive governments was a “delusion” 
(Morozov, 2011:i).    
Many regimes have often responded to the threat of online activism by cracking down 
on the use of social media. In many cases, those in power or elites own and/or control 
the infrastructure for such technologies and can disrupt internet and mobile phone 
services, as occurred in Iran and in Egypt. So, although social media can initially help 
protest movements, they can also help the regime to crack down on the movement 
(Aday et al., 2010; Papic and Noonan, 2011). 
 
Malcolm Gladwell has noted that instead of being defined by their causes, activists are 
now being defined by their tools.  The protest in Moldova in 2009 against the 
Communist government was dubbed the ‘Twitter Revolution’, because of the means 
through which demonstrators were brought together (Gladwell, 2010a).  Coverage of 
the revolts in Egypt and Tunisia were also labelled the ‘Wiki Revolution and ‘Twitter 
Revolution’.  
But Gladwell insists “the revolution will not be tweeted”.  He argues that the 
platforms of social media are “built around weak ties” and suggests “whereas strong 
ties are required for high risk (off-line) activism that explicitly confronts socially 
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entrenched norms and practices, the weak ties sustained by social media produce little 
more than “clicktivism” (Gladwell, 2010b).  
The focus on the role of social media has been critiqued for taking away attention 
from the actual causes of protests and movements and the role of human agency.   
These labels attribute to a technology what is in fact the reaction to economic, social 
and political grievances (Ottaway and Hamzawy, 2011).    
These discussions illustrate some of the current debates about the role digital 
technology can play in political change.  These debates are pertinent as many media 
assistance donors are encouraging the use of ICTs in their programmes without any 
systematic evidence that they will achieve positive results.  According to Aday, “most 
accounts are based on anecdotes rather than rigorously designed research” (Aday et 
al., 2010:3). 
Along with the growth in these ICTs in Africa and claims of the democratising power 
of digital platforms, claims are also made about the knock-on effect on the public 
sphere.  Odugbemi maintains “whether these governments like it or not, these 
technologies are transforming their communication environments, their national 
public spheres in irreversible ways” (Odugbemi, 2014).  
It is asserted that this new space provides citizens with numerous opportunities to 
engage in political process as well as to take a more active role in the governance 
process (Benkler, 2006).    
This is important in the context of this research because, as noted, legacy media has 
traditionally been seen as fulfilling this role (see Habermas, 1962; Norris and Tettey, 
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2010) and media assistance projects often work to strengthen and support the public 
sphere. Can the internet and digital platforms do this more successfully? 
 
ICTs and the new Public Sphere 
The internet and digital media are seen to provide new opportunities for dialogue and 
participation and this is why they are often referred to as the New Public Sphere or 
‘virtual public sphere’.  In modern day high-tech societies, there is a redefinition of 
the public sphere which goes beyond Habermas to include new ‘cyberspaces‘ 
(Kellner, 2000:284).  A number of different formulations of this position exist. 
Castells, for one, maintains an optimistic view of the internet as a new space of 
inclusive public sphere, saying that ‘the internet was expected to be an ideal 
instrument to further democracy – and  still is’ (Castells, 2001:155). 
Benkler (2006) further asserts that the World Wide Web encourages a more open, 
participatory approach because it enables users to potentially communicate 
directly with many other users in a way that is outside the control of the media 
owners. He claims that it “holds great practical promise; as a dimension of 
individual freedom; as a platform for better democratic participation” (Benkler, 
2006: 2). 
Digital platforms have brought down barriers to group action, which has allowed for 
new ways of gathering together and getting things done.   In “The Political Power of 
Social Media” (2011) technology evangelist, Clay Shirky offers a view of social 
media as a long-term tool for strengthening civil society and the public sphere. He 
argues that by democratising media production, now with a handheld device, it 
“allows people to privately and publicly articulate and debate a welter of conflicting 
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views” (Shirky, 2011:5).  In other words, the internet provides not just great access to 
information, but greater “access to conversation”. 
Digital technologies and social media are seen to expand the realm for democratic 
participation and debate and create new public spaces for political discussion.  
Morrissett (2003) argued that ICTs can be used to provide a modern-day equivalent of 
the barbershop, connecting citizens across the nation and with their leaders (Morrisett, 
2003). 
This is especially relevant in countries where radio, television, and the other electronic 
media of communication are closed to critical voices, both in systems controlled by 
the state or by private corporations. In these countries, if access is permitted, the 
internet certainly provides a new public sphere where traditional media cannot, 
because it is censored by the state or by its ties to big business and advertising.   
This is of particular relevance in countries such as those we look at in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, as there are new spaces being created by digital technologies, and arguably 
these spaces for information, debate, and participation can invigorate democracy. 
For instance, Frère and Kiyindou (2009) claim that in francophone Africa the 
internet has enhanced citizen engagement in the public sphere through public 
debates, more access to official information and more interaction with civil 
society, thereby giving African citizens more capacity to participate in local and 
worldwide public spheres (Frère and Kiyindou, 2009:73). 
As will be seen in the country Case Studies, the internet in Kenya and Tanzania 
has enabled the growth of blogs, forums and social media which provides 
alternative virtual spaces to the mainstream media, which is the main has been co-
opted by politicians or business interests.  
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However, the idea of the internet as an ideal public sphere has its complications.  In 
The virtual sphere: The internet as a public sphere, Papacharissi (2002) maintained 
that although the internet may hold the promise of reviving the public sphere, features 
of the technology simultaneously curtail its potential: information access inequalities 
and new media literacy issues.  She claimed:  
A new public space is not synonymous with a new public sphere. As public space, the 
internet provides yet another forum for political deliberation. As public sphere, the 
internet could facilitate discussion that promotes a democratic exchange of ideas and 
opinions. A virtual space enhances discussion; a virtual sphere enhances democracy  
(Papacharissi, 2002:11).  
 
Papacharissi also noted that internet-based technologies, while enabling discussion 
between people on far sides of the globe, also frequently fragments political discourse. 
So while these technologies have the potential of bringing people together, they also 
risk “spinning them in different directions” (Papacharissi, 2002:16).  
Comparing new and old media, a study by German scholars Jürgen Gerhards and 
Mike Schäfer in 2009 tried to establish whether the internet offers a better and broader 
communication environment compared to newspapers. They investigated whether the 
online space proved to be a more democratic public sphere, with a wider range of 
sources and views, but found "only minimal evidence to support the idea that the 
internet is a better communication space as compared to print media" (Gerhards and 
Schäfer, 2010:13).     
Furthermore, Gerhards & Schäfer found that the internet is not an alternative public 
sphere because less prominent voices end up being silenced by the search engines' 
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algorithms. "Search engines might actually silence societal debate by giving more 
space to established actors and institutions" (Gerhards and Schäfer, 2010:14). 
This is noteworthy here because there is often a utopian rhetoric that surrounds 
discussion on new media technologies and promises of citizen engagement.   
Proponents of cyberspace claim that online discourse will increase political 
participation and pave the way for democracy.   
However, Fackson Banda (2009) questions whether new media technologies do 
“indeed improve and qualitatively change the African continent’s political structures, 
systems, and process or only create a quantitative increase in access to information 
and interaction stemming from the ease and relative cheapness of new ICTs” (Banda 
et al., 2009:14).   
The tech-evangelists believe that the virtual sphere holds promise as a political 
medium as it encourages political discussion and serves as a forum for it.  However, 
the virtual public sphere is dominated by those with access to computers or mobile 
internet, much like the bourgeois of Habermas’ public sphere, still available to only a 
portion of the population. Furthermore, as will be investigated later in the thesis, 
technologies are not universally accessible and can result in fragmented discussions.   
Polat (2005) suggests that although the internet may provide an additional space for 
political deliberation, its role in extending the public sphere is limited because “of its 
fragmented nature, inequalities in access and formation of groups around single 
issues” (Polat, 2005:452). 
Research by Davis (2007) on the internet’s role in representative politics found that 
new media accelerated the decline of the traditional mass-mediated public spheres and 
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contributed to “exclusionary political ‘elite discourse networks’ despite assumptions 
to the contrary” (Davis, 2007:55).  
Indeed, Foster and McChesney state that ‘the enormous potential of the internet has 
vaporized in a couple of decades’ (Foster and McChesney, 2011:21).  The era of Echo 
Chambers12 and Fake News13 has also shown the virtual public sphere to be anything 
but ideal.   
Curran, Freedman and Fenton (2012) have challenged the cyber-optimism relating to 
the internet and its proposed transformational power over society. Fenton describes 
how social media “reinforces political fragmentation and inhibits solidarity among the 
disenfranchised”, whilst “providing an illusion of direct control through self-
expression” (Curran et al., 2012:170). 
Indeed, after examining the ownership structures of new media, Curran et al. find that 
the internet era is market by the increasing power of existing large corporations. And 
whereas democracy is intended to give a voice to everyone, the internet broadly fails 
to achieve this due to educational, language and economic barriers (Curran et al., 
2016). 
So, mobile phones may have transformed the “ecology of political 
communication” and also “facilitated democratic engagement”, but Tettey (2017) 
notes that despite this positive relationship there was still “no significant alteration 
 
12 In media, an echo chamber is a situation in which information, ideas, or beliefs are amplified or 
reinforced by transmission and repetition inside an "enclosed" system.  “The idea that online 
conversations about politics are typically divided into a variety of sub-groups, and that this division 
takes place along ideological lines with people only talking to others with which they are already in 
agreement (Bright, 2017: 1). 
 
13 A reference to fabricated and untrue stories, but used by current US President as a tool to discredit 
journalism and the press. 
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in fundamental structures of political power” (Tettey, 2017:1). 
In fact, Tettey (2001) argued that “while technologies have expanded the amount and 
sources of information that are potentially available to citizens, they have not resulted 
in any significant transformations in the way government is run or how politics are 
conducted on the [African] continent” (Tettey, 2001:1). 
So, while the literature suggests that the internet has the potential to extend the public 
sphere, at least in terms of the information that is available to citizens, more 
information does not necessarily lead to greater political activity.   
Akpan-Obong (2010) confirms “that ICTs may well have revolutionized the social 
space of sub-Saharans is not contested. Yet, one must grapple with the reality that 
level of mobile phone penetration has far outpaced political development in the sub-
Sahara” (Akpan-Obong et al., 2010:18). 
These issues make it a most interesting point in time to investigate support for media 
assistance and independent journalism and the impact of digital technologies on this 
sector.  
The potential of digital technologies with respect to social change will be explored 
more in later chapters in relation to the two case study countries.  The stakeholders 
provide valuable insights into the true potential of ICTs to influence change on the 
continent. 
The cyber-optimism that is apparent in the literature would suggest that these new 
technologies will dramatically alter media development work - providing a new open 
space for political discussion, for participation, for education, for cross-society 
reconciliation even. What need for traditional media and traditional ‘media 
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development’ then?  Is it still relevant in the new information ecosystem in Africa?  
These are the central questions which the research addresses in subsequent chapters.    
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the debate on development aid, media 
development and ICTs in an African setting.   
It was noted that the concept of development itself is unclear and donors have 
different priorities and ways of expressing what it means to them in their aid policies. 
There is little evidence in the literature showing foreign aid as a resounding success, 
and there are arguments both for and against overseas development interventions. The 
same argument can be made for media assistance, or ‘media interference’ as it has 
been referred (Berger, 2002). 
Jones and Waisbord maintain “we still know very little about the link between aid 
interventions and media transformations” (Jones and Waisbord, 2010:1). Noske-
Turner noted that “few media assistance evaluations manage to provide sound 
evidence of impacts on governance and social change” (Noske-Turner, 2014:1). 
The fast growth of ICTs and the mobile phone on the African continent has been 
accompanied by enthusiastic claims about what they can do for the regions’ social, 
economic and political problems.  
This chapter examined the potential for ICTs and digital technology for development 
goals.  No doubt they have impacted on the social and economic sphere in this region 
of Africa, but the political impact of ICTs may have been exaggerated. This is 
particularly relevant for media development projects, where ICTs are being viewed 
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through rose-coloured lenses by donors as a solution to governance, accountability 
and participation issues. However, the effectiveness of new digital technologies to 
bring about political change is contested.   
Both Chapters 2 and 3 have critically assessed the strengths and weaknesses as 
outlined in the literature of both traditional media and ICTs with regard to 
development goals.  The primary research aims to ascertain from those working 
directly in the practice of media development whether these technologies can 
positively contribute to their programmes to address media development goals. Thus, 
the research will build on the academic literature reviewed here to address the 
question of whether media assistance is still relevant in the current political and 
technological environment. 
Chapters 5 and 6 present findings on the current landscape and ‘information 
ecosystem’ for media development practice in Kenya and Tanzania and subsequently, 
whether these digital technologies are being utilised to address donor goals. Prior to 
that, Chapter four will outline the methodology adopted.   
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Chapter 4  
Methodology 
 
This chapter outlines the methods and the research design employed to address the 
central research question of whether media assistance is obsolete, and more 
specifically the potential for digital technologies to achieve media development donor 
goals in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Motivated by ongoing changes in the media and 
journalism spheres brought about by digital technology, the thesis asks how these 
changes are impacting in practice on the media development sector.14   
The approach adopted in the research design was a mixed method one using a variety 
of research methods to address the hypothesis. This entailed using secondary data 
sources to construct case studies of the two focus countries followed by a period of 
qualitative research comprising face to face interviews to collect primary data.  The 
rationale for using these methods will be discussed in more detail in this chapter. 
In answering whether digital technologies can contribute to donor goals in media 
development practice, the research elicits the views of those working on the ground 
implementing projects as to whether they are integrating these technologies into their 
 
14 The distinction is made again between Media Development as in strengthening the media sector and 
media for development, which uses media as a medium for development messages. These are both 
covered by the umbrella term ‘media development sector’. The research found that in the case study 
countries, these two disciplines tended to overlap. 
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programmes, and if they are being used to what success. If they are not being used, the 
research investigates why not. 
The underlying rationale is that if digital technologies are being used in media 
development activities to address media development objectives, will this render 
established methods of media assistance redundant?  Thus, the thesis looks at what 
form current media development practice takes in East Africa, specifically in Kenya 
and Tanzania.  In this chapter then, the methods used to address the central research 
question will be discussed.   
 
Methods for this research 
The choice of which research method to employ depends on the nature of the research 
question. Morgan and Smircich (1980) argue that the actual suitability of a research 
method  “derives from the nature of the phenomenon to be observed” (Morgan and 
Smircich, 1980:491).  
The first step was to review the literature on media development, democracy 
promotion and ICTs in development to provide a theoretical underpinning for the 
research question.  To provide deeper insight into the subject matter, the literature 
review in Chapters 2 and 3 gave a background to the field of media development and 
the media assistance sector, of the ideology that drives it, including the context for 
media development activity on the African continent today.  The literature provides a 
framework on which to understand the role and function of media assistance in Sub-
Saharan Africa in its current setting. 
As such, appropriate methods are required in order to: 
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a) Compile recent data via desk review of available sources of information on Kenya 
and Tanzania.  This will give a picture of the context and landscape (or the 
‘information ecosystem’15) in which ‘media development’ projects are currently 
being carried out in these countries  
b) Garner from a range of key informants working within the media development 
sector in Kenya and Tanzania the degree to which digital technologies and social 
media are being utilised in their current programmes.  This provides the “view 
from practice” of the thesis title.  It was thought especially important to provide a 
perspective from those working directly in the field of media development, a 
practical view which could illuminate whether digital technologies can live up to 
their promise in the context of media assistance.  The key stakeholders can also 
provide a view as to whether the work is still relevant in the current information 
eco-system. 
 
With regards to (a) above, the research presents an overview of the media landscapes 
in Kenya and Tanzania and how they may have changed as a result of recent changes 
in digital media technologies.  Any changes in the media environment might influence 
the medium used or media addressed by media development NGOs in their projects or 
the format of capacity building programmes. A survey of the media environment 
might also help identify what media interventions are needed in the region.   
For instance, media development projects, if they are going to be effective, need to 
employ the media that their target groups are using.  As example, if a donor is funding 
 
15 An “information ecosystem” refers to the producers and consumers of various types of media, as 
well as the social and community structures through which information is accessed, consumed, 
influenced, trusted, and shared (Bourgault, 2016). 
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a project with the objective of encouraging urban youth to engage more and 
participate in political processes, the project might use TV (a more urban based media 
in many African countries) or youth journals/ magazines to connect with this group.  
Alternatively, if a project is trying to encourage rural women to use more modern 
practices in their agricultural work, the project would most likely use radio (which is 
widely used in rural Africa, both my males and females, literate and non-literate).   
With regards to media sector reform projects, if there are training initiatives taking 
place, to what extent do journalists need capacity building in digital technologies or 
are they already skilled in these areas? And with media restructuring endeavours, have 
these projects changed to incorporate the newer technologies?  Are ICTs a central part 
of media sector transformation programmes, if any are being undertaken?  
Providing a snapshot of the focus countries’ media systems will enable a deeper 
understanding of the needs of the media sector in the region, what the industry term 
‘needs analysis’.  
Thus, the country case studies give a background context for the media development 
projects that are taking place, and furthermore, can identify what media assistance 
interventions are needed, if any.  This will help with assessing whether digital 
technologies have the potential to contribute to these interventions. 
The research approach is also informed by Robson and McCartan (2016) who suggest 
the following guidelines for selecting research methods: 
To find out what people do in public: use observation 
To find out what they do in private, use interviews or questionnaires  
To find out what they think, feel and/or believe, use interviews, questionnaires or 
attitude scales  (Robson and McCartan, 2016:242) 
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As noted by Woods, “large amounts of relevant information about the experiences of 
others may be collected by directly questioning or talking to people” (Woods, 2011:2).  
Therefore, in this instance, it was deemed most appropriate to use qualitative 
interview methods to learn directly from those organisations implementing the 
projects, what the shape and form of those projects were, to what extent they use ICTs 
to enhance their projects and whether these technologies have the same potential to 
achieve donor goals. 
Analysis of the primary interview data will also give a picture of what activities the 
‘media development’ sector is currently implementing in their projects in Kenya and 
Tanzania.  The interview data thus gives perspective on whether media assistance is 
still relevant and also contributes an insight into the future role, if any, for the media 
development sector. 
The justification for these qualitative methods will be now be outlined.    
 
Methodology 
As noted, in this research the methodology was two-pronged.  Firstly, case studies of 
the two countries under review, Kenya and Tanzania, were developed. Then, face-to-
face interviews were conducted with stakeholders in the media development sector in 
these two countries. This section will illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of 
the different methods considered and the rationale for adopting a qualitative approach 
for capturing primary data in this instance.   
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Buckley and Chiang (1976) describe research methodology as a strategy or 
‘architectural design’ by which the researcher maps out an approach to problem-
solving (Buckley et al., 1976).  According to Crotty (1998), research methodology is a 
comprehensive strategy ‘that silhouettes our choice and use of specific methods 
relating them to the anticipated outcomes’ ( in Jamshed, 2014:1).  The choice of 
research methodology is based upon the type and features of the research problem 
(Noor, 2008). 
Silverman discusses the relative merits of quantitative and qualitative methods in this 
book Doing Qualitative Research and says that “outside the social science community 
there is little doubt that quantitative data rules the roost” (Silverman, 2006:35).  
However, the methods used by qualitative researchers show a belief that they can 
provide a “deeper understanding” of social phenomena than would have been 
garnered from purely quantitative data (Silverman, 2006:56).  
Dabbs (1982) claims that “quantitative and qualitative are not distinct” (in Berg et al., 
2004:2). Yet in many social sciences the quantitative orientations are often given more 
respect.  This may reflect the tendency of the general public to regard science as 
relating to numbers and implying precision.  
Berg (2004) confirms that “certainly, qualitative methodologies have not 
predominated in the social sciences.  After all, qualitative research takes much longer, 
requires greater clarity of goals during design stages, and cannot be analysed by 
computer programmes. Qualitative research methods and analytic strategies are not 
associated with high-tech society in the ways quantitative techniques may be”.    
Nonetheless, Berg adds that “qualitative research has left its mark conceptually and 
theoretically on the social sciences. The lasting contributions to social understanding 
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from qualitative research, as well as the sheer number of contributing social thinkers, 
are significant” (Berg et al., 2004:2). 
Creswell suggest that qualitative research methodology is suitable when the researcher 
or the investigator either investigates new field of study or intends to ascertain and 
theorise prominent issues (Creswell, 2007). Creswell adds that “researchers bring their 
own worldviews, paradigms, or sets of beliefs to the research project, and these inform 
the conduct and writing of the qualitative study” (ibid).   
In this instance, direction was taken from Berg who asserts “Qualitative research 
refers to concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions of 
things. In contrast, quantitative research refers to counts and measures of things” 
(Berg et al., 2004:3).  What was desired in this research was further insight and fuller 
description of media development projects taking place in-country than had been 
retrieved from project documentation and thus qualitative interview methods were 
considered most appropriate for gathering this data.  
 
Research Design 
The research process consisted of four main phases with each stage of the research 
used as input for the following part, as illustrated in the figure below: 
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Figure. 5   Research Design. 
 
The first part involved the literature review (reported in Chapters Two and Three), 
which surveyed the most relevant research themes from the literature and identified 
the following as particularly significant: the origin and growth of the media 
development sector; media assistance methods; theories of the press including media’s 
relationships to accountability, transparency, governance and democracy; the public 
sphere and the new public sphere; Development and Aid; ICTs and development. 
To understand the core tenets of the research question, those chapters review the 
academic literature on the following questions: how is media related to democracy? 
What is its relationship to the donors objective of democracy promotion? How is 
media linked to governance and accountability? What is the public sphere?  
The literature under consideration is drawn from a wide range of sources.  In addition 
to relevant academic literature on the social and political theory relating to the role of 
journalism and media in society and scholarly literature of development studies, this 
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research also draws on the substantial body of ‘grey literature’. This includes policy 
sources such as reports, working papers, and evaluations from government and 
institutional donors; research papers of media NGOs who implement projects and 
think-tanks working in the sector.  Online and academic sources relating to the field of 
Information Communication Technology for Development (ICT4D) and the debates 
regarding technology and social change are also consulted. 
These diverse sources have been used due to the limited academic literature on the 
subject of media development itself.  In reality, there is only a small (but admittedly 
growing) body of academic work focused on the media development sector. As 
Geertsema-Sligh (2019) notes “there is not much scholarly or theoretical research in 
the area (Geertsema-Sligh, 2019: 2440).  Historically, there have been few academic 
courses at third level education devoted solely to media development; often the 
subject is covered as a module under international development or political 
departments.  
Recent exceptions to this in the UK are Masters programmes at the University of East 
Anglia, University of Westminster, LSE and SOAS in London.  The programmes aim 
to provide an understanding of the relationships between media and development, and 
contemporary practices as defined by states, NGOs and other actors.  They cover 
theories and concepts and practical skills around the themes of media and 
development and communications. 
As a result, to get recent and up to date assessments of media development practice 
and projects, the literature review needed to draw on a combination of academic and 
so-called grey literature. This includes research emanating from organisations working 
in the sector. These organisations include UN institutions such as UNESCO and 
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UNDP, they include government funded research such as Centre for International 
Media Assistance and DFID, and they included implementing organisations such as 
BBC Media Action, IREX and Internews. These organisations produce research 
evaluation of projects and policy documentation relating to the media development 
industry. 
The literature review was followed by the data gathering process. Data gathering was 
divided into two phases; the creation of Case Studies and two fieldtrips for data 
collection to the focus region.  Research Trip One to Nairobi and Dar es Salaam 
during May 2014; and Research Trip Two to Nairobi during February 2015.  These 
data gathering phases will be described in more detail below.  
 
Data Gathering:  Phase 1 Case Study Country Profiles  
Detailed case profiles of the two countries under review were created to give a deeper 
insight of the ‘ecosystem’ in which media development projects are undertaken and to 
contribute to a better understanding of why certain media development projects are 
being carried out.   
The Case Study is an approach to research that assists the exploration of a 
phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources. This ensures that the 
issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows for 
multiple facets of the issue to be revealed and understood.  Robson describes Case 
Study as “a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a 
particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple 
sources of evidence” (Robson, 1993:146).  
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De Smaele has argued that “media systems are given shape not only by economic but 
also by political and cultural factors… behaviour patterns, questions of culture and 
habits” (De Smaele, 1999:186). The shape of media development projects are also 
determined by the same factors. 
According to Yin, a case study design should be considered when: (a) the focus of the 
study is to answer “how” and “why” questions; (b) you cannot manipulate the 
behaviour of those involved in the study; (c) you want to cover contextual conditions 
because you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under study; or (d) the 
boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context (Yin, 2003). Certainly 
(c) above is significant for this research undertaking - the context is relevant to the 
research project under study. 
Shuttleworth, noted “case studies make more interesting topics than purely statistical 
surveys…. The general public has little interest in pages of statistical calculations but 
some well-placed case studies can have a strong impact” (Shuttleworth, 2008:2).  
Robson argues that until recently case studies have been considered in methodology 
texts as “kind of 'soft option', possibly admissible as an exploratory precursor to more 
'hard-nosed' experiment or survey, or as a complement to such approaches but of 
dubious value itself (Robson and McCartan, 2016:151). 
In many studies, it can be appropriate to study more than a single case. Yin (1994) 
suggested that carrying out multiple case studies is more like doing multiple 
experiments, they may build upon the first experiment, perhaps carrying the 
investigation into an area suggested by the first study; or they may seek to 
complement the first study by focusing on an area not originally covered (Yin, 1994).  
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In this instance, a case study approach was adopted to gain a detailed understanding of 
the media landscapes in which current media projects are being carried out, and also 
what media assistance needs there may be.  Two case studies are presented as then 
comparative issues in these countries can be highlighted and analysed which will 
serve to support the evidence from both and enhance the credibility of the evidence. 
The first foundation of the case study is the subject and relevance.   For example, 
statistical analysis has shown that birth-rates in African countries are increasing. A 
case study on one or two specific countries becomes a good focused tool for 
determining the social and economic pressures driving this.  Similarly, with regards to 
this research thesis, statistics have shown widespread growth and penetration of new 
technologies and mobile phones in Africa. This case study will be a tool for 
determining the reasons driving this and then its effect on media development 
activities. Context is key. 
There are two key approaches that guide case study methodology; one proposed by 
Robert Stake, (1995) and the second by Robert Yin (2003). They use different terms 
to describe a variety of case studies. Yin categorises case studies as explanatory, 
exploratory, or descriptive. He also differentiates between single, holistic case studies 
and multiple-case studies.  
Stake (1995), by contrast, uses three terms to describe case studies; intrinsic, 
instrumental, and collective. According to Stake, if you are interested in a unique 
situation, conduct an intrinsic case study. This means that you have an intrinsic 
interest in the subject and you are aware that the results have limited transferability. If 
the intent is to gain insight and understanding of a particular situation or phenomenon, 
then Stake recommends using an instrumental case study to gain understanding. Stake 
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uses the term collective case study when more than one case is being examined. In 
these terms, the case study method in this thesis is both instrumental and collective 
(Stake, 1995). 
A major advantage of a case study as a methodological approach is that it provides 
much more detailed information than what may be available through other methods, 
such as surveys. Case studies also allow one to present data collected from multiple 
methods (i.e., surveys, interviews, document review, and observation) to provide the 
complete story.   
For this research, Kenya and Tanzania were chosen as the case study countries.   Both 
countries went through a process of media liberalisation during the last decade of the 
20th Century and as a result have seen a proliferation of media outlets and platforms. 
Not all the outcomes of the liberalisation process have been positive as noted in the 
literature review, but it provided the countries under review with dynamic and plural 
media landscapes in which to investigate the media development sector.  
As Deane et al explained: “liberalisation, particularly of broadcast media, has often 
been partial, haphazard and evolutionary rather than revolutionary, but it has 
nevertheless been transformative” (Deane et al., 2003a:70). 
Media Development NGOs have a well-established presence in these two countries 
and have been carrying out media development activities for decades. For instance, 
one area of focus has been supporting community radio,– i.e. radio produced by and 
for the community, independently of state or commercial interests – which has a long 
tradition throughout sub-Saharan Africa, and is widely considered important as a tool 
for social change, participatory development and poverty reduction (Skuse 2005; 
Slater and Tacchi 2004).  
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Another focus for media development NGOs in the region has been helping the 
process of converting previously government-controlled state broadcasters into public 
service broadcasters. However,  this process has been difficult and “there are very few 
examples of former state broadcasting monopolies successfully transforming 
themselves into genuinely public service broadcasters” (Deane et al., 2003a:74).  
Thus, donor-supported media development activities are well established in both of 
the case study countries, therefore providing ample secondary documentation but also 
suitable participants for the primary data collection. 
Another benefit of case studies as a method is that they typically rely on multiple data 
sources of information and methods to provide as complete a picture as possible. This 
is a strategy which also enhances data credibility and reliability (Yin, 2003).  Potential 
data sources may include: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct 
observations, and participant-observation (Baxter and Jack, 2008).  In comparison to 
other qualitative approaches, with case study research, investigators can integrate 
quantitative survey data, which facilitates reaching a holistic understanding of the 
phenomenon being studied. This research integrated primary qualitative interview data 
in the case studies to add further in-depth information.  
There are many relevant indicators and data available for the research on Kenya and 
Tanzania which will make it possible to profile the media and ICT environment, as 
well as development and economic indicators. These measures will enable the study to 
give a comprehensive picture of the media and telecommunications landscape in the 
country.  
For example, with regards to the media landscape, there are three primary indices 
which are used by media development organisations to evaluate their projects as 
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baseline data and final data.  The indices by Freedom House, IREX and Reporters 
Without Borders form the ’oligopoly‘ (Burgess, 2010) of media rating systems so this 
research used them as a starting point.   
The indices focus on the social, economic and political environment as they relate to 
the media sector of a country. They are constructed by assigning quantitative 
measures to expert qualitative assessments. These numbers therefore are very different 
from either actual numbers of economic indicators like number of people living in a 
city, number of cars produced in a year or estimates like Gross Domestic Product, 
Foreign Direct Investment Inflow as a share of GDP, etc.  
Another source for profiling the media environment in Kenya and Tanzania is 
Intermedia ‘Audiencescapes’ research16.  AudienceScapes is well-known resource for 
the international development community for media habits and communication 
information on developing countries from a bottom-up perspective.  It provides 
information for traditional and new media in terms of access and general use, 
including radio, television, mobile phones, newsprint and the internet.  While not 
completely up to date (the most recent user data for these countries is 2010/2011) it 
provides invaluable qualitative research into local audience media and telecoms habits 
in the countries under question. 
Thus, for the case study in this research thesis, data from these multiple sources will 
be synthesised in the analysis process rather than handled individually. Each data 
source is one piece of the “puzzle,” with each piece contributing to the researcher’s 
understanding of the whole media landscape. Baxter and Jack  suggest this 
 
16 http://www.intermedia.org/research-findings/audiencescapes/ 
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convergence adds strength to the findings as the various strands of data are braided 
together to promote a greater understanding of the case (Baxter and Jack, 2008).   
As noted, primary interview data will also be included with secondary data, as 
stakeholder insights, in the case study profiles, and these will reveal in more detail the 
media systems, market structure and audience habits in Kenya and Tanzania. 
By accessing these data sources for the country case studies, the thesis can build a 
picture of both the background social and political environments and the media 
landscape.  Cross-referencing the data sets will help spot trends that have happened in 
these countries over the past years and also provide information such as audience 
habits of traditional media and in addition to usage patterns for newer technologies 
such as mobile and internet.   
Looking below the surface of the statistics will give a picture of whether the 
technology revolution is having a tangible impact in these countries.  For instance, 
despite rising access to mobile phones and the steady growth of these countries’ 
economies and populations, gender inequities and income disparities continue to 
present barriers.  As noted by Murthy “in many fast--‐emerging economies…… the 
privileged live in a highly connected information society, while those at the bottom of  
the income pyramid (BOP), and especially BOP women, remain disconnected” 
(Murthy, 2011a:2). 
Shuttleworth proposed that a case study is “an in-depth study of a particular situation 
rather than a sweeping statistical survey. It is a method used to narrow down a very 
broad field of research into one easily researchable topic” (Shuttleworth, 2008:1).   
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In this case, by choosing to add qualitative interview data in the case study, this 
research is able to go beyond the quantitative statistical survey and understand also 
social or cultural conditions which might affect media assistance requirements in the 
region. 
 
Data Gathering: Phase 2 Qualitative Interviews 
Berg claimed that “interviewing may be defined simply as a conversation with a 
purpose. Specifically, the purpose is to gather information” (Berg et al., 2004:67) 
In addition to secondary data sources, interviews are important sources of case study 
information. This type of qualitative research tries to understand and interpret the 
meaning of situations or events from the perspectives of the people involved and as 
understood by them.   
A choice between research methods rests fundamentally on a set of decisions about 
the questions a researcher wants to answer and the practicality of gathering the kind of 
data that will answer those questions.  Whereas, it is said that quantitative research 
seeks to identify the relation among a set of variables, qualitative research aims to 
gain some understanding of a phenomenon.  Collecting these descriptions can be done 
in several ways, of which face-to-face interviews are the most common.  
Kvale defines the purpose of the qualitative research interview as "to gather 
descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee with respect to interpretation of the 
meaning of the described phenomena" (Kvale, 1983:174).   This description was 
deemed most aligned with the research objectives, where semi-structured interviews 
could garner from interview participants what exactly was being implemented in 
projects and the advantages and disadvantages of these activities. 
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In this instance, it was felt that, whilst data could be obtained through policy and 
programme documents of the donors and NGOs implementing the projects, many 
documents are not readily available and also were not up to date. Interviewing staff of 
these organisations would give a much more current view as to what their activities 
are and it would also be possible to garner the negative or less successful aspects of 
some of their project work.  
 
The interview was also chosen as a suitable research method because, despite 
quantitative and statistical data, there are many cultural and local determinants that 
effect behaviour and adoption of new technologies in different countries.   A good 
example of this was described by Amy O Donnell, project manager for Frontline: 
SMS radio17 in interview with the author.   When talking about the potential of 
gathering market research information using mobile phones, she claimed that many 
local women in Kenya didn’t like sharing information about their age, sex and profile 
over text to ‘faceless institutions’: 
In their communities everyone knows each other and they take pride in the 
community and being known.  It was almost insulting to be asked by text “who are 
you?!” as it questioned their position in the community18 
 
This insight into how Kenyan women feel about using ICTs can be best gained by 
surveying those involved on the ground in implementing the projects.  It illustrates the 
 
17 Frontline SMS: Radio is an organisation which is creating a buzz in Africa with their free, 
downloadable, open source software which allows users to use SMS to communicate with large 
numbers of people using just a laptop and mobile, and is now being harnessed by many local and 
community radio stations in Africa.   
18 Amy O Donnell in interview with the author London 2012 
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complexities of personal ICT use in region. There is a practical and local element to 
every international development project and these are the details that are not 
immediately apparent from analysis of the secondary data sources.   
The primary advantage of in-depth interviews is that they provide much more detailed 
information than what is available through other data collection methods, such as 
surveys.  It can be argued that to understand the potential for digital technologies in 
media development projects it is logical to ask those implementing the projects at first 
hand. 
Interviewing is the most common format of data collection in qualitative research. 
Most qualitative research interviews are either semi-structured, lightly structured or 
in-depth (Mason,1994).   When choosing the interview, there are several forms of 
interviews that are possible: Open-ended, Focused, and Structured or survey. In an 
open-ended interview, key respondents are asked to comment about certain events. 
They may propose solutions or provide insight into events.  
Unstructured interview resembles a conversation more than an interview and is always 
thought to be a “controlled conversation,” which is skewed towards the interests of the 
interviewer (Gray, 2013). Non-directive interviews, a form of unstructured interviews, 
are aimed to gather in-depth information and usually do not have pre-planned set of 
questions (Jamshed, 2014).  
In contrast, semi-structured interviews are those in-depth interviews where the 
respondents have to answer pre-set open-ended questions and thus are widely 
employed by different professionals in their research. These types of interviews are 
conducted once only, with an individual or with a group and generally cover the 
duration of 30 min to more than an hour. 
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In this project, the research schedule contained a series of open-ended questions and 
the interviews were semi-structured.   A key feature of the semi-structured interview is 
in the partial pre-planning of the questions.  Semi-structured interviews allow for 
replication of the interview with others, but are less controlled.  Woods contends that 
“a great deal of qualitative research (grounded theory, thematic analysis, etc) uses 
semi-structured interview material” (Woods, 2011:7). 
 
In a semi-structured interview, as conducted in this instance, the researcher provides 
some structure based on his or her research interests but works flexibly and allows 
room for the respondent’s more spontaneous descriptions and narratives (Brinkmann, 
2014). 
The ability to ask some spontaneous questions is sensitive to the participants need to 
express themselves. They also may provide a more relaxed atmosphere in which to 
collect information—people may feel more comfortable having a conversation with 
you as opposed to filling out a survey (Boyce and Neale, 2006). 
As the interview was the primary data gathering instrument for the research, a semi-
structured interview was chosen where questions were carefully designed to provide 
adequate coverage for the purpose of the research. Major questions were developed in 
the form of a general statement which was then followed by a sequence of sub-
questions for further probing. 
In terms of research instrument design, the author drew up a schedule of interview 
questions in advance of the first field trip. This schedule (see Appendix A) has 20 
questions which were grouped into themes, such as Local Media Environment, 
Funding of projects, Journalism Practice, Current Media development Activity.  The 
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questions were derived from the primary Research Question, and were sub-themes 
within the hypothesis. 
  
 
Conducting the Fieldwork 
For this thesis, the author travelled to Nairobi and Dar es Salaam over two research 
field trips in 2014 and 2015 to meet and interview a sample of stakeholders in the 
media development sector.  Of the interviews conducted most of these were face-to-
face on the field trips; some were done via skype and a small number were completed 
by email.   
 
Most of the fieldwork involved interviewing using semi-structured questions with 
various categories of respondents from the participating organisations. These took 
place primarily in the respondents’ offices either in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam or 
London. A number also took place in cafes, though this did affect sound quality of the 
recordings.  
When using the interview as a methodology the author had to decide whether to take 
notes, tape the interview, rely on memory or write in the answers.   In this case, the 
author decided to use a dictaphone for most of the face-to-face interviews apart from 
one or two where the tape recorder was not permitted for security reasons (US 
Embassy, Dar Es Salaam) or the environmental noise was not suitable (Fes Media and 
Tanzania Media Fund, Dar Es Salaam). In these instances, handwritten notes were 
taken.    
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The Role of the Researcher  
The role of the Researcher in the study is also a factor that requires consideration.  
Hughes (2012) maintained that qualitative research is “not totally objective because 
the researcher is subjectively involved in the very choice of a problem as worthy of 
investigation and in the interpretation of the results” (Hughes, 2012:6). 
Denzin & Lincoln (2008) claim that in qualitative studies the researcher is an 
instrument of data collection.  Greenbank (2003) argued that consumers of the 
research need to know about the human instrument. The qualitative researcher needs 
to describe relevant aspects of self, including any biases and assumptions, any 
expectations, and experiences to qualify his or her ability to conduct the research 
(Greenbank, 2003). 
In this study, the author brought her experience of working in the media development 
industry to the work.  Having been a former actor in the sector - having previously 
worked for BBC Media Action, one of the largest Media Development Organisations 
(MAOs) - it could be argued that the author was an “insider” and had knowledge of 
the industry. While not being a full participant in the study the researcher brought 
previous knowledge, assumptions and even ideology to the study.  Attia and Edge 
(2017) argue that the researcher always has a particular standpoint. 
Punch (2008) maintains that the qualitative researcher should explain if their role is 
emic --an insider, who is a full participant in activity, programme, or phenomenon, or 
the role is more etic –from an outside view, more of an objective viewer. There could 
be a great deal of variations in between –a researcher can start as an outsider and then 
becomes a member of the group. Or the reverse can occur –the researcher starts as a 
member of a group then becomes a more objective observer (Punch, 2008). 
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This process of reflection by the researcher, or reflexivity, is a process of self-critique 
to examine how her own experiences might or might not have influenced the 
researcher process (Dowling, 2006).   Reflexivity acknowledges the role of the 
researcher as a participant in the process of knowledge construction and not merely an 
outsider-observer of a phenomenon. So, reflexivity requires researchers to reflect upon 
and articulate their position and subjectivities (world view, perspectives, biases), so 
that readers can better understand the filters through which questions were asked, data 
were gathered and analysed, and findings were reported (Patnaik, 2013).   
Relevant researcher’s positioning include personal characteristics, such as gender, 
race, affiliation, age, personal experiences, linguistic tradition, beliefs, biases, 
preferences, theoretical, political and ideological stances (Bradbury-Jones, 2007). 
These positions of the researcher may impact the research several ways. First, they 
can affect access to the ‘field’ because respondents may be more willing to share their 
experiences with a researcher whom they perceive as one of them.   In this study, the 
authors’ position as a previous employee in the sector may have resulted in the 
researcher achieving easier access and greater response from interview participants.   
The researcher brought her insider knowledge of the sector, its motivation and its 
possible flaws, to the interview process. This may have meant that the researcher did 
not always ask participants to qualify or expand on certain answers during the 
interviews as the interviewer understood the terminology and context without having 
to go into as much detail.   
However, the author could engage with participants on a professional level within the 
discussions and understand the jargon and also the practicalities of implementing 
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projects in-country. This allows the researcher to find issues that are often missed 
(such as subtleties and complexities) (Hughes, 2012). 
The positions of the researcher may also shape the nature of researcher–researched 
relationship, which, in turn, affects the information that participants are willing to 
share; for instance, interview participants may feel more comfortable talking about 
project failures with a colleague from within the sector who can empathise with the 
challenges of the work, than with an outsider.  
Bradbury-Jones (2007) maintains that reflexivity can occur throughout all phases of 
the research process, including the formulation of a research question, collection and 
analysis of data, and drawing conclusions (Bradbury-Jones, 2007).  Kacen and Chaitin 
(2006) argued that the worldview and background of the researcher affects the way in 
which she constructs the world, poses questions, and chooses the lens for filtering the 
information gathered from participants and making meaning of it (Kacen and Chaitin, 
2006).   
Doctoral research demands a high level of critical analysis of the subject matter, but 
the researcher acknowledges the potential impingement of subjectivity on the analysis. 
In this instance the researcher reflected on herself as the researcher in an attempt to 
provide more effective and impartial analysis.  The researcher of this study, coming 
from a predominantly white, Christian, liberal democracy in the West of Europe, 
might bring that bias to the research and interviews, and the analysis of data. Kvale 
called it “the asymmetrical power relations of the research interviewer and the 
interviewed subject” (Steinar Kvale, 2002). 
Temple and Young (2004) maintain that positionality can affect research outcomes 
and interpretations, because “one’s position within the social world influences the way 
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in which you see it” (Temple and Young, 2004:164). The researcher reflected on 
whether she had directed some of the participants towards answering the questions in 
a particular way and concluded that while she had certainly endeavoured not to, 
objectively this could have occurred.  As Wilkie argues “it is a subtle readjustment to 
your self-awareness that can make a profound difference to what you get out of your 
research” (Wilkie, 2015). 
Furthermore, working as a western researcher in an international context, especially in 
the global south, gives rise to ethical issues and questions, which will now be 
addressed.  
 
Research Ethics 
Any research that involves human subjects or participants raises unique ethical, social 
and political issues. Research ethics is interested in the analysis of any ethical issues 
that arise when people are involved as participants in research. There are several 
objectives in research ethics. The first and broadest objective is to protect human 
participants.  
Thus, the research should be conducted with integrity and minimises physical, mental, 
legal or financial risk for the participants. The research was undertaken with ethical 
principles such as avoiding doing harm, seeking informed and voluntary consent from 
those taking part, respecting confidentiality and anonymity of participants.   
A secondary objective of research ethics is to ensure that research is conducted in a 
way that serves interests of individuals, groups and/or society as a whole. Another is 
to examine specific research activities and projects for their ethical soundness, looking 
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at issues such as the management of risk, protection of confidentiality and the process 
of informed consent.   
Doiron and Asselin (2015) claim that there are several dilemmas for researchers 
planning to work in Global South countries with “few or different ethical standards for 
conducting research… from the Global North academic community” (Doiron and 
Asselin, 2015:1). These dilemmas can include: 1) differing views on what counts as 
research: 2) differing values and policies on gender, religion, inclusive practices and 
other social and cultural areas; 3) the insider/outsider phenomenon (white privileged 
researchers working in non-white communities); and 4) development of culturally 
sensitive research instruments (Doiron and Asselin, 2015).  
Hosted in the School of Media at TU Dublin (then DIT), the project was granted 
ethical approval and complied with the ethical requirements as set out by TU Dublin’s 
Research Ethics Committee. Falling within the broad domain of social sciences 
research, the project was informed by ethical guidelines such as those of the 
Sociological Association of Ireland and the British Sociological Association.  
The project also incorporates the field of development studies to the extent that the 
primary research question is centred on media and development.  This is an ethically 
complex field of enquiry.  Development studies often involves work with research 
participants at completely different levels of social and economic power to the 
researcher.   
However, there is a notable lack of literature that deals specifically with the ethical 
dimensions of social science in developing contexts. Whilst work has been undertaken 
to both comment upon and critique medical research, this is far from true for social 
science research ethics generally. Brown et al. (2004) claim that 
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It is fair to say that there is a notable paucity of literature that deals specifically with 
the ethical dimensions of social science in developing contexts... With a few notable 
exceptions very little from within quantitative social science has been published on 
the ethical difficulties presented by the methodological complexities of 
underdeveloped regions since ... the early 1980s (Brown et al.,2004:5). 
 
Andrew Sumner, from the Institute of Development Studies UK, argues that this field 
has yet to explore fully many of the ethical dilemmas raised by doing research in 
developing countries (Sumner, 2007).   
In the past, development studies have faced criticism from ‘post-development theory’ 
and ‘post-colonial theory’. As covered in Chapter 3, some scholars suggest that 
‘development’ itself might be a problem because it presents a Western view of 
development as modernity that is then imposed on the Third World.  In the same way, 
media assistance and development has been criticised for transplanting its own models 
of democracy and journalism on recipient nations (LaMay, 2007; Barker, 2008).  
Thus, there are a number of special considerations for research in developing 
countries and contexts.  In particular, research projects in these contexts can involve 
some of the world’s least powerful and most vulnerable populations.  The 
relationships between the researcher and the researched in such contexts are likely to 
be asymmetrical, and this may impact both on the welfare of participants and the 
veracity of findings.  
In this case the researcher was a white, female from a Western European nation.  In 
terms of the profile of the interview participants, some were European employees and 
managers from donors, NGOs or Media Assistance Organisations. Some were local 
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staff from Tanzania and Kenya. All of the interviews were conducted in English, and 
in public spaces such as their workplace, a café or hotel lobby.   
The researcher needed to consider whether there was any implicit bias in the form of 
interviewees seeking to give answers they thought the interviewer might want.  
Crawford (1997) refers to this as “courtesy bias” - the tendency for respondents to 
give answers that they think the interviewer wants to hear, rather than what they really 
feel. Courtesy bias can be a hurdle to gaining useful and reliable data.   
However, Crawford suggests that this can be mitigated or avoided by the creation of a 
good interview environment and an appropriate relationship between the interviewer 
and the respondent (Crawford, 1997).   In this instance, project documentation relating 
to the structure of the projects themselves would back up the information relating to 
the make-up of media projects, which would corroborate the interview data.  
Consideration must be given to the idea that the participants were being deferential 
given the privileged position of the researcher. However, as noted previously, many of 
the key informants were also white westerners and those participants that were local 
were often in senior positions within the organisations and so had their own seniority 
and authority to counter this.   
Interview participants were at all times professional, courteous and helpful during the 
interview process and there was mutual respect for each other’s professional position.  
Consideration must also be given to the issue of gender. As Järviluoma et al. (2003) 
argue “the importance of gender should not be understated, as it is not an 
inconsequential detail that may be ignored in research situations. On the contrary it is 
a significant topic of research as such” (Järviluoma et al., 2003:27).  It could be 
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argued that the researcher’s gender impacted on the behaviour and responses of the 
interview participants in the same way as her ethnicity and race, and thus would 
impact on the data collected.   
Interestingly, Huddy et al (1997) propose that less-well educated respondents are more 
influenced then well-educated by the interviewer’s gender. They argue that well 
educated people are not affected by gender as much because they are more 
accustomed to inter-gender relations (Huddy et al., 1997). In this case, it could be 
argued that the informants were well-educated in so far as they had relatively senior 
roles in the participating organisations and in addition familiar with dealing with 
different genders in their day to day work in these international organisations.  
Conducting fieldwork overseas, particularly in the Global South, can also be a 
challenge. The researcher may face logistical complications, health and safety issues, 
cultural differences, language barriers, and more.  Lunn argues that “the reality is that 
each situation is unique and the individual researcher must negotiate their own path 
through a variety of ethical challenges and dilemmas” (Lunn, 2014: xix).   
For this fieldwork conducted in-country in Tanzania and Kenya, the researcher 
managed any potential complications by making very detailed logistical arrangements 
in advance.  All the participants were asked for their consent in advance by email to 
interview with the author and participate in the study. Participants were fully briefed 
on the purposes of the study to support informed consent and were free to withdraw at 
any time. They were provided with detailed information about the project, its aims, 
and potential future publication.  The researcher made clear the purpose of the 
research and was in frequent contact with the participants in advance of meetings, by 
email and mobile phone.   
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The interviews were conducted in English and in the context of one professional to 
another, and in public spaces or offices.  This is not to say that there were not 
language barriers, but by using a Dictaphone the researcher could double check the 
data at a later date to assist comprehension.  Not all interviews undertaken provided 
relevant or pertinent data.  
Despite detailed plans and preparations in advance of the fieldwork in this instance, 
Lunn concludes that, because of the complexity of fieldwork in the ‘global south’, 
“there is no one correct way to conduct research 'ethically' …despite what formalised 
paperwork from ethics review boards suggests” (Willis, in Lunn, 2014:268).  
 
Interview Participants: Types and Roles 
To get a good spread of opinions the participants in the interviews were stakeholders 
at various levels of the media and media development industry. The individuals who 
participated in the research were either from international donor organisation who 
fund media development projects, or staff from Media Development NGOs and other 
individuals working in the ICT or media sector.   
Potential respondents were initially identified by search through company websites 
and documentation, and by recommendation from other interview respondents, based 
on their job responsibilities, position and involvement in media development 
activities. Social Networks and LinkedIn were also a source of potential respondents.  
Respondents were also selected on the basis of the researchers’ individual judgement 
on the grounds that they could provide the necessary information needed for the 
research.  
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All of the individuals were emailed in advance and given details of the research and 
the objectives for meeting and interviewing.  Those who were contacted were very 
positive in their response to participate in the research.  Respondents were asked to 
and agreed to participate in interviews, either in person, by skype or email.  
Participants were notified that the interview would be published in the research thesis 
or the print media in Ireland.  Participants were informed of the availability of 
confidentiality should it be required. None of the participants in these interviews 
requested not to be identified or to use a pseudonym, thus their real names have been 
used.  
The participants were primarily speaking on behalf of their organisations.  Their role 
in the organisations was predominantly project staff, implementing the projects in-
country. Some of the participants are well-known in the media development 
community but they still spoke as representatives of their organisation or projects. For 
example, James Deane is a well-known media development advocate and expert, but 
he spoke from the position of his role as Policy Director for BBC Media Action.  A 
few individuals were not attached to any organisations such as the local journalists 
with whom the researcher met, such as Maurice O’ Nioango and Elsie Eyakuze. 
The interview participants came from different types of organisations as outlined 
below 
 
a. Donors:  these are the organisations that finance media development projects.  
Bi-Lateral funders include the UN, the EuropeAid, UNESCO.  Government 
funders include USAID, DFID (UK), Irish Aid, DANIDA (Denmark), German 
overseas development agency (KFW), NORAD (Norway) amongst other. 
According to much of the literature from the funding agencies, they are aware 
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of the growth in and optimistic of the opportunities presented by ICTs. 
However their documents seem unsure as to exactly what impact these are 
having.  The researcher asked respondents whether their positive attitudes to 
ICTs are directing their policies and whether this is reflected in new funding 
opportunities for media development.  Are the changes that are happening in 
technology impacting on international donor policy in terms of directing 
funds?  Are the donors prescribing the technological elements of projects or 
are implementing agencies free to choose which media to use? 
 
b. Project Implementers/ Media NGO staff:  These are the individuals at the 
vanguard of the media development industry.  These respondents could tell the 
researcher the objectives and formats of projects taking place on the ground.  
Are projects using digital technologies instead of old media?  In what way?  
Are the projects meeting their stated objectives?  What success have they had 
using digital technologies? What are the practical hurdles with using digital 
technologies in African projects? What are the problems in implementing the 
projects that do use ICTs?  And what is the future role of media assistance? 
 
c. Journalists/ Media staff:  journalists were interviewed to contribute to an up-
to-date picture of the media landscape in their country, and also what 
conditions are like working as a journalist in the present day in Kenya and 
Tanzania. They were also able to give an additional perspective on whether 
digital technologies are being used by the media industry in their country, and 
by journalists, in what manner and to what success. 
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d. Research Organisations: these organisations provided background 
information on the countries under review, both in terms of economic and 
social data but also in terms of citizens opinions on matters of public interest.  
For instance, Afrobarometer is a pan-African, research network that conducts 
public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and 
other issues in more than 35 countries in Africa. They state that through their 
research “ordinary citizens can have a voice in policy-making processes that 
affect their lives”19. They produce research on subjects such as corruption, 
poverty, democracy and attitudes to government. 
 
Of the 40 individuals interviewed over the course of the research, 20% were from 
donor organisations, 48% were from NGOs implementing media projects in some 
form, 10% were journalists and 12% were research organisations.  The remaining 
participants were from a news outlet, a journalism network or a local activism 
organisation which use media.   
 
The list of participants in the interviews is outlined in Table 1.    
  
 
19 https://www.afrobarometer.org/about 
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 NAME ORGANISATION Type of Org. Mode Location 
1 Amy O Donnell Frontline SMS NGO Face2Face 
Interview London 
2 
Carol Morgan  BBC Media Action NGO 
Face2Face 
Interview London 
3 
Caroline Ford BBC Media Action NGO 
Skype 
Interview  
4 
Ernest Sungura  Tanzania Media Fund NGO 
Face2Face 
Interview 
Dar Es 
Salaam 
5 
Aran Corrigan  Irish Aid Tanzania Donor 
Face2Face 
Interview 
Dar Es 
Salaam 
6 
Daniel Dedeyan  USAID Tanzania Donor 
Face2Face 
Interview 
Dar Es 
Salaam 
7 
Mark Montgomery  
Department for 
International 
Development  (UK) Donor 
Face2Face 
Interview 
Dar Es 
Salaam 
8 
Rolf Paasch  FES Media Tanzania Donor 
Face2Face 
Interview 
Dar Es 
Salaam 
9 
Colin Spurway  
BBC Media Action 
Tanzania NGO 
Face2Face 
Interview 
Dar Es 
Salaam 
10 
Kris Kapella  FeminaHip Tanzania NGO 
Face2Face 
Interview 
Dar Es 
Salaam 
11 
Anthony Wafula HIVOS NGO 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
12 
Ida Jooste Internews  NGO 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
13 
Alex Pitkin  Frontline SMS NGO 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
14 
Abel Oyuke  Afrobarometer Research Org 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
15 Rosemary Okello 
Orlale  Ford Foundation Donor 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
16 
Bart Sullivan Farm Radio Tanzania NGO 
Email 
Survey  
17 
Kees De Graaf Twaweza Tanzania NGO 
Skype 
Interview  
18 
Siema Patterson UNDP  Donor 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
19 
John Okande UNESCO ICT Donor 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
20 
Jackie Davies 
BBC Media Action 
Kenya NGO 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
21 
Chloe Spoerry HiviSasa NGO 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
22 
Eric Chinje 
African Media 
Initiative NGO 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
23 
Tom Rhodes 
Committee to Protect 
Journalists East 
Africa 
Non-Profit 
Journalism 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
24 
Angela Okune ihub Research Research Org 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
25 
Erik Hersman Ushaihidi 
Non-Profit 
Tech 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
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26 
Judy Kimamono 
Search for Common 
Ground NGO 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
27 
Daudi Were 
Making All Voices 
Count  Donor 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
28 
Claudia Lopes Africa’s Voices  NGO 
Skype 
Interview  
29 
Vincent O Neill,  
Embassy of Ireland, 
Kenya. Embassy 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
30 
Robert Munuku 
Action for 
Transparency  NGO 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
31 
Sasha Kinney PAWA 
Non-profit 
activism 
group 
Face2Face 
Interview Nairobi 
32 
Maurice O’nioango  Medeva Journalist Journalist 
Email 
Survey  
33 
Dickens Olewe 
The Star Journalist 
and UGC App Lead Journalist 
Skype 
Interview  
34 
Rob Burnet Well Told Story  NGO 
Skype 
Interview  
35 
Elsie Eyakuze  
Mikocheni Report 
Blog Tanzania Journalist 
Email 
Survey  
36 
Victor Bwire  Media Council Kenya Research Org 
Email 
Survey  
37 
Josh Oguare  Kibera news Network Journalist 
Email 
Survey  
38 
Gerry Power  
MC Saatchi World 
Services Research Org 
Face2Face 
Interview London 
39 
James Deane  BBC Media Action NGO 
Face2Face 
Interview London 
40 
Dmitry Shishkin BBC World Online  Media 
Email 
Survey  
 
Table 1.  Interview Participants 
 
These interviews helped to uncover not only what the funders’ priorities and 
motivations are in relation to their objectives with media development interventions 
but also the practical realities of managing projects on the ground.    At the early 
stages of the research, it became apparent that the general attitude of those working 
for media development organisations was one of scepticism towards the impact that 
digital technologies might have on the media development industry. They questioned 
the real role of social media in the so-called Arab Spring for instance, in contrast to 
the cyber-utopian narratives of the time.   
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For example, James Deane, from the BBC Media Action spoke about a recent large 
grant the organisation had received from the Department of International 
Development (DFID).  Deane mentioned that they did not yet know to what extent 
they would actually use digital or social media.  He spoke how their most innovative 
and creative project at the time called “Shankaboot” – an interactive web-based video 
series filmed in and around Beirut, Lebanon and the world's first Arabic Web Drama 
Series, which won the Digital Emmy in 2011.  However, this series “did not reach that 
many people!    If the objectives of the projects are civic engagement and reach, well 
the project was not deemed an unqualified success” (Deane, 2012, in interview).    
These insights revealed through face-to-face interviews in the research the reality of 
digital technology use for media development objectives and in particular negative 
aspects or failures in projects, which may not have been revealed using other research 
methods.  Using face-to-face, semi-structured interviews enabled the author to extract 
information that may not have been an answered in a survey question (Boyce and 
Neale, 2006). 
By conducting interviews with both media assistance donors and practitioners in 
Africa, the research unearthed the real-world practical experience and data needed to 
illustrate the landscape for digital technology and journalism in Africa.   It is a 
practitioner focused study with real world informants providing an industry 
perspective on the issues of media development assistance.    
As Esipisu and Kariithi (2007) note, despite the uptake of new technologies in Africa, 
“the African mass media system faces age-old problems stemming from poor 
ownership structure, a weak financial base, low quality staff (particularly journalists), 
lack of access to information, and conflict with authorities” (Esipisu and Kariithi, 
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2007:22).   Using qualitative methods in this research helped uncover to what extent 
digital technologies are being used by media assistance organisations to address such 
problems in the media systems. 
 
Key Organisation Profiles 
From the analysis of the interview data, it became apparent there were a number of 
key organisations which could add support to the research argument and act as 
illustrative examples for key points. The projects that such organisations undertake 
provided interesting perspectives on media development activity in an East African 
context.  They are relevant for illustrating the different form of media development 
activity being implemented.  In order to elaborate on their role within the research 
design, the relevant larger organisations are briefly introduced below with further 
details outlined in subsequent chapters. 
 
1. BBC Media Action 
BBC Media Action (formerly the BBC World Service Trust) is the BBC’s 
international development charity.  Funded independently by external grants and 
voluntary contributions, the purpose of the organisation is to promote development 
through the effective use of the media.  
BBC Media Action receives funds from international development agencies to provide 
journalism, media production and management training to organisations and 
practitioners around the world, which assist the development of an independent media 
with fair, accurate and objective news reporting. 
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It works in partnership with the BBC World Service and other local media and 
development partners in over 35 developing and transitional countries around the 
world. They provide mentoring and training for journalists and development 
professionals.  
BBC Media Action has established and managed Schools of Journalism in Belgrade, 
Sarajevo and in Ekaterinburg (Russia) and these projects provided media courses for 
national, community, public and independent broadcasting stations. Other training 
projects include post-conflict broadcasting courses. 
Another aspect of their work is to encourage programming on topics not traditionally 
covered by the local media, and to foster partnership and understanding between 
media organisations and other sectors such as NGOs, educational establishments and 
the civil service.  They have established and supported independent media 
organisations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Nepal and several regions of Africa.   
The researcher met and interviewed three key informants from the organisation: 
Jackie Davis – Project Manager – BBC Media Action Kenya 
Colin Spurway – Country Director – BBC Media Action Tanzania 
James Deane – Director of Policy and Learning 
 
2. The African Media Initiative 
The African Media Initiative (AMI) is a pan-African organisation that seeks to 
strengthen the continent’s private and independent media sector from an owner and 
operator perspective to promote democratic governance, social development and 
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economic growth. It does so through a set of activities aimed at transforming the 
media and communications landscape on the continent.  
AMI’s overall goal is to promote the development of pluralistic media as a necessary 
and critical ingredient of democratic governance, as well as economic and human 
development in Africa. The organisation was established in 2010 and is headquartered 
in Nairobi, Kenya. 
AMI’s work focuses on the following five priority areas: 
1. Expanding Access to Finance and New Revenue Streams 
2. Building a Leadership Cadre in the Media Sector  
3. Strengthening the Media Owners and Operators’ Community 
4. Harnessing the Digital Revolution through Technological Adaptation and 
Innovation 
5. Content Development for African media outlets, by African journalists 
 
The researcher met with the CEO of African Media Initiative, Eric Chinje, based in 
Nairobi. 
 
 
3. Internews 
Internews is an international non-profit organisation whose mission is “to empower 
local media worldwide to give people the news and information they need, the ability 
to connect and the means to make their voices heard”   
Internews trains both media professionals and citizen journalists, increases coverage 
of vital issues and helps establish policies needed for open access to information.  
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Internews programmes create platforms for dialogue and enable informed debate, 
which bring about social and economic progress.  Internews has worked with 4,800 
radio and television stations and print publications worldwide. Activities include: 
 Training. Internews trains 8-10,000 media professionals each year in 
journalism, production, and management. For more advanced students, 
Internews offers training in topics such as computer graphics, media law, and 
investigative journalism. 
 Production. To strengthen the independent media sector, Internews works with 
local media professionals to produce original programming.  
 Media infrastructure: Internews provides a broad range of infrastructure 
support to enable independent media to provide vital news and information, 
including providing journalists and stations with production equipment, 
creating production studios, and building radio stations from the ground up. 
 Media law and policy. To allow independent media to fulfill their “watchdog” 
function, Internews has worked for the adoption and implementation of fair 
media laws and policies in 21 countries. 
 
In Kenya, Internews works with media to develop a response to issues such as 
HIV/AIDS, child and maternal health and malaria using broadcast and print media. 
Internews Kenya also supports projects that counter hate speech, promote peaceful 
solutions and further better understanding of election issues. 
The researcher interviewed Internews Kenya Country Director Ida Jooste. 
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4. UNESCO 
UNESCO encourages international peace and universal respect for human rights by 
promoting collaboration among nations.  UNESCO pursues its objectives through five 
major programmes: education, natural sciences, social/human sciences, culture and 
communication/information.  
Projects sponsored by UNESCO include literacy, technical, and teacher-training 
programmes, the promotion of independent media and freedom of the press and 
attempts to bridge the worldwide digital divide.  UNESCO’s approach to media 
development includes tailored activities that are context-sensitive, and which also take 
account of the challenges and opportunities created by the rapidly changing media 
environment.  
UNESCO Media Development Activities include: Journalism education and training; 
Journalism Curricula; Journalists Safety Indicators; Media Development Indicators. 
The special-purpose International Programme for the Development of 
Communication (IPDC) is a unique multilateral forum in the UN system that 
mobilises the international community to support media in developing countries 
through a grant-making process. 
UNESCO Kenya is involved in many projects to encourage freedom of expression and 
support independent media. Their project "Empowering Local Radios with ICTs"  is 
funded by the Swedish aid agency, SIDA and aims to bridge the gap between poor 
people - especially women and girls - and encourage public debate on issues of local 
public concern.  
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This is achieved through a series of capacity-building activities in local radio stations, 
improving the programming quality, providing training on the use of ICTs and helping 
them to increase their geographical range of news coverage with a network of 
correspondents. The project, furthermore, focus on gender equality actions and 
financial sustainability of the radio stations. 
The researcher met with UNESCO project Manager John Okande. 
 
5. FARM Radio 
Farm Radio is a Canadian charity working with more than 650 radio partners in sub-
Saharan countries to fight poverty and food insecurity.  They help African radio 
broadcasters meet the information needs of local small-scale farmers and their 
families in rural communities.   
They provide training services to broadcasters, including direct in-station training, 
distance education and custom workshops to help them meet a higher standard of farm 
radio services. All training is directly targeted toward the needs and realities of 
broadcasters 
They aim to provide and exchange practical and timely information for use by their 
broadcasting partners (community, public and private radio stations, farmers 
associations, productions houses).  They work in three areas: Impact Programming, 
Broadcaster Resources, and Broadcaster Training. 
They have also created, Barza, an online community for African radio broadcasters. 
This is a space for broadcasters, who all share similar experiences even though they 
can be thousands of kilometres apart, to interact and share resources with their peers.  
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Broadcasters can access a library of scripts, Farm Radio Weekly, and on-line training 
modules.  It also offers a way for broadcasters to share scripts and programmes that 
they have created.  And it is a place where broadcasters can discuss issues, chat, and 
follow each other. 
The researcher spoke with Bart Sullivan, Radio and ICT Manager with FARM Radio. 
 
6. HIVOS 
Hivos (Humanist Institute for Cooperation) is the Dutch organisation for development 
and it supports social change, digital activism and rural innovations.  They support 
civil society organisations and “infomediaries” (e.g. independent journalists, 
hacktivists,   academics and civic watchdogs) to make information accessible and 
usable for citizens who wish to hold governments and companies to account. 
HIVOS works in areas so these infomediaries also feel safe and independent enough 
to use the available space for expression, dialogue and debate. They want 
powerholders to have a more open and responsive attitude towards transparent and 
accountable governance. 
With their Kenya Media Program (KMP), they aim to improve the quality of 
journalism in Kenya and contribute to a responsive, representative and accountable 
government through citizen engagement. Its purpose is to strengthen the existing 
media landscape in Kenya. As a dedicated media facility, the KMP provides a 
framework of various interventions aimed at improving the professionalisms and 
effectiveness of the media in Kenya. 
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KMP focuses particularly on improving the professionalism and effectiveness of 
public interest and investigative or quality journalism. Financial resources are made 
available for selected media-related institutions, development organisations, training 
institutes, policy and research initiatives, media houses and journalists. 
Their key funding partners are: the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DFID), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), 
Canadian Development Agency (CIDA) and the Netherlands Embassy. HIVOS 
implement the project on their behalf. 
The researcher met with Anthony Wafula, Programme Manager for KMP. 
 
7. Tanzania Media Fund (TMF) 
The TMF aims to support an independent, quality, diverse and vibrant media in 
Tanzania by enabling investigative and public interest journalism and facilitating 
critical reflection and learning. 
Through funding and learning activities, they support quality journalism that better 
informs the public, contributes to debate and thereby increases public demand for 
greater accountability across Tanzania. TMF’s interventions focus on strengthening 
the media through a combination of training and mentoring, buoyed by grant-giving. 
TMF offers five different grants. These have been developed in order to increase the 
quality, quantity and diversity of investigative and public interest journalism products 
in the media as well as to strengthen the professional capacity of journalists and media 
institutions. 
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TMF provides mentoring to both individual and institutional grantees. Mentorship for 
individual grantees largely focuses on enabling journalists to increase their skills and 
thus the quality of their products during the course of their grant. 
For example, one grantee, Envirocare received a capacity building grant to engage 20 
journalists in reporting on chemical management in the textile and tanning industries 
in Tanzania. Journalists on the project received investigative journalism training 
before they went into factory premises to investigate approaches to disposal of 
wastewater from leather treatment processes after which they wrote exposés on the 
impact of the pollution. 
The researcher met with the Head of TMF, Ernest Sungura in Dar Es Salaam. 
 
8. FeminaHip 
Femina Hip is a civil society initiative working with youth, communities and strategic 
partners across Tanzania. Since 1999, their aim has been to promote healthy lifestyles, 
sexual health, HIV prevention, gender equality and citizen engagement.   
Femina Hip employs a range of communication vehicles, including traditional and 
social media products, used in a strategic and complementary way to achieve their 
objectives. They also promote active learning through outreach activities and 
multimedia products focusing on entrepreneurship, financial literacy and secure 
livelihoods. 
Its media products have has grown from one magazine (Femina) to two magazines 
(Fema and Si Mchezo!), two television products (Fema TV Talk Show and Ruka Juu), 
an interactive website (Chezasalama) and an interactive SMS platform. All are backed 
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by community mobilisation and face-to-face interaction through Fema Youth Clubs.  
Femina’s media products are estimated to reach an audience of about 11 million.  
According to Femina, they are the largest local, multimedia civil society organisation 
working with youth, communities, and partners throughout Tanzania. Edutainment is 
their main approach, whereby Femina entertains and educates audiences through real-
life stories, testimonials and docudrama.  
Femina conducts strategic communication through clear messaging and a participatory 
production process, which gives voice to young people; resulting in a more relevant 
end product which effectively transmits knowledge, shifts attitudes, and creates 
behavioural change, triggering social action. 
This messaging is brought directly to the audience through magazines, TV, radio, 
social media, SMS as well as community mobilisation activities which, taken together, 
reinforce key messages.  
What marks out Femina even more is the powerful brand they've created over the past 
12 years. They are a very well-liked and hugely trusted brand, associated with young 
people and use their edutainment approach to ‘educate by stealth’. 
The researcher met with Kris Kapella, Strategy Development and Evaluation Advisor 
from Femina Hip. 
 
9. Twaweza 
Twaweza is a citizen-centred initiative, focusing on large-scale change in East Africa.  
Twaweza means 'we can make it happen' in Swahili.  Twaweza works towards 
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enabling children to learn, citizens to exercise agency and governments to be more 
open and responsive in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. 
They seek to enhance ‘citizen agency,’  the ability of men, women and young people 
to get better information more quickly, cheaply and reliably; monitor and discuss 
what’s going on; speak out; and act to make a difference.    
Twaweza supports ordinary citizens in East Africa to: 
 Access information – by expanding the means and channels through which 
people can access information   
 Exercise agency – to express views, take initiative to improve lives, and hold 
government accountable 
 Get better services – such as primary and secondary education, primary health 
care and clean water, and exercise greater control over public money 
 
Twaweza works to provide practical information to everyone, to foster quality 
independent media and citizen monitoring services. By addressing these issues 
through its partner organisations, Twaweza works to create what it calls an 'ecosystem 
of change. They undertake public and policy engagement, through media partnerships 
and leadership of initiatives such as the Open Government Partnership. 
Twaweza works through 'five networks,' which already reach millions of citizens 
across East Africa and are important in their lives – mass media, mobile phones, 
religion, teachers' unions and fast-moving consumer goods. Twaweza builds 
partnerships in all these areas to spread ideas, draw in new voices and open up 
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conversations. It works like a venture fund, initiating ideas and getting new 
organisations off the ground. 
Twaweza is supported by a consortium of donors who provide long-term support 
towards the overall programme. These are Sida, UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) Tanzania and Uganda, the Hewlett Foundation, AJWS and 
Danida.  
The researcher spoke with Kees De Graaf, Director of ICT Programmes at Twaweza. 
 
10. Well Told Story (WTS) 
Well Told Story is an innovative, socially‐oriented media research and production 
company based in Kenya.  Since being established in 2009, Well Told Story has 
developed and produced a set of media intended to reach and engage young people 
with important information that can contribute positively to their lives. 
Their main project is centred on a character called Shujaaz, an on‐going  multi‐media  
communications platform encompassing monthly comic books (30m+ free copies 
distributed to date), daily syndicated radio shows, SMS, online, video, and national 
TV. This project has reached more than 69% of Kenyans aged 15 ‐24. The pre-
recorded radio shows are syndicated to over 26 FM stations across Kenya six days a 
week, with the Saturday edition running for a full 20 minutes.    
The comic book, written in local dialect, sheng, is set in a fictional world that mirrors 
the real one, and aims to inspire and motivate Kenyans between the ages of 18 and 35 
to get involved in political and social issues that affect their future.   It has won two 
International Emmy Awards.   
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All their media is free to the audience and is financed by development agencies who 
wish to use the powerful brand of the Shujaaz character to transform the lives of 
young people. Recent partners include The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, UK’s 
Department for International Development, The World Bank, and others.   
The researcher spoke with Rob Burnett, Founder and CEO of Well Told Story. 
 
The 10 organisations introduced above are just some of the participants from the 
interviews, but their projects provided key relevant data, and are used are used to 
illustrate and highlight aspects of using digital technologies in current media 
development practice in Kenya and Tanzania.  
 
 
Data Analysis 
Qualitative research results in large amounts of detailed data.  This data usually comes 
from interview transcripts and/or observation notes and must be re worked or 
‘reduced’ to represent major themes or categories that describe the phenomenon being 
studied.  
Data reduction facilitates the revealing of findings simply and efficiently. Depending 
on the type of data being used the analysis will differ. According to Berg “the actual 
task of analysis will depend on the data-gathering method or methods used in the 
research process… The overall effort will be to create descriptive accounts based on 
the information captured by various data-collection technologies” (Berg et al., 
2004:183). 
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With the qualitative interviews, the content was interpreted so it related to the 
objectives of the project. Wood advised that a useful way to keep the various 
objectives in mind is to keep in front of you a summary of the main concepts, 
relationships, and hypotheses that are central to the study (Wood, 2000).   The 
interview schedule in this instance was derived from the thesis research question and 
sub-questions (see Appendix A).   
The data analysis involved sequential steps including transcribing, reduction, 
categorisation, clustering units of relevant meaning, and determining themes from 
these.  Transcribing the interviews was a slow process, but unavoidable.    This 
process resulted in large amounts of data that had to be reworked or ‘reduced’ to 
represent major themes or categories that describe the issues being studied.  Data 
reduction can help the revelation of findings quite efficiently.   
The researcher must decide how he or she will code the data to enable categorisation – 
and the themes to emerge. Another decision the researcher must make when analysing 
data is whether to analyse the interview data obtained from each participant 
independently or whether to use cross-case analysis.  In this instance each 
respondent’s data was analysed first and then cross-referenced.  
Braun and Clarke (2006) described thematic analysis as a way of seeing, as well as a 
process for coding qualitative information. The researcher must make many decisions 
about the process of identifying themes, and he or she must inform others why 
specific categories were chosen. They argue that “thematic analysis is a poorly 
demarcated, rarely acknowledged, yet widely-used qualitative analytic method” 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006:2).  They describe what should ideally happen during each 
phase of analysis and this research followed a similar manner of analysis.   Table 2 
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below breaks out the stages of analysis based on phases suggested by Braun and 
Clarke (2006). 
 
Table 2. Qualitative Data Analysis 
 
Phase 1 Becoming 
familiar with 
the data 
This involves transcribing 
the data, reading and re-
reading the data, noting 
down initial ideas 
regarding themes. 
 
This researcher spent 
considerable time listening 
to and transcribing 
interviews which were each 
at least 40 minutes in 
duration, producing very 
large amounts of data. From 
this effort, several themes, 
perspectives and points of 
discussion were noted. 
 
Phase 2 Generating 
initial codes  
This stage of the analysis 
involves the researcher 
coding or categorising 
interesting features of the 
data in a systemic fashion 
across the entire data set, 
collating data relevant to 
each code or category 
 
From the large amount of 
data produced during the 
first phase the researcher 
started to divide and code 
the interview data according 
to certain points or issues, 
such as opinions on use of 
technologies in projects or 
views on donor policies. 
 
Phase 3 Searching for 
themes  
In this phase the 
researcher collates codes 
into potential themes, 
gathering all data relevant 
to each potential theme 
 
From the coded data above 
the researcher could start to 
identify and gather certain 
codes together and group 
them together. Most 
interview participants had a 
view on the benefits or not 
of ICTs in journalism in 
their country, and all could 
speak about recent changes 
in the media landscape in 
their country.  These could 
be grouped together to 
create an argument from 
various participants. 
 
  
Phase 4 Reviewing 
themes   
The researcher checks if 
themes worked in relation 
to the coded extracts, 
generating a thematic 
‘map’ of the analysis 
 
The data was reviewed to 
provide evidence for each 
argument or theme.  Such as 
discussions regarding 
problems encountered when 
using ICTs in media 
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development projects.  This 
provided support for each 
theme. 
  
Phase 5 Refining 
categories and 
themes 
The researcher defines 
categories and named 
themes and undertakes 
ongoing analysis to refine 
the specifics of each 
theme 
    
The researcher confirmed 
whether there was enough 
data or evidence for each 
theme or issue. For instance, 
it emerged from the data 
that there was mixed views 
of whether technology was 
of benefit for journalism in 
the region, and the data was 
refined to support different 
perspectives on this theme. 
 
Phase 6 Producing the 
report   
The researcher selects 
“vivid, compelling extract 
examples”, and 
undertakes final analysis 
of selected extracts, 
relating back to the 
research question and the 
literature 
 
The overarching themes 
were extracted from the 
coded and categorised data.  
Some themes were more 
central and some secondary.  
For instance, the 
practicalities of using 
technology in media 
development projects was 
an overarching category and 
journalism training was a 
secondary one. Extracts and 
examples relating to these to 
themes were selected for 
supporting the conclusions 
in the Discussion and 
Closing chapters. 
 
 
 
Coding 
As noted, a common way to approach qualitative data analysis in this case is the 
construction of themes. Sometimes these have already been decided when designing 
the study, or if the data collection is structured around these predefined themes. In 
other cases, the themes are constructed afterwards.  
Coding was an important part of qualitative data analysis and is the process of 
grouping interviewees’ responses into categories that bring together the similar ideas, 
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concepts, or themes that have been discovered.   The analysis of qualitative data 
usually involves the selection of quotes to support the presentation of the findings 
(Grbich, 2012). This was the method used here where quotes will support the findings. 
Upon initial reading of the interview data the researcher looked for these patterns or 
themes among the data.  The researcher was able to discover a variety of themes, 
codes, or even possible categories that provided the beginnings of analysis, and/or 
ideas for future interviews.  
Wood described analysis as an exercise that draws on your background knowledge, 
your ability to listen with an open mind, and your ability to link particular 
observations and pieces of information to more general concepts (Wood, 2000). 
Bogdan and Biklen (1998) provide common types of coding categories but emphasise 
that the central questions or hypotheses will shape the coding scheme.   This was the 
case here. The researcher could reduce the data and categorise according to the survey 
questions. These were grouped and clustered according to larger themes such as Local 
Media, Project Activities, and Journalism Practice. 
The use of software for qualitative data analysis has increased rapidly over the past 
few years. Researchers are, however, not quite agreed on whether it improves the 
quality of the analysis (Grbich, 2012).   In this instance the author did not use software 
but undertook the coding, categorisation, reduction and extraction processes manually.  
It was felt that this approach would lead to greater familiarity with the data and 
important for deducing what the important themes were.  
Once the themes were identified and the data reduced, then the findings started to 
emerge from the data.  In this instance, the subcategories of the questions became 
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apparent from the findings around themes of: Journalism Practice and New 
Technologies; Donors views on media development in Kenya and Tanzania; Media 
Development projects currently in implementation; The use of new technologies in  
media projects in Kenya and Tanzania; The traditional medium; Problems with 
integrating ICTs into media projects; Engagement with ICTs;  The potential for digital 
technologies in Media Development. 
These findings fed into salient themes for further exploration in the Discussion 
Chapter which would relate back to our literature review, including the narrative of 
Africa Rising and ICTs: the digital divide, Radio Convergence with ICTs; and the 
problems of citizen participation and engagement using digital technologies in these 
projects. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter the research methods used to gather and analyse the data to address the 
hypothesis were reviewed. A mixed methods approach was used and the rationale for 
this was presented. By applying the case study and qualitative interview methods the 
thesis gained direct and deeper knowledge of the extent to which digital technologies 
are being used by the ‘media development’ sector.  These methodological approaches 
were deemed the most appropriate research methods to present a comprehensive and 
up-to-date picture of current media development activities being undertaken in sub-
Saharan Africa.  
The research gained insight into how citizens of Kenya and Tanzania are currently 
interacting and engaging with their media and digital technologies.  The data helped to 
illustrate the consumption of media in these countries.    Local media consumption 
patterns are important to the research because almost all donor-funded media 
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development projects are now undertaken after baseline research has been carried out 
into local media patterns and habits.  This is so their projects can be tailored to suit not 
only the objectives of the funders but also the actual media habits in any given 
country.   
The data also provided insight into the effect of digitisation on the media landscape. In 
particular the growth of alternative media spaces was noted such as online forums and 
blogs which break news and where citizens can debate issues.  
Using secondary and primary data, it was discovered the extent to which media 
development organisations have adjusted to take into account the growth of digital 
technologies in Kenya and Tanzania, if they can contribute to donor objectives and if 
so to what extent and to what success.  This would inform the primary research 
questions of whether media assistance is still relevant, from practitioners working on 
the ground. 
These findings shall be presented in detail in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 5 
Country Findings 
 
 
Introduction 
Having contextualised the research question in earlier chapters on the relevance of 
media assistance in an ever-increasing digital environment and mapped out the 
research design in the previous chapter, this chapter now presents Case Studies of the 
two countries on which the study focuses – Kenya and Tanzania. As illustrated in the 
Research Map above, this chapter addresses the environment for media assistance 
activity in the case study countries.  The research specifically focuses on Kenya and 
Tanzania. In the following chapter findings regarding current approaches to media 
assistance in these countries will be presented and discussed.  
In order to examine the impact of digital technologies on media assistance in the 
chosen case study countries, the thesis puts forward the following sub-question 
relating to the environment in which media assistance takes place, specifically: What 
are the characteristics of the current media and information environment in the 
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selected case studies of Kenya and Tanzania?  In so doing, this chapter will provide a 
contextual analysis for the two case study countries which serves as a needs analysis 
for their media systems.    
Also addressed are the media habits of the citizens of Kenya and Tanzania, the extent 
to which newer technologies and new digital forms of journalism are taking hold, and 
the health of the public sphere. This will assist in a deeper comprehension of what 
type of media development interventions might be required in these countries, and 
whether digital technologies have a useful role to play in addressing these needs. 
This chapter draws on sources from relevant documentation, grey literature and 
sundry media development source material – as well as primary data – to create 
detailed country profiles for Kenya and Tanzania. 
Firstly, a justification for the selection of this region and the two case studies is 
presented.  
 
Rationale for the Case Studies 
In the period since ‘media development’ gained considerable momentum in the 1990s, 
a lot has changed in the area of media assistance.   As noted, media development in 
the period 1989 to the late 1990s focussed on transitional democracies in post-
Communist Eastern Europe. Once free market principles had been established, the so-
called “media missionaries” started focusing their attention elsewhere. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, these media interventions in the post-Soviet states were not deemed an 
unequivocal success (Džihana, 2011; Lauk, 2008; Rhodes and Lange, 2007).  
181 
 
However, the policy focus of the traditional donors of media development has in any 
event moved strategically and geographically to other regions.     
One explanation for this change of geographic focus could be because a number of 
countries entered the EU and so could no longer be the recipient of democracy-
building funds – by definition they are meant to be democratic.  The assumption was 
and is that there is now a sufficient plurality of information and communication in 
these former Soviet satellites.   
The literature reviewed in Chapter Two underscored how media assistance has been 
employed by donors to promote democratisation (Howard, 2003).   Since independent 
and reliable news media play such a crucial role, especially in free and fair elections, 
they are regarded as key part of such citizen decision-making, and democracy.  After 
the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, it was considered necessary to establish new 
independent media outlets in these countries to assist with the process of 
democratisation and therefore donors focused on that region during the period.   
There has also been a growing awareness more recently of the role of media in 
potentially spreading violence, and this has resulted in more programmes in conflict-
affected and fragile states, with a focus on peace-building and countering hate-speech 
(Kalathil, 2017).  This was in evidence in Kenya around the time of the 2007 elections 
and some radio stations were shown to have contributed to encouraging violence at 
that time (Allen and Gagliardone, 2011; Marsh, 2014). 
Consequently, following the turn of the century, for a variety of reasons, international 
media donors turned their attention more to the Middle East and to Africa (Kumar, 
2006). 
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The region has drawn attention for additional reasons. Having once earned the title of 
the ‘the hopeless continent’ by The Economist (Dowden, 2000), Africa has more 
recently been defined as the world’s fastest growing region (African Development 
Bank, 2013).   A flow of positive economic statistics has made Africa a focus for 
international investors, and much of this growth and optimism around it has been 
attributed to ICTs.  Kenya in particular has been the centre of much technological 
investment and international focus, earning it the moniker ‘silicon savannah’20. 
As noted in earlier chapters, many African countries have seen an increase in both 
media and access to information, through liberalisation of traditional media and 
dissemination of new technologies. However, it should be cautioned that these 
changes are not necessarily having the positive effects on the broad populace assumed 
by the techno-determinist view.  Research from Afrobarometer showed that after a 
decade of growth in Africa, ‘lived poverty’ remains pervasive across the continent 
(Mitullah and Kamau, 2013; Dulani et al., 2013). 
This paradox will be explored further in the current chapter, where a detailed picture 
of the two Case Study countries - Kenya and Tanzania – is presented.  The focus of 
this research thesis is the media and media systems in this region, and whether media 
assistance interventions using digital technologies can address the needs of these 
systems and citizens. Thus, it is necessary to present a comprehensive analysis of the 
‘information ecosystems’ of both of these countries. 
To start, a brief overview of the history of journalism in the region is presented to 
contextualise the current environment for media assistance activity and the needs of 
the journalism sector. 
 
20 Mobile Phones Transform Africa, Time Magazine (Perry, 2011) 
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A brief history of journalism in Sub-Saharan Africa 
When looking at media development work in sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to 
acknowledge Africa’s long experience of colonialism and the events that followed 
(Bourgault, 1995; Gicheru, 2014; Kasoma, 1995; Ronning, 1994).  These impact the 
environment for media freedom and independence just as it has in the democracies of 
the West, and will impact further the issues that media development projects need to 
address.  
For instance, Mano (2009) argues that difference approaches to journalism training on 
the continent originate in the “partition of Africa in Berlin, in 1884, which created 
rigid vertical lines of command with little lateral interaction between African 
institutions, countries and regions” (Mano, 2009: 281). 
 
 
Sources: Shaw, 2009; Birmingham, 2008, Mwesige, 2009; Gichero, 2014; Skjerdal, 2013 
 
Figure 6. Journalism in Africa 
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As noted in the diagram above, during the Colonial period [19th century up until the 
period of independence in the 1950s], the media served the information needs of 
missionaries and colonial settlers (Shaw, 2009).   Prior to this, news was circulated to 
the people in the form of oral discourse “with communal storytellers (griots), 
musicians, poets and dancers playing the role of the modern-day journalists” (Shaw, 
2009:5).   
Kasoma argues that the press was more independent during colonial times than it has 
been subsequently during military or one party rule (Kasoma, 1995).  The press 
played more or less a critical watchdog role in dealing with the colonial administration 
according to Shaw (2009). After liberation in the 1950s and 1960s, press freedom 
violations, unknown during the colonial period, were used by the new African leaders 
to control their journalists.   
Eribo and Jong-Ebot argue that at independence, the media “became ideological tools 
of the new African leaders, and were brought under state control and made to sing the 
praises of dictators in the name of national unity and development” (Eribo and Jong-
Ebot, 1997:x).  
During the Post-Colonial Period (1970s and 1980s), therefore, the role of the press as 
government watchdog was overshadowed by its role as “public cheerleader for 
development efforts’ in areas such as health, agriculture and education, and steering 
clear of politics (Bourgault, 1995).  This style of journalism, referred to as 
‘development journalism’, emerged out of a compromise between “nation building” 
and “a free and unfettered press” (Bourgault, 1995:173).  However, the practice of this 
style of development journalism has attracted criticism for promoting political 
agendas instead of people’s interests (Skjerdal, 2013).   
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Later, the decade following the fall of the Berlin Wall, was called the decade of 
democratic journalism. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa underwent significant 
political reform (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994) and the press played an important 
role in forcing autocratic African regimes to press for democracy (Shaw, 2009).  Calls 
for governance reforms from citizens of these countries, and international donors, 
brought in a new era of competition for political leadership.  This helped open up 
governments to criticism from the media and was conducive to a more open and free 
press (Karikari, 2010; Myers, 2014).   
The diversification of the media sector across the sub-Saharan continent was 
accompanied by better legal and institutional frameworks in support of media freedom 
and the new constitutions adopted in the region in the last three decades have all 
enshrined some right to the freedom of expression (Wasserman and Benequista, 
2017). 
This brief timeline of journalism in the region contextualises the current day 
environment for media assistance activity and serves as a backdrop for the 
presentation of findings from the direct research, which now follows. 
 
Country Profiles 
This section will now present an in-depth look at the media ecosystems of both 
countries as background to current media development activity.  This chapter directly 
addresses the sub- question:  
 What are the characteristics of the current media and information environment 
in the selected case studies of Kenya and Tanzania (RQ2a)?   
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This will help gain greater insight into the context for media assistance practice in 
these countries, the characteristics of which will then be presented in the following 
chapter (RQ2b).   
This chapter will therefore provide the reader with an understanding of important 
aspects of media systems in both these countries: market structures, the level of press 
freedom, and an analysis of the journalism profession in each country. The following 
analysis draws on Hallin and Mancini’s Comparing Media Systems (2004), which 
outlines a conceptual framework for the analysis of media systems consisting of four 
dimensions. These are: 
 Structure of media markets - newspaper circulation rates, relative importance of 
newspapers and television as sources of news 
 Political parallelism - the “fact that media in some countries have distinct political 
orientations, while media in other countries do not” Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 27). 
 The role of the state 
 Professionalisation of journalism sector 
 
These themes will be drawn upon for analysis of the media systems of both Kenya and 
Tanzania in the following sections.  This current chapter will therefore help assess the 
needs and weaknesses of the media systems in Kenya and Tanzania which could be 
addressed by the media assistance sector.   
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Case Study: Kenya  
 
Overview 
Table 3. Kenya Overview 
 
 
 
 
21 CIA World Factbook 
22 UN Development Index Statistics 2018 
23 UNDP http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/KEN 
24 Freedom House 2018 
25 https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 
26 https://rsf.org/en/ranking 
Population21 48,397,527 (July 2018 est.) 
Forty per cent of whom are under 15 
years of age   
40 ethnic groups 
Human Development Index22 0.590 - Medium Human development 
category - positioning it at 142 out of 189 
countries and territories 
Poverty Levels 
Population living below income poverty 
line, PPP $1.90 a day (%)23 (2015) 
 
36.8% 
Freedom House Press Freedom 
Index24 
‘Partly Free’ Rank 48/100 
Transparency International 
Corruption Index 201825 
Score: 27/100 
Rank: 144/180 
Reporters Without Borders 2019 
World Press Freedom Index26 
32.44 
Rank 100/180 
Languages English (official), Kiswahili (official), 
Kiswahili numerous indigenous 
languages 
Statutory Code of Ethics Yes. Media Act 2013 
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Background 
Kenya gained independence from Britain in 1963, but was a de facto one-party state 
under the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party until 1992.  This was 
followed by a multi-party political system post-1992 that has helped the liberalisation 
of the Kenyan economy and the media environment (Abdi and Deane, 2008)   
Kenya is a leader in Africa in some key economic sectors— notably in 
telecommunications.  This has been attributed to its growing youthful population, a 
dynamic private sector, highly skilled workforce, improved infrastructure and its 
pivotal role in East Africa (The World Bank, 2018).  It has become a key centre for 
technology in the region 
The country still faces development challenges, illustrated by its ranking on the 
Human Development Index, and made more difficult by political and social upheaval 
in past years, the most well-known of which was the civil unrest and riots that broke 
out during the disputed presidential election in 2007.  Up to 1200 lives were lost and 
nearly one million people displaced during that time.   
Kenya is a top ten recipient of aid (OECD, 2018).  Economic liberalisation has been a 
priority with these donors and aid has thus been conditional on an opening up of the 
economy.   
 
The political environment for media in Kenya  
Mainstream media frequently reflect the environment in which they operate (Abdi and 
Deane, 2008) and there are some notable events that have occurred in Kenya in recent 
years that have impacted on the media sector.  The most significant of these is the 
aforementioned unrest during the 2007 elections and the subsequent outburst of 
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violence. The events of 2007 illustrated the political and ethnic tensions that have 
been a constant under the surface of the country.   
This was highlighted by Irish Ambassador to Kenya, Vincent O Neill: 
There are over 42 ethnic groups living reasonably peacefully together. But, from time 
to time within the country, you get a lot of sparking points between tribes and across 
counties, over grazing rights or whatever ... There's a fragility keeping the country 
together in ways (O Neill, 2015, in interview) 27. 
 
Abdi and Deane (2008) argue that politics in Kenya has become more split and 
factionalised along political and ethnic grounds and as a result the media have been 
drawn into, and often aligned with these different political interests (Abdi and Deane, 
2008).  This was highlighted in 2007 when local radio stations were accused of 
inciting hate speech during the unrest (Marsh, 2014).  The Kenyan government and 
international reports alleged that ethnically-based radio stations in Kenya were partly 
responsible for inflaming ethnic hatred (Allen and Gagliordone, 2011).     
Abdi and Deane have noted how staff at these stations may not have the skills to 
mediate such on-air discussions: 
[During the 2007 elections] These talk shows had become an outlet for a public 
debate and an expression of voice which had been suppressed for decades. Many of 
these voices were angry, disaffected and determined on change.  In any society, such 
debate in such a political environment would have required skilful and careful 
moderation.  That is not what generally happened.  People hired to broadcast in these 
stations were rarely trained journalists or commentators, but sometimes entertainers 
 
27  Vincent O Neill, Irish Embassy in interview with author Feb 2015 
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and other personalities familiar to their audience. Personnel from these radio stations 
have acknowledged that they have little or no training in mediating discussions in 
conflict situations  (Abdi and Deane, 2008:4). 
 
Even during peaceful periods, the media in Kenya are influenced by politicians and 
ethnic allegiances. Harwood et al (2018) argue: 
 
Politicians at every level of government have used ethnic allegiances as a tool to 
mobilize support. Just as ethnic identity is woven into Kenyan society and politics; it 
too is woven into Kenyan media. It is reflected in both the decisions about which 
stories to cover and how to cover them, as well as how audiences perceive ethnic bias 
in reporting  (Harwood et al., 2018:6) 
 
In addition to ethnic tensions from within, another factor is the threat of violence from 
outside Kenya.  Since 2011, the country has faced several terrorist attacks by the 
Somali group, Al-Shabaab, as retribution for the Kenyan military's involvement in the 
group's home country of Somalia.  For instance, in January 2019, they claimed 
responsibility for the death for 21 people in a shootout in a hotel complex in Nairobi 
city centre. 
Lohner et al. (2016) stress that “political volatility due to ethnic divisions and the 
threat of terrorism from Al-Shabaab impact on the current structural conditions of 
Kenya’s political and media system” (Lohner et al., 2016:48). 
A new Constitution was adopted in 2010 in the aftermath of the riots that took place in 
2007, and this Constitution was regarded as an instrument that would potentially 
reform the social landscape and foster harmony  (FesMedia, 2012).  It has been 
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praised for expanding freedoms of expression and of the press, specifically by 
prohibiting the state from interfering with the editorial independence of individual 
journalists and both state-owned and private media outlets (Freedom House, 2015). 
However, Transparency International28  found that Kenya’s rank in the Corruption 
Perceptions’ Index (143rd out of 180 countries under review) “calls to question the 
reforms that have been instituted in various sectors since the adoption of the 
Constitution of Kenya 2010” (Transparency International Kenya, 2014).   
 
Market Structure  
Despite the growth in media outlets since liberalisation of the market, Kenya suffers 
from concentration in media ownership (Mbeke et al., 2010; Titus and Brombart, 
2016). This is most likely because there have been no ownership regulations or 
restrictions imposed upon corporate or political interests.  
The growth of the media sector has been closely tied to Kenya’s political history, and 
this means that there are still strong links between large media players and the 
political environment.  According to Mbeke, almost every media channel can be 
identified with a political party or personality (Mbeke et al., 2010).    
The media is often considered a tool to promote political agendas. Nyabuga claims 
that “most detrimental to media diversity, pluralism, and independence are the profit 
motive and the political allegiances of most of the media outlets” (Nyabuga et al., 
2013:75).  
 
28 Transparency International is an NGO which aims to combat corruption and publishes the Global 
Corruption Barometer and the Corruption Perceptions Index 
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A report by Internews on this subject called “Factually True Legally Untrue – Political 
Media Ownership in Kenya” found that while media ownership is sometimes obvious, 
media owners often use their spouse, parents or friends to register their media outlets, 
making it difficult to obtain clear data on media ownership (Nyanjom, 2012).   Maina 
(2015) maintains: 
Concentration of ownership remains a major issue in the Kenyan media landscape, yet 
the Programming Code proposes to increase the number of licences one person may 
hold concurrently. No attempt is made to rein in cross-ownership between print and 
broadcast media” (Maina, 2015).     
 
The author concludes that “ultimately the best safeguard for a vibrant and pluralistic 
broadcasting sector would be a genuinely independent regulator” (Maina, 2015). 
Freedom House noted positively that “Kenya’s leading media outlets, especially in the 
print sector, are often critical of politicians and government actions. They remain 
pluralistic, rigorous, and bold in their reporting” – however they also “pander 
frequently to the interests of major advertisers and influential politicians” (Freedom 
House 2014).   
The market is dominated by four groups: Nation Media Group (Mwananchi 
Communication Ltd), Standard Media Group, Radio Africa Group, Royal Media 
Service and MediaMax Communication Group.  This environment, in which only a 
handful of players are shaping the media ownership structure, is reinforcing barriers to 
market entry in the media sector.  Media ownership in Kenya is thus concentrated in 
the hands of a few very powerful people, leading to unfair representation of voices in 
their favour. 
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Therefore, media concentration, political bias and lack of genuinely independent 
regulator are problems within the media ecosystem in Kenya which prevent the media 
from performing its role to its full potential.   As noted by Price and Krug (2002), 
media need an ‘enabling environment’ that is supportive of a free and unfettered press.   
Professionalism of journalism sector 
The professionalism of journalism is exhibited in the observance of standards such as 
verification of news content, confidentiality of sources, fairness, and public interest 
(UNESCO).   
Academic research into journalism in the region illustrates the challenges of being a 
journalist. These include: the repression coming from the many authoritarian regimes, 
the oppressive legal systems kept on from the colonial period, the self-censorship of 
editors, and the bribing of journalists (Eribo, 1997; M’Bayo et al., 2000; Wasserman 
and Jacobs, 2012).   
It must be qualified that these problems do not exist across the entire continent of 
Africa but there are similarities with regards to the obstacles and challenges that 
journalism face in the two countries under review for this research. 
Despite the growth of the media sector in Kenya in the past decades, it has been said 
that there is not necessarily improvement in the quality of news in the media 
(Nyabuga et al., 2013). What has improved is the diversity and not the quality per se.   
Nyanjom (2012) blames the perceived lack of professionalism on the absence of 
professional training and orientation.  He points out that many prominent members of 
the media sector practice without any paper qualifications (Nyanjom, 2012).  
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Journalism training in Kenya is available from a variety of institutions, ranging from 
universities to small colleges, but quality and standards of training are matters of 
concern (Power, 2006).  Lohner (2016) argues that “one of the structural factors 
indicating the level of professionalisation and development of journalism as a 
profession in its own right is the condition of professional education and training” 
(Lohner et al., 2016:69).   Ireri found that local journalism and communication 
colleges are faced by a myriad of problems, chief among them being lack of resources, 
unqualified lecturers, and proliferation of new low-standard colleges (Ireri, 2018) 
For instance, in a study called “Criteria and Indicators for Quality Journalism Training 
institutions and Identifying Potential Centres of Excellence in Journalism Training in 
Africa,” UNESCO found that of all the near to 30 universities in Kenya offering 
communication courses, only University of Nairobi was mentioned as a potential 
centre of excellence (Berger and Matras, 2007).  
Most schools and colleges offer courses that are general in nature and experts have 
claimed a need for a more specialised journalism training in order to mainstream 
topical issues and concerns (Schmidt and Deselaers, 2015). 
International Media Development Organisations also provide training programmes. 
The largest of these are Internews, HIVOS and BBC Media Action, who have been 
surveyed for this research and their projects will be outlined in more detail in the 
following chapter. 
Another challenge for the journalism profession in Kenya is that journalists are poorly 
paid and this leaves them vulnerable to bribery.  Media organisations have spoken out 
against corruption but in practice, bribing journalists is common. It has been called 
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‘grassroots editing’ - the practice whereby Kenyan journalists receive money to run 
stories that are biased in favour of the person who has paid the bribe. 
The pay levels for both electronic and print media are inadequate and this has 
promoted corruption (FesMedia, 2012).  Even senior editors have been implicated and 
many of them are suspected of being on a retainer for personalities in positions of 
power (FesMedia, 2012). 
Investigative journalism is also frustrated by political intimidation.  The Committee to 
Protect journalists in Kenya reports that journalists frequently experience harassment, 
intimidation and even violence for doing their job. In September 2018, Daily Nation 
journalist Barrack Oduor was assaulted and abducted and his source allegedly 
murdered.  Oduor had been working on a story about a woman who alleged she had 
been impregnated and abandoned by a prominent politician (Rhodes, 2018). 
Reporters Without Borders note that “during election campaigns, the media are 
routinely subjected to physical attacks by the security forces and the public… Their 
equipment is often confiscated, and their writing is censored. Journalists can pay 
dearly for covering opposition events or for portraying President Uhuru Kenyatta’s 
party and its flaws in a negative light” ("World Press Freedom Index 2018 | Kenya").  
As a result, self-censorship is a common practice among the Kenyan media, and it 
affects all levels.   
This section has illustrated the myriad problems facing journalists and journalism 
practice in Kenya. The next section will present the media market for audiences and 
citizens in Kenya to provide a clearer picture of the limitations of the media, both old 
and new, in Kenya. 
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Kenyan Media 
Economic liberalisation has helped grow the media in Kenya, allowing an opening up 
of the media and communication space.  At the same time, there has also been a 
growth in the middle class in Kenya, which provides buying power to support an 
advertising base, and thus media companies have flourished.   
Kenya has over 100 radio stations, including about 30 vernacular broadcasting 
stations, providing at least one local language radio station for each of Kenya´s largest 
ethnic groups (Schmidt and Deselaers, 2015).  There are more than 60 free to view TV 
stations and an unconfirmed number of print newspapers and magazines.   New 
players in TV and radio have grabbed viewership and listenership from state owned 
KBC’s platforms, reducing it to a small player in a market dominated by private 
broadcasters. 
The variety of media outlets in different formats (print, radio, television and online) 
gives the Kenyan media scene the appearance of plurality and diversity.    
Television 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Kenya TV Stations 
 
Source: GeoPoll February 2019 
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Television is still a luxury in Kenya but is a trusted medium of news and information 
(Nyabuga et al., 2013).   Research conducted by the Kenya Audience Research 
Foundation (KARF) in 2016 found 30.6% valued TV (Amadala, 2017).   
Television is a regular feature of city life rather than country: The number of Kenyans 
getting news from television displays the major differences between urban and rural 
areas, with 57 per cent of urban respondents getting news from this channel every day, 
while only 20 per cent of the rural people do the same (Mitullah, 2012).  
One of the reasons for the popularity of television is because entertainment centres 
such as restaurants, cafes and bars put up television sets to attract more customers. “At 
7pm every day these social venues are packed to the brim as most people flock there 
to catch the evening’s prime time news bulletin. Clients even know which bar, 
restaurant or cafe offers the channel of their choice” (FesMedia, 2012:8). 
In February 2015, Kenya introduced Digital Migration29 for television, almost 10 
years after the process had begun in Europe. The changeover was poorly managed and 
despite months of notice, when the government switched off the analogue signal, it 
left most Kenyans without TV for days.   Resourceful Nairobians plugged computers 
into their TV and streamed it for themselves but most Kenyans were left with blank 
TV sets for a period during the switchover.   
 
29 Digital Broadcasting Migration is a process in which broadcasting services offered on the traditional 
analog technology are replaced with digital based networks over a specific period. The transition or 
switch from analog television to digital television is referred to as the Digital Migration. 
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The biggest effect that digital migration has had on the Kenyan media scene is the 
increase of TV channels.  Since digital migration Kenyans have access to over 337 TV 
channels, 66 of these are local channels (KARF, 2017).   
The introduction of digital TV has seen the emergence of stations that deal with 
various issues such as education, farming, health, women and children issues among 
others. So, one positive result is that a segment of the TV industry has embraced the 
“educative role of mass communication” (Nyabuga, 2016:44).  
However, many people have not yet converted to the digital signal as new set-top 
boxes are too expensive, and several boxes are required to get the same number of 
channels (Davies, 2015, in interview)30.   
In contrast to the generally held view that digital television removes control of 
broadcasting from the state and allows much more extra territorial involvement, 
Ugangu (2018) argues that the transition to digital television in Kenya has in fact 
created more leverage for state influence over the media landscape. He claims that the 
digital migration process maintains state control in more subtle ways over the 
countries media landscape (Ugangu, 2018). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 BBC MA, Jackie Davies, Feb 2015 in interview with author. 
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Print Media 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Kenya Print Media 
 
In Kenya, the print media audience is smaller than radio and TV audiences (Bowen, 
2010). Ibelema and Bosch argue that there are several barriers to wide circulation of 
newspapers, including the logistical challenge of distribution to remote rural 
communities, literacy limitations and high purchase prices forced by limited 
advertising environments (Ibelema and Bosch, 2009).   
Research conducted in 2010 found that 37% of respondents said they had not read a 
newspaper within the last year; when they were asked why, many cited the cost or 
inability to read or understand newspapers (Bowen, 2010).   About one quarter of non-
readers at that time said that they were simply not interested in getting news and 
information from print media 
 
 
 
Source: GeoPoll 2015 
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As the print media is considered expensive, Kenyan vendors rent out daily newspapers 
for a nominal fee for an hour or two. Once the individual has read the paper it is 
handed back to the vendor who will place it back on the newsstand (FesMedia, 2012). 
The introduction of 47 counties in the country’s recent devolution reform has 
increased the number of new publications. The 2010 constitution created a 
decentralised system of government and Kenya shifted from centralised control to 
devolution in which 47 counties were given a free hand to set their development so the 
leadership, the tax collection, the delivery of services has become decentralised.   
With this devolution of power, there is a growing need for local newspapers that cover 
local issues and local governance. Making local governments and citizens talk to each 
other is essential to that process of local government, but there is a severe shortage of 
local news (Spoerry, 2015, in interview).     
 
Radio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Kenya Radio Stations 
 
 
 
Source GeoPoll 2019 
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Research consistently underlines the prominence of radio in Kenya, which has the 
highest penetration both in rural and urban areas (Bowen, 2010; Gilberds and Myers, 
2012a; Minderhoud, 2009).   
Nearly all Kenyans are radio listeners, and nearly all of them use radio as a regular 
source of news and information (as opposed to listening strictly for entertainment): 89 
per cent of Kenyan adults get news and information from the radio on at least a 
weekly basis (Bowen, 2010).    
There has been a large expansion of FM radio outlets in recent years, and this has 
included local-based and vernacular radio stations across the country.   While 
commercial local-language radio is vibrant, there are few non-commercial community 
radio stations.   
Community broadcasting offers a distinct broadcasting service dealing specifically 
with community issues that are not normally dealt with by private and public 
broadcasters (Nyabuga et al., 2013).  A community radio station is one that is run for 
the community and by the community and, most important, it is not run for profit.     
Of note is that local radio that is focused on the community, but not commercially 
driven nor politically owned, has been identified as a potentially positive resource for 
cross ethnic dialogue and debate in Kenya (Gustafsson, 2016; Mohamed, 2016; 
Oburu, 2016).   
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Information and Communication Technologies  
Table 5. ICTs Kenya 
Sources: 
Kenya Communications Authority https://ca.go.ke/document/sector-statistics-report-q2-2018-
19/ 
Internet Users and Facebook Subscribers: https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm 
iGDP: The measure of the internet’s contribution to a country’s economy (Manyka et al., 
2013) 
 
 
Kenya has seen a significant growth in mobile phone uptake with figures showing 
mobile phone penetration in Kenya by 2017 was over 100 percent (CCK, 2017).  The 
penetration level of more than 100 per cent is attributed to multiple SIM-card 
ownership. 
The mobile sector is the predominant provider of data and internet services to Kenyan 
users, accounting for 99 percent of total internet subscriptions.   As such, internet-
enabled mobile phones are the primary drivers of the growing internet uptake in 
Kenya (Freedom House, 2015).   
Mobile Phone Penetration 49.5 million (Q2 2018/19) 
106.2% 
Digital Television Changeover: February 2015 
Internet Users 43,329,434 (31 Mar 2019) 
83% Penetration 
Facebook Subscribers 7,000,000 (31 Dec 2017) 
internet Gross Domestic 
Product (iGDPs) 
2.9% 
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Landline telephone coverage remains largely inaccessible, with fewer than one 
telephone line per 100 people. Investment in ICT has thus focused instead on bringing 
mobile and internet access to all parts of the country. 
However, whilst internet penetration continues to increase across the country, there is 
still a large difference in access between rural and urban areas.   Internet use in Kenya 
is mainly concentrated in urban areas; according to a 2013 report by the McKinsey 
Global Institute, Kenya’s urban internet penetration rate stood at 78 percent, compared 
to a national rate of 39 percent (Manyka et al., 2013).   
Additionally, the cost of mobile devices and internet subscriptions remains an struggle 
for many poor Kenyans to access the internet.   
Despite widespread access to mobile phones for basic uses such as voice calls, some 
of the more innovative uses of mobile phones have been less widely adopted.  Abel 
Okuye from Afrobarometer maintains that “news services are more for the elite. It is 
not very common with, for example, the rural population (Okuye, 2014, in 
interview)31.    
Social networking sites are becoming very popular but regular users of the internet are 
predominantly young, male, relatively wealthy and relatively well educated compared 
to the population as a whole (Nyabuga et al., 2013).   
Smartphones are also gaining in popularity in Kenya. According to the Consumer 
Barometer survey by Google, the percentage of people who use a smartphone to 
access the internet in Kenya has increased from 27 per cent in 2014 to 59 per cent in 
2018 (The Connected Consumer Survey, 2018).   
 
31 Abel Okuye, Afrobarometer, May 2014 interview with author. 
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---- 
This section presented the media environment in Kenya, how Kenyan citizens access 
news, their preferences, and adoption of new information and communications 
technologies.  These technologies are impacting on the ways in which citizens in 
Kenya network, share information, and try to affect change.  The next section now 
discusses this in the wider context for media assistance activity in Kenya. 
 
Discussion 
It has been noted that Kenya has become a regional centre for technology and 
innovation in East Africa.  But despite its connectivity, among all media and ICT 
platforms that Kenyans have at their disposal, radio remains the most widely 
available, reaching directly into more than 85 percent of Kenyan adults’ homes 
(Muema and Mwaura, 2012).   Radio continues to be the mainstay of news 
consumption in the country.  This is largely because radio is affordable and its 
broadcasts can reach even the remotest parts of the country.  Importantly the cost of 
buying and running radio sets is low.   
Research from the Kenya Audience Research Foundation underscores how Kenyans 
still prefer traditional media. The survey shows 94% of the media consuming 
population consume TV, Radio and Print while only 33% consume new media (Media 
Establishment Survey  Kenya 2015, 2015) . 
Regardless of widespread mobile penetration, seventy-six per cent of the Kenyan 
population live in rural areas, and many of these are remote areas, where “last-mile” 
issues of electrification, infrastructure, and network connectivity still present major 
challenges to consumption of news media.    
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Even urban areas including the capital, Nairobi, still do not have universal electricity 
connection as only 53 per cent of total households have access to electricity (Nyabuga, 
2013). 
Radio is also by far the media channel mostly used by small‐scale farming households 
in Kenya for receiving agricultural information (Bowen, 2010).  And despite large 
investment in the ICT and Technology sector, agriculture is the mainstay of the 
Kenyan economy (Kamonzo, 2012).  
So, while at first glance, Kenya appears to have one of the most connected and plural 
media sectors in Africa, in terms of accessibility at an individual level, there are 
socioeconomic and geographic divides: urban and affluent citizens enjoy wide access 
to media in all forms, especially digital, while rural and poor populations do not.  
Consequently, despite growing mobile and internet penetration, there remains a stark 
rural-urban split in access to and use of most media and newer digital technologies.  
The busy media scene to be found in urban areas is in contrast to rural areas, where 
state radio dominates and one or two other stations are likely to be available to 
residents there (Matende, 2012).    
 
What this means is that the internet as a potential forum for expression and source of 
news and information has been limited to one part of the population – those in urban 
areas. 
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Case Study: Tanzania 
 
Overview 
Table 6. Tanzania Overview 
 
 
32 CIA World Factbook 
33 UN Development Statistics 2018 
34 UNDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TZA 
35 Freedom House 2018 
36 https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 
37 https://rsf.org/en/ranking 
38 CIA World Factbook 
Population32 55,451,343 (July 2018 est.) 
Approx. two-thirds of the population is under 25 
More than 130 ethnic tribes 
Human Development 
Index33 
0.538  
Low human development category - positioning it at 
154 out of 189 countries and territories 
Poverty Levels  
Population living below 
income poverty line, PPP 
$1.90 a day (%)34 (2018) 
 
49.1% 
Press Freedom Index35 ‘Partly Free’ Rank: 45/100 
Transparency 
International Corruption 
Index36 
Score: 36/100 
Rank: 99/180 
Reporters Without 
Borders37 
36.28 
Rank: 118/180 
Languages38 Kiswahili or Swahili (official), Kiunguja (name for 
Swahili in Zanzibar), English (official, primary 
language of commerce, administration, and higher 
education), Arabic (widely spoken in Zanzibar), 
Statutory Code of Ethics Yes.  The Media Services Act of 2016. 
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Background 
The United Republic of Tanzania, in East Africa, was formed by the union of 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964.   Since independence from Great Britain, Tanzania 
has progressed into a multi-party democracy that assures the separation of powers 
(Stiftung, 2014). 
The current government is headed by the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party and 
they have maintained the same ideals of socialism for decades.  Tanzania has been 
claimed one of the most politically stable countries in Africa (Bjerk, 2010). The 
national language of Kiswahili is said to be a significant unifying factor within the 
country (though English is used as the official language) (CIA, 2017).   
Since the 1990s, the country has had strong economic growth and in 2011 was 
predicted to be one of the fastest-growing countries in the world (Cooksey and 
Kelsall, 2011). 
This growth may not have translated into poverty reduction however (Cooksey, 2012).  
As the table 6 above illustrates, Tanzania continues to rank among the lowest on the 
Human Development Index and there is substantial poverty in both urban and rural 
areas.   
Corruption is cited as one of the major constraints for doing business in the country 
and Tanzania has made slow progress on Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI).  (Transparency International, n.d.).   
Transparency International notes that corruption in Tanzania is a significant problem 
at all levels, from provision of public services and public procurement to the workings 
of the political system (Lindner and Banoba, 2014).   
208 
 
While the president and others have claimed to be on the forefront of the anti-
corruption fight, opponents have said that his efforts are insincere and merely to 
appease international donors (Kambenga, 2012)   
A report for the European Union on their overseas governance promotion noted that 
“the United Republic of Tanzania turned from “donor’s darling” to problem child with 
regard to anti-corruption and governance reforms” (Montgomery, 2017:116). 
International donors are therefore focused on addressing transparency and governance 
in Tanzania. 
 
The political environment for media in Tanzania  
While the constitution of Tanzania provides a foundation for the protection of freedom 
of expression in the media, in fact, Tanzania has a series of laws that are often used to 
punish critics of the CCM government and “the courts and parliament are 
fundamentally hostile to journalistic freedom” (Matumaini, 2011:1).  Kambenga 
argues that laws dealing with libel, defamation, and anti-terrorism have remained in 
place as barriers to press freedom (Kambenga, 2012). 
The Media Services Act of 2016 was enacted in November 2016 and established a 
statutory Media Services Council.   This has been criticised as not being independent. 
The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) noted that multiple sections of Tanzania's 
Media Services Act restrict press freedom and freedom of expression, and has called on 
the Tanzanian government to repeal the act (Avenue et al., 2019).  One issue of concern 
is the requirement that all journalists must seek accreditation, and that those without 
such accreditation would not be allowed to practice as journalists (Ishabakaki et al., 
2016). 
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The Cybercrimes Act and the Statistics Act (2015) are also seen by media 
stakeholders as not having “been made for the purpose of promoting media freedom, 
but of restricting it” (Titus and Brombart, 2015:16).   The Cybercrimes Act grants the 
police broad powers of search and seizure and criminalises the publication online of 
information that the state deems “false or misleading” and “to levy heavy penalties 
against individuals involved in a host of criminalized cyber-activities” (Freedom 
House 2016).   
This limits the scope for digital publication and encourages heightened self-
censorship.  For instance, the founder of the popular social media blog JamiiForum, 
Maxence Melo, was arrested in December 2016 on multiple charges, including 
managing a domain not registered in Tanzania, based on the provisions of this bill, 
and strict bail procedures kept him behind bars (John, 2016). 
Journalists in all media face high risks for criticising the ruling party Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi (CCM) or the government.   Journalists, especially those operating in rural 
areas, are reported to face regular harassment and beatings, and have been known to 
receive death threats from government officials if they expressed opinions in 
opposition.  Nicknamed the “Bulldozer,” President Magufuli has tolerated no criticism 
of himself or his policies since becoming president in 2015 (Reporters without 
borders: Tanzania, 2019). 
IREX’s Media Sustainability Index (2012) reported that on many occasions, journalists 
have been prevented from reporting or taking pictures on stories or events negatively 
portraying the ruling party or the government (Kambenga, 2012).  This has created an 
environment where journalists fear losing their jobs if they dare to question the 
government or media owners.    
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As a result, only a small portion of civil society in general, and journalists, feel free to 
express themselves.  Titus and Brombart (2015) claim that most feel “intimidated by  
the draconian anti-media laws that exist in Tanzania, as well as by the powerful 
interests of the owners of the various media houses” (Titus and Brombart, 2015:14). 
And with CCM having won every election since the establishment of the multi-party 
system in 1992, future advances for the media in Tanzania will likely face challenges 
(FesMedia, 2010). 
 
Market Structure  
Like Kenya, the media industry in Tanzania has grown rapidly over the past decades.  
The media landscape in Tanzania has become more diverse following the advent of 
multi-party era in the 1990s (IPSOS, 2012).  Fifteen years ago, the media on the 
mainland consisted of two newspapers and one State owned radio station. Today, 
Tanzania has many privately-owned newspapers, radio and television stations. 
However, the media landscape continues to be dominated by a few large players and 
media organisations are concentrated in a small number of hands in Tanzania.  The 
government controls two daily newspapers, and the two main political parties own one 
each. As of September 2018, 175 newspapers and magazines were registered in 
Tanzania with the majority of them privately owned39. 
IREX’s Media Sustainability Index (2012) found that most media owners are 
politicians who started media outlets to promote themselves and curry political favour.  
 
39 GeoPoll Online and Print Consumption Aug/Sept 2018  https://tanzania.mom-rsf.org/en/media/print/ 
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Like in neighbouring Kenya, such political owners tend to heavily influence the 
editorial slants of their organisations (Kambenga, 2012).    
Powell calls this the “phenomenon of news media ownership for political ends”.  
Newspapers emerge during election periods, and then disappear, thus “electoral 
politics dominate the media industry,” (Powell, 2017:92).  He argues that this 
“produces a form of media capture dominated by the centralized state, an emerging 
democracy marked by rent- seeking and corruption, in a wider context of inequality 
and exclusion enabled by elite-driven privatization processes and global capital” 
(Powell, 2017:93).   
Thus, like in neighbouring Kenya, media in Tanzania is owned and controlled by 
politicians and elites.  There have been attempts to limit cross-media ownership in 
2009 - only after media conglomerates had already expanded in a concerning manner - 
but these were not followed through (Media Ownership Monitor Tanzania, 2018).  
 
Professionalism of journalism sector  
According to Le Pelley (2010), the journalism profession in Tanzania suffers an 
apparent lack of capacity, a high degree of sensationalism, corruption, job insecurity, 
editorial interference by media owners, and poor and risky working conditions (Le 
Pelley, 2010). 
Certainly, like elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, corruption is a problem.  Media 
professionals accept payments or gifts in exchange for certain types of coverage, 
otherwise known as “brown envelope” journalism.  Skjerdal noted “there is legitimate 
reason to believe that this phenomenon and other types of informal incentives and 
bribes are common in African media practice” (Skjerdal, 2010:367). 
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This can be understood if put in context and levels of remuneration; 75-80% of the 
Tanzanian journalists work as freelancers and these freelancers are poorly paid and 
often earn below minimum wage (Sungura, 2012).   In general, staff journalists have 
better income than freelancers, but the modest wages still result in some of the most 
competent and best educated journalists leaving the profession to work in better paid 
fields such as public relations (ibid).   
Powell noted a form of “brain drain” where investigative reporters leaving the field of 
independent journalism for the “commercially profitable world of government and 
corporate communications” ( in Powell, 2017:91). Of course, this is not unique to 
Tanzania. 
There is also a problem with regard to lack of advertisement power for Tanzanian 
press.  In neighbouring Kenya, a single newspaper like The Nation sells 250,000 
copies a day and can depend on strong advertising revenue as well as sales to fund it, 
whereas quality papers in Tanzania sell a maximum of 25,000 copies (Sungura, 2012).  
The main advertiser in the press is the Tanzanian government who has, at times, 
withdrawn advertising as a reaction to unwelcome editorial content. 
Advertising therefore plays a very strong role in self-censorship, and editors will 
avoid antagonising advertisers. It is an issue of survival, especially if a newspaper 
relies on advertising revenue (FesMedia, 2012).  
Powell maintains that there are “multiple constraints facing the media in Tanzania” 
(Powell, 2017:93) and he calls this “media capture”.  As noted, regulation can limit 
freedom of expression and promotes self-censorship, but reporters are faced with 
“other forms of censorship such as intimidation, unfavourable economic 
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circumstances, top-down economic and political development, and self-interested 
ownership patterns” (Powell, 2017:93). 
Thus, although giving an outward impression of press freedom, there is limited space 
for criticising government in Tanzania and limited transparency (Le Pelley, 2010).  
Unsurprisingly then, there is little such criticism in Tanzanian media.  
This was noted by Newell who found “a general reticence within Tanzanian culture to 
publicly question or criticise” (Newell, 2012:2).  This culture of not questioning or 
criticising the state has been found to impact negatively on the motivation of citizens 
to engage in governance programs.  This will be discussed in more details when 
analysing media development programmes being implemented in Tanzania.  
This section examined the challenges to the media sector in Tanzania.  In the next 
section, patterns of media use in Tanzania are explored.  This provides essential 
background to Chapter 6 where methods appropriate in media assistance projects are 
discussed.   
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Tanzanian Media 
 
Television 
There was no television network operating in mainland Tanzania until 1994. Upon 
independence in 1961, it was decided by President Nyerere’s cabinet that television 
was too expensive to introduce to the whole population and radio was prioritised as 
the medium to unify the newly independent state (Katz and Wedell, 1977).  
Consequently, television was introduced to the Tanzanian population quite late, but 
has since become a popular media in the country, in particular for youth.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Tanzania TV Stations 
 
 
 
Source: GeoPoll Tanzania Q2 2017 
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There are currently 48 television channels licensed under the Tanzanian 
Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA)40.  Only a small percentage of the 
population has access to television, however, due to high costs. Few people in rural 
areas own a television set, which means that the TV audience in the country is still 
largely concentrated in the urban areas.  People in rural areas are able to watch 
television through community viewings in public establishments, like coffee shops 
and pubs (Murthy, 2011b).   
Deregulation has lifted restrictions on broadcasting activities in most sub-Saharan 
African countries including Tanzania. This liberalisation has opened the market to the 
wider distribution of satellite TV services, both private and state funded (Mytton et al., 
2005).  Nwokeafor and Langmia (2010) argue that digital television has 
“revolutionised the way millions of household viewers receive and interact with their 
televisions” (Nwokeafor and Langmia, 2010).   
In December 2012, Tanzania became the first country in mainland Sub-Saharan Africa 
to switch off its analogue television signal.   However, at the time, this change to the 
digital signal changed TV viewing habits: there was a shift away from TV in the 
country, viewership dropped after the digital transition and there was a shift towards 
radio.   The reason for this is that viewers now need a digital antenna and decoder and 
that is an expense that a lot of lower middle, or lower class Tanzanian cannot afford 
(Kapella, in interview, 2015). 
It is interesting to note that these sorts of transitions to newer technology such as with 
digital migration do not suit the whole population in Tanzania, as in Kenya.  Cost is a 
central issue here.  Despite digitalisation, in Tanzania, recent research by satellite 
 
40 https://tanzania.mom-rsf.org/en/media/tv/ 
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operator SES found that 52% of homes in Tanzania don’t have TV access yet, out of a 
total of 11.7 million households. Among the 5.6 million homes that do have TV 
reception, 55% receive their TV channels via satellite, while the rest are still served by 
terrestrial and cable networks (Satellite Monitor Study, 2018). 
 
Print Media 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Tanzania Print Media 
 
The private press has grown strongly since the introduction of multi-party democracy 
in 1992 and most of the major newspapers in Tanzania are published in Kiswahili; 
thus readership is not affected by those who don’t read in English. The major hurdle 
for newspaper readership is circulation, as circulation is mostly limited to the urban 
areas in the key regions.  
 
 
Source: IPSOS Synovate, May 2014 
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Long distances and poor road infrastructure in Tanzania results in the delay of 
newspapers reaching rural centres on time and there are many outlying areas that the 
print media never reaches at all.  A survey conducted by Murthy found that the largest 
proportion of non-readers of print media cite non-availability in their area as the prime 
reason for non-readership (69%) (Murthy, 2011).  Consequently, newspaper 
readership is higher for urban residents.   The most widely read newspapers are 
printed and distributed from Dar es Salaam (Murthy, 2011). 
In the same survey, other reasons cited as obstacles to reading newspapers were that it 
was too expensive (19%), the audience do not have the time (14%), they are not 
interested (23%) and that they cannot read newspapers (13%) (Murthy, 2011).  Otiso 
claims that despite increased access to media in Tanzanian society, a reading culture 
still does not have a strong hold in most of the population (Otiso, 2013).   Hence, print 
media is not the most popular media in Tanzania. 
 
Print media has also suffered recent setbacks including operating under a political 
environment dominated by repressive laws. A government directive in 2018 to re-
register all newspapers and magazines took owners by surprise, leaving them with 
only one choice: to either re-register or close down business (Bazira and Muhanika, 
2019). 
 
Radio 
The state-owned Tanganyika Broadcasting Corporation (TBC) began broadcasting 
nationally in 1956, while still under colonial control. Following independence, TBC 
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was placed under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting in 1965 and renamed 
TBC Taifa.   
Following liberalisation in 1992, the Tanzanian government allowed the establishment 
of private radio stations which have flourished. But given the country’s large 
geographic size and low population density, few stations are able to have full national 
reach.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Tanzania Radio Stations 
 
Research by Murthy (2011) found that 83% of Tanzanians said they get news and 
information from radio.  Radio is the top source for every age group and income group 
tracked, as well as both males and females, and rural and urban dwellers (Murthy, 
2011). More recently IPSOS confirmed that radio was the most frequently used media 
channel (IPSOS, 2014). 
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Tanzania has close to 120 ethnic groups, each of which has its own language.   Local 
and community radios are therefore of great relevance to the local populations. As 
noted in Kenya, the costs associated with running community media outlets are very 
high, thereby discouraging communities’ access to media.  Again, some community 
radio stations have been established by politicians to boost their popularity in their 
constituencies.    
The rise in access to mobile phones represents a potential boost for access to broadcast 
media in Tanzania by people listening to the radio on their cell phones.  And as with 
Kenya, radio in Tanzania is becoming more interactive over time, with increase in use 
of mobile phones and with more radio call-in shows.  
Interestingly, although Tanzanians may listen to these call-in shows, radio is seen 
more as a medium for passive entertainment than as a forum for voicing one’s 
opinion. One study found that 76 percent of radio listeners listen to radio call-in 
shows, but only five percent had actually called in to one of these shows in that year 
(Murthy 2011).  This may also be culturally specific to Tanzania where citizens are 
just starting to be comfortable with expressing their opinions in public.  This shall be 
explored in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Information and Communication Technologies 
Table 7. ICTs Tanzania  
 
 
As noted, Tanzania has experienced a large upsurge in telephone ownership with the 
introduction of mobile phones. The total number of mobile phone subscriptions rose 
from close to zero at the turn of the century to some 43 million by Dec 2018 
(Tanzanian Communication Regulatory Authority (TCRA), 2017) which is a 
penetration of near 80%. 
With the increase in mobile phone penetration there has also been greater access to the 
internet. The use of internet is becoming more widespread among Tanzanians and 
especially among younger Tanzanians between 15-30 years (Femina Hip 2013).    
 
Mobile Phone 
Penetration 
80% (as at Dec 2018)   43,497,261 
Digital Television  Changeover: Dec 2012 
Internet Use 23,000,000 (31 Mar 2019) 
38% Penetration 
Facebook Accounts 6,100,000 
internet Gross 
Domestic Product 
(iGDPs) 
 
1.3% 
 
 
Sources: 
Mobile:  TRCA Dec 2018 
https://www.tcra.go.tz/images/documents/telecommunication/TelCom_Statistics_December_2018.pdf 
Internet Users and Facebook Subscribers: https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm 
iGDP: The measure of the internet’s contribution to a country’s economy (Manyka et al., 2013) 
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Huge discrepancies however remain in the consumption pattern.   A survey conducted 
by Femina Hip highlighted that access to the internet is confined to urban areas of 
Tanzania, as the majority of internet users are based in urban zones (Femina HIP, 
2013).  Like Kenya there appears an urban-rural split. 
 
Furthermore, as exciting as this new online public space is for Kenyans and 
Tanzanians it needs to be highlighted that more than 70% of Kenyan and Tanzanian 
citizens still get their news from radio.   
 
Discussion 
To address whether digital technologies have impacted on the relevance of media 
assistance in the chosen case study countries (RQ2), this chapter examines the 
characteristics of the media and information environment in the case studies of Kenya 
and Tanzania (RQ2a). 
In Tanzania, mobile phones and the internet are certainly becoming important 
communication and news gathering tools in Tanzania.  However, factors such as 
infrastructure, high illiteracy rates, access and poverty levels prevent many 
Tanzanians from accessing new sources of information.   
Access to media outlets and the new virtual space is determined by two factors; cost 
and location.   The main challenge that prevents citizens from accessing the media in 
Tanzania is not lack of availability or lack of information, but rather poverty.  Most 
cannot afford to buy newspapers or radio and television sets.    
In terms of print media, lack of distribution networks due to bad roads and 
inaccessibility make it incredibly difficult for those in rural areas to access newspapers 
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or print media.   What this means is that those living in rural areas, the majority of the 
population - have difficulty accessing TV and Newspapers.    
The lack of a dependable electricity supply is another of the main factors that prevent 
many rural people from using electronic media, from the internet to television sets and 
is a serious issue for access to broadcast media in Tanzania.  Lack of stable sources of 
electricity has an impact on the ability to access all media and communication devices 
and is disproportionately a problem in poorer and more rural provinces (Murthy, 
2011).   
Those in rural locations have had much lower access to main power grids than those 
living in more urban locations.  Murthy found that close to half of all Tanzanians 
who say they have never watched television cited “problems with electricity” as one 
of the reasons for non-use (Murthy, 2011).  Only 11% of those living in rural parts of 
the country (which constitutes 72% of the population) had access to the main power 
grid in 2014 (African Development Bank, 2015).   
As a result, those living in urban areas (and in turn more stable electricity sources) 
are thus more likely to have access to broadcast media, network coverage and also 
print media for distribution reasons.  
Therefore, like in Kenya, and possibly even more so, there is a sharp distinction 
between those living in urban and rural areas with regards to access of information.    
Many media largely remain reserved for urban dwellers, while the broader portion of 
the population residing in rural areas is left out.  As such, it appears that “Tanzania 
still lacks a diverse broadcasting sector essential to a functioning democracy that can 
contribute to the public interest” (FesMedia, 2010:5).  
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The media in Kenya and Tanzania face many challenges to being able to fulfil its 
democratic potential as watchdog and public sphere.   But in both countries, the 
affordability and accessibility of both old and new media should not be 
underestimated. 
 
Stakeholder Perspectives  
The previous section presented secondary data to illustrate the landscape for media 
assistance in Kenya and Tanzania.  This chapter explores the context for media 
assistance activity in these countries and in particular the impact of digital 
technologies on journalism and the media systems in these two countries.  This will 
influence what types of media interventions are now needed and whether traditional 
media assistance continues to be relevant. 
Key stakeholders who participated in the interviews contributed valuable insights in 
this area and in this section these insights are presented as supporting evidence of the 
impact of digitisation on the media environment.  They also provide perspectives on 
the techno-optimistic funding environment for media assistance in these case study 
countries, which may influence the projects being undertaken.   
 
Digital technologies, Social Media platforms and news production  
The interview participants, or key stakeholders, contributed important insights 
regarding the impact that digital technologies have had on news production and 
consumption and the public sphere in Kenya and Tanzania.  Stakeholders noted the 
emergence and growth of user generated content (UGC) and citizen journalism as one 
of the most evident changes of the increasing use of digital technologies.  Kenyans 
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and Tanzanians increasingly report eye-witness accounts on their mobile phones, 
telling stories and reporting local news.   
Citizen journalism is seen by some as a remedy to the widening gap in societies where 
traditional news media are in decline or not fulfilling their watchdog role (Banda, 
2010; Riaz and Pasha, 2011).  Platforms such as Twitter have certainly changed the 
landscape for journalism in the region and Moyo (2007) suggests ‘new’ technologies 
offer alternative platforms of expression in the face of state monopolies of the mass 
media in Africa (Moyo, 2007).  It has been called ‘citizen-driven’, ‘participatory and 
‘democratic’ journalism for these reasons. 
The stakeholders confirmed that digital technologies and social media platforms have 
changed the way journalists gather and disseminate news.  Journalists in Kenya now 
file stories, pictures, and audio and visual clips from the field using their laptops and 
mobile internet connection facilities.   The larger media houses have invested in 
converged newsrooms such as those seen in the headquarters of BBC and CNN. The 
Standard Group, for example, has a converged newsroom where reporters working for 
the radio, television, online, and newspaper share stories, pictures, and videos.  
Mabwaezera (2015) noted that “there is no denying that journalists in Africa, like their 
counterparts in the rest of the world, are experiencing the disruptive practice of new 
digital technologies on the way that they gather, produce and distribute news” 
(Mabweazara, 2015:1).   
Stakeholder Dickens Olewe is a Kenyan journalist who has worked at The Star in 
Kenya and is a scholarship recipient in Stanford University in California focusing on 
using new technology in the news process.  He argues that Kenyan media and 
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journalists have adapted but at different paces.  “In terms of journalists, they were 
really quick in adopting being in social networks” (Olewe, 2015, in interivew)41.   
The bombing of Westgate was an important event in motivating Kenyans to sign up to 
social networks and showed how social media could provide another platform for 
news “because mainstream media was absolutely inadequate in covering West-gate” 
(Dickens Olewe, 2015).  This event was “very, very important” for getting people in 
Kenya to start using social media for news.   
Olewe notes that “the independent voices on social [media] were amazing [during 
WestGate] and the Kenyan media, especially the broadcast media were absolutely 
incompetent, they did not ask any questions.  People on twitter got together and put 
out a list of questions they wanted the media to ask” (Olewe, 2015, in interview).     
Stakeholders confirmed that social media platforms such as Twitter have enabled new 
voices to be heard, providing alternative news sources to mainstream and other media 
that are be controlled by the government or elites.  For instance, in Tanzania people 
are using Twitter in particular because the official mainstream news tends to be self-
censored.   
Titus and Brombart (2015) concur that social media has provided a new platform for 
journalists and members of civil society in Tanzania to express themselves more 
freely on various issues (Titus and Brombart, 2015).   
For instance, stakeholder Kris Kapella from Femina Hip noted that:  
People don’t think they can get the most accurate and open information from 
traditional media outlets and so the strength of something like Twitter in Tanzania in 
 
41 In skype interview with author March 2015 
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particular is that people can get live real time information as it happens, with Twitter 
people are using it as a substitute for traditional news media (Kapella, 2014, in 
interview).42. 
 
Kapella notes how “in the past the government has cracked down on newspapers that 
have been overly critical of the government so as a result there is self-censorship”.   
Elsie Eyakuze, a blogger from Tanzania writes the popular MikoCheni Report, notes 
“the growth of social media has been significant, not necessarily challenging 
traditional media so much as bringing in a whole new dimension of interaction 
between producers and consumers of content.  It has enhanced the dialogue and 
democratic space” (Eyakuze, 2015, in interview).43 
Stakeholders noted that digital technologies have impacted on the way journalists 
undertake their work in the region and they are very aware of social media and online 
sources.  Josh Ogure, from Kibera News Network, confirms that new technologies and 
social media “are being used a lot in Africa for news” (Ogure, 2015, in interview)44.   
Maurice Oniang’o, an independent journalist from Kenya who has been recipient of 
the Thompson Foundation ‘Young journalist from a Developing country Award’, 
claims: 
In the past five years the media has experienced dynamic changes which include 
embracing new media techniques in delivering news. Today almost all media houses 
have active social media channels through which they deliver news through as well as 
interact with their audience.  All the major TV, Radio and Newspapers in Kenya have 
 
42 Kris Kapella, Femina Hip, interview with author May 2014. 
43  Elsie Eyakuze, Blogger, Tanzania, Mar 2015 In email communication  
44 Josh Ogure from Kibera News Network in email communication with author Mar 2015 
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an active Twitter account, Facebook account and websites through which they update 
their audiences on current issues and stories that they are following (Oniang’o, 2015, 
in email communication).45   
 
Oniang’o himself is “always keen on trends on Twitter and it has always updated me 
on breaking news before I see it on TV or listening to it on radio”. For instance, the 
Westgate mall terror attack46 was reported on Twitter “hours before any TV or radio 
stations picked it up” (ibid). 
Nyabuga reports: “today’s journalist will hardly depend on the newsroom diary or 
phone tip offs from sources but will also have their eye on social media platforms to 
see what has been posted” (Nyabuga, 2016:44).   Kaigwa and Wu (2015) refer to 
Twitter as Kenya’s virtual “town square” (Kaigwa and Wu, 2015:154).  Kaigwa 
argues that journalists now consider it to be a “part of their beat, staying tuned to 
trending blogs and other updates. It has become common to see news broken on 
Twitter by a blogger… legitimizing it  .. and publishing it in the Kenyan news media”  
(Kaigwa, 2017:193). 
In addition to integration of digital technologies into journalism practice, other 
websites and blogs have sprung up, encouraging citizen engagement and interaction 
 
45 Maurice Oniang’o, Freelance Journalist Kenya). In email communication Mar 2015 
46  On 21 September 2013, unidentified gunmen attacked the upmarket Westgate shopping mall in 
Nairobi, Kenya. The attack, which lasted until 24 September, resulted in at least 67 deaths, including 
four attackers. More than 175 people were reportedly wounded in the mass shooting, with all of the 
gunmen reported killed. 
228 
 
and eye-witness reporting.  Kenya boasts a vibrant blogging community, some of 
whom have become quite famous (such as Robert Alai and Patrick Gathara).47     
Eric Chinje from African Media Initiative confirmed “there are three or four bloggers 
in Kenya who contribute to influencing the agenda, no doubt about it” (Chinje, 2015, 
in interview)48.    
For example, Robert Alai is a high-profile blogger in Kenya who has become so well 
known that whistle-blowers willingly go to him to introduce sensitive documents to 
break the story on the internet. “You will see the mainstream media following up to 
try and make a story out of that, and I think that tells you where the trend is 
going……Bloggers are breaking the stories” (Dickens Olewe, 2015, in interview). 
Josh Ogure from the Kibera News Network argues that citizen journalists are the new 
watchdogs:   
In the last five years Kenyan media was somehow ranked as the most trusted 
institution, but that’s not the case anymore, they have changed, Kenyan media have 
got into bed with the government, they would rather cover up the government than 
serve the public with the truth.  Social media and citizen journalism has become a 
great alternative (Ogure, 2015, in interview)49.     
 
 
47 Robert Alai, is a Kenyan blogger, internet entrepreneur and cyber-activist. Alai has been sued and 
briefly incarcerated for his highly opinionated political and sometimes personal attacks on politicians, 
government officials and business leaders.. Patrick Gathara is a Kenyan journalist, blogger, and writer. 
He is a regularly published commentator on regional and international affairs. His work has appeared in 
multiple publications, including The Washington Post, Al Jazeera, 
48 Eric Chinje, African Media Initiative, in interview Feb 2015 
49 Joshua Ogure, Kibera News Network, email communication Feb 2015 
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Olewe agrees that citizen journalists are carrying out the real watchdog role: “They 
are taking over from mainstream media. For example, with a platform like HiviSasa50 
we democratise journalism where everyone can report their stories” (Olewe, 2015). 
Chloe Spoerry is the founder of ‘HiviSasa’, an online county-level newspaper, and she 
argues that due to a centrally owned media, two out of three Kenyans receive written 
news that is not locally relevant, poorly distributed, slow, biased, easily censored and 
costly. She refers to the severe lack of local news in Kenya and Tanzania, and that 
new citizen journalism tools such as HiviSaSa address that gap: “stories will never be 
killed any more” (Spoerry, 2015, in interview). 
Online news has filled gaps in information and news requirements of local audiences 
who are neglected in Kenya due to either accessibility, ownership or infrastructural 
issues.  Spoerry claims “Hivisasa is a real tool for democracy, it creates more dialogue 
between local governments and citizens…. I’m talking about accountability and 
transparency” (Spoerry, 2015, in interview)51.  
Tom Rhodes, from the Committee to Protect Journalists in East Africa, agrees that 
digital storytelling is “certainly playing a major role [in news]. The stories that you're 
not seeing on the press, you're seeing on social media. People are talking about it 
there”.   He cites the example of Jamiiforums in Tanzania, an online news forum and 
discussion website. “Jamiiforums is this amazing cathartic tool where disgruntled 
 
50 The ‘HiviSasa’ platform is an online, local, county-level Kenyan newspaper tailored for the mobile 
web. It sources all its news stories from local citizen reporters (i.e. anyone who wants to report the 
news) who are paid via mobile-money for each article they publish. Professional journalists/editors 
curate the incoming articles and choose the best ones for publishing. 
51 Chloe Spoerry, HiviSasa, Feb 2015 in interview with author 
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politicians will go and upload very sensitive documents” (Rhodes, 2015, in 
interview).52  
The increasing popularity of these social networking sites like Twitter and Jamii 
Forums show a potential for online and citizen journalism.   Jamii Forums is 
Tanzania’s number one most visited website and the most popular destination for 
Kiswahili speakers. “JamiiForums is unique in Africa in terms of the openness of the 
platform, and the site has a moderator to try to keep by validating claims” (Titus and 
Brombart, 2015:41). 
Another informant suggests that mainstream journalism in Kenya could learn from 
social media and some of the bloggers, such as Robert Alai, Ory Okolloh and Gathara 
who “give context as well as reporting, which you don’t get that in the mainstream 
media”.    Robert Munuku, from the organisation ‘Action for Transparency’, claims 
that as a result of blogging and citizen journalism “mainstream media have stepped up 
their game, they've stepped up the quality of their news, they've stepped up the quality 
of their research, and the veracity of the content” (Munuku, 2015, in interview).  
Munuku adds “when you look at political issues, on-line conversations and on-line 
behaviour is slowly affecting political issues in the country”.   
What the stakeholder insights in this section reveal is how the internet and citizen 
journalism is seen as an important new platform for dissemination of news.  They 
underscore how citizen journalism, blogging and social media platforms are affecting, 
possibly challenging, how the mainstream media is working in Kenya and Tanzania.  
 
52 Tom Rhodes, Committee to Protect Journalists East Africa in interview with author Feb 2015 
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Robert Munuku claims these online media are “they are keeping them on their toes” 
(Munuku, 2015, in interview).    
This is supported by academic literature. Mabweazara et al (2014) claim that online 
and digital journalism are “thriving on the continent” (Mabweazara et al., 2014:1) and 
Mudhai (2011) argues that mainstream media in Kenya show signs of struggling to 
catch up with an active blogosphere and to remain relevant, as events are increasingly 
debated via social media as they occur (Mudhai, 2011).    
Abdi and Deane noted that Kenya has a lively blog culture and that they “provide a 
key form of public debate and a source of investigation at a time when investigative 
journalism is under threat in the country.  As such, blogs provide a growing form of 
democratic expression and accountability, and fresh opportunities for dialogue and 
debate across cultures and communities (Abdi and Deane, 2008:11). 
It will later be determined whether the changes brought by digitsation is impacting on 
the projects being undertaken by media assistance organisations and its relevance in 
an increasingly technological environment.    
 
Funding environment for Media Assistance in Kenya and Tanzania 
The stakeholders who participated in the interviews also had noteworthy insights into 
the environment for funding of media assistance projects and technology in the region. 
One aspect of the relevance of traditional media assistance approaches in the region is 
the extent to which they continue to be supported financially.  
As discussed in earlier chapters, there is great enthusiasm amongst donors about the 
potential for ICTs, and the mobile phone in particular, in the development sector.  
Traditional donors and new donors are recommending ICTs to address issues such as 
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governance and transparency to citizen participation to health programmes.  Some of 
these are also traditionally media assistance goals.  
ICT now forms a significant part of many donor funded projects and with the entry of 
the technology foundations - such as Gates Foundation and Omidyar Network - into 
the media assistance space, their media projects encourage technology solutions for 
development problems. Nelson says these foundations take a strong interest in digital 
media projects (Nelson, 2009:17).   Sara Chamberlain from BBC Media Action noted 
how these “tech companies, particularly foreign tech companies, they're very focused 
on high-end technology, the cutting-edge, the latest end user interface design….  
essentially touch screens and Apps” (Brown-Martin, 2014).  
Over the recent past, Kenya’s capital, Nairobi, has grown into a global technology hub 
and a regional role model for innovation.  Nairobi is home to the first tech incubator in 
Africa, the iHub, which has supported a movement of young tech-savvy Africans to 
develop a community.  There are also technology hubs springing up across Tanzania:  
Kinu, Buni Hub and DTBi are local innovation hubs along the lines of iHub.  This 
proliferation of tech communities and clubs, and “Tech-Hubs” has led to the term 
“Silicon Savannah”.   
The energy coming from Kenyas buzzy technology centre has gained the attention of 
governments and donors who are keen to support it.  Social Tech companies, not-for-
profit organisations, for-profit technology initiatives are increasingly establishing 
themselves in these centres on the back of donor funding. 
In their recent strategy report “Doing Development in a Digital World” the UK’s 
Department of International Development proclaimed optimistically that “digital 
technologies offer an unprecedented opportunity to revolutionise the global 
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development system, change lives, transform entire economies, stimulate growth and, 
ultimately, end reliance on aid” (DFID Digital Strategy 2018 to 2020, 2018).  The 
organisation admits however to “falling prey to fads, buzzwords, and endless jargon” 
(Orton-Vipond, and Powell, 2018). 
This illustrates how donors are promoting use of ICTs in development projects aimed, 
for example, at promoting accountability, transparency or at guaranteeing peaceful 
elections, and there is certain optimism around these technologies.   
Many of the stakeholders interviewed for this research confirmed that the funders of 
media and development projects were encouraging the use of new technology in their 
programmes.    
Stakeolder Alex Pitkin from Frontline SMS53 confirms that “there are lots of projects 
that get funding because they are doing something innovative…. It’s more likely to 
get funding if they have good ideas on technology” (Pitkin, 2015, in interview) 54. 
Bart Sullivan from the Canadian NGO FARM Radio, which undertakes projects in 
both Tanzania and Kenya, revealed “there is a lot of excitement around this.  Almost 
all the projects we are funded to work on combine radio and mobile and online 
technologies…  And ICTs in general” (Sullivan, 2015, in email).55   
 
53 Frontline SMS is a NGO which teams SMS with Radio for interactive discussions. It is a free, open-
source software used by a variety of organisations to distribute and collect information via text 
messages (SMS). Their radio product - Frontline SMS: Radio - helps radio stations increase listener 
engagement, build interactive programming and manage data in real-time, all using SMS 
54 Alex Pitkin, Frontline SMS, in interview with author May 2014 
55 Bart Sullivan, FARM Radio, Email communication with Author, March 2015 
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Daniel Dedeyan from USAID in Tanzania attests that “there is an excitement about 
new technologies to transform lives and bring about social and political change” and 
agreed that at USAID “we’ve had that excitement” (Dedayan, 2014, in interview)56.     
He revealed that they “are definitely getting a push from Washington to be 
innovative” in their projects (Dedayan, 2014, in interview).  USAID are one of the 
larger funders of media development work in the region and this would have an 
impact on the direction of the media development sector.   
Dedayan noted that, historically, a major obstacle to some of USAID’s development 
goals, such as accountability and transparency, has been information flows in 
Tanzania. Now ICTs are viewed with optimism as a possible solution to these 
problems (Dedayan, 2015, in interview).   
Sasha Kinney who works with PAWA254, a community-based activism organisation 
in Nairobi, also spoke of “the big technology bias” that has appeared in the aid sector 
over the past five years.   Kinney claims the message that the NGO community is 
getting from donors is: “Tech is new, we have to use tech.  Tech will revolutionise 
everything on its own”.  But she maintains that “people forget to give training in the 
fundamentals…It's kind of backwards” (Kinney, 2015, in interview). 
Kinney warns “this idea of advanced technology, it’s funder-driven and it’s popular, 
and there's very little regard as to what is really appropriate to reach a certain audience 
or engage them” (Kinney, 2015, in interview)57.    
 
56 Daniel Dedayan, USAID Tanzania, interview with author May 2014 
57 Sasha Kinney, PAWA, in interview with author Nairobi Feb 2015 
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This is of note because it tells of the push for use of new or digital technology 
regardless of whether they are the appropriate intervention or tool or whether their use 
is evidence-based.  Kinney confirms “no-one ever asks about adoption or usage, no, 
because they also don’t want to see failure…  They're not really thinking through 
really what's needed” (Kinney, 2015, in interview).  
Colin Spurway from BBC Media Action Tanzania concurs: 
With the pressure on donors to show innovation there is very often a pressure to be 
doing things with smart phones and Apps.  It is an extremely bad idea because the 
people you’re actually trying to reach, let say this woman, she doesn’t have a smart 
phone for Apps and even if she does have such a phone, it is probably one of those 
crappy little Nokia with a broken black and white screen and she can’t even read it 
(Spurway, 2014, in interview). 
 
From the interview data and from observation during the two field trips to Nairobi and 
Dar es Salaam in 2014/2015, it is apparent that donors are excited about technology 
for development and for media development.  Consequently, aid organisations based 
in Kenya and Tanzania are designing media programmes in an environment where 
funds are becoming more easily accessible for technology-focused solutions. Whether 
direct or indirect, there may be subtle pressure to use these technologies.   The 
researcher heard from informants that sometimes a technology element is added on to 
grant applications for potential projects just to secure funding.  This illustrates the 
mind-set emanating from the capital at the time. 
The media assistance interventions that are being implemented in Kenya and Tanzania 
on the back of this donor funding shall be examined in more detail in the next chapter.  
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What this section illustrates is an environment in Kenya and Tanzania where donors 
are certainly enthusiastic for digital technologies in their programmes and view them 
as possible solutions for their development objectives.  Will this impact on the 
relevance of traditional media assistance methods?  This will be addressed in the next 
chapter which analyses the uptake, and effectiveness, of these technologies for media 
assistance objectives. 
 
Key comparative issues in Media Assistance in Kenya & Tanzania  
As can be garnered from the case studies presented here, neighbouring countries, 
Tanzania and Kenya are different not only in their history, politics and economy but 
also in terms of their current day openness to press freedom, technology and 
innovation. Kenya is much more technologically advanced than Tanzania, especially 
in urban places such as Nairobi.   Kenya appears to enjoy more freedom of media than 
Tanzania although they are both ranked “Partly Free” by Freedom House. There are 
political and cultural reasons for these differences, and with its background as a 
socialist country for several decades, Tanzania does not have the same culture of 
entrepreneurship that can be witnessed in Kenya.  
It has been shown that there has been a sharp increase in use of digital technologies in 
both Kenya and Tanzania in recent years, predominantly use of mobile phones, and 
also an increase in internet use.  
New digital technologies have helped to advance the economy in both these countries 
and arguably, its public sphere as more people are brought into the new public space.  
Mobile phones and social media have widened the public sphere and this has given 
citizens of these countries’ new platforms for discussion.  Citizen journalism and 
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blogging is a growing practice and the internet as a medium has provided citizens of 
Kenya and Tanzania with an alternative view to the mainstream media.  This has 
provided an outlet for dissenting and critical views of the government, in particular in 
Kenya.  
Digitisation of Television and satellite TV has meant that more channels and 
platforms, not regulated by local governments, are available to those who do own or 
access a television.  
Open Government initiatives have resulted in more information made available to the 
public and journalists.  For instance, Kenya was the first sub-Saharan country to put 
its data online.  The Kenyan government launched the “Kenya Open Data Initiative” 
in 2011, making key government data freely available to the public through a single 
online portal.   
But while government information is now technically free and available to the public, 
access to it is limited because only a small percentage of Kenyan citizens have the 
internet capability to access the information, or the educational level needed to absorb 
it (Foster, 2012).  
Indeed, this is being addressed in Kenya, and elsewhere, by a relatively new field of 
journalism called ‘data journalism’ or ‘data driven journalism’ (Gray et al., 2012; 
Howard, 2014) where journalists are trained in statistical analysis so they can interpret 
this data for the wider population and present it in a more comprehensive way for 
audiences.  This is one area that media development organisations in the region are 
addressing with training and capacity building. 
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However, both Kenya and Tanzania’s’ media and media systems face many structural, 
legal, access and ownership issues.   Although freedom of information is guaranteed 
on a constitutional basis, regulations have limited meaningful press freedom and both 
countries are ranked as ‘Partly Free’ by media freedom indices.   These rankings have 
dropped in past years with recent media laws endeavouring to restrict online 
expression in both countries, under the guise of national security.  
For instance, in Kenya, a 2014 Security Bill was fast tracked through government 
saying that it needed more powers to fight militant Islamists.  The bill contained 
provisions that carry the potential to restrict freedom of the Kenyan press when 
covering terrorist acts and issues related to national security, with harsh penalties for 
individuals convicted of infractions. 
While the legislation is supposedly targeted at print and broadcast media houses and 
the journalists they employ, citizen journalists, bloggers or those who are active online  
fear the loosely defined terminology hides an attempt to bring the unregulated online 
space into ‘prosecutable reach’ (Verjee, 2014). Tom Rhodes of the Committee to 
Protect Journalists claims that these laws “force journalists and news outlets to self-
censor to survive. They are a severe blow to investigative reporting in Kenya” (CPJ, 
2013).   
This chapter examined the challenges to the media sector in Kenya and Tanzania to 
fulfil its potential democratic role as watchdog, as informant and as public sphere.  
Impartial and independent journalism continues to be hampered by those issues 
common elsewhere in the region – finances, concentration of ownership, harassment 
of journalists and censorship (Nelson and Susman-Peña, 2012).     
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The factors limiting access to or participation in the public sphere by Kenyan and 
Tanzanian citizens are many and have been documented in this chapter, in particular 
the sharp differences between media access between urban and rural areas.  The stark 
urban-rural divide is what emerges most notably from the analysis of these media 
systems.   
Digital technologies may not yet be fully relevant when reaching the broader 
populations of Kenya and Tanzania with news and information, providing a public 
sphere accessible by all or facilitating national discourse. 
Furthermore, interview participants noted that the growth of digital technologies and 
social media have not necessarily improved the quality of news journalism. Key 
informant, Elsie Eyakuze, noted that with digital technologies “there is a lot more 
feedback, interaction and it means that news from all over the country gets 
disseminated faster. Not better, but faster” (Eyakuze, 2015, in interview).  Nyabuga 
argues “it is not clear whether these have had any significant effect on the quality of 
information and news. Digital technologies have had both positive and negative 
consequences for journalism” (Nyabuga, 2013).   
These issues are not limited to this region of Africa or even the continent.  Problems 
of credibility and trust with online information are being experienced both in these 
countries and globally with the growth in social media and citizen journalism.  The 
veracity of online news and the growth of “disordered information” is a global and 
growing problem (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017).  Concepts such as the echo 
chamber58, fake news and filter bubbles have risen to prominence both globally and in 
 
58 the idea that online conversations about politics are typically divided into a variety of sub-groups, 
and that this division takes place along ideological lines with people only talking to others with which 
they are already 
in agreement (Bright, 2017: 1). 
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this region in recent years.  There are many recently established initiatives to 
understand the phenomena and mechanics of ‘fake news’59.  
This chapter reflects some of the issues with regards to the growth in newer digital 
technologies and social media in Kenya and Tanzania and the impact on reliable, 
impartial and trustworthy information.  It suggests there is still a space for traditional 
media that is impartial, independent and is accessible for the broader populace.  This 
would suggest that there is still a gap which traditional media assistance can address.  
 
Conclusion 
This thesis asks whether digital technologies have impacted on the relevance of media 
assistance in the chosen case study countries.  In order to address this, this thesis put 
forward questions relating to the environment in which media assistance takes place. 
This chapter addresses the question: What are the characteristics of the current media 
and information environment in the selected case studies of Kenya and Tanzania 
(RQ2a)? 
This chapter therefore presented a profile of the media systems and media 
environment of Kenya and Tanzania.  Secondary data and interview data from key 
stakeholders illustrated the impact that digital technologies have had on both the 
media ecosystem and the practice of journalism in Kenya and Tanzania.  
In doing so, this chapter has provided a scene-setting and context analysis for the two 
case study countries which serves as a needs analysis for their media systems.   It 
 
59 DIT Fake News Project Provenance https://fujomedia.eu/provenance/ 
BBC Beyond Fake News: https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p06r9vvf 
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offers an overview of the media and communications environment in which Media 
Development NGOs and donors implement projects in the focus countries.  
Understanding the setting for media assistance will help in understanding the real 
potential of digital technologies to achieve donor goals in media assistance 
programmes.   
For instance, dominant political issues in Kenya are ethnic divisions, the threat of 
terrorism from Al Shabaab and corruption, and these issues impact on the media 
sphere as well as elsewhere.   They will also influence media assistance donors’ 
objectives. 
The next chapter will present the primary data on media development projects in 
Kenya and Tanzania.  Analysing the project data will illustrate whether digital 
technologies can fully address donor objectives and whether traditional media 
assistance methods are still relevant. 
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Chapter 6 
Project Findings:  Media Development Practice in East Africa 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 5, the research showed, from a range of both primary and secondary 
sources, the characteristics of the media systems in Kenya and Tanzania.   Most 
pertinent to the research question, it illustrated the extent to which the media 
landscapes in these case study countries have changed as a result of digital 
technologies.   That chapter also outlined stakeholders’ insights into the changes 
digital technologies have made on the practice of journalism in the region and 
revealed donors enthusiasm for using such technologies. 
Chapter 6 now proceeds to address the type of projects that are being implemented on 
donors’ behalf and to what extent these use digital technologies.   
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As exhibited in the research map above, this chapter takes up the research question 
with regards to media assistance practice in East Africa. It presents data on media 
assistance projects being implemented on the ground in Kenya and Tanzania.  The 
research investigated, through face to face interview with stakeholders, whether media 
development agencies have changed the form and make-up of projects they implement 
in these countries as a result of the evolving “information ecosystems” in which they 
operate.   This chapter thus directly addresses the sub-questions of: 
 What are the characteristics of current media development practice in a modern 
East African context?  (RQ 2b) 
 Have ICTs impacted on the practice of media assistance in the chosen case 
studies? (RQ 2c) 
 
In so doing, this chapter examines the nature of media development activity taking 
place in Kenya and Tanzania and whether digital technologies are being used to 
address project goals. This will help address the question of what the strengths and 
weaknesses of digital technologies are compared to traditional media development 
approaches for achieving donor goals.  This will ultimately help explain the rationale 
for a continuing emphasis on traditional media methods. 
 
Schema for Presentation of Data 
This chapter presents the data from fieldwork and comprises interview data focused 
on a sample of eleven relevant organisations whose casework is representative of 
media interventions in the region.  To address the research question, the researcher 
needed to ascertain precisely what kind of media development projects were currently 
244 
 
being implemented in the case study countries, and what the objectives and activities 
of these projects were.  Then, it could be extrapolated to what extent digital 
technologies are part of these projects and furthermore, whether these technologies 
can address donor objectives in a more effective manner than traditional forms of 
media.  
For each project the data shows: 
 The type of interventions being undertaken 
 To what extent the media development organisations are using digital technologies 
in their projects.  
 If these organisations are using digital technologies in their media interventions, 
have they experienced success, and to what extent?   
 If these organisations are not using new digital technologies in current projects to 
achieve their objectives, what is the rationale for this?  
Thus, the data addresses the question of whether digital technologies, if they are being 
integrated into media development programmes, are having the desired impact.  The 
chapter also examines reasons for not integrating them into projects, on the basis that 
they did not serve to address donor goals.   
Obstacles encountered in the use of ICTs for donor objectives will then be analysed 
further in the following chapter.  This will help understand the limitations of using 
these ICTs for achieving media development goals.    
Analysing the data will therefore address whether the cyber-optimism that is apparent 
in the literature and donor policy documentation reviewed in Chapter 3, and expressed 
by the stakeholders in interview, is feeding down into project activities on the ground.   
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In addition, this chapter discusses an important finding that emerged from the data: 
how media development projects in this region rarely solely address media sector 
reform or support, but are often combined with elements of media for development.   
The introduction chapter outlined the difference between what is understood as a 
‘media development’ project and a ‘media for development’ project.  The data in this 
research revealed how media assistance projects in these countries often takes the 
form of a ‘media development hybrid’ as referred to by Scott (2014).  This will be 
discussed briefly below as it is a noteworthy aspect of media assistance in this region.  
 
The Media Development Hybrid 
As was noted in the literature review, media assistance was associated historically 
with establishing and strengthening democracy in the transitioning countries of 
Eastern Europe (and elsewhere) and for those objectives the sectors’ activities were 
especially focused on the professionalisation of the media sector and transformation of 
the media systems.  
More recently, with the field of media development expanding to other geographic 
areas and widening its remit in terms of goals such as food security and humanitarian 
assistance, there has been a corresponding increase in funding for media for 
development activities. For instance, it is estimated that USAID spends four times 
more on C4D-related projects now than it does on media development (Cary and 
D’Amour, 2013). 
Donors who support media development projects do so for a variety of objectives. 
These vary from trying to improve accountability, transparency and governance 
problems within a country, or increasing access to information, to encouraging 
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behavioural change within target groups (such as promoting use of condoms or breast-
feeding).  The type of media development project, whether Media Development or 
Media for Development, also depends on the project objectives and the target group. 
The data from this research reflects that in an East African context, media 
development practice is often a combination of the two strands.    
Within the sample of NGOs who participated in this research, very few were focused 
solely on media sector support or reform.  Within the sample, there were several 
projects which had media for development activities but which also contained 
elements of capacity building or training as captured in the notion of the ‘media 
development hybrid’ (Scott, 2014).   
For example, a BBC Media Action project called Niambie (Tell Me) is an youth radio 
show in Tanzania, using media to help young people understand their rights and 
responsibilities. The BBC project Haba na Haba (Little by Little) is a radio show 
aiming to bridge the gap between leaders and ordinary Tanzanians. Both projects 
provide a platform for public discussion, helping to bring people’s voices into the 
open but with additional journalism training, the projects provide support and capacity 
building to local and national media.  
This is an important aspect of this research.   Whereas the research focus initially was 
on digital technologies and media sector support, the primary data from this research 
showed much donor support in this region is in the form of this media development 
hybrid.  That is – media-strengthening or capacity building activities hand-in-hand 
with ‘media for development’ or ‘communication for development’ activities.  This is 
in contrast to early media development interventions in the former Soviet region 
which predominantly focused on media sector reform and capacity building.   
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Thus, the data illustrates that projects in the region are very often not only focused on 
media sector support but also using the media as a tool for change.  Media for 
development projects are projects which use radio, TV or print media to convey 
messages about specific development issues. These tend to focus on food security, 
health issues, environmental or humanitarian information for instance.   
In these ‘media for development’ projects, the emphasis is on content: “the strategic 
employment of media and communications as facilities for informing, educating and 
sensitising people about development and pertinent social issues” (Manyozo, 
2012:54). 
With ‘media development’, the emphasis is on structure.  Manyozo describes this as 
“initiatives that are strategically designed to build media infrastructures, policies and 
capacities ... as a way of consolidating good governance, free speech, political 
citizenship and sustainable development” (Manyozo, 2012:112). 
 
 
Figure 13. The Media Development Hybrid 
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Furthermore, although these types of hybrid projects are focused on both content 
(production of radio programmes) and structure (training and mentoring) they often 
simultaneously created new platforms for national debate, a place for voices to be 
heard, for discussion to take place and working towards a stronger public sphere.   
This is illustrated in Figure 5. 
Therefore, although these projects can be recognised for their ‘media for 
development’ characteristics, in fact they also fulfil additional structural and 
democratic objectives of media assistance – strengthening the public sphere, 
contributing to a healthier democracy. 
However, as Warren Feek (2008) suggested, perhaps the distinction between the two 
areas is “false and distracting” (Feek, 2008).  The data from these sample projects is 
presented in the next section. 
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Project Data: Media development activity in Kenya and Tanzania 
Interviews with representatives from a sample of organisations undertaking media 
assistance in Kenya and Tanzania provide the main source of data for this analysis and 
is presented below.   The data is presented for a sample of eleven organisations that 
participated in the interviews and reflect media assistance activity in these two 
countries at the time of the fieldwork.  These organisations spearhead media 
assistance in the region and the projects vary in size and the extent of their focus on 
ICTs in their media development activities.    
The data is organised around four categories of projects, defined by their activity and 
goals, as outlined in the table:    
 
Table 8. Categories of projects 
 
Project 
Type 
1. Capacity 
Building using 
digital 
technologies 
2. Traditional 
Media 
Development 
approaches 
3. The Media 
Development 
Hybrid 
4. Strengthening 
the Public Sphere 
and platforms for 
dialogue 
 
Project 
Name 
 
UNESCO 
 
TANZANIAN 
MEDIA FUND 
 
BBC MEDIA 
ACTION KENYA 
 
FEMINA HIP 
  
INTERNEWS 
 
HIVOS 
 
BBC MEDIA 
ACTION 
TANZANIA 
 
WELL TOLD 
STORY 
  
ACTION FOR 
TRANSPARENCY 
 
AFRICAN MEDIA 
INITIATIVE 
 
FARM RADIO 
 
TWAWEZA 
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A. Capacity Building projects using ICTs 
 
UNESCO - Empowering Local Radio through ICTs 
A capacity building project in Africa which aims to address the lack of quality 
programming for local radios and coordinated by United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) provides the first example. The 
project is called ‘Empowering Local Radio through ICTs’ and focuses on local radio 
stations, based in the community.  
Table 9. UNESCO 
Organisation Name UNESCO 
Who was 
interviewed John Okande Project Manager Kenya 
Project Title Empowering Local Radio through ICTs 
Problem Identified 
 Local radios lack of quality programming. 
 The scarcity of reporting on development issues. 
 Limited debate platforms for the poor 
 A need to upscale local radio stations with a focus on 
sustainability.  
 Assist active participation of the poor in public debates. 
Methods 
Offered local stations a range of training and capacity building 
options: editorial programming; producing radio programmes; use of 
internet for research; management of daily contacts; training in use of 
ICTs; use of internet to report; role of correspondents to feed local 
news and collect testimonies; news desks’ work with correspondents 
for interviewing and reporting; and income generation 
Use of ICTs 
 ICTs were introduced in radio programming and production. 
 ICTs selected on the basis of improving editorial work, radio 
programming, broadcasting, engaging audiences &financial 
management. 
Outcome 
 Helped to diversify news coverage greatly. 
 Established correspondent’s networks. 
 From a very limited availability of news a few years ago, now they 
have many stories coming from all over the region.   
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Summary:  
The UNESCO radio project in Kenya was part of a wider project across 10 African 
countries over a 6-year period from 2012-2018. The objectives of the project were to 
expand the news coverage and diversity in news that was broadcast by the 
participating radio stations, usually based in the community.  The project aimed to 
improve the quality and quantity of local content for the radio station.  John Okande, 
the UNESCO Project Manager in Kenya, claimed that “previously, some of them 
would play music for the whole day” (Okande, 2015, in interview).   
Local radio is an important source for information for those living in rural areas, due 
to language and accessibility issues.  Few independent private local stations operate in 
local areas, as most local radio stations are affiliated to big media houses, such as 
Royal Media Services or Capital Group. 
Okande noted “local radio stations in Kenya face many challenges such as human and 
technical capacity building – including training on local content production, 
sustainability strategies, reach, ethical issues guiding the management and editorial 
policies, and continued independence from political influences” (Okande, 2015, in 
interview). 
The project focused on local radio and on integrating ICTs to modernise the radio 
stations’ operations, “such as how they use basic ICTs to produce quality radio 
programmes for broadcast” (Okande, 2015, in interview)60..  Trainers chose the most 
appropriate software, taking into account the radio station’s technical infrastructure 
 
60 John Okande, UNESCO. In interview with author Feb 2015 
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and ICT literacy (based on previous assessment and surveys).  Training also focused 
on use of phones for interviewing and reporting of news.   
While in some radio stations the goal was to introduce basic internet skills, other radio 
stations were able to implement more complex ICTs like SMS polling or automated 
call-ins. Radio stations embraced some new media elements such as WhatsApp with 
their audiences.  Examples of ICTs introduced by the project activities include 
Frontline SMS, Freedom Fone and Crowdmap. 
According to Okande there was considerable change in how things were run at the 
participating radio stations, and how to use the available technologies in their day to 
day running of the radio station (Okande, 2015, in interview).  Use of ICTs in radio 
stations resulted in improvements in sources for radio journalists and the quality of the 
stories they produced. 
The project has now established several correspondents’ networks, composed of 
trained community members.  These networks have “helped largely to diversify the 
news coverage from the usual norm where they used to play the same thing 
throughout the day”. Okande claims they now have “lots of content to use in their 
programmes… There's more news, diversified news.  There's no repetition, the way it 
used to be” (Okande, 2015, in interview). 
Okande states that the project improved the quality of programmes, the interaction 
with listeners, mostly poor people in rural areas, and extended the geographical 
coverage of news through the creation of networks of local correspondents.   
This project illustrates a successful case of how integrating digital technology into the 
training at the local radio stations increased diversity of content (and perhaps quality) 
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of radio output as well as being a useful research and organising tool for the stations 
and upskilling staff.   
It illustrates how ICTs can contribute to media assistance objectives in terms of 
improved quality of programming whilst also providing a platform for local 
audiences.  
 
INTERNEWS – Data Journalism project 
Internews is an international non-profit organisation whose purpose is “to empower 
local media worldwide to give people the news and information they need, the ability 
to connect and the means to make their voices heard” (“About Internews,” n.d.).   
Internews trains both media professionals and citizen journalists in Kenya and 
increases coverage of important issues.  Internews in Kenya supports projects that 
counter hate speech, promote peaceful solutions and better understanding of election 
issues.  They also promote journalism around specific health issues in Kenya. 
As noted in Chapter 5, a new field of journalism has emerged called ‘data journalism’ 
or ‘data driven journalism’ (Gray et al., 2012; Howard, 2014) .  Data Journalism is a 
media product gaining in popularity in many parts of the world, as a result of the Open 
Government partnerships of which Kenya and Tanzania have signed up, and 
governments have committed to making more data available to the public.   
As more countries open up their data to the general public under Open Government 
initiatives, there is a need for journalists to interpret this information and present it in 
ways that is understandable to the general public.  Data journalism can help a 
journalist tell a complex story by using infographics for example.  Journalists can now 
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use this newly available data to uncover stories, better explain or provide context for a 
news story.  Internews is a media development NGO providing training in this field.   
 
Table 10. Internews  
Organisation 
Name 
INTERNEWS 
Who was 
interviewed 
Ida Jooste: Country Director Kenya 
Project Title Health Media Project 
Problem 
Identified 
 The Health Media Project works to develop a media response to 
public health issues in Kenya. 
 The project focuses on revealing corruption and inequality and 
promoting accountability.   
Methods 
Working with media managers, owners and government stakeholders to 
promote sustained coverage of health issues. 
Includes workshops and mentoring for aspiring data journalists, 
teaching how to develop a narrative around data findings to ensure the 
public understands the human impact of the data and how government 
can solve the problem. 
 
Training in use and analysis of data, such as: 
*How to identify public interest story angles in data 
*Examining data sets for evidence of mismanagement and 
marginalisation of public funds 
Use of ICTs 
Use of visualisation tools including maps, charts and infographics to 
present the data in a way that helps audiences can understand how 
complex issues relate to their own lives. 
Outcome 
The Data journalism training uses data to give depth and integrity to 
mainstream reporting.   
Internews in Kenya “have done very, very well in terms of introducing 
new technologies” into media development projects according to 
Internews Kenya Country Director Ida Jooste.      
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Summary:   
Internews Kenya had identified how local journalists were not making use of data that 
had been recently made available by the Kenyan government. At the same time, 
traditional journalists were finding it difficult to differentiate themselves from citizen 
journalists.   Director of Internews in Kenya, Ida Jooste, explained the rationale for 
data journalism training: 
Journalism has to offer something deeper, something different, something more 
comprehensive, but the story has to be different for me as a traditional news consumer 
to be interested in it…. If you just have lots of statistics and graphs and so on, nobody 
would be drawn into the story, so you mustn’t forget the human element.  We are 
helping to produce a combination of evidence but also kind of how real human beings 
are affected by government inattention or corruption or whatever the case might be 
(Jooste, 2014, in interview). 
 
Internews trained journalists in skills for high-impact data journalism - how to 
interpret and integrate data into their stories.   They provided capacity building for 
these journalists through activities such as developing new tools to help journalists 
report on health topics.   They created a project website, called the “Data Dredger”, 
which includes datasets to explore, tutorials on data journalism tools, free 
visualisations for the trainee to investigate and publish at their own outlet and 
inspiring examples of data journalism from across the world. 
Using this newly available data to its full potential,  journalists can create “stories via 
investigative reporting and powerful interactive graphics that explain the reasons 
behind and explore the solutions to some of Kenya's greatest societal, economic and 
governance challenges” (“Internews Data Dredger,” n.d.) .   
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Internews focused also on data literacy and digital training in the program. “We 
thought that that this would be a way for journalism to give something different and 
that for us as media developments players would be one of the ways we would remain 
relevant.  The media gets to produce and offer its audience something that citizens 
don’t produce” (Jooste, 2014, in interview).   
Data Journalism is a notable example of how digital tools and ICTs are being fused 
with journalism in a successful manner in the region.   Country Director Jooste claims 
that “Internews was really pivotal in terms of helping journalists with this data” 
(Jooste, 2014, in interview).   
 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL - Action for Transparency 
Another project which was raised in the interviews is ‘Action for Transparency’ 
(A4T), a project funded by the Swedish authority for development cooperation 
(SIDA) and managed by Transparency International in Kenya. The overall objective 
of this project is to contribute to strengthened democratic accountability and 
transparency in Kenya through citizen monitoring of government expenditure.   
The project aims to fight corruption and mismanagement of government funds in 
Kenya and focuses on funds disbursed by the Government for the provision of Free 
Primary Education (FPE).   The aim is to uncover suspected corruption and 
mismanagement of these public funds.  Kenyans want to know “whether local 
government funding is getting to the target” stressed Robert Munuku, Project Manager 
in Kenya (Munuku, in interview, 2015)61.  
 
61 Robert Munuku, Action for Transparency, in interview with author, Feb 2015 Nairobi 
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The Action for Transparency project uses a combination of ICTs and traditional media 
and comprises three phases of interventions designed to “catalyse a culture of 
accountability and transparency through a ripple out effect” (Munuku, in interview, 
2014).  
Table 11. Transparency International 
Organisation 
Name 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL 
Who was 
interviewed 
Robert Munuku Project Manager Kenya 
Project Title Action for Transparency (A4T) 
Problem 
Identified 
 Government Corruption 
 Mismanagement of Funds 
Methods 
Citizens report inconsistencies they notice in government spending 
directly to a project website via an App.  
Training for up to 4,000 journalists, civil society representatives and 
public sector employees on how to access, analyse and communicate 
information on government spending. 
A public awareness campaign to raise awareness of the new ICT tools. 
Use of ICTs 
Development of ICT tools, including the online application (app) which 
enables users to compare the amount of government money pledged to 
specific schools and health clinics against their own observations of 
what appears to have been spent. 
Outcome 
“Reported cases arising from the increase in awareness and reporting 
have been forwarded to the relevant authorities for appropriate action. 
Cases from both the education and health sectors have been discussed 
with the County leadership with a commitment given for follow-up and 
redress” (Transparency International, 2018).Project Manager Munuku 
claims “the App, the Facebook site and the websites connected to it are 
providing a digital space for debates about corruption and misuse of tax 
payers' money”. 
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Summary 
The Action for Transparency project seeks to tackle Government corruption and 
mismanagement of Funds by giving people in Kenya and Tanzania the training and 
tools to identify and report any potential misallocations of government spending, 
using an App as its central focus.   
End users report any suspected corruption directly into their mobile phone with the 
bespoke App. The report is published immediately on the Action for Transparency 
(A4T) website and on Facebook.  If they don't have access to the internet, it is also 
possible to report using SMS or calling a hotline number. 
Project Manager Munuku describes the process: “You may find that the amount 
pledged for your school does not match with reality. For instance, there may only one 
teacher even though the Government says it is funding five teachers? Are there no 
schoolbooks even though the government has budgeted for one book for each pupil?” 
(Munuku, 2015, in interview).   They have produced a tool so that citizens can report 
this mismanagement. 
The concept is that by exposing which institutions and individuals are involved in 
corruption and providing the data to journalists and activist groups it intends to make 
corruption less attractive. 
One learning outcome for the team what that they could not solely rely on the 
technical aspect of the programme. A critical element of the project was getting 
people involved in the reporting process and a central part of the initial plan was an 
App.  Munuku says “it worked in Zambia, it worked in Tanzania. So, we asked ‘Can 
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this app work here [in Kenya]?   However, after doing a lot of research and 
understanding the local dynamics, we realised “we don't just launch an app and expect 
people to just report” (Munuku, in interview, 2015).  
As a result, they had to make training and outreach a much larger part of the project 
than in the other countries where they rolled out the same project.  “We didn't want it 
to be is an app-centred project.  The app is just one element of the project” (Munuku, 
2015, in interview).   The A4T team concluded that an integral part of the project in 
Kenya should be offline community-based elements and training for journalists.   The 
training focused on empowering journalists with skills to investigate reported cases of 
suspected corruption or mismanagement of public funds and to analyse 
financial/budgetary information to reveal gaps affecting the health and education 
sectors.   
Action for Transparency is a noteworthy example of a project using technology 
combined with training journalists for transparency and accountability goals.     
 
These three projects – UNESCO, A4T and Internews - illustrate the use of ICTs 
integrated into media training work. Despite the use of newer and digital technologies 
by the projects profiled above, they are often combined with traditional media, such as 
radio or newpapers, in the mix.  
While the projects above do employ new technologies to some extent, there is still a 
number of organisations in the sample for this research who remain committed to 
traditional media assistance methods in their projects. The next section focuses on 
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these organisations who remain committed to traditional media in the context of media 
development projects. 
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B. Traditional capacity building projects  
 
TANZANIAN MEDIA FUND 
The Tanzania Media Fund (TMF) is a media sector support initiative funded by Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID), Irish Aid and The Royal Danish Embassy.    The Tanzania 
Media Fund was launched in 2008 to contribute to greater domestic accountability in 
Tanzania through a programme of grants and capacity building to the media.   
Table 12. Tanzania Media Fund 
Organisation 
Name 
TANZANIA MEDIA FUND 
Who was 
interviewed 
Ernest Sungura, Director 
Project Title Grant Making Organisation 
Problem(s) 
Identified 
 Greater accountability needed in Tanzania 
 Media should be upskilled to better inform citizens and to raise 
awareness about the responsibilities of local government and the 
role that communities can play in holding their government 
accountable.   
Methods 
 
 
 Support public interest and investigative stories linked to domestic 
accountability, with special attention for rural stories  
 Traditional journalism training 
 Ongoing grants and capacity building to the media. 
Use of ICTs  Very limited 
Outcome 
“TMF has made impressive achievements in terms of number of 
individual journalists and media institutions it has reached out to, and in 
the evident improvements in public interest and investigative 
journalism it has sponsored and mentored” (Adams, 2014)62. 
 
 
62 External Review of TMF by Gordon Adam of iMedia Associates Limited, November 2014 
262 
 
Summary  
According to project donor DFID, journalism standards in Tanzania has been made 
worse by the deregulation of the media, the move to digital, and the growing 
popularity of social media, “all of which amounts to a revolution in the media 
landscape. Inevitably this rapid expansion has resulted in inexperienced staff with 
little or no journalism training often being hired” (“DFID Project Completion Review: 
Tanzanian Media Fund,” 2015). 
As a result, there is a need for skilled, sustainable, professional media in Tanzania 
better equipped to hold powerful people to account. TMF provides grants for training 
and investigative reporting. 
As an example of one successful project which received support from TMF is Mbeya 
Highlands FM, a regional radio station.   In this case, the radio station had noticed that 
many of the concerns of their listeners related to a lack of access to safe water and 
sanitation. With a grant from Tanzania Media Fund, a team of young journalists 
travelled around three districts in the region “to see the challenges for themselves and 
investigate the causes” (Sungura, 2014, in interview).    
The journalists broadcast live shows featuring debates between community members 
and local authorities, sharing information from their investigations on local water 
plans and budgets.  Sungura claims “these debates were very popular and led to 
greater demand from citizens and greater response from local authorities. Water 
pumps were fixed, pipes were replaced, new wells were built and new governing 
boards for water were installed” (Sungura, 2014, in interview). 
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Sungura believes that it is this type of media support that is needed in this region, not 
innovation.  Similar grants have led to more relevant issues being raised in the local 
communities.  Sungura confirms their media sector support work is “very traditional” 
(Sungura, 2014, in interview) 63.    
With regards to digital technologies in their work, in 2012 the TMF initiated the New 
Media grant for individual journalists. TMF quickly came to realise that finding 
quality candidates and suitable mentors for this grant was challenging. Sungura admits 
that “no-one applied”.   The challenges were that “some [applicants] never met quality 
criteria, and some had problems with technology”.  He adds “we want to use 
technology going forward but we are struggling also” (Sungura, 2014, in interview).    
TMF also note that experienced digital media organisations, such as Jamii Forums in 
Tanzania, require help with marketing, management and governance issues rather than 
the online outputs. These organisations are already skilled in the technology elements. 
TMF illustrate the continued need for capacity building and support for investigative 
journalism skills in Tanzania. Director Sungura attests to limited success with new 
technologies but the donors view is that media should become more interactive in 
future. An evaluation report from the largest donor DFID noted that future support 
should focus on “supporting dialogic formats and interactivity through social media 
and mobile telephony” (“DFID Project Completion Review: Tanzanian Media Fund,” 
2015) 
However, Sungura argues “the TMF are not seeing more accountability with new 
technology” (Sungura, 2014, in interview). 
 
63 Ernest Sunguru, Tanzania Media Fund, in interview with author, May 2015 
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HIVOS  
HIVOS (Humanist Institute for Cooperation) is another organisation based in Kenya 
which focuses on capacity building and strengthening the existing media landscape.  
HIVOS is a Dutch NGO and implements a project called the Kenya Media 
Programme (KMP).  This is a media support project that issues grants to both 
individuals and institutions.  It gives funding for investigative journalism and media 
capacity support for strengthening media. 
Table 13. Hivos  
Organisation 
Name 
HIVOS 
Who was 
interviewed 
Antony Wafula, Program Manager 
Project Title Kenya Media Program 
Problem(s) 
Identified 
 Improve the quality of journalism in Kenya 
 Contribute to a responsive, representative and accountable 
government through citizen engagement.   
Methods 
 Development of local content  
 Media accountability  
 Institutional development for media organisations 
 Safety and Protection of journalists 
 Media policy and legislation 
 Grants for journalism focusing on high impact stories 
 Institutional and individual grants to develop local content  
Use of ICTs 
 Very Limited.  
 Some projects such as Kenya Community Radio Network include 
training for journalists relating to engagement with social media 
platforms.   
Outcome 
An evaluation of the project acknowledged: “As few media houses are 
willing to finance a journalist to carry out the simplest of stories in Kenya, 
KMP is greatly beneficial as it gives the much-needed funds to do the 
stories” (Mogambi and Oyugi, 2015). 
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Summary  
KMP make financial resources available for selected media-related institutions, 
development organisations, training institutes, policy and research initiatives, media 
houses and journalists. They invest in relatively traditional structural support for the 
media sector because they discovered that Kenyan media houses are “so weak”. 
In the Kenyan media, “the public interest is not represented so to speak… There is a 
question about the depth and analysis of reporting we are offering the public” 
(Programme Director, Wafula, in interview, 2014)64. 
As noted in Chapter 5, with the recent government devolution, Kenya now has 47 
county governments.  There is a need to build the capacity of journalists at county 
levels to tell stories that would help citizens hold their leaders to account.    
An obstacle for producing investigative stories is the capacity and funds to produce 
the stories.  KMP have focused therefore on financial support for investigative stories 
that will contribute to accountability and transparency.   KMP also run a mentorship 
programme. The need for mentors became apparent when KMP realised that most of 
the individual grantees required editorial support to help improve on their story ideas. 
Programme Director Anthony Wafula at HIVOS says their limited use of ICTs is 
because they believe “focusing on new media technologies is hype…..We try as much 
as possible to speak of e-government but the take-up is extremely slow”.  Wafula 
argues that for the wider population “mobile phone use is debatable in terms of better 
access to information.  We have people for whom even sending a text message is a 
problem” (Wafula, 2014, in interview).  
 
64 Anthony Wafula, HIVOS, in interview with author May 2014 
266 
 
 
AFRICAN MEDIA INITIATIVE 
Another organisation which focuses particularly on capacity building in the region is 
the African Media Initiative (AMI), a pan-African organisation based in Kenya. The 
objectives of the AMI are to “strengthen the continent’s private and independent 
media sector to promote democratic governance, social development and economic 
growth”.65  
Table 14. African Media Initiative  
Organisation 
Name 
African Media Initiative 
Who was 
interviewed Eric Chinje CEO 
Project Title Ongoing capacity building 
Problem(s) 
Identified 
 Expanding access to finance and new revenue streams for media orgs 
 Building a leadership cadre in the media sector with a commitment to 
improved ethics and management.  
 Content development for African media outlets, by African journalists.    
Methods 
 Focus on journalism specialisation within industries; to develop 
journalism networks around important sectors of the economy, such as 
finance and agriculture and networks of skilled reporters capable of 
writing substantively on these issues.  
 AMI develops training packages for journalists and brings together 
needed expertise from the mentioned sectors.   
 Created with the input of relevant partners in various industries including 
Agriculture, Health, Education, Energy, Maritime Economy, 
Telecommunications, and Governance.    
Use of ICTs 
 Uses mainly traditional media development methods including capacity 
building workshops for journalists 
Outcome 
AMI has established networks for journalists on the African continent. 
 
 
65  www.Africanmediainitiative.org 
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Summary  
The African Media Initiative promotes the development of pluralistic media as a 
necessary ingredient of democratic governance, as well as economic and human 
development in Africa.  They note that “lack of ethics and leadership has curtailed the 
development of a free and independent African media landscape”. 
CEO Eric Chinje says their objective is “improved media performance across the 
continent, that would contribute to an improved social dialogue and political dialogue 
and economic dialogue on the continent” (Chinje, 2015, in interview) 66. 
The AMI works with strategic partners in each sector of the regional economy to build 
a ‘critical mass’ of media specialists on the issues that drive economic growth in 
Africa.   Chinje hopes “if you have a few journalists doing good stories in the sector 
and that begins to drive advertisements, you’ll see a natural movement of media 
content into that sector” (Chinje, 2015, in interview). 
Research by AMI found important knowledge and skills gap among media houses 
when it comes to understanding the business and financial worlds. To address this, 
AMI developed a series of workshops on ‘Financial Proficiency for Media 
Executives’ (funded by the African Development Bank (AfDB).    
An additional example of a successful project was called ‘Encouraging the Media in 
Kenya to Adopt a Pro Health Agenda: The Treatment and Coverage of Tobacco 
Related Stories’.   This project provided specialised training for the media community 
to improve tobacco control coverage in the media in Kenya.   The project built the 
awareness and reporting skills of journalists on the issue of tobacco control and 
 
66 Eric Chinje, African Media Initiative, in interview with author Feb 2015 
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engaged media leaders and editors in chief to treat tobacco control stories as 
newsworthy. 
AMI media programmes do not necessarily put new or digital media at its centre. 
Director Eric Chinje confirmed “we are training journalists but not necessarily from 
new media”.   
 
Discussion 
The above three organisations – TMF, AMI, HIVOS - focus on supporting 
independent media and training journalists and working with partner organisations for 
capacity building within the media sector. They confirmed limited use of digital 
technologies or ICTs in their work.  This suggests that these newer technologies have 
little role to play in established media assistance methods, such as journalism training 
and editorial training, to strengthen the media sector in the region.   
One possible reason is that the identified weaknesses in the media systems of these 
countries are in areas not obviously related to digital innovation.  As noted in the 
Country Findings chapter, the problems in the media systems of Kenya and Tanzania 
are particularly related to corruption, political control and concentration of media 
ownership, lack of professionalism and resources, and safety of journalists. 
Despite the development sectors enthusiasm for technology and innovation,  
recommendations for media sustainability on the continent are told to focus on areas 
of corruption, culture and business management in the media sector, not areas 
necessarily related to technology (Susman-Peña, 2012).     
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As remarked by Ernest Sungura from the Tanzania Media Fund, the innovative and 
popular website Jammii Forums in Tanzania does not need training in technical skills 
but skills in management and financial planning. 
Another reason to acknowledge is that radio has the highest penetration in Africa: 77 
per cent report listening to radio news at least a few times a month or more (Mitullah 
and Kamau, 2013).  It is the dominant mass-medium in Africa because of its relatively 
low operational cost, its accessibility to illiterate populations and the continuity of the 
prevalent oral tradition of most African countries (Mwesige, 2004; Myers, 2008).   
So, when trying to reach or connect with audiences’ right across these countries, it 
makes sense to focus on journalists working with this medium. 
 
 
C. Hybrid projects: Capacity Building with Content Creation 
 
BBC MEDIA ACTION 
As noted, the data revealed that there is a category of media assistance intervention 
captured by the notion of ‘media development hybrid’ and these shall be presented 
here. 
BBC Media Action is one of the largest and best-known of the media development 
NGOs that implement projects on behalf of international donors.  Funded 
independently, it works in partnership with local media and development partners in 
over 35 developing and countries around the world.  Country Director, Colin 
Spurway, discussed their principal project in Tanzania and Project Director Jackie 
Davis in Kenya discussed her principal project 
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Table 15. BBC Media Action Tanzania. 
 
Organisation 
Name 
BBC Media Action Tanzania 
Who was 
interviewed Colin Spurway Country Director 
Project Title 
1. Haba na Haba (Little by Little): A national radio magazine 
programme  
Problem(s) 
Identified 
The donor, DFID UK, stated objectives in Tanzania were to improve 
Tanzanians’ knowledge of key governance issues, “including their 
rights and responsibilities, and the country’s political processes”.  
Additional objectives were “to create a national conversation which 
results in Tanzanians feeling confident to freely express their views 
about issues that matter to them and confident that these views are 
being heard and responded to by their leaders” (Bangapi et al., 
2017:10). 
 
 
Methods 
 Content Production and Capacity building: 
 Providing capacity strengthening to participating stations 
 Supporting local partner radio stations to produce their own 
local governance programmes 
 This training aimed to equip station managers with the skills to 
help their stations become more financially sustainable.   
 Assisting those stations in delivering outreach activities, such 
as community debates and Open Days 
 Mentors spent time in local radio stations to help them produce 
programmes around governance.  
Use of ICTs 
Limited use of digital technologies.  
A Facebook page was established for the project and the radio show 
also had a Facebook page.  These were “add-ons” rather than central to 
the project (Spurway, in interview, 2014). 
Outcome 
According to the BBC, Haba na Haba, reached 7.2m listeners across 
Tanzania, tackling a wide range of topics - from corruption in the 
judiciary to the circulation of fake anti-malarial drugs.  
Since 2013, over 300 journalists have been trained.  
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Summary 
The goal of the Haba Na Haba project was to “build Tanzanians’ knowledge of 
governance issues and confidence in their ability to hold leaders to account, to 
encourage dialogue on national and local issues, and encourage greater political 
participation” (Bangapi et al., 2017:6).    
The radio programme aimed to explain government structure, systems and services, to 
provide a platform for discussion and help people get involved in how the country is 
run. 
BBC Media Action worked on the capacity of local radio station partners and 
journalists to produce programmes about local governance issues.  The Haba na Haba 
radio show takes a ‘topic of the week’, like obesity or access to clean drinking water, 
or a range of current affairs issues, and then puts them together in a radio magazine 
format “to interrogate and look into and ask government what their role is and what 
they’re doing about something” (Spurway, in interview, 2015).  
Outreach activities included Radio Open Days and Community Debates. The open 
days took place once a year at BBC Media Action’s partner radio stations and aimed 
to bring local radio and local government closer together in order to build 
better relationships, and improve the flow of information between leaders, citizens and 
local media and to progress government accountability.  
The community debates took the format of town hall meetings, bringing citizens and 
government officials together to discuss important issues in local communities.  
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Spurway claims “it has been great in terms of leading to changes in local 
communities” (Spurway, 2014, in interview). 
The BBC Media Action projects in Tanzania use mostly traditional media assistance 
methods, for the objectives of informing and educating Tanzanian citizens about 
governance issues. They are not necessarily using ICTs or newer digital technologies; 
instead they are undertaking radio programming hand in hand with traditional capacity 
training.  
Country Director Colin Spurway explained the reason why they continue to use these 
methods. In Tanzania, mobile phones use is now near full penetration, but Spurway 
argues how “they are very simple mobiles, people with very limited knowledge, 
limited literacy, and a huge range of challenges of how you use it” (Spurway, 2015, in 
interview).   
Spurway says that many of their audience cannot find an address book in their phone, 
or “the vast majority have never sent or received a text”.  And so, “it is about 
understanding their limitations” (Spurway, 2015, in interview).  Thus, working out the 
right platform is vital.    
With regards to achieving donor objectives he reasons “we have to start off by 
defining what the change is that is needed in the project?  Then who the audience is?  
Then, how do you reach that particular group of people?”.  That is how to determine 
the particular approach or intervention. 
Spurway reasoned “there’s certainly a tendency when working with young people and 
when there is pressure to innovate to say, well in that case, let’s use Facebook.  But 
you’ve got to know who accesses it and in what way. If you want to reach urban 
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males, yes, Facebook is a great idea but not if you’re talking about adolescent girls in 
villages and farms” (Spurway, in interview).    
In these projects BBC Media Action has specific objectives, in that often they are 
trying to reach the rural poor in this region, or bring them into a wider national 
discussion, or support media relevant to them in their locale.  
With these issues in mind, Spurway argues that using digital technologies in media 
development projects can be “technically massively complicated and potentially 
extremely expensive”.  In contrast, with radio you can “reach three million people by 
radio by just beaming it out”.  Therefore, BBC MA still favour traditional media to 
connect with these target groups. 
BBC Media Action also undertakes projects in Kenya, outlined below.  
  
274 
 
Table. 16. BBC Media Action Kenya 
 
Organisation 
Name 
BBC Media Action Kenya 
Who was 
interviewed 
Jackie Davies 
Project Title Sema Kenya 
Problem(s) 
Identified 
 The need for greater public understanding of constitutional and 
electoral reform and devolution,  
 Addressing persistent challenges to corruption and impunity 
 Build trust in Kenya’s democratic processes by giving people 
trustworthy information and improving their knowledge of 
governance related issues 
 Provide a platform for people in Kenya to ask their leaders about 
issues that affect them.   
Methods 
 The project produced a weekly TV and radio national discussion 
programme, a low-tech, ‘Question Time’-style debate show. 
 Brought Kenyan citizens face to face with their leaders, some of 
them whom they had never even seen before.   In this environment, 
they could ask questions and demand accountability.    
 Featured a moderated discussion between a live panel of officials 
and an audience of Kenyans.  
 Themes included: youth participation in political processes, 
corruption, ethnicity, young women in leadership & youth violence. 
Use of ICTs 
 Limited use of digital technologies.  
 There was a Facebook page for the show through which there was 
some feedback and interaction with audiences.  
Outcome 
People who regularly watched or listened to Sema Kenya reported 
greater knowledge of key governance issues than those who did not 
watch or listen to the programme (Sema Kenya: Can a debate 
programme increase people’s knowledge of democratic processes? 
2015). 
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Summary 
The primary BBC Media Action project in Kenya was the radio debate show called 
Sema Kenya.  The objective was to contribute to a “genuine, credible election in 2013 
and to mitigating against a repeat of the electoral violence seen in 2007” (Buckell and 
Baskett, 2017:10). 
The project activities were centred around the donors (DFID) goals at country level 
which were: “to contribute to rebuilding trust in the democratic process in Kenya by 
creating a national and inclusive conversation and debate and to encourage dialogue as 
a means of settling conflicts within and among communities” (Buckell and Baskett, 
2017). 
The show was designed to enable individuals, communities and governments to be 
better informed and more engaged in tackling governance challenges (Buckell and 
Baskett, 2017).  BBC MA worked to strengthen the capacity of Kenya’s media sector 
to produce this governance programming.   
Project Director Jackie Davies testified that they choose appropriate media and project 
design to address donor objectives based on lots of sound research. Davies confirmed 
that “it was probably the most researched program of its kind in Kenya” (Davis, 2015, 
in interview)67. 
The project team tried to ensure that Sema Kenya represented constructive, audience-
driven debate, particularly when covering sensitive issues.  The radio shows were 
focused not only on discussion but following up on accountability with those in 
 
67 Jackie Davies, BBC Media Action Kenya, in interview with author Feb 2015 
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power.  An important element of the success of the show was that the presenters knew 
that part of their role was to drive that accountability from politicians on the show. 
For instance, Davies claims “If an MP or a governor or a senator says, “I'm going to 
build the road, I’m going to fix that road,” then the presenter would ask, ‘Okay what's 
the time frame, when is it going to start? When can people expect to see it?’   “We 
didn’t allow people to just come on and make statements without follow-up” (Davies, 
2015, in interview). 
BBC MA delivered a mentoring programme, initially with six local radio stations, and 
later with the national broadcaster Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC). The 
mentors worked closely with the local radio partners to improve editorial processes, 
journalistic and production skills (such as interviewing and source-checking) and 
management skills (such as news-room management, programme scheduling and staff 
development).   
The capacity strengthening programme with KBC included: editorial training; training 
in audience research and engagement; graphics; engineering support; production 
training as well as production and editorial support on-air.   For KBC, the partnership 
with BBC Media Action resulted in the launch of a new governance programme 
modelled on Sema Kenya, called Beyond the Headlines. 
Management at KBC reported that Beyond the Headlines “provides a new benchmark 
by which all other KBC productions are produced and that they hope to instill the 
same ethos, procedures and practices across the organisation going forward” (Buckell 
and Baskett, 2017:7). 
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This project had limited use of digital technologies.  Davies explained “even though a 
lot of people are using their mobile phones to access radio content, [our project] is still 
using the traditional methods. It is still what we perceive to be appropriate, 
particularly in the areas we’re trying to reach - which are media dark areas”68 (Davies, 
in interview, 2015).  She maintains “radio is still the most effective medium to 
communicate with target groups that we are after” (ibid).   
Both of these BBC Media Action projects did employ digital technologies, but to a 
limited extent.  Spurway from the BBC Tanzania projects confirmed that both of their 
radio programme projects had related social media websites, but that they were just 
“future-proofing” or “add-ons” (Spurway, 2015).  
Davies argues “social media is great, and this innovative ICT approach is very good, 
but I still believe that old media drives new media” (Davies, 2015, in interview).   
Both these BBC Media Action projects in Kenya and Tanzania demonstrate how the 
organisation uses a mix of traditional media development methods and media for 
development approaches to achieve donor goals related to governance and 
accountability. 
 
  
 
68 These are areas that are not reachable at all through media such as newspapers or TV.  
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FARM Radio 
A second organisation in the interview sample whose interventions could be termed 
‘media development hybrid’ is Farm Radio International. FARM Radio is a Canadian 
NGO working with radio partners in 38 African countries to fight poverty and food 
insecurity.   
A large part of the work of FARM Radio is training broadcasters, including direct in-
station training, distance education and workshops to help them produce a higher 
standard of radio services. FARM Radio undertakes projects in both Kenya and 
Tanzania. 
 
Table 17. FARM Radio  
Organisation 
Name FARM Radio International 
Who was 
interviewed Bart Sullivan, Head of ICT  
Project Title 
In Tanzania, FARM Radio is implementing radio campaigns on food-
security topics of nutrition, climate-smart farming techniques and women-
friendly market/food processing ideas.   
In Kenya, Farm Radio runs radio campaigns promoting girls’ education in 
the Somali refugee camps of Dadaab (Northern Kenya).   
Problem(s) 
Identified 
In Kenya the goal is to provide useful information on low cost methods to 
improve food security in rural households. 
 
In Tanzania, the goal is to improve attitudes about the importance of sending 
Somali girls to school instead of keeping them at home.   
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Methods 
 Project objectives are being addressed with radio campaigns (3.5 months 
each) with 30-minute weekly shows.   
 FARM Radio develops radio scripts, information packages, an electronic 
news service and shares them with local broadcasters.  
 The broadcasters, in turn, use these resources to research, produce and 
present relevant programmes for their audience of farmers 
 Training of local radio journalists 
Use of ICTs 
o FARM Radio have successfully used various mobile channels and 
technology applications in their projects.   
o Each radio show features interactive windows in which listeners can 
participate with the questions of the week via their mobile phones.   
o In Kenya they use radio combined with mobile SMS and Interactive 
Voice Radio (IVR) polls.   
Outcome 
 “Digital technologies are absolutely essential pieces to making radio 
more interactive in these projects” (Sullivan, 2015, in email).    
 
 
Summary 
FARM Radio training is targeted toward the practical needs of broadcasters.  FARM 
Radio measure the quality of local broadcasters’ radio services and help them take 
steps to improve them, by appraising their programmes.   
Digital technologies are central to these projects.   Head of ICT for FARM Radio, Bart 
Sullivan, says “it is often overwhelming how many people want to participate.   By 
using these mobile technologies more people can participate and have their vote 
counted or their voice heard” (Sullivan, 2015, in email).  
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Sullivan confirmed that that they have had “lots of steady participation and the 
midterm evaluations are excellent… Many people in Tanzania have started to change 
their practice around food/ farming and in Kenya, adults and shifting some of their 
views around girls education” (Sullivan, 2015, in email). 
Sullivan concedes that there are additional hurdles to using ICTs in these projects: 
Cost and ease of use are the two main obstacles. Sullivan says they “currently try and 
bear the costs for expensive services like sending audio messages as we work with the 
poorest farmers.  But in general, it is important to try and keep costs down” (Sullivan, 
2015, in email). 
He noted that it is important to remember the “technical abilities of the majority of 
listeners, their budgets and their limitations in terms of electricity and equipment” 
(Sullivan, 2015, in email).   “It’s also important to make it easy to interact - many 
listeners have a very basic technological capacity - if they are doubtful of their ability 
- they won’t try it” (Sullivan, 2015, in email). 
 
Discussion 
The projects in this section – BBC Media Action and FARM Radio - demonstrated 
having elements of media for development (M4D) - a focus on content - informing the 
public about health, governance or food security issues through radio programmes - 
but they also provide support to the media sector in additional ways: media training, 
journalism training, creation of new sources of news.  This ‘media development 
hybrid’ contributes to ‘media for development’ objectives but also ‘media 
development’ goals such as structural support for media sector.   
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These projects are creating content that is needed by audiences in these countries, but 
they also address weaknesses within the Kenyan and Tanzanian media systems. In 
particular they address the lack of local media content, lack of quality reporting and 
dialogue on important governance issues and the lack of capacity in local media to 
address the information needs of rural populations.  
These projects have furthermore developed platforms for discussion and debate, for 
educating citizens about their rights or about elections, and have provided forums for 
holding government representatives to account.  As noted in the Country Case Study 
chapter, these are particular weaknesses in the media systems of Kenya and Tanzania 
when it comes to local rural populations.  
 
D. Projects to strengthen the public sphere & create platforms for 
dialogue  
This research found that much effort is focused on accountability and governance 
issues in the region.  As noted, whilst some organisations fulfil the objectives of 
strengthening the capacity, and providing support to, the media sector, other 
organisations that took part in the interviews focused more on providing platforms for 
public engagement and discussion. This contributes towards goals of bolstering the 
public sphere and enabling wider groups in society participate in the governance of 
their country.  Platforms for national dialogue can also potentially contribute to 
reducing to cross-ethnic conflict, which is a threat in the region. 
As noted in the Media Development Theory of Change in Chapter 1 (Figure 2), media 
assistance projects operate consecutively at different levels of a media system - 
addressing the needs of audiences, practitioners and the sector. This section focuses on 
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organisations which focus on strengthening the public sphere – providing fora for 
dialogue and debate in society. 
 
FEMINA HIP 
Funded by the Swedish development agency SIDA and Irish Aid, Femina Hip focuses 
mainly on engaging with youth in Tanzania. They produce a range of media, including 
a widely distributed magazine, FEMA and two TV shows that target Tanzanian youth 
to “promote healthy lifestyles and financial literacy”69 .   
FeminiHip endeavours to educate their youthful audience through their media 
products and work to motivate Tanzanian youth.  Youth are key to the development of 
Tanzanian society, as 66 per cent of the Tanzanian population is below the age of 25 
and 23 per cent of the population are adolescents (Chipeta et al., 2013).    The 
government is making great efforts to get all young people to complete primary 
school, but the proportion who drop out is high and many young people find it hard to 
find employment. They are also a group that is frequently marginalised.   
  
 
69 www.feminahip.tz 
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Table 18. Femina Hip 
 
Organisation 
Name 
Femina Hip 
Who was 
interviewed 
Kris Kapella,  
Project Title FEMA Magazine 
Problem(s) 
Identified 
 Work towards an “empowered society that fosters democratic 
values, critical thinking and positive attitudes” (Chipeta et al., 
2013). 
 To create dialogue amongst Tanzanian youth. 
Methods 
 Communicates and connects with youth through its multimedia 
products as well as through face-to-face activities and outreach 
interventions.  
 Activities are designed to connect youth to each other and to 
Femina Hip: to stimulate conversations and reflection; and to offer 
an opportunity to speak up, share and express concerns70. 
 Aims to foster democratic principles by encouraging volunteering, 
working together, taking action, and demanding rights.   
Use of ICTs 
They have established websites related to their media products and an 
interactive SMS platform.  However, the website is not central to their 
work and the SMS platform is expensive to run. “It can be expensive.  
An individual SMS is quite cheap but when you talking about sending 
SMS to 50,000 people…  Cost is a big issue” (Kapella, in interview). 
Outcome 
42 per cent of Tanzania's population were familiar with FEMINA HIP's 
products. Each week, 2.8 million people read the newspaper Fema, 
making it the most widely read in the country. 
An evaluation report by funder SIDA found: “Femina has been 
effective, not only with regard to reaching youth with information, but 
also in creating a dialogue with young people regarding issues of 
concern” (Chipeta et al., 2013). 
 
 
 
70 FeminaHip Annual Report 2017 
http://www.feminahip.or.tz/fileadmin/03_downloads/01_reports/FeminaAnnual_report_2017.pdf 
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Summary:  
The Fema Magazine has been produced and printed quarterly for 20 years in 
Tanzania. It has one of the largest print runs and is one of the most popular and well-
known magazines in the country. It is distributed to both secondary schools, colleges, 
local government and civil society partners across Tanzania. The magazine content 
includes sections on all of Femina Hip’s strategic agendas: Sexual and Reproductive 
Health and Rights, Economic Empowerment, Citizen Engagement and connecting 
youth. 
With their print magazine FeminaHip reach every district of the country. Kapella says 
“I don’t think there’s any district that we don’t reach. When it comes to print, we 
reach more people than even the newspapers, they are again very limited to urban 
parts of the country” (Kapella, 2014, in interview).  This is no small achievement as 
many rural areas in Tanzania are almost inaccessible by road. 
Editorial collection is highly participatory and approximately 100 youth from ‘Fema 
youth Clubs’ engage in Youth Reporting so they contribute to the content with their 
own letters and stories.  According to the organisation, the success of the magazine is 
largely due to its community-based editorial collection process. For every issue, 
editors travel to rural communities with a digital camera and document the real-life 
stories and views of ordinary people. 
Kapella argues that “the magazine is actually what makes us the most innovative in a 
sense. We’re doing something that’s been around for ages and ages and it actually 
really separates us because we can reach basically almost anyone in this country 
which no other type of media can do” (Kapella, 2015, in interview). 
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The Fema TV Show has been on air since 2003, highlighting different themes and 
campaigns each season.  Each episode features young people, experts, celebrities and 
politicians discussing critical issues relating to youth lifestyles. Each show highlights 
youth stories and testimonials and incorporates comic elements to reinforce the 
messages and recorded 'on the road' in different locations across Tanzania. 
Femina Hip say that their change programs create opportunities and platforms for 
people to “actively participate in a process of dialogue, reflection, negotiation and 
mobilisation. We build our work around creating intention and motivation to act” 
(FeminaHip Annual Report, 2016).  
FeminaHip aim “to reinforce the notion that people must take ownership of and act as 
agents in their own change processes”.  A key part of its approach is “Edutainment”, 
entertaining and at the same time educating through their media products.   
The organisation is an example of continued use of a traditional media as their main 
focus, which has widespread reach throughout Tanzania to engage youthful 
populations and work for social change.  Their magazine and outreach activities 
provide spaces for dialogue, discussion and education which can empower youthful 
audiences.  
 
 
WELL TOLD STORY 
Another participant organisation in the research and whose goals focus on engaging 
with youth is Kenyan media research and production organisation ‘Well Told Story’ 
(WTS).  Their work aims to contribute to social change and youth empowerment and 
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can also be termed “communication for social change”.   Their projects provide 
platforms for discussion and engagement on important issues.  
 
Table 19. Well Told Story 
 
Organisation 
Name 
WELL TOLD STORY 
Who was 
interviewed 
Rob Burnett CEO 
Project Title Shuujaaz  
Problem(s) 
Identified 
To encourage ‘youth discourse on governance, participation, & 
transparency’ & engage young people in national conversation about 
issues that affect them.   
Methods 
WTS use different communications platforms: monthly comic books, 
daily syndicated radio shows, SMS, video, national TV.  The projects 
also include offline engagement with local government officials.  
Use of ICTs 
WTS are innovative in their use of technology. WTS employ many 
media in the projects- video, radio, television, comic books, SMS, 
Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram and music festivals - “which are 
basically experiential media” - to achieve projects objectives.   
Burnet says “we’re interested in our audience making the content, not 
us”.   For example, in 2014, WTS made a TV series, and they asked 
their audience to make the other half of the series with their mobile 
phones, and submit their video on WhatsApp. Burnet claims that 
“mobile phones have changed the way people relate to one another; 
they’ve turned ordinary people into media makers”.   
Outcome 
Their media that has reached more than 69 per cent of Kenyans aged 15 
‐24 and they have won two International Emmy Awards.71  
 
71 The main character that Well Told Story focus their stories around is a 19 yr-old Boyie, who left 
school in 2009 but could not afford to go to college and remains job-less.   The show reaches out to 
Kenyan youth with practical ideas they can use toimprove their lives.   He communicates to his listeners 
in Sheng and asks them to send him text messages with ideas on making money and better living. He in 
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Summary 
Well Told Story endeavour to engage youth in order to achieve social and behaviour 
change (Dr Christopher Beaudoin, 2016).  CEO Rob Burnet says “we are focused on 
how to make young people feel as if they have the power, they have the agency to 
make change happen” (Burnet, 2015, in interview) 72 
They have developed a platform, centred on a comic-book character called Shujaaz, 
which engages youth in Kenya on important issues and provides a platform for public 
discussions.  Burnett claims “the combination of the comic books, syndicated FM 
radio, SMS, social media, web and video animation is engaging 5 million youth every 
month in a huge public conversation; to help change the way people live, think, act 
and govern in Kenya,” (Burnett, in interview, 2015).  
The projects are very often targeting 15-24 year olds in their projects, who are “the 
right audience for innovation”.  Burnet concedes that if they were designing media for 
a forty to fifty-year-old audience, they would take quite a different approach.   Burnett 
confirms that “different media have different jobs to do” (Burnett, 2015, in interview).   
Burnett maintains “for a lot of people in Africa, an exciting comic book is cutting-
edge ICT. So, most of our projects combine multiple media, all the time” (Burnet, 
2015, in interview).  
Well Told Story and Shuujaz have become an established trusted media platform that 
uses youth-friendly approaches to stimulate engagement with the population.  For 
Well Told Story, much of their project work is communication for development, 
 
turn shares those ideas with youth around the country through his radio programmeme.  These ideas 
then form the content of the daily Shujaaz FM radios show and are the stories in the monthly comic 
books, and the topics discussed on DJB’s Facebook page.    
72 Rob Burnet, Well Told Story, in skype interview with the author, March 2015 
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engaging with citizens and youth, and Well Told Story does not focus on capacity 
building the media sector in any way.  Like FeminaHip, they provide a platform for 
engagement and discussion on important issues for local populations.  Their projects 
show positive results with an increase in volume of conversations about agriculture 
and shifting attitudes. 
 
TWAWEZA 
Table 20. Twaweza 
 
Organisation 
Name 
TWAWEZA 
Who was 
interviewed 
Kees De Graaf – Head of ICTs 
Project Title 1. Makatuno Junction 
Problem(s) 
Identified 
Citizen Engagement and Government Accountability: 
Methods 
Production of a Kenyan soap opera that premiered in 2007. The story is 
set in a fictional village named Makutano and has a cast of different 
Kenyan actors. It captures different themes that affect local society such 
as corruption, education, early marriages.   
Throughout episodes, Makutano Junction communicates the idea that 
ordinary citizens can make change happen, by solving problems and 
pressuring government and public institutions to act.   
The goal is that by watching the show citizens will be provoked to discuss 
solutions to problems in education, health and water and take action for 
the better.  
Where public authorities are not doing the right things, informed citizens 
are encouraged to find ways of holding public leaders accountable, like 
the characters in the show. 
Use of ICTs A mobile phone SMS platform for feedback was established. 
Outcome High quality show with broad viewership 
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Table 21. Daraja Project. 
Project Title 2. Daraja - Maji Matone 
Problem(s) 
Identified 
Waterpoints in Tanzania: nearly half of the waterpoints in rural 
Tanzania were not working at the time & even minor breakdowns went 
unrepaired for months or years.     
Methods 
 Established an SMS reporting system  
 Encouraged people in rural Tanzania to use their mobile phones to 
report broken down water points, hand-pumps and wells. 
 Work with media to put pressure on the government to get 
problems fixed.   
Use of ICTs 
 Central to the project.  
 Citizens encouraged to use SMS technologies to report broken 
water pumps to government.  
Outcome Very little uptake of the service  
 
Summary 
Twaweza was cited by several of the interview participants as an example of a project 
attempting to use digital technologies for engaging local audiences and citizens and so 
it shall be analysed in detail here.  They have had much success with their Makatuno 
junction project, however Head of ICT, Kees De Graaf, claims that getting people to 
participate in projects to report to government through mobile technologies is more 
difficult than expected and that “the response rates are really very, very low” (de 
Graaf, 2015, in interview). 
With regards to the response to their Daraja water pump project and use of ICTs, De 
Graaf, revealed “the reality did not live up to the promise.  Rather than the 3,000 text 
messages we had expected in our pilot, we got 53, despite our best efforts to promote 
the service” (de Graaf, 2015, in interview).    
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The Daraja project illustrates the complications of using digital technologies for 
citizen participation in projects.  The objective of the project was to engage citizens in 
reporting to their local government regarding water-points, thus looking for 
accountability from elected officials. 
The Daraja project initially received a lot of attention and the approach ticked many of 
the right boxes for donors: citizen participation, transparency, technology, innovation, 
accountability and the use of mobile phones. As the project progressed however, the 
problem was getting citizens to engage with local government via SMS. 
De Graaf says that persuading citizens to send messages and persuading government 
officials to act on those messages were the main challenges for this project.  “We did 
pretty well on the second part of that - our record of turning information provided by 
citizens into action taken by District Water Engineers and repaired water points was 
very good. The problem was the first part - persuading citizens to engage” (de Graaf, 
2015, in interview). 
Daraja had undertaken lots of publicity, so awareness of the initiative did not seem to 
be an issue amongst the population, but they were not getting the citizens to actually 
use the service.  “This raises questions as to why?  Do they feel that they won’t get 
response?   Is it a technical thing and it’s too complicated?” (de Graaf, 2015, in 
interview). 
Ben Taylor who worked on the project for Daraja has argued that the failures of the 
project were not about technology:  
Technology is not what matters here. Getting the human side of things right was 
clearly going to be much harder than making the technology work. … Motivating 
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people to take action is tough, especially when the promise of anything happening as 
a result is distant and unclear.   Our rural focus means we're dealing with a group of 
people who are poorer, with less education, and less politically engaged than their 
urban counterparts (Taylor, 2012).  
 
To understand further the failure of the water pump project, Twaweza conducted a 
study on citizens' attitudes towards local government in Tanzania.  The study found a 
“widespread sense of powerlessness among citizens, a sense that there's nothing they 
can do to hold local government to account."  This "powerlessness of citizens has 
made them fear to form and/or join movements to raise issues, question the actions of 
leaders or fight for their rights" (Taylor et al., 2012:1).   
De Graaf claimed that when it came to engaging citizens with these SMS technologies 
in order to hold local government accountable for their water-pumps and wells: 
People don't really see the value in it... By and large, they think it's not going to help 
anything.  They don't see the point, and there's many things that have to be right at 
that point for it to work. For example, they have to think that if they send a message, 
that it will go somewhere. They have to feel responsible for it, first of all. They must 
think that if I do [send a message] that there's at least a minimal chance that it will 
contribute to some change.  There's a whole number of things that will go through 
people's minds before they actually send an SMS (de Graaf, 2015, in interview).  
 
What is of note with Twaweza, and one of the big lessons from the failure of the 
Daraja water point project, was the demonstrated power of the traditional media.  
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After the Daraja project, Twaweza pulled back from their initial exuberance with 
regards to digital technologies and now favour traditional media in their projects.   
De Graaf, confirmed “we had actually high hopes for both ICT and mobile 
phones…We thought it was going to be a major part of what we're doing, but it has 
become a lot less than we thought” (de Graaf, 2015, in interview).  Twaweza have 
now become much more focused on the power of traditional media, rather than ICTs 
to address their objectives and audiences.  
When it comes to using digital technology in their projects they are “not pulling back, 
but we are definitely more careful.  We're putting it under serious scrutiny” (De Graaf, 
2015, in interview).   
De Graaf contends “ICTs that stand alone, that do something by themselves, almost 
all of them, they don't work. Or many of them don't work” (de Graaf, 2015, in 
interview).   This is in line with Robert Munuku from the A4T project who argued that 
an App-centred project was not going to work for their Kenya project.  These 
complications will be explored more in the following chapter with regards to donor 
objectives in the region and engaging citizens with digital technologies. 
 
Discussion 
Whilst the three organisations in this section – FeminaHip, Well Told Story and 
Twaweza - are not directly involved in capacity building in the media sector - some 
are solely C4D projects - these projects provide avenues to engagement with local 
populations, using both old and new media methods.  Certainly, regardless of ICT use, 
their aims are aligned in that they endeavour to increase citizen engagement, 
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participation and activity in the governance of these program countries. They illustrate 
a range of experiences of utilising digital technologies in projects and successes 
relating to achieving their objectives.    
Certainly, the platforms that these organisations create for discussions amongst youth 
are important in such culturally diverse countries.  Kenya has over 70 different ethnic 
groups, 42 tribes, and a growing non-indigenous population73.  As seen during the 
2007 election, this can sometimes spill into inter-ethnic rivalry. Any platform for 
public discussion between these groups, in Kenya and Tanzania, which can foster 
inclusion and understanding and dissipate these tensions, therefore contributes to the 
democratic functioning of the country. 
In this section, the data has illustrated the extent of use of digital technology in media 
development projects in a sample of media development organisations operating in the 
region.  It addressed the question of, when digital forms of technology are employed 
in these projects, have they been effective for these organisations to achieve donor 
goals? And, if not, what are the reasons for this?  The next section will analyse 
whether using ICTs has the desired impact, thus determining their use in future media 
development work.   
  
Analysis: Digital technologies and donor objectives 
In the previous chapters, it was noted how mobile and new digital technologies are 
being embraced by the development sector across Africa to address a range of 
development objectives in their programmes. Media assistance has not been immune.  
 
73 http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/kenya-population/ 
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In the area of governance for instance, mobile technologies have been mooted as 
having the potential for empowering citizens and improving democratic processes.   
In theory, these technologies expand access to information and communications 
channels and create new opportunities for people’s participation, giving voice to those 
who have previously been excluded from national discussions. In this research, these 
assumptions and theories are tested with regards to the media assistance sector.    
In this chapter, the interview data showed the extent to which media development 
organisations are using digital technologies for their project objectives.  This chapter 
addressed the questions:  
o What are the characteristics of current media development practice in a 
modern East African context?  (RQ 2b) 
o Have ICTs impacted on the practice of media assistance in the chosen case 
studies?  (RQ 2c) 
Organisations were asked if they were employing digital technologies, and if so with 
what success had they achieved in their view?  And if they were not using new media 
technologies, what were the reasons for this?  Answering these questions will assist in 
clarifying the rationale for a continued preference for traditional media development 
approaches.  
What was found is varying levels of use of digital forms of technology in media 
development activity from one project to the next. This was for a variety of reasons 
and reflects the objectives of the different projects; the target group, the type of media 
development intervention, the desired goal.   
295 
 
A media project trying to reach teenagers in urban areas will have a different 
perspective on utilising digital technologies than a project for capacity building in 
rural radio stations.  Most projects choose their activities based on objectives, research 
and on a case-by-case basis, as noted by key informants. 
For some organisations, digital media are central to their plans, such as Well Told 
Story. Other organisations have changed little in how they address media development 
goals, in particular with regards to media capacity interventions. The African Media 
Initiative, Kenyan Media Programme and Tanzania Media Fund do not focus on 
digital technologies at all in their programmes.  Organisations such as BBC Media 
Action used them peripherally, or as “future-proofing” in their projects.  
Evidence from the interview data reveals how Internews, FARM Radio and UNESCO 
successfully used digital technology as an add-on to their projects.  Digital technology 
can make positive changes when integrated either with traditional media, such as the 
UNESCO radio project and Internews’ work with data journalism or software such as 
the Frontline:SMS Radio product.   
It must be noted though that the use of ICTs in these projects is as an add-on rather 
than a central tool or strategy in the project.  The Internews Data Journalism project is 
part of a larger overall capacity and training programme with Kenyan journalists, 
albeit a very successful part of the programme. UNESCO’s project offered ICT 
training as one of a range of trainings to the local radio stations and the 
correspondent’s networks were seen as one of the most successful aspects of the 
programme for creating new content.   
As noted, the A4T project was initially focused on an app but the team had recognised 
that an app alone would not be sufficient for the project goals of transparency and 
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reporting misuse of local government funds. They concluded that in Kenya the 
technology element of the project needed to be backed up by local community 
outreach, and especially training of journalists to interpret this data. 
In the FARM radio project, mobile phones and IVR were used to complement the 
training, open days and radio programmes that were created for informing rural 
citizens about food security practices.  But there were cost and technical literacy 
issues for these projects. 
Indeed, the combination of radio and mobile phones is seen as one of the most 
successful outcomes of using newer technologies in media and development projects.  
Mobile phones have effectively made radio more interactive, a two-way medium, no 
longer one-to-many (Gilberds and Myers, 2012b; Myers, 2008; Thompson, 2013).   
One participant argues that “when ICTs interact with something else, when they 
interact with traditional media it becomes much more powerful” (de Graaf, in 
interview)74.   
The merging of radio and new technologies such as mobile phones has resulted in the 
growth of call-in radio shows in the region, which were rare before the arrival of 
mobile technologies. James Deane, Policy Director for BBC Media Action, has 
highlighted the importance of radio as a space for public discussion and claims that 
“even in countries where liberalization has been slow or non-existent, there are 
important examples of talk radio catalysing major social change. …. It is happening 
because many of these countries have been starved of spaces for public discussion and 
debate” (Deane, 2005:181). 
 
74 Kees De Graaf, Twaweza, in skype interview with author March 2015 
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So, according to the research data, there are positive contributions that digital 
technologies can make to media development projects.  One important outcome is the 
emergence of a new public sphere provided by the combination of old and new media.  
However, the convergence process is happening slowly.  Gilberd and Myers (2012) 
have noted the “contextual, technical and capacity-related factors that constrain the 
use of convergent technologies to facilitate knowledge sharing among development 
actors and to contribute to broader processes of social change in Africa” (Gilberds and 
Myers, 2012b:76).  
What are the factors which constrain the use of these technologies?   
As noted in Chapter 5’s presentation of Country Findings, one reason that can hinder 
use of ICTs is limitations in access to the internet and network coverage in these 
countries.  In some regions mobile phones are not reaching the poorest or the most 
marginalised. Use of the internet is the same.  Access to the internet relies on 
electricity, phone network and language abilities.  And so, technology can only access, 
or reach, a certain proportion of the population and a very limited one in a lot of cases.    
The data revealed that there are additional reasons factors such as, ease of use, 
network access, literacy and individual agency, that discourage media development 
organisations using digital technologies to address donor goals in their projects.   The 
Twaweza testimony was evidence of the unexpected complications arising from using 
ICTs in projects for citizen engagement. 
As key informant Kees De Graaf maintained “a lot of the initiatives that have sprung 
up, many of them haven't really brought the case that we thought… because 
technology can only do so much” (de Graaf, 2015, in interview).   
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An important factor that determines ICT use is the objective of each project.   Donor 
goals in the region are focused on: Accountability, Participation, Engagement, 
Governance.  To date, these media assistance organisations remain committed to 
traditional methods when addressing these objectives.  The next chapter will analyse 
why this is. 
Conclusion: Media Assistance activity in East Africa   
This chapter presented findings from fieldwork conducted in the target countries. This 
data illustrates the characteristics of current media development interventions and 
analysed whether digital technologies have impacted on the practice of media 
assistance in the focus countries. 
Evidence was presented which illustrated the make-up and format of media 
development projects currently being implemented in Kenya and Tanzania.  These 
took the form of both media capacity building activities as well as ‘media for 
development’ activities.  It was found that the hybrid form of media development 
projects is prevalent in this region.  This is notable for particular objectives in the 
region such as engaging with youth and wider audiences on issues such as sexual 
health, food security or governance issues.  
Evidence was presented from interviews with media development practitioners, or key 
stakeholders, in Kenya and Tanzania as to whether digital technologies can assist, or 
better address their project goals, thereby contributing to the primary question of 
whether traditional media assistance methods are still relevant. 
The data here underscores how digital forms of technology are not necessarily being 
used by individuals in the manner that donor or development agencies assume when 
they are promoting technology innovation in development.    
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What was revealed in this chapter is how digital technologies, such as mobile phones, 
do not necessarily result in increased engagement or participation from citizens of 
Kenya and Tanzania.  Human factors come into play in a possibly unforeseen way 
when it comes to interacting with technologies and motivating the citizens of Kenya 
and Tanzania to use them for development ends.  The Daraja water pump project was 
offered as an example of the complications with ICTs to achieve these objectives and 
the reasons why will be examined further in the next chapter.   
The perspectives and interview data that were presented in this chapter will therefore 
be discussed in a wider context and in more depth in the next chapter in relation to use 
of digital technologies to achieve donor objectives.  
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Chapter 7  
Discussion 
 
 
Introduction 
Chapter 6 presented data outlining projects being implemented by a sample of media 
development organisations in Kenya and Tanzania and the extent of use of digital 
technologies in these projects.  
Despite their widespread availability and potential for some development objectives, 
this research found that digital technologies are not necessarily being employed 
widely in Media Assistance programmes in Kenya or Tanzania. There is a mix of 
experiences from the implementing organisations in this regard from the sample 
interviewed.   
What is apparent is that with regards to media support interventions, such as capacity 
building and strengthening the sector, media assistance programmes are still using 
301 
 
quite traditional techniques.  ICTs can certainly contribute to much needed upskilling 
of local media organisations, as demonstrated by the UNESCO radio project.  With 
media for development projects, digital technologies seem to be used more centrally, 
if appropriate for project goals and target audiences. 
Chapter 5 and 6 presented stakeholders’ insights and they testified to the enthusiasm 
for technology from the funders of international media development in the region. 
However, this may be misjudged.  This research found that despite enthusiasm for the 
use of digital technologies in media development, the digital divide still exists, and 
this impacts greatly on which tools are appropriate for media development objectives.  
The interview data revealed that there are other important factors that must also be 
considered when planning which tools to use for media assistance programmes, and 
these include issues of access, cost, the technical literacy of audiences and whether 
people actually use the technologies in the way assumed.  Furthermore, radio 
continues to be the media of choice for the majority of Kenyans and Tanzanians. 
Thus, many media development NGOs continue using traditional media methods in 
their projects. 
In this chapter, the findings from the field are synthesised and analysed in greater 
depth. Specifically, this chapter dissects the reasons why ICTs are not being widely 
used in media assistance interventions in this sample. Gaining an insight into the 
limitations of ICTs for these projects will help understand the continuing appeal, and 
role, for traditional media development methods.  This chapter therefore contributes to 
the question:  
 What is the rationale for a continuing emphasis on traditional media methods?   
(RQ 2d.) 
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This chapter offers eight salient themes which have emerged from analysis of the data.  
These serve to address the overall research question and draw conclusions with regard 
to the relevance of digital media technologies to the media assistance sector.   
Whilst the previous chapter presented and analysed the research data, this chapter 
offers a thematic analysis which advances the argument relating to the continuing 
importance of media assistance in the current information ecosystems.  These themes 
are presented below. 
 
Theme 1: The role of ICTs in ‘Africa’s Rise’ is being overstated 
The Africa Rising trope and reality of ICT use in Kenya and Tanzania 
The starting point for the research was the ubiquity of stories emerging in western 
media adhering to the “Africa rising” narrative.  As Taylor reported, “barely a week 
passes without a new article, report or conference eulogizing the continent and its 
growth figures…. Analyses thus far have had strong evangelical undertones, 
suggesting that Africa has turned a corner and that its emergence is imminent” 
(Taylor, 2014a:1-2)   
At the same time, there appeared a growing movement expressing optimism in what 
technology could do for development, and further, for Africa.    Headlines claimed 
that “mobile phones transform Africa” and one periodical created the moniker of 
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Kenya as ‘Silicon Savannah’ (Perry, 2011).   Jeffrey Sachs75 called mobile phones a 
‘gift for development’.    
It was noted in the literature review how enthusiasm for ICT4D76 is rooted in this 
techno-optimism, where technology is increasingly proposed as a solution for 
development problems.  As noted by Wyche and Olsen, “increased mobile phone 
ownership and access to the Internet figure prominently in this optimistic narrative” 
(Wyche and Olson, 2018:1). 
Furthermore, optimism that ICTs can be a solution for the continent’s development 
problems “was accompanied by hype about the continent’s possibility of 
“leapfrogging” some stages of development, as though the whole process of 
development had been rendered less problematic” (Banda et al., 2009:1).      
The data from this research illustrated how in recent years there has been a push from 
donors in the promotion of ICTs for development in the region. Findings from 
interviews with key stakeholders revealed that the media assistance sector has not 
been unaffected.  The techno-optimist feels that access to ICTs can facilitate a wide 
range of developmental goals, for example in fields such as health, agriculture and 
humanitarian assistance.  And there has of course been success in these areas.  
Whether digital technologies can be applied successfully to media development 
objectives, however, is a matter of debate and the central theme of this research. 
Making use of them would arguably be relatively easy for donors and practitioners 
working on media development, as use of these new technologies is user-driven, and 
 
75 Sachs is an American economist and director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University. He is 
known as one of the world's leading experts on economic development and the fight against poverty 
76 Information Communication Technology for Development 
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relatively low-cost.  But incorporating digital technologies in traditional media 
development models may be a more complicated process than it appears.   
Kees De Graaf, who is Head of ICT at the organisation Twaweza, explained how at 
his organisation “when we started that mobile phones we thought were going to be a 
big hit…. because it is such a technical innovation; it makes such a difference already 
in people’s lives.  Penetration is very high in Tanzania.   You can practically reach 
almost everybody”.   
De Graaf admits however that when it comes to digital technologies, “a lot of the 
initiatives that have sprung up, many of them haven't really brought the change that 
we thought.  It has been a bit disappointing. I think we've all been, maybe, focusing 
too much on the technical part of it” (De Graaf, 2015, in interview).   
More than one interview participant noted that if societal change was the result of 
higher mobile phone and internet penetration rates these countries would probably be 
seeing the impact already.   
Abel Okuye from Afrobarometer argued that “if the mobile phone brings changes, 
especially by the youth in Kenya you would see the figures.   I think Kenya and South 
Africa have like 98% penetration, very high figures.   If political transformation was 
to come, there would be a lot of transformation by now for Kenyan and other 
countries. But that massive usage is not translating into some of the changes. Why that 
disconnect is happening, whether it’s lack of interest from people, I don’t know” 
(Okuye, 2014, in interview). 
Whilst mobile phone usage and penetration has been rising exponentially in this 
region, a report by Afrobarometer shows that despite higher ICT penetration in Kenya, 
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corruption seems to be on the rise (Afrobarometer, 2015).  The report found that two-
thirds (64%) of Kenyans say that the level of corruption in the country had increased 
in that year.  This is despite an increase in access to information and news sources for 
most Kenyans in the same time period (Afrobarometer, 2015)77. 
Likewise in Tanzania, despite growth in access to ICTs, Tanzanians perceive that the 
level of corruption has increased also (Aiko, 2015). 
So, while ICTs may have transformed the social space of sub-Saharans, Bailard points 
out that the level of mobile phone penetration has far outpaced political development 
in the sub-Sahara (Bailard, 2009).   Thus, it cannot be assumed that technology is 
triggering social change, or that “the change that accompanies new technologies are 
automatically democratic and beneficial” (Allen and Gagliardone, 2011:29).   
The research data suggests that it is possible that the potential of digital technologies 
for developing countries is being overstated.  Stakeholders in the research felt the 
narrative of technology and Africa Rising did not apply to the broad population but is 
“a minority” (Munuku, 2015, in interview)78 
Eric Chinje from the African Media Initiative questioned the narrative of an Africa 
rising.  “I think the man on the street in Kenya who can hardly afford two or three 
square meals a day would question the concept”.   He reflected on whether digital 
media has in fact ‘changed the way Africa interacts with itself’ and whether it has 
‘contributed to improved policy making. The question is who is talking to who and 
what impact is it having?’ (Chinje, 2015, in interview).  
 
77 Afrobarometer, Kenya Corruption on the Rise, April 2015 
78 Robert Munuku, Action for Transparency, Interview with Author Feb 2015 
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Kenyan writer and investigative journalist Parselelo Kanthai refers to the “Africa 
Rising” trope as ”insidious little fiction manufactured by corporate interests” whilst 
Taylor notes “much of the [Africa]-boosting, local and international, will serve only 
political and financial interests” in (Taylor, 2014b:3).  
In a separate study on the experience of ‘Africa Rising’, Brooks found that economic 
growth had limited developmental benefits for those in the middle.  He argues that 
“despite the optimism, poverty ratios remained stable and impoverishment was 
widespread. Change was occurring, but the gains were uneven” (Brooks, 2018:1).   
The Irish Ambassador to Kenya, Vincent O Neill spoke in interview of this 
contradiction with regards to the Africa Rising story and these uneven gains, what he 
referred to as the ‘dual narrative’:  
[There is a dual narrative].  Kenya has only recently graduated but it's still a lower, 
middle income country.  It suddenly came into the lower part of the middle bracket. 
However, there are still very high poverty rates in 40- 45%. There's huge inequity 
across the country. The physical environment is very, very difficult. There are very 
high rates of maternal mortality and childhood mortality in those regions. Yet, you 
come down closer to some of the urban areas and you have a strong middle class. The 
major disease is diabetes or hypertension or obesity…. You have a few different 
worlds going and part of the economic disparities, the inequalities, are both a function 
and a cause of the tribal politics that has been here since independence (O’ Neill, 
2015, in interview).  
 
307 
 
And although Kenya is the biggest and most advanced economy in East and Central 
Africa, it is pertinent to remember that it is still a poor, developing country, with 
approximately 38% of Kenyans living in absolute poverty (World Bank, 2014).   
So, when one reads ‘Africa is rising’, this is essentially for a small, urban based group. 
There are still very high poverty rates in these countries, c.40-45% but in some areas 
this can be as high as 85% (O Neill, 2015, in interview).  
This is an important aspect in the research. For the most part, Media Development 
projects are not necessarily targeted at the urban middle classes.  Media Development 
projects are in the main funded by international donors to bring information to 
audiences where they have problems accessing information – either in “media dark” 
areas or in countries where populations or groups may have restricted access to 
independent news.   
As noted, media assistance is focused on strengthening of the media sector, and this 
also means making more media and information available to wider populations of 
Kenya and Tanzania.  Often, efforts are focused on poor, rural or marginalised groups, 
this is the reason why they are funded by international aid agencies and foundations.   
As noted, there are large swathes of the population who are still underserved and 
unreached by news and information, unable to take part in national debate or 
conversation. 
A 2016 World Development Report suggests that “to get the most out of the digital 
revolution, countries also need to work on the “analog components” ( Peña-López et 
al, 2016:1).  This has echoes of the ‘enabling environment’ of which Price and Krug 
stressed was crucial to the success of media assistance (Price and Krug, 2000).  
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The projects outlined in this research demonstrate how donor priorities in Kenya and 
Tanzania centre around governance, empowering citizens, dealing with health issues, 
connecting with youth, and facilitating dialogue. Despite the excitement of the ICT4D 
sector and the optimism relating ‘Africa’s Rise’ to technology, the data from this 
research found that ICTs have limited application for addressing these goals in the 
context of current media assistance projects.  
So, despite the framing of economic growth in Africa linked to technology, the 
limitations of these technologies are noted in this research.  As noted by a 2016 World 
Bank report: “digital technologies have spread rapidly in much of the world, but 
Digital dividends – that is the broader development benefits from using these 
technologies – have lagged behind… Their aggregate impact has fallen short and is 
unevenly distributed” (Peña-López et al, 2016).   
 
Theme 2: The prevalence of a techno-optimistic narrative in development  
Digital technologies and ICTs are not always the correct intervention according to key 
stakeholders. Indeed, they may serve the interests of corporations more than citizens.  
As noted, a trend in the media development sphere in recent years has been the 
emergence of a new generation of donors emerging from technology Foundations 
originating in Silicon Valley who often emphasise technological solutions for 
development. The Gates Foundation run by Bill and Melinda Gates; the Omidyar 
Foundation established by Pierre Omidyar, owner of eBay; Google.Org; and the Skoll 
Foundation (Jeff Skoll, also of eBay) – these foundations are increasingly involved in 
international development, as well as media development, and have an impact on the 
discourse about development.  It has been called tech-philanthropy (Callahan, 2017). 
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Nelson argues that the Gates Foundation “may not have invented media for 
development but in recent years it has undoubtedly helped to set the agenda” (Nelson, 
2009).  Whilst media for development is only a part of the broader media assistance 
sector, it gives some indication of the influence these foundations are having on the 
discussions taking place and the influence they may have on the direction of media 
assistance.   
What is noteworthy for this research is that claims about the potential of technological 
innovation to contribute positively to the lives of individuals and communities often 
emanate from these philanthropic foundations.  Donors such as the Omidyar Network, 
Skoll Foundation and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation are proponents and funders of 
the use of ICTs as a solution to development problems. 
Thus, it is pertinent to ask: what drives the techno-optimist view of new technologies 
in development?  And whose interest do they serve?  For instance, a focus on 
providing access to new technologies in the Third World could be seen as a 
mechanism of allowing corporations to establish new channels of market entry.   
The ownership structures and the means for access to the much celebrated ‘new’ 
public sphere, which is being enabled by the internet and mobile phones, are often 
owned by transnational corporations such as Vodacom, Safaricom, Microsoft or 
Facebook.  Increased use of their products means more reliance on and future revenue 
streams for these corporations. 
In the same way that it can be argued that the state sponsored media assistance of the 
1990s was motivated by the desire to create new markets for media products in 
Eastern Europe, it can equally be argued that media development and assistance in the 
current day, now funded more by private technology foundations, is motivated to 
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create new markets for those products, whether it be mobile phones, software 
applications or social media platforms. 
Boyd-Barett updated the concept of media imperialism with reference to what he calls 
the “digital media empires” (Boyd Barrett, 2014).  He argues that the structures of 
power and control that were at play in media imperialism continue to regulate access 
to and consumption of global media, but “it's no longer just Disney and Dallas - it's 
also now Apple, Facebook and Google” (Boyd-Barrett, 2014:118). 
Indeed, Facebook’s attempt to provide free internet access to all Indian citizens in 
2015 - called Free Basics79 - resulted in accusations of the corporation’s “neo-
imperialism”.  Research by Bonilla et al. found that Free Basics exists “primarily as a 
mechanism for collecting profitable data from users” (Bonilla et al., 2017).  
As was noted in the literature review, there are ‘ideological connotations of the new’ 
in discussions about new technologies and development.  Fackson Banda spoke of the 
“modernist belief in social progress as delivered by technology” (Banda, 2006).  This 
modernist narrative is associated with an ideology about the Third World ‘catching 
up’ with such Western societies.  Banda argues “indeed, this narrative is subscribed to 
not only by the entrepreneurs, corporations who produce media hardware and software 
in question, but also by whole sections of media commentators, educationalists and 
cultural activists” (Banda, 2006:4).  
 
79 The platform, presented by Facebook as a way to help people connect to the internet for the first 
time, offered a stripped-down version of the mobile web that people could use without it counting 
toward their data-usage limit.   
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For the purpose of this research, this serves as a critical note to the techno-
determinism of recent years in relation to development in the region.  Manji (2008) 
warned about the dangers of technological determinism and questioned 
Why are we not holding conferences about the role of the pencil in development? Or 
the role of paper? There is more evidence of social progress made by these humble 
instruments than all the information and communication technologies (ICTs) over the 
last 20 years…. There is nothing intrinsically progressive about the pencil or paper. It 
depends on who uses it and for what purpose (Manji, 2008:129) 
 
This thesis proposes a more practical and evidence-based perspective in contrast to the 
techno-optimistic narrative which has dominated the development debate in the past 
decade.  Key stakeholders who contributed to this research confirmed that using ICTs 
in their projects was not necessarily the right approach for addressing donor goals, 
despite pressure to use them.    
Daniel Dedayan from USAID Tanzania confirmed in interview that “there is an 
excitement about new technologies” and at USAID “we’ve had that excitement”.  He 
revealed that they “are definitely getting a push from Washington to be innovative” in 
their projects (Dedayan, 2014, in interview).   
Alex Pitkin from the organisation Frontline SMS80, argued that “there are lots of 
projects that get funding because they are doing something innovative…. It’s more 
likely to get funding if they have good ideas on technology”.  But he questioned why 
 
80 Frontline SMS is a NGO which teams SMS with Radio for interactive discussions. It is a free, open-
source software used by a variety of organisations to distribute and collect information via text 
messages (SMS). Their radio product - Frontline SMS: Radio - helps radio stations increase listener 
engagement, build interactive programming and manage data in real-time, all using SMS 
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“funders are doing Twitter campaigns [in their projects] when they maybe should just 
be putting money into people on the ground on bikes” (Pitkin, 2015, in interview) 81. 
Sasha Kinney who works with PAWA254, a community-based activism organisation 
in Nairobi, also spoke of “the big technology bias” that has appeared in the aid sector 
over the past five years. “This idea of advanced technology, its funder-driven and it’s 
sexy and popular, and there's very little regard as to what is really appropriate to reach 
a certain audience or engage them” (Kinney, 2015, in interview)82.    
Kinney claims the message the NGO community is getting from donors is “Tech is 
new, we have to use tech.  Tech will revolutionise everything on its own”.  But she 
argues that “people forget to give training in the fundamentals…It's kind of 
backwards” (Kinney, 2015, in interview). 
This is of note because it tells of the push for use of new or digital technology 
regardless of whether they are the appropriate intervention or tool or whether their use 
is evidence-based.  Kinney confirms “no-one ever asks about adoption or usage, no, 
because they also don’t want to see failure…  They're not really thinking through 
really what's needed” (Kinney, 2015, in interview).  As Chinje from AMI argued “the 
donors want something more sexy (Chinje, 2015, in interview).   
This research therefore offers evidence to counter the ‘cyber-optimism’ in 
development. It needs to be considered that implementing technology-related 
development solutions may serve other interests than the citizens of the “beneficiary” 
country.  Christensen warned of the “fundamental questions regarding the increasingly 
 
81 Alex Pitkin, Frontline SMS, in interview with author May 2014 
82 Sasha Kinney, PAWA, in interview with author Nairobi Feb 2015 
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blurred lines among policy, development aid, technological determinism and 
commodification”  (Christensen, 2012:250). 
And Gumucio-Dagron (2008) claimed “in the name of the ‘digital divide’, great 
business is being made” (Gumucio-Dagron, 2008:77).   
 
Theme 3: The Digital Divide remains a hurdle for ICTs in media 
development  
There is a ‘dual narrative’83 in Kenya and Tanzania and this impacts on the extent to which 
media development projects should use digital technologies or ICTs. 
The term digital divide was introduced in the mid-1990s and defined as the gap 
separating those who have access to new forms of information technology from those 
who do not (Srinuan and Bohlin, 2011).  Compaine (2001) argues that “if we are 
indeed in an Information Age, then not having access to this information is an 
economic and social handicap” (Compaine, 2001:ix).   
Access does not just mean actually having physical access (such as actually owning a 
phone, for example), access also means knowing how to use these technologies, and 
being able to afford to use them. So, albeit there has been much progress in Africa in 
bridging the digital divide as mobile adoption rates have exploded over the past 
decade, there are still many challenges. 
The Country Profiles data presented in Chapter 5 highlighted the extensive changes in 
the media environments of both Kenya and Tanzania.   Yes, there is a huge growth in 
mobile phone use and a definite growth of online activity, such as social media, 
 
83 ‘Dual Narrative’ is the term used in interview by Irish Ambassador to Kenya Vincent O Neill in 
reference to those with good access to communications and media and those who do not 
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forums and blogging. Many people now use social media to access news; Twitter and 
Facebook are very popular.  So, there has been a very definite expansion in media and 
communications channels. 
There has also been an opening up of the media sector and a proliferation of media 
outlets, both print and FM radio. These changes have come after a phase of 
liberalisation in the media sector in these countries.  Digital TV has recently been 
introduced in Kenya and Tanzania.   
However, these phenomena are mainly observed in urban areas.  In both Tanzania and 
Kenya, the majority of populations live in rural areas (c. 72% in Kenya -76% in 
Tanzania) and in these areas citizens have limited access to a range of media for a 
variety of reasons outlined in Chapter 5.  For instance, print media is very limited in 
rural areas of Tanzania due to lack of infrastructure; roads are very poor quality and, 
in some areas, unpassable so distribution is difficult.  
Chapter 5 illustrated this sharp urban/rural divide.  It revealed how the two target 
countries of Kenya and Tanzania are predominantly rural and poor, factors that 
continue to hamper access to news and information. Interview participant Kris Kapella 
from Femina Hip commented: 
The technology is here now, it is just the fact it hasn’t filtered down to all levels of 
society yet and I don’t think that is going to happen for while…  The fact is here you 
are still dealing with a predominantly rural poor population which doesn’t have access 
to even the most basic of services (Kapella, 2014, in interview). 
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These countries remain divided, with a growing affluence and connectivity for the 
residents of the major cities and continued poverty for the rural majority.  The Irish 
Ambassador to Kenya, Vincent O’ Neill, called it the “dual narrative”.   
Thus, despite widespread optimism for ICT in development, the majority of the 
citizens in Kenya and Tanzania live in rural areas where access to even traditional 
media continues to be difficult for many of these people.  Although mobile technology 
can circumvent infrastructure hurdles, access to new technologies and the internet is 
still challenging.  In fact, Norris believes that the rapid growth of the internet is 
exacerbating existing inequalities between the information rich and poor (Norris, 
2001). 
 
There are several aspects of the digital divide which are relevant to this region: 
1. Access  
 
As has been illustrated from the country data, the use of digital technologies and 
social media is mainly an urban phenomenon.  The issue of limited access for rural 
populations is due to a number of factors - access to either consistent network 
coverage or internet access or even a consistent electricity supply. 
Understanding Kenya’s official languages of English and Kiswahili is also key to 
using newspapers, government documents, the internet, and SMS services, all which 
are primarily in those two languages. However, only 59 per cent of rural respondents 
said they can speak and understand English, compared to 80 percent of those in urban 
areas (Bowen, 2010). 
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Lower levels of education in rural areas also limit the scope for information gathering, 
particularly given that new ICTs such as the internet and SMS services usually require 
literate audiences (Bowen, 2010).    
2. Technical Literacy 
The technology itself is an issue.  Citizens of Kenya and Tanzania are most definitely 
using mobile phones in an enthusiastic manner, but at the timing of the fieldwork 
these were predominantly what are called ‘feature phones’ (i.e. not internet enabled), 
and are used only for making calls or sending SMS. Many of the mobile phones used 
are cheap Chinese imports.  They are certainly making it more affordable for larger 
part of the population to have access, but many of the phones do not have the 
character sets of particular languages that the users speak.  Often users cannot use the 
more advanced applications and services on these phones and use them mainly for 
calls. As one participant mentioned, some cannot use their address book or contacts 
(Spurway, 2014, in interview).  
Sara Chamberlain from BBC Media Action has discussed the limited ways in which 
users use their phones:  
What we've discovered…is that people don't know how to use that technology. What 
we discovered is that only nine per cent had ever sent a SMS. The reason that only 9 
per cent had ever sent a SMS is because the majority of the phones that they have are 
used, second hand, very poor quality sort of brick phones.   They're copycat, so 
‘Nokais’ and ‘Simsungs’ that are coming in over the border and are in foreign 
languages. ……. Essentially people have a very basic piece of technology in their 
hands that's in a foreign language which is really limiting their ability to actually use 
it for anything other than a voice call.   The majority can only make and receive voice 
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calls and that's really it. That really dictated our choice of technology (Brown-Martin 
2014).  
 
Thus, mobile phones and ICTs are not yet being used to their full technical potential 
by citizens in these countries.  The ideology of a technology-led revolution is 
undermined by the fact that it is underpinned by very basic devices and crude 
applications. 
3. Cost 
One of the largest hurdles for Kenyans and Tanzanians to access information via new 
technologies is the cost.  The growing middle class are mainly based in urban areas, 
and the price of more expensive phones and data schemes is out of the reach of many 
citizens.  Even if they can pay for a device, they cannot easily afford the 
telecommunications and data usage charges that are required to access the internet.  
Kenyans and Tanzanians at the Bottom of Pyramid84 (‘BOP’) are already known to be 
making sacrifices of basic food and utilities, so they can buy credit on their phones: 
“People would rather not buy bread or milk but have airtime”85 (Patterson, 2015, in 
interview).  
This was echoed by Angela Okune from iHub: “There's no doubt that even bottom of 
the pyramid they sacrifice milk to get calls. They’re sacrificing; they’re walking 
instead of taking a matatu because with that 20 Ksh, they call someone and look for 
job and potentially make 2000 Ksh” (Okune, 2015, in interview). 
 
84 In Aid work this is the largest, but poorest socio-economic group 
85 UNDP, Siema Patterson, Feb 2015 in interview with the author 
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In a more commercial regulatory environment, where prices and taxes are lowered, we 
can anticipate that prices will come down and these services will soon be within reach 
of the mass population. Kenya has a more business-friendly and consumer-friendly 
environment where the existence of several operators make sure the data and call 
prices will fall, and cheaper mobile and Smartphones are entering the market.  
In Tanzania, the government is making cost more restrictive by imposing new taxes 
on mobile devices or telecommunications fees. In their report on digital inclusion and 
mobile tax in Tanzania, the GSMA86 found that mobile communications is one of the 
most heavily taxed sectors in Tanzania, with operators subject to 10 different taxes, 
along with regulatory fees and charges.   
These taxes increase the total cost of mobile ownership for Tanzania consumers and 
create “barriers to affordability” (Digital inclusion mobile sector tax Tanzania, 2015).  
For instance, Richard and Mandari (2018) found that transaction cost have a 
significant negative influence on the usage of mobile banking services in Tanzania 
(Richard and Mandari, 2018). 
Consequently, at the time of the fieldwork, the cost of accessing information on new 
technologies was still prohibitive for a large part of these populations.  As one 
interview participant remarked “technology seems to be ahead of people’s capacity to 
afford things” (Wafula, 2014, in interview). 
Thus, technical literacy, language barriers, electricity supply and cost restrict citizens 
of these countries accessing new digital forms of media and the internet. The digital 
divide remains a substantial problem in this region and the urban/rural split is a critical 
 
86 The Global Association of Mobile Operators 
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aspect with regards to uptake of digital technologies with target groups for media 
development projects. 
As one interview participant confirmed “for reaching the last populations or reaching 
the millions of citizens, ICT is not yet the big thing” (de Graaf, 2015, in interview).   
And as the World Bank notes in their 2016 Development report “the lives of the 
majority of the world’s people remain largely untouched by the digital revolution” 
(Peña-López and others, 2016) .   
As a result, media development projects have not necessarily changed what they are 
doing ‘on the ground’ in Kenya and Tanzania. Use of digital technologies or social 
media platforms is often as an add-on or “future-proofing” in these projects (Spurway, 
2014, in interview).   
 
Theme 4: Participatory Radio has emerged as a new public sphere 
Radio is still of huge importance and ICTs combined with radio is an area of some success for 
media development   
An issue of interest that emerged from the data relates to the convergence of radio and 
newer forms of technology, in particular the mobile phone. In this research, the 
UNESCO and FARM Radio projects illustrated how the potential for participatory 
radio programming is enhanced by the spread of mobile phones.   
Radio remains the dominant electronic medium of communication throughout sub-
Saharan Africa.  Gilberds and Myers found (2012) “low production and distribution 
costs coupled with widespread liberalisation of the airwaves in many sub-Saharan 
African countries have made radio the most affordable, pervasive and flexible mass 
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medium available” (Gilberds and Myers, 2012:77).  It is a medium that also resonates 
with dominant oral culture in many African societies.  
Many people, especially in rural areas, depend on the radio for news of the latest 
innovations and market prices, to advice on tackling agricultural, health and other 
developmental problems.   This research shows that one of the biggest successes with 
regards to ICTs seems to be convergence of new digital technologies with radio which 
facilitates two-way flows of knowledge.  
Research undertaken by Carleton University in Canada found that most radio stations 
now have talk-shows incorporating listeners’ phone calls on a regular basis (Gilberds 
and Myers, 2012).   According to Freedom House, “their call-in shows have fostered 
increasing public participation” (Freedom House, 2014).   
These call-in radio shows are taking over the airwaves and are said to be transforming 
how Africans listen to and interact with each other (Hudson et al., 2017).  This two-
way communication has been called “Participatory radio”.   
Thompson suggests that the combination of radio and cell phone is empowering local 
audiences and argues that it is because they can now engage with others and with 
issues: 
Radio is the original ICT in Africa, and the cell phone is its most recent add-on 
ICT…. The cell phone is empowering people by allowing them to engage with the 
number one electronic purveyor of information and entertainment on the continent.  
As oral culture predominates in most of Africa, radio and the cell phone are simply 
extensions of the human voice; they are the electronic post office that functions while 
the traditional post office barely exists  (Thompson, 2013:13). 
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Talk-based radio, which involves free-ranging studio discussions, phone-ins, political 
interviews, interviews with celebrities and music, are becoming some of the more 
popular programming for broadcasters.  
Talk Radio may be an old and much-used format in the West for decades, but in the 
past years it has been ground-breaking for people who live in these remote areas. 
Africans can now voice their opinions in public, talk to politicians about their 
grievances and engage in debate in a way that was hardly possible a few years ago.   
As Gordon (2012) maintains 
The very definition of radio is changing …Ordinary community members have been 
empowered to participate by sending in stories, calling in to give their views, and 
giving comments on policies thus challenging the hegemonic control on content 
production by journalists  (Gordon, 2012).  
 
Although few local radio stations have the resources to invest in significant 
independent news-gathering operations, talk shows are opening up new spaces for 
political and public debate, and through debate to public engagement (Lopes, 2015, in 
interview).87   Converged radio has been compared to Habermas’ coffee houses, as 
Deane noted: 
Habermas originally argued that a public sphere, independent of the reigning 
governments, was established out of a space carved out in the coffee houses of 
enlightenment Europe. The radio revolution in many developing countries can 
arguably be seen as a similar phenomenon, where public debate over radio meshes 
 
87 Claudia Lopes, in phone interview with author, May 2014. 
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with the billions of informal and interconnecting conversations enabled by the new 
technologies of mobile telephony and the internet  (Deane, 2005).  
 
Indeed Ethan Zuckerman, Director of the MIT Center for Civic Media, claimed that 
“considered together, radios and mobile phones can serve as a broad-distribution, 
participatory media network with some of the same citizen media dynamics of the 
internet” (Zuckerman, 2007). 
Therefore, Africa's rapid spread of mobile phones, combined with the ubiquity and 
popularity of radio presents a significant opportunity for public discussion.  It 
provides a two-way communication channel, one accessed by a broad church of the 
population.   
Interview participant Claudia Lopes, Project Director from the Africa’s Voices project, 
confirms how radio phone-ins and text-ins can impact public debate, public opinion 
and the ability of citizens to hold authority to account: “suddenly there are spaces 
where people can get relevant information and within which they might even 
participate” (Lopes, 2015, in interview).     
The opportunity for audiences to express their opinions and gain acknowledgement of 
taking part in a discussion by other members of the community seem to be significant 
drivers for participation in her Africa’s Voices programmes.   Lopes argues that “they 
want to be recognised, give their views – and they hope the presenter will read their 
message out on air and perhaps greet their mother” (Lopes, 2015, in interview).  
Participatory radio echoes the positive aspects of Habermas’ ideal public sphere in the 
coffee houses of Europe: discussion, deliberation and debate. 
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However, Lopes admits “people in urban areas participate more and we have to be 
very honest about this” (Lopes, 2015, in interview). 
And barriers to participation are more complex than just access: women and girls with 
low educational levels were much less likely to call in to a radio station than men and 
boys of a similar income and educational level.  Lopes cautioned “this divide still 
exists with interactive radio essentially.  It doesn’t mean that women don’t listen to 
the programmes. They listen to the programmes and the programmes will reach them 
but they don’t participate which is different” (Lopes, 2015, in interview). 
Manyozo et al (2011) found that in rural areas, where women are economically 
marginalised, the more expensive an ICT instrument is, the more its ownership is 
likely to be dominated by men (Manyozo et al., 2011), further limiting women’s 
ability to participate. 
So, although the convergence process of the mobile phone and radio is happening and 
is positive and exciting, it is still subject to the digital divide: the disparities governed 
by geography, income and gender still exist.   Jackie Davies from BBC Media Action 
confirmed “there are huge populations in this country who don’t really have a voice in 
the national debate, about anything” (Davies, 2015, in interview). 
Consequently, this new public sphere is not the ideal that Habermas or the techno-
optimist envisages.   Criticisms of the new public sphere which has been facilitated by 
digital technologies and the internet were noted in the literature review. Perhaps the 
concept of the public sphere is itself is a utopian ideal, as Grbeša claimed “the public 
sphere is an ideal model that has probably never existed” (Grbeša, 2004:119).  
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Theme 5: The ICT for Accountability Model has not delivered as promised 
Participation and citizen engagement are often the objectives for using ICTs in projects but as 
illustrated in the case studies these are not guaranteed. 
During the field trips to both Kenya and Tanzania, it was found that there is much 
development work going on in the area of citizen participation and accountability 
using ICTs and apps.  Aran Corrigan from Irish Aid confirmed how “there is a lot of 
this going on in Tanzania, a lot of ‘accountability for checks” (Corrigan, 2014, in 
interview). 
Corrigan explained that “these projects depend on the idea that you empower citizens 
to act and the government responds and the services get better. We all work with that 
sort of model.   It’s called the Accountability model” (Corrigan, 2014, in interview).88. 
This Accountability Model envisions that ICTs will empower citizens to act and this 
will promote openness and transparency which will result in increased government 
responsiveness and accountability. It will make public discussion between citizens and 
governments easier. Traditional Media Assistance also works towards these goals. 
Integrating ICTs into projects for these ends is not always straightforward however, 
and organisations in the sample have experienced problems with implementing ICTs 
in this regard.  Corrigan offered the example of the Daraja Water project in Tanzania 
and its use of new technology for citizen participation in accountability and 
governance projects but “it failed” (Corrigan, in interview, 2015). 
The objective of that project was to engage citizens in reporting to their local 
government regarding water-points, thus looking for accountability from elected 
officials.   The Daraja project showed how it can be a challenge to incentivise people 
 
88 In interview with Author, Dar Es Salaam, Feb 2014 
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to engage and participate with digital technologies in development projects. One 
explanation proposed is that users have not seen evidence that using them will help to 
make a change to their lives. 
The Daraja experience was raised by several of the interview participants and is 
interesting because the problem also exists in Kenya with regards to the technology 
and engagement model – or the ‘Accountability model’.   
De Graaf Head of ICT confirmed “we actually had high hopes for both ICT and 
mobile phones…. We thought four or five years ago it was going to be a major part of 
what we’re doing, but it has become a lot less than we thought” (De Graaf, in 
interview, 2015). 
This is in line with other research into whether Kenya’s ICT revolution has triggered 
increased citizen participation. Salome (2016) found that ICTs do not necessarily 
trigger better governance. She found that  despite an explosion of e-government tools, 
“only a small minority of Nairobi citizens use ICTs to engage with the state” (Salome, 
2016:4). 
Heeks (2003) found that many ICT projects aimed at better governance result in lower 
expected returns especially in developing/transitional countries where 35% of e-
governance related projects are likely to fail (Heeks, 2003).  Recent findings from the 
World Bank attest “it’s actually quite shocking how many e-government projects 
fail…  we see a lot of disappointment and wasted investments”  (Peña-López and 
others, 2016). 
So, even though mobile phone penetration is growing all over Africa, people may not 
necessarily want to engage with national and local governments through mobile 
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phones, e-initiatives and social media.  There exist numerous websites, mobile phone 
and web applications for governance which are not used as often as the developers 
expected. 
This begs the question that if people have the technology in their hands, and if they 
can afford the connectivity, why would they not engage with ICTs in these 
development projects?  What are the reasons that audiences and citizens did not 
respond to technologies in the way presumed? (See also Fung et al, 2010).   
The Daraja project found “low user expectations regarding government 
responsiveness to feedback, particularly given a long history of unfulfilled promises 
from politicians, government, NGOs, and others … in relation to water supply 
services” (Taylor, 2012).   Sika et al (2014) suggest: 
Citizens are not optimistic about action being taken on the issues they raise, thus 
limiting their use of the applications. This is brought on by the lack of consultation 
during the creation of the ICT tools in governance, lack of follow up procedures on 
the issues raised, poor communication by government on the course of action to be 
taken on issues raised by citizens, and, the fact that there are more people who share 
negative experiences they have had with government than there are people who share 
positive experiences (Sika et al., 2014:19). 
 
Afrobarometer research in Tanzania found that “most Tanzanians are dissatisfied with 
the current level of public service delivery, but only a minority takes direct action for 
change”.  Many Tanzanians feel that their opinions are not heard and that it is a 
useless battle to try to influence policy makers (Aiko, 2012:1).    
327 
 
This is backed up by a USAID report which found that Tanzanians have “a passive 
tendency to shrug and accept things as they are…….a “culture of silence,”   (Dichter 
and Aulick, 2013:4).      
Twaweza tries to address this in their work.  De Graaf says that part of the reason for 
setting up the programme was “to challenge the culture of apathy and to be part of a 
wider effort (through Twaweza) to replace this with a culture of citizens' agency - 
citizens taking action to hold government to account and to improve their own lives 
(de Graaf, 2015, in interview). 
But Twaweza’s use of ICTs to address this was a failure.  In fact, none of the 
evaluations undertaken of the Daraja project uncovered evidence that Twaweza’s 
information was “registering with citizens on any scale, still less triggering increased 
citizen action” (Green, 2013a) (Eissa et al., 2013; Gunning et al., 2013). 
It is an important point for this research, and for projects hoping to use ICT for 
Accountability - the issues of agency and engagement.  As Aran Corrigan from Irish 
Aid noted, many donor-funded citizen engagement and participation projects which 
focus on governance are based on this concept of engagement.   
Angela Okune, Head of Research at Nairobi’s iHub, argues that for audiences to 
engage with these technologies, whether for accountability or participation or 
governance objectives, what audiences need is to see the benefit. “There's 
engagement… if you’re going to see a real key benefit.   If you engage, or you take 
part in polls, or you vote, you do all these things and then you feel like none of that 
made a difference … you just opt out” (Okune, 2015, in interview). 
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Interview participant, Sasha Kinney from PAWA254, also questioned whether, despite 
the huge growth in access to information, and the growth in two-way communication, 
these citizen participation initiatives are creating active citizenship.  She concluded, 
no. “I think there's a lot behind that. It's not lack of information.   I think it's that 
people don't see a viable course of action. They don't actually see something that they 
can do that's actually going to change things” (Kinney, 2015, in interview). 
Kinney argues that Kenyan’s post-dictatorship mentality is one reason for this: “The 
idea of collective action and the fact that you could really leverage your numbers as a 
source of power is just still really underdeveloped here” (Kinney, 2015, in interview). 
This sense of powerlessness was also noted by the head of Twaweza, Rakesh Rajani, 
who observed in Tanzania, “people don't have that sense of agency that something 
could – and should – be changed. ..It is basic to the way western democracies work, so 
it's hard to appreciate how its absence shapes a political culture” (Bunting, 2011). 
Zanello and Maassen (2011) analysed the conditions that bring citizens to become 
active citizens. They found that citizen agency is driven by people but it needs some 
form of accountability from the authorities to take place.  They maintain that for 
citizen agency to work ” they must have the conviction that they can make changes” 
(Zanello and Maassen, 2011:6).  Individuals are willing to participate in political life 
only if they feel that somehow they are able to make a difference.   
As Green notes, in the East African context, “confidence in engaging with the 
governmental sectors has been eroded by years of unresponsive and corrupt systems, 
so much so that even when there is a genuine opportunity to engage or provide 
feedback, citizens often don’t do so” (Green, 2013b). 
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Most of these projects using digital technologies are based on the model that action on 
the part of the individual will lead to action on the part of those in power when they 
hear from their citizens. But if change does not happen, citizens learn not to bother 
participating.  A key demotivating factor in the two-way interaction between citizens 
and governments using ICTs is the belief by citizens that nothing will come out of the 
interactions.  
Findings from this research illustrate how sustaining the motivation of citizens to 
participate is a challenge.  Interview participants attested to the importance of 
understanding what drives citizens to engage in development projects.   A critical 
aspect is that people must have trust in feedback or accountability mechanisms and be 
convinced that, by providing feedback, they can influence positive social changes.   
There must be evidence that their actions, their agency, might lead to change. 
Thus, it cannot be taken for granted that citizens, when given the opportunity to 
provide feedback or interact, will have the incentives to do so.    
Interview participant, Okune from Nairobi’s iHub, attests how “access is not really the 
issue anymore. Simply giving someone a phone is not going to make them so excited 
and start calling the government and demanding their rights you know?   There's so 
much else involved there.  I think the question is – is the government willing to 
change as a result of listening to Citizens Voices?” (Okune, 2015, in interview). 
Okune continues with regards to ICTs such as the mobile phone “as a communication 
tool, yes, for sure it will continue to grow. As a tool to improve governance, as a tool 
for social good, I think that’s a lot harder and that’s a lot more up in the air. It really 
depends on, I think, government will” (Okune, 2015, in interview).   And that is an 
issue outside the realm of achievable goals in Media Assistance projects.   
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Theme 6: Traditional Media platforms have underestimated potential for 
engaging citizens 
Traditional media Assistance projects provide positive results for engagement and 
participation by citizens, as illustrated by project data.  
As noted by participants in the research, the presumption of a link between ICTs and 
Accountability processes is problematic. As illustrated by the project data, one of the 
problems with digital technologies in media development work is that they do not 
automatically guarantee participation by citizens or engagement in accountability 
processes. 
In an assessment of Twaweza initiatives, Lieberman et al. (2013) concluded “there are 
lots of prerequisites to behavioural change and the usefulness of ICTs for generating 
citizen action is likely oversold” (Lieberman et al., 2013). 
Participation and engagement are central in media development work because of their 
relationship to governance and democracy. Norris argued, political participation is the 
“lifeblood of representative democracy” (Norris, 2002) and Hauser claimed that 
democratic governance rests on the opportunity for citizens to engage in ‘enlightened 
debate’ (Hauser 1998). 
As noted in the literature review, Habermas’s study of the public sphere centred on the 
idea of political participation as the core of democratic society. The public sphere 
served as a forum for deliberation by citizens around issues and decisions relevant to 
governing.   
Habermas spoke of “the power of public discourses that uncover topics of relevance to 
all of society, interpret values, contribute to the resolution of problems, generate good 
reasons, and debunk bad ones” noting that “Discourses do not govern. They generate a 
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communicative power that cannot take the place of administration but can only 
influence it” (Habermas, 1992:452).  
This concept of public sphere is central to models of deliberative democracy, which is 
based on the idea that political decisions should be the product of fair and reasonable 
discussion and debate among citizens.  As distilled from the literature review, 
Habermas, amongst others, had proposed that the media fulfilled the role of the public 
sphere, until it was spoiled by its ‘structural transformation’ (Habermas, 1962; Hauser, 
1998; Norris and et al, 2010).   
Increasing political participation is also seen as one of the key routes to building 
accountability between citizens and leaders. Accountability is enhanced when citizens 
play an active role in making demands and when officials are expected to respond to 
those demands.  
This has implications for media development.   
Often in media development projects the objective is to draw wider society into the 
national conversation – reflecting a range of views and political opinions, thus 
encouraging this ‘deliberation’. Yes, media assistance works towards strengthening 
the independence and freedom of the media, but to what end? Because of its watchdog 
role, its agenda setting role and its potential to hold leaders to account, thereby 
contributing to democracy. This also involves bringing wider society into discourse, 
debate and deliberation – not just urban groups or elites. 
Media development projects use media and communication to help foster this political 
participation. They can do this by providing access to information, stimulating 
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discussion and helping people interact with decision makers. This is particularly 
important around elections where media has a central role to play.  
This relationship can be evidenced in the project documents from media development 
organisations. For instance, the objectives of the BBC Media Action project in 
Tanzania, Haba na Haba, included increasing the capacity of journalists and media 
practitioners to produce quality radio programmes.  This would contribute to 
improving Tanzanians’ knowledge of key governance issues, including their rights 
and responsibilities and the country’s political processes.  They also aimed to “create 
a national and inclusive conversation which results in Tanzanians feeling confident to 
freely express their views about issues that matter to them and confident that these 
views are being heard and responded to by their leaders” (Bangapi et al., 2017:10) 
With the Sema Kenya project in Kenya, the BBC Media Action objectives were to 
improve Kenyans’ access to reliable, trustworthy information and also increase their 
knowledge of key governance issues.   The project worked to “rebuild trust in the 
democratic process in Kenya by creating a national and inclusive conversation and 
debate and encouraging dialogue as a means of settling conflicts within and among 
communities” (Buckell and Baskett, 2017:11). 
The intended cumulative outcome for the project was that “individuals, communities 
and governments…are better informed and more engaged in tackling challenges in 
governance’ and thereby contributing to more accountable state-society relations and 
governance ” (Buckell and Baskett, 2017:11). 
Thus, while the media development sector focuses first and foremost on supporting 
and strengthening the media sector it is often done in tandem with bolstering this 
element of deliberative democracy – a platform for public debate.  A platform for 
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ensuring that citizens can become active participants in their societies, to engage 
people across all sections of society.  
As noted, participation is important for this research as digital technologies are often 
posited as a new and better way in which global citizens can participate in the public 
sphere and hold those in power to account. Can digital technologies do a better job 
that traditional media in this manner?  
Digital technology certainly has a role in achieving development goals, such as health 
and improving public service delivery (Heeks, 2002; Sika et al., 2014; Singh et al., 
2010). And they have been mooted as assisting countries leapfrog development stages 
(Fong, 2009; Steinmueller, 2001).     
However, this research has shown how it can be a challenge to incentivise citizens to 
engage and participate with digital technologies in some development projects.  One 
explanation proposed is that users have not seen evidence that using them will help to 
make a change to their lives.   
In contrast, results from a sample of projects that took part in this research show the 
power of traditional media to nurture this citizen engagement. An evaluation of the 
DFID-funded radio discussion programme, Sema Kenya, found that regular listeners 
and viewers of the show were significantly more likely to participate in politics 
frequently (34%) compared with those not exposed (21.5%) (Sema Kenya: Can a 
debate programmeme  increase people’s knowledge of democratic processes?, 2015).  
In a separate evaluation for the Tanzanian radio programme, they found “Haba na 
Haba contributed to people being more informed about and engaged in politics. 
Audiences were more knowledgeable about the key governance issues that mattered to 
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them, discussed these more with friends and family, and participated more in 
governance-related activities – all factors that support bottom-up accountability” 
(Bangapi et al., 2017:7). 
A further example is the Twaweza project ‘MiniBuzz’, a daily current affairs 
programme on TV with the goal of stimulating citizen debate among Tanzanians. Set 
in a dalla dalla (a commuter mini-bus), the programme aims to “stimulate agency by 
informing and providing space for exchange of views among citizens” (Wolff and 
Lipovsek, 2014).   
A report praised the show for its setup, which allows for a large variety of people, who 
usually do not express their opinions publicly, to share their thoughts on issues such as 
service delivery, quality of education, food prices and even traffic jams in Dar es 
Salaam (Wolff and Lipovsek, 2014).  
These types of TV and radio show are popular when trying to model behavior 
changes, especially empowerment.  They might empower citizens and encourage 
‘agency’ to demand their rights.   Wolff and Lipovsek argue “every day, millions of 
people watch that show, so imagine if every day you see ordinary people like yourself 
speak out and have an opinion, angry at the government or pleased with the 
government.  We think that if you see that every day, it will do something to your own 
psyche as well. At some point, you'll start feeling it normal that you can do that” 
(Wolff and Lipovsek, 2014).   
A study by Rath et al (2015) found that of the 13 million Tanzanians (or nearly half of 
those who watch TV regularly) who have seen Minibuzz, the majority watch it to get 
information on current topics or hear the views of ordinary citizens: 18% reported this 
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was the best part of the show (Rath et al., 2015).   The report found that “Twaweza’s 
programmes have ushered in innovative citizen agency around important social, 
economic and political issues of the day” (Rath et al., 2015:93).  De Graaf confirmed 
Twaweza now hope to make more impact with media partnerships such as these.    
What the evidence from this sample of media development projects illustrates is that 
digital technologies alone have limited success for engagement and participation in 
public accountability or governance projects, whereas traditional media platforms 
have shown to be successful for these goals. This points to why many organisations 
continue to use traditional media to achieve these same objectives.  
 
Theme 7: Traditional Media assistance methods remain relevant 
Stakeholders confirm there is a continuing need for journalism training and capacity building, 
but in a different format. 
Focusing on the non-technical aspects of media support interventions leads back to a 
central part of media development projects since their emergence decades ago as part 
of democracy support programmes.   A significant aspect of ‘democracy promotion’, 
media assistance has the objective of fostering ‘free and independent media’. Part of 
this process is to increase the skills of journalists and strengthen the capacity of media 
organisations. 
The topic of training in media development projects has received much criticism over 
recent years in evaluations of projects and strategies (Howard, 2003; Ognianova, 
1995; Rhodes and Lange, 2007; Skjerdal, 2011).  This is especially true in light of 
analyses of media development activities where “parachute professors” delivered 
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short, culturally insensitive and in the end, ineffective journalism training (Ognianova, 
1995). 
Hume coined the term “media missionaries” for the journalists and media workers who 
poured into the former Soviet Union (FSU) after the fall of the Berlin Wall “to spread 
the gospel of democracy…. some of America’s most altruistic journalists, who hoped 
to midwife a newly independent press” (Hume, 2004). 
Miller has criticised how “media assistance donors – project originators, designers and 
funders – conceive of their work in ideal terms as a kind of supra-political, even 
altruistic technology transfer. Exporting Western journalism as a means of 
establishing democracy, from this point of view, is hardly contentious; it is, instead, a 
gift, from the developed West to the ‘transitional’ or developing Rest” (Miller, 
2009:10)  
Eric Chinje, from African Media Initiative, spoke in interview about traditional media 
development training and how it “could go on forever with nothing really happening. I 
know that first hand because over two decades in the World Bank, I trained easily, 
easily 2500 reporters, easily. Every year I had anywhere between 200-300 and it went 
nowhere” (Chinje, 2015, in interview).   As Rolf Paasch said of Tanzanian journalists 
“they have been over-workshopped!” (Paasch, 2014, in interview).   
However, journalism training is still recommended in media development policy 
documents and during this research it was found that several of the interview 
participants supported training but in new and different formats.  Chapter 5 illustrated 
the enduring need for further professionalisation of the sector and support for 
journalists in Kenya and Tanzania. 
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Eric Chinje from AMI, Ernest Sungura from Tanzania Media Fund and Anthony 
Wafula from HIVOS all argued that journalism training and capacity building is still 
needed in the region. They stressed however that is has to be the right type of training 
and targeted at the right people. In the African Media Initiative project, Chinje 
envisaged a continent-wide network of mentors and trainers in speciality subjects 
which would have more impact than years and years of training individual journalists.   
John Okande from UNESCO believes this format would work better: “We need to do 
more mentorship, specialised mentorship on the critical elements”.   “Rushed training” 
was one of the leading causes of challenges amongst community radio stations. Radio 
agents admitted not being completely comfortable with the technologies, but did not 
communicate this due to lack of time” (Okande, 2015, in interview).  
Dickens Olewe supports a mentoring approach, “not necessarily just a seven day thing 
and then go back to your newsroom…..  that doesn’t work I think.. because it's a 
different eco-system” (Olewe, 2015, in interview). 
He suggested that embedding trainers and mentors in newsrooms is the way forward. 
“Something the Code4Africa did about two years ago, they sponsored a training 
fellow to be in the news room for six months.  Essentially you have your training but 
then you also have somebody seconded to follow you in the newsroom and to be a 
resource to help you with the stuff you have learnt and also to help at no cost..  His 
expenses are paid for by the sponsoring organisation and through that, you can 
hopefully start planting seeds of change” (Olewe, 2015, in interview). 
Elsie Eyakuze, a Tanzania Blogger and key informant, suggested that donors should 
“stick around and actually spend the money on quality, longevity and dependability 
rather than simply quantity and youth-centric stuff. Investing in media is investing in 
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the intellectual trust of a country, that’s not something done lightly” (Eyakuze, 2015, 
in interview). 
The data relating to the professionalisation of the journalism sphere in these countries, 
and presented in Chapter 5, shows that there is still much to be done and support 
needed.  There is always a need for impartial and reliable information.  As Howard 
argues “a reliable news media enables well-informed citizen decision making that, 
when freely exercised, in turn contributes to democratization” (Howard, 2003:8).  As 
noted in the literature review a strong fourth estate can support accountability and 
transparency. 
Siema Patterson from UNDP also admitted quietly that, despite the exuberance in 
Kenya with regards to ICTs and the sharp growth in mobile phones and citizen 
journalism, “at election time, Kenyans still turn to the BBC” (Patterson, 2015, in 
interview).   This suggests that citizens still want a trusted, reliable source of news to 
supplement their information requirements at these critical times. 
The data illustrated how data journalism training has been a successful media 
development intervention by Internews. As a result of Open Government partnerships, 
governments around the world have committed to making more data available to the 
public.   This has created opportunities for data integration into investigations, as 
journalists begin to bring data into their work.  Data journalism has proved to be a 
successful new media assistance method in which journalists will continue to need 
skills training in accessing, interpreting and re-visualising this data for the general 
public.  It illustrates how the traditional training model has adapted to the new digital 
environment. 
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Theme 8: The changing information ecosystem makes media assistance 
more relevant than ever 
Digitisation and fragmentation of media means that independent and reliable news platforms 
are more important than ever and these need donor support. 
 
This research has focused on digital technology and media assistance in the Sub-
Saharan region.  Throughout the research other interesting trends were revealed, in 
particular with regards to growth of traditional media outlets, which was noted by the 
stakeholders.  One of the by-products of a focus on new technologies and social media 
is not to fully appreciate what has been happening with traditional media in the same 
period. 
Notable changes have also occurred with traditional media over the last 5 or 10 years, 
which has grown in popularity in many parts of Africa, and elsewhere. In many 
settings, the number of radio and television stations, satellite television channels, 
commercial and community channels, and broadcast channels has multiplied.  As 
noted in Chapter 5, there are considerably more of them available to consumers now.  
This has created a competitive media market, and in some media markets (such as 
Kenya) these outlets are increasingly targeted at particular communities.  These can be 
linguistic or ethnic communities, factional or political communities. 
As a result, there has been a fragmentation of media, and a lot more media associated 
with particular entities and identities in society. This has some advantages because it 
has created a voice for communities who have never previously had a voice and now 
have a legitimate outlet for anger or grievance. They are now able to have a discussion 
in their own language and in their own community.   
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However, according to stakeholder James Deane, Policy Director from BBC Media 
Action, this can also lead to much more divisive politics, much more polarised 
political contexts, and it has spilled over into hate media.   This was evident in Kenya 
around the 2007/8 elections. 
Deane argues that these more fragmented media systems are “increasing political 
polarisation and driving greater extremism in society” (Deane, in interview, 2015).   In 
this thesis, the Case Study analysis revealed how in Kenya and Tanzania there has 
been an increasing corruption of media - political actors are increasingly buying up, 
taking over, and intimidating the media to advance their own interests.  Co-option of 
the media by narrow factional interests appears to be growing.  It is referred to as 
‘media capture’ (Schiffrin, 2017). 
Deane argues that “most of the media ... actually now doesn't exist to inform a public 
or enable a public debate or even hold power to account in the public interests. It 
exists to advance an agenda” (Deane, 2015, in interview).  
As a result, what has emerged is a much more crowded, complex and much more 
polarised set of media environments, and much more disaggregated information 
environments.  And as people become increasingly exposed only to information and 
opinion with which they already agree, the resulting “echo chamber” effect drives a 
process of so called ‘group polarisation’ (Sunstein, 2009).   
This is remarkably different to the media landscape of post-cold war Europe where 
media development first gained traction.   In the post-Cold War days when Media 
Development thrived, there was very little trust in government media. This is still the 
case and most state broadcasters are in trouble when it comes to trust.  Bussiek claims 
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a majority of citizens are dissatisfied with their national broadcasters and that “they 
lack credibility – perhaps the most important quality for any successful media” 
(Bussiek, 2016).  But, increasingly, so are a lot of commercial media (Moehler and 
Singh, 2011).   
Thus, what is becoming more urgent in such a fractured, polarised and politicised 
environment is a reliable source of information, a source that audiences can trust.  
Deane claims audiences “want something that they can trust and rely upon to 
triangulate all the other information they’re getting” (Deane, 2015, in interview). 
The need for reliable news sources and a platform for a national debate is especially 
valid in the context of countries in conflict or transition.  In countries like Kenya and 
Tanzania, which have many ethnic groups, often with tension “bubbling just below the 
surface” (O Neill, 2015), it is becoming especially important that there is a trusted 
platform for a national public conversation, which represents the views of the whole 
of society and reflects a range of views and political opinions.    
Putzel and Van der Zwan (2006) argue that in countries where there has been conflict, 
such as the post-election Kenya, there is a need for a national public platform through 
which people can argue out their differences, understand each other, and understand 
people who are very different from themselves ethnically, politically or religiously 
(Putzel and Van der Zwan, 2006).  However, as noted, media in these countries are 
often aligned with political and ethnic groups. 
Deane argues that “currently it is very difficult to see where that national public 
conversation would take place” (Deane, in interview, 2015).   Whether such national 
conversations can occur on social media or the virtual public sphere is questionable as 
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these spaces have been shown to create ‘echo chambers’ (Sunstein, 2009) and Fenton 
argues that social media “reinforces political fragmentation and inhibits solidarity 
among the disenfranchised” (Curran et al., 2016).   
 
Furthermore, Papacharissi maintains that the internet frequently fragmentises political 
discourse and risks “spinning them in different directions” (Papacharissi, 2002) and 
Gerhards & Schäfer suggest that internet technologies  “might actually silence societal 
debate" (Gerhards and Schäfer, 2010).   
In a report from the Centre for International Media Assistance, Abbott argued  
Contrary to the idea that digitization provides a panacea for all that’s wrong with 
media systems, many experts believe that what is fundamentally still needed across 
the world is better journalism, along with a means of ensuring that all people have 
access to fair, balanced and quality news and information (Abbott, 2016:6). 
 
As noted, interview participant Siema Patterson from UNDP revealed how most 
Kenyans “still turn to the BBC World Service” when it comes to election time in that 
country (Patterson, 2015, in interview).  Despite an increase in news outlets now 
available to them, new and old, they believe they can trust the information from this 
source.  This was reinforced in a survey on the value of the BBC's brand in Africa 
where the BBC was found to be the most admired media brand in the region (Shishkin, 
in email 2015). 
The evidence from this research suggests that the need for donor supported assistance 
for independent and impartial media, one which can reach the broad populace, provide 
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a platform for balanced and ‘rationale debate’ and has not been subject to ‘media 
capture’ (Schiffrin, 2017) is more urgent than ever.  Abbott questioned “whether 
commercial media systems alone can adequately provide for quality news and 
information with sufficient democratic value” (Abbott, 2016:6).    
As Nelson noted “although it is extremely important to stimulate innovative new 
platforms, it is at least as important to help trusted sources” (Nelson, 2012:22).   
 
Conclusion: The resilience of the traditional media assistance model 
When assessing the contribution that digital technology can make to media 
development goals, it is worthwhile to recap what the original motivations and aims of 
the sector are.  As covered in Chapter 1, media assistance programmes have 
historically focused on strengthening the media sector, promoting better governance 
through accountability and transparency and supporting a healthier public sphere.   
Support for these programmes is based on the presumption that these goals would 
create a healthier and stronger democracy (Kumar, 2006).    
Projects and activities work to improve standards and quality of journalism, and also 
assisting in the creation of regulatory and legal environments which provide an 
“enabling environment” for a free press. The objectives of the media development 
sector are varied but all focus on a more robust and plural media sector which can 
hold those in power to account.  
The primary focus of this thesis is whether media assistance is still relevant given 
the digital transformation in the media and communications environment.  In 
particular, it investigates at the impact of digital technologies on the relevance of 
media assistance in Kenya and Tanzania.  Have ICTs impacted on the practice of 
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media assistance in these countries?  And if not, what is the rationale for a continuing 
emphasis on traditional media methods? 
Analysing the data from this research has shown that although use of digital 
technologies is certainly growing in East Africa,  and have provided alternative 
platforms and avenues for news, media development organisations are not necessarily 
changing their practice to achieve donor goals.  Despite enthusiasm for the use of 
ICTs in development, this research found that digital divides still persist in Kenya and 
Tanzania and this impacts on the decision of what interventions are used in media 
support initiatives.  
This chapter analysed the reasons why digital technologies have not been effective in 
achieving donor objectives, such as citizen engagement, participation and 
accountability in Kenya and Tanzania.   It found that 
o For reaching young, urban based youth in the region with messaging for behaviour 
change, yes, digital technologies certainly have a role.  However, this group is not 
a majority in Kenya and Tanzania and there is still a digital divide. 
o For increasing citizen engagement for governance and accountability - long-time 
aims of the media development sector – ICTs have not yet proven themselves as 
effective tools to achieve these objectives.  The ICT4Accountability model is 
flawed. 
o Traditional ‘media development’ and ‘media for development’ approaches 
continue to be used to address donor objectives, including engaging citizens, and 
key stakeholders explained the rationale why this is the best approach 
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o For goals such as widening of the public sphere and providing platforms for broad 
national discourse, these are better addressed by a medium that can be accessed by 
all of the population: radio being the most prominent means of access. 
o The internet is not an ideal public sphere, and online spaces have increasingly 
become fragmented and fractured further limiting its role as a unifying platform 
for national and cross-ethnic discussion.   
 
The reasons for failures, or not using digital technologies, were discussed.  Engaging 
audiences and citizens using these ICTs is not straightforward.  The findings suggest 
that projects need to use traditional media or community outreach in conjunction with 
ICTs for more success. This is supported by research by Nairobi’s iHub, who found 
that using ICT tools for governance (or e-participation) is most effective in cases 
where low-cost and non-internet based methods and tools (such as radio and feature 
phones) are used, and in areas where forums exist for citizens to physically meet, then 
follow up on issues raised using ICTs (Sika et al., 2014).  
Citizens need to see the benefits of why they should use these technologies, and see 
the results of doing so.  In particular in Tanzania, citizens also need to feel empowered 
or they have ‘agency’ enough to assert their rights. 
As Rajani (2008) argues “citizen agency is not only the purpose – or the ends – of 
development and democracy, it is also its most effective means” (Rajani, 2008). 
The data from this research suggests that technology is not a ‘silver bullet’ for media 
development.  Colin Spurway from BBC Media Action in Tanzania suggests that 
donors should be “sceptical about pressures to use new technology” to achieve these 
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objectives “just because new technology is making such an impact on our rich western 
lives” (Spurway, 2015, interview).    
Spurway argues that when it comes to media development work, “it is important not 
to be distracted by the latest gimmick. If people are suddenly excited about Snapchat 
it doesn’t mean you got to go and do everything on Snapchat or WhatsApp.  We need 
to have a more stable perspective than to be that sort of reactive. And we have to be 
grounded in the realities of our audiences’ experience and not just our own” (Spurway, 
2014, in interview). 
It is for these reasons that more often than not media development organisations are 
continuing to use traditional approaches: training, capacity building, and production of 
relevant content, in particular supporting local news and strengthening platforms for 
national discussion.  
What this research thesis suggests is that the broad societal, political and cultural 
issues at play in citizen participation, accountability and good governance are not 
easily addressed with new digital technologies.   As noted by Nelson, “getting 
constructive outcomes for and from media systems requires thinking about media 
development more as a governance issue rather than a technical one” (Nelson, 2019)  
The themes outlined in this chapter indicate that media development interventions 
using traditional methods are certainly still relevant, and even perhaps underestimated, 
in the new technological information ecosystems. This shall be discussed further in 
the concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
In the context of considerable enthusiasm from global donors with regards to the 
potential of new technologies to answer development problems, this thesis has posed 
the question as well as tested the proposition that Media Assistance is obsolete.  
Examining the changes, if any, that have followed through to media development 
projects in practice, the research has investigated whether the methods and approaches 
of the Media Assistance sector are still relevant in an increasingly connected 
technological global information system.    
The thesis began with a discussion of the changing environment in which Media 
Assistance now takes place.  Donor priorities have changed since media assistance 
emerged, as has the geo-political landscape in which it takes place.  In post-Cold War 
Europe, media assistance was seen as central to democracy building and establishing 
free market societies.  More recently, with the crisis in western journalism as a result 
of the failing business model and pressure from online news, the model which media 
assistance promotes as a template has been called into question.   But in an 
environment of ‘disordered information’ and fragmentation of media, this research 
argues that media assistance can continue to play an important role. 
Despite narratives of ‘Africa rising’, ‘Silicon Savannah’ and unchecked optimism 
about ICTs and African development, this research finds there is currently limited 
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application of digital technologies in media development work in the region. This is in 
line with research by Kalathil (2017) who found that “overall, despite the advent of 
digital media and the multitude of changes wrought within the global media 
landscape, the priorities of broad media development assistance seem to have shifted 
only marginally” (Kalathail, 2017). 
This chapter, the Conclusion, will draw together the context, theoretical background 
and significance of the research and conclude its assessment on whether media 
assistance is still relevant in the current technological information ecosystem.   
 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework for this study draws on theories concerning the role of 
media in society and how media is related to development.  The media development 
sector is founded on a Theory of Change based on related theoretical positions 
regarding the role of journalism and a free press in accountability and transparency, 
participation in the public sphere and in democracy.  The study also critically assessed 
the theories of change related to ICT for Development and this was evaluated 
throughout the research. 
In Chapter One the media development theory of change was outlined and this model 
draws on theories that were evaluated in the Literature review. The model, which is 
based on Western liberal model of the press, suggests a fourth estate, which is free and 
independent, will contribute positively to democracy.  
This theoretical framework is based on the evidence of how an independent media, 
which produces reliable and trustworthy information, can contribute positively to a 
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democracy, through its role as watchdog, as agenda setter and as a platform for 
discussion (Norris, 2008).   
 The media development theory of change is also based on theories of the public 
sphere as advanced by Habermas, whereby, by means of the media, populations of a 
country can fulfil their roles as citizens by participating in the public sphere, hold 
leaders to account and influence how their country is governed.  Much media 
development work is based on this framework which reflects the importance of 
political public dialogue and assumes that by strengthening the public sphere, it will 
lead to greater debate, deliberation and discussion across society about important 
issues. This is the rationale by which donors have used media assistance as a tool to 
address participation, transparency and governance objectives. 
Therefore, media assistance methods and activities, such as those outlined here 
throughout the study, are presumed to contribute to a stronger media sector, a 
strengthened fourth estate and an enhanced public sphere. These in turn contribute to 
more reliable information being available for citizens, further educating them about 
issues relevant to them and stimulating discussion which can empower citizens to hold 
those in power to account.  This process will, in theory, result in increased 
participation in public life, improved accountability and thus better governance.  
However, there are flaws in this theoretical framework, which have been discussed 
throughout the study. One is whether the media in many settings today can be 
considered truly independent. As noted in the country profile chapters, the media in 
both Kenya and Tanzania are not considered independent, are owned and controlled in 
the main by politicians and businessmen, and these are used to promote their owners’ 
agendas, whether business, political or electoral aspirations.   
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In this thesis, Chapters 5, which presented a Case Study analysis, revealed how in 
Kenya and Tanzania there has been an increasing corruption of media - political actors 
are increasingly buying up, taking over, and intimidating the media to advance their 
own interests.  Co-option of the media by factional interests appears to be growing 
and is referred to as “media capture” (Schiffrin, 2017; Powell, 2017).  In these 
countries, it was also noted how ethnic and tribal conflicts are played out through the 
media.   
Under these circumstances, where owners control and influence the agenda of the 
media, it is difficult for journalists to carry out impartial and unbiased reporting, as it 
is taught in media assistance programmes. Thus, regardless of how good these 
capacity-strengthening programmes are, when journalists are working under challenge 
of media control, self-censorship and sometimes intimidation, it is difficult to 
implement and undertake the role of watchdog, and fulfil this democratic role.   
Another problem with the theoretical framework for media development assistance is 
that it is difficult to define what development is. As noted in the Chapter 3, 
“developed” can mean different outcomes for different donors.  For instance, the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) focuses on 17 goals which include gender 
balance, migrant issues and climate change.   
And, how does one define when a country is finally “developed”? One criticism of 
media development is that it remains closely allied to the “modernization” paradigm 
of development, the idea that the underdeveloped could be ‘developed’ through the 
transfer of particular technologies (Lerner 1958; Shcrammb1964; Rogers 1962).  As 
noted, Rogers proposed that media could be a ‘magic multiplier’ for development by 
fostering transmission of messages between the developers and ‘developees’ (Berger, 
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2005:3-4), irrespective of the impact that this would have on local cultures. Reid-
Henry called this “the replacement of traditional poverty by a more modern form of 
misery” (Reid-Henry, 2012).   
Furthermore, modernisation theory has been criticised for using western-style political 
and social institutions as indicators of progress. For instance, according to this theory, 
and the media development theory, “local media were expected to emulate Western 
patterns of behaviour and contribute to the construction of democracy” (Miller, 
2009:10).   
The media development theory of change is based on western liberal ideas of the press 
and this model promotes a privately-owned press.  As Jacobson argues media 
development theory of change “embodies a set of normative values concerning what 
journalism has to offer Western-style political systems” (Jacobson, 2019:191). 
The theory does not take into account local cultures and contexts nor how 
understanding of concepts of impartiality or objectivity can change depending on the 
“developee” (Berger, 2010:550).  Nyamnjoh (2005) argued that western media 
programmes, instead of acknowledging local conditions, required that ‘aspiring 
journalists in Africa must, like containers, be dewatered of the mud and dirt of culture 
as tradition and custom, and filled afresh with the tested sparkles of culture as 
modernity and civilization’ (Nyamnjoh, 2005:3).  Shaw outlined that that “the African 
model of journalism lays emphasis on the community (civil society), or communities 
(civil societies), the Western Liberal model emphasises the individual” (Shaw, 
2009:20). 
Furthermore, Skjerdal offers that “libertarian discourse assumes an exclusivist view of 
the journalism profession where the media constitute a clear-cut fourth estate and 
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journalists accordingly make up a fraternity distinct from other societal communities. 
In contrast, African journalism models are strong in their belief that social and cultural 
identity comes prior to professional identity” (Skjerdal, 2012:648).   
As outlined by LaMay (2008), “exporting press freedom” is a complex endeavour and 
has been a complicated and not altogether successful process for many media 
assistance programmes in the past decades.   
More recently, media development programmes have acknowledged the flaws within 
the model and are more rooted in local communities and consultation with 
“developees” (Berger, 2010:550). 
Thus, the media development theory of change is not without its shortcomings.  In fact 
Noske-Turner argues that “few media assistance evaluations manage to provide sound 
evidence of impacts on governance and social change” (Noske-Turner, 2014).  And 
Schiffrin and Zuckerman argue that “the multitude of variables that affect any process 
of social change makes it hard to isolate—let alone measure—the impact of 
journalistic efforts” (Schiffrin and Zuckerman, 2015). 
Abbott offers that, when it comes to media development, there are many “unique 
challenges” for “selecting a research framework or methodology to assess impact. One 
reason for this is media development constitutes a vast range of activities, programs 
and types of support” (Abbott, 2019:48).  In fact, she questions “whether there is a 
measurable theory of media development and one that is evaluable” (Abbott, 
2019:42).    
At the same time as critically reviewing the theoretical framework on which the media 
assistance sector is founded, this thesis has also tested the ICT for development 
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framework.  This theoretical framework assumes that ICTs can contribute positively 
to the same development goals as the media assistance sector.  The narrative in 
western media in past years has reflected a cyber-utopian approach to development 
and democracy with regards to what mobile phones and the internet can do for the 
continent of Africa.  The objectives of the ICT4Development sector often overlap 
with those of the media development sector – that is, citizen engagement, 
transparency, accountability and governance.   
Zanello and Maassen (2011) confirmed that since the late 1990s, the prospect of using 
ICT to improve accountability, transparency and effectiveness of authorities has 
attracted much optimism (Zanello and Maassen, 2011).  The opening up of new online 
public spaces, potentially accessible by all, has resulted in assumptions about 
increasing participation and accountability in the democratic sphere of a country.  
Techno-optimists such as Negroponte, Sachs and Diamond talk of “liberation 
technologies” and proclaim a new democratic space has been created that can be 
accessed by all which “will increase the political influence of ordinary citizens” 
(Graham, 1999:79).  
But this has not necessarily occurred.   
The flaws with this model have been discussed: The internet may provide an 
additional space for political deliberation, but its role in extending the public sphere is 
limited because of its fragmented nature, inequalities in access, uncertainty regarding 
validity of information and the phenomenon of echo chambers. For instance, Polat 
(2005) argued that the internet does not offer much for extending the public sphere or 
providing an alternative virtual public sphere because the internet is not universally 
accessible by everyone.   Dahlberg argues that online discourse is overall too 
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fragmented and decentralised for a public sphere: “online deliberation appears to take 
pace among like-minded people which results in a fragmentation of cyber-discourse 
into mutually exclusive cyber-communities” (Dahlberg, 2001:618).  Papacharissi 
suggests that the electronic public sphere is “exclusive, elitist and far from ideal” 
(Papacharissi, 2002:14).   
This research illustrates that ICTs are not necessarily the best tools to achieve 
development goals and engagement with them has been disappointing.  
A complication with both these frameworks - the media development model and the 
ICT for development model - which was highlighted in the study is the assumption 
that end users of these programmes will act as expected. With some ICT projects end 
users did not engage or use the technology as presumed.  
 
 
355 
 
 
Figure 15. The ICT4Development Theory of Change and the Media Development Theory of Change 
are often working towards the same development goals and this is the framework on which this 
research is based.  
 
This challenge was illustrated with the ICT4Accountability projects presented in this 
study.  The assumption with those projects is that “technological interventions are 
almost sufficient unto themselves [and that they] set into motion social forces and 
reactions that result in increased accountability and responsiveness” (Myers, 2013:25). 
But the data shows how end-users, audiences and citizens do not necessarily behave in 
the ways assumed in these theories of change.  This can be as a result of a range or 
reasons including apathy, or disillusionment with the political system, and lack of 
belief that their actions will produce change.  
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The same could be said with traditional media assistance programmes - even if 
citizens have more information and better information available to them, they may not 
use this in activities that progresses better transparency or governance or results in 
‘development’.  
Zuckerman and Schiffrin (2015) note that “just because journalists have exposed 
people to information doesn’t mean that people will take action or demand policy 
changes in response to that information” (Schiffrin and Zuckerman, 2015). 
This research evaluated two interrelated theoretical frameworks which are based on 
theories of media, public sphere, development and ICTs in Development.   It finds that 
despite techno-deterministic claims of the potential of ICTs in development, in fact 
traditional media assistance methods (i.e. strengthening the institutions of traditional 
mass media) are still more relevant in this sample of projects and can make a positive 
contribution towards achieving development goals.   
The theoretical framework and the theory of change on which media assistance is 
founded, although not perfect, remain valid in the context of this research.  
 
 
Empirical Findings 
The main findings were presented and analysed within Chapters 6 and 7 and are 
summarised below in response to the research question: Is Media Assistance obsolete?   
Specifically, the research asks:  have digital technologies impacted on the relevance 
of media assistance in the chosen case study countries? (RQ2) 
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To answer this, the research investigated, through a process of practitioner-based 
studies, a series of sub-questions, which will be dealt with in this section: 
 
What are the characteristics of the current media and information environment 
in the selected case studies of Kenya and Tanzania? (RQ 2a) 
The research showed the extent of change in media in Kenya and Tanzania as a result 
of use of mobile phones and new digital technologies, as this will impact the uptake of 
these tools in media development work.  Arguably, radical changes in the media 
systems and audience habits in these countries will have an impact on the 
interventions needed and the practice of media development in those countries.   The 
research illustrated, through primary and secondary data, how the media landscapes 
and media sector have changed in the case study countries as a result of digitisation.  
The data revealed that the information ecosystem in Kenya and Tanzania have 
changed considerably in recent years, in particular with the introduction of mobile 
phones and social media applications. There has been notable growth in citizen 
journalism and a convergence of new and older media with radio and mobile phones.  
The data illustrated how the growth and penetration of digital technologies has 
provided important access to alternative news sources and online fora such as Twitter 
and Facebook have widened the public space for discussion for the citizens of Kenya 
and Tanzania.   
This is particularly important for areas not served by traditional media outlets.  Citizen 
journalism platforms such as HiviSasa have provided essential new sources of news 
for rural audiences, relevant to the populations who are not served by a Nairobi-
centred and Dar-centred news agenda. 
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However, in the case study countries, issues related to the digital divide limit the 
extent to which this has broadened the public sphere and access to trusted, quality 
information.  Problems such as cost, location, electricity, gender and education limit 
uptake of newer digital media amongst the wider populations of Kenya and Tanzania.  
Use of these platforms is often limited to urban populations and not rural populations.  
There are also problems of a gender digital divide as well as the urban-rural split, or 
“dual narrative”, when it comes to experiencing the benefits of newer technology. 
Moreover, it was noted that digital technologies could even be widening the digital 
divide in some countries.  Alzouma found that newer forms of media can be 
“intimidating technology which can contribute to widening the gap between those 
who possess everything and those who do not”  (Alzouma, 2005:352). 
Therefore, despite growth in these technologies, in particular the mobile phone, the 
most popular medium remains the radio, which can be accessed by the broad 
population.  
The study then investigated what these aforementioned changes in the information 
ecosystems of Kenya and Tanzania mean for the media development sector. Are 
Media development NGOs using digital technologies in their projects along with, or in 
place of, traditional media?   
 
What are the characteristics of current media development practice in a modern 
East African context? (RQ 2b) 
To address this question, the thesis interviewed key stakeholders undertaking projects 
in Kenya and Tanzania and through face to face interviews learnt whether they are 
now employing digital technologies in their media development projects.  This 
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enabled the research to get the perspective of those working in practice as to whether 
digital technologies are relevant for donor objectives. 
Chapter Six documented the findings relating to projects being undertaken in Kenya 
and Tanzania at the time of the fieldwork. The project data examined the objectives of 
each of these projects is including the methods with which the project and 
organisations address these objectives; the extent of their use of ICTs in these 
projects; and the outcome in relation to their projects activities.  
The data illustrated that Media Development Organisations are not using digital 
technologies to a great extent in their programmes in this region. Media Capacity 
projects attest to using them only peripherally.   Media sector reform and capacity 
building projects such as those undertaken by Tanzanian Media Fund, African Media 
Initiative and Kenyan Media Programme attested to limited or no use for digital media 
in their programmes. 
The larger “hybrid” projects still use traditional media to reach wider target groups, 
with digital technologies as “add-ons” or “future-proofing”.  This was evidenced with 
the BBC Media Action capacity building and content creation projects.  
On the positive side, successes were discovered with regards to use of digital 
technology in the area of Data Journalism, which is linked to recent Open Government 
policies in the region and more data becoming available to the public. Internews have 
shown success in this area.   
The convergence of radio with mobile phones, enabling two-way communications, 
chat shows and debates were successful activities in terms of achieving participation 
in the public sphere using digital technologies.  UNESCO and Farm Radio had 
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success in this regard with their Participatory Radio initiatives.  Thus, mobile phones 
are offering new and exciting opportunities for audiences to participate in radio 
broadcasting and on-air debates (Allen and Gagliardone, 2011).   
Successes using digital technologies and apps were also found where the target 
audiences of communication plans focused on youth and in urban areas (with Well 
Told Story projects for instance). However, these were more in media for 
development and behaviour change projects as opposed to media sector assistance 
projects. 
The data also revealed limited success using digital technologies in projects where 
participation in the new public space was expected for objectives such as service 
reporting and accountability. Twaweza’s Daraja project was presented as an example 
of problematic use of digital technologies for citizen engagement and accountability. 
 
Have ICTs impacted on the practice of media assistance in the chosen case 
studies? (RQ 2c) 
The results show that use of new digital technologies in media development projects is 
(currently) limited. This implies that they are not necessarily the right tools for 
achieving donor media development objectives.  For the most part, use of traditional 
media continues to be favoured to achieve media development objectives with this 
sample of Media Development Organisations.   Explanations for this are related to the 
issues such as the digital divide and how technology use is for the most part limited to 
urban centres, as noted above. 
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What was noted in relation to use of digital technologies in media development projects 
is the significance of project objectives.  And as illustrated by data in the Chapter 5, the 
present-day needs of the media systems of Kenya and Tanzania include the creation of 
local news and content, professionalising the journalism sector, platforms that hold 
government accountable and the safety of journalists.   
The Media Development sector focuses on strengthening and improving the capacity 
of the media sector, but additionally, according to one leading advocate and 
practitioner, the objective is ‘reach’ (Deane, 2015, in interview) 89 . This means 
reaching those audiences who cannot easily access reliable information or news that 
might improve their lives.  
These groups are often the poor, the marginalised, women, or ethnic minorities. The 
reason they need access to donor supported media might be to get access to better 
information relating to food security, humanitarian assistance, information relevant for 
elections or to give them access to a public platform.  
Thus, Media Development projects needs to engage with, or reach, these groups by 
the means and medium that are most appropriate to them in their current setting.  It is 
for this reason that the media development projects in this study remain committed to 
using traditional media to achieve their project objectives, according to key informants 
working in practice. 
Consequently, digital technologies are not considered core to media development 
activity at this time.  These technologies are certainly revolutionising the information 
landscape and citizen journalism provides an important source of news for citizens of 
 
89 James Deane in interview 2015 
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Kenya and Tanzania. But digital technologies currently offer limited advantages over 
traditional media for the principal goals for media development in Kenya and 
Tanzania. 
As Deane from BBC Media Action notes: “I haven't actually seen a tremendous 
amount of compelling evidence of how those projects that have specifically privileged 
the use of social media or new technologies to achieve objectives in and of 
themselves, having some unique advantage” (Deane, in interview 2015).  
 
What is the rationale for a continuing emphasis on traditional media methods? 
(RQ 2d) 
By examining the sample of media assistance projects, the research provides a counter 
narrative to the techno-optimism in relation to use of digital technologies for 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Indeed, the data shows relatively low utilisation 
of ICTs in the sample of projects reviewed. 
The process and mechanisms by which citizens engage and participate using digital 
technologies were revealed.  What was found is that dissemination and diffusion of 
digital technologies, such as mobile phones and social media platforms, is widespread 
(but not equal) in Kenya and Tanzania but this is not enough to guarantee increased 
participation and engagement. Digital technologies and social media are not 
necessarily used in the ways assumed. Thus, the potential for these technologies to 
achieve goals such as participation, governance and a more equitable public sphere 
has not necessarily been realised in the way the cyber-optimist narrative envisages.   
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For engaging citizens, and for public discussion and debate, traditional media remains 
an appealing and relevant platform and evidence from projects has demonstrated 
effectiveness. 
Media Development interventions are based on thorough research of media systems 
and audiences and for the most part the organisations participating in this research 
deemed traditional media a more appropriate route to achieve their donor objectives.   
This study showed that those projects more focused on media sector reform attested to 
limited use or uptake in new technologies in their programmes.  Their focus continued 
to be on traditional capacity building or production training, and creating spaces for 
public discussion.  
Additionally, the target audiences of media for development projects in Kenya and 
Tanzania (often rural populations) are not using mobile phones in an advanced way 
beyond calling and texting, and media development programmes need to take this into 
account.  
While projects are being “future-proofed”, the radical impact of newer forms of digital 
media has yet to be felt for many populations of sub-Saharan Africa that media 
development projects work with.  The sample of media development organisations 
surveyed in this study reflects this.  
This research has found that despite theoretical frameworks relating to digital 
technologies, such as the ICT4Accountability model, assuming increased participation 
by citizens of these countries, these technologies have not been shown to be 
necessarily more effective than traditional media for achieving goals such as 
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transparency, accountability and engagement.  In the data from this research, this 
model was shown to be problematic. 
Regardless of innovation and the growth of the tech-industry, the most popular mobile 
service currently is the money transfer service, M-Pesa.   M-Pesa is a branchless 
banking service, designed to enable users to complete basic banking transactions 
without the need to visit a bank branch.  Its success has been attributed to the fact that 
it is free, simple to use, and a practical means to address a critical, previously 
unfulfilled need in Kenya – banking without having to go to a bank.   
This illustrates how the most successful application of technology in the region is one 
that can be used by the broad populace, is easy to use, does not require high standards 
of literacy and is accessible in both urban and rural areas.  As key informant Kees De 
Graaf from Twaweza noted: “there's very little technology that, with all its promises, 
has made a real big difference in ... on top of just being able to talk to each other on 
the phone (Graaf, 2015, in interview).   
Therefore, in spite of what is often reported about the proliferation of technology use 
in this region of Africa - and the possible advantages that it can offer for governance 
and development - in practice, digital technologies have limited success in achieving 
media development goals, according to the sample in this research.    
Undoubtedly, mobile phones and the internet have had huge social and economic 
impact for the citizens of Kenya and Tanzania (and elsewhere) but the political impact 
has not been as significant.  Tettey confirms that even though “a lot more people are 
getting a lot more information”, this does not translate into a “significant expansion in 
the numbers and categories of those who engage in, and hence influence, the direction 
of politics on the continent” (Tettey, 2001:153).   
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These findings need to be considered when approaching donor policy and 
development goals relating to good governance and accountability in this region.  
 
Contribution to knowledge 
This current work offers a new perspective and understanding of the field of media 
assistance.  Geertsema-Singh (2019) notes that to date there has been little scholarly 
research in the area of media assistance and that there is “almost no research on NGOs 
and media assistance” (Geertsema-Singh, 2019:2440).  This research thesis provides a 
critical review of media assistance’ evolution to date and contextualises it in the 
current ‘new’ media environment.  The study presents evidence for the positive 
contribution that traditional media can continue make to development when digital 
tools are being viewed as an alternative.  It provides a fresh appreciation for 
traditional media assistance methods in an environment where digital technologies are 
assumed to provide solutions to a range of development problems.   
The significance of the findings in this research is that they counter the dominant 
techno-deterministic narrative with regards to ICTs in development. This will 
hopefully counteract some of the hype for technology and support an evidence-based 
approach that is grounded in the realities of how people use and assimilate 
technologies into their lives.   
Whilst there are academic works which assess the impact of digital technologies on 
journalism, on media, on society and on development, this research reveals the impact 
of these technologies of media development in practice.  It is a practitioner focused 
study with real world informants providing an industry perspective on the issues of 
media development assistance.    This thesis adds to the body of literature in that it 
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reveals the crossover of Media Development Assistance and ICTs in its current, 
applied working environment. 
The research builds on previous academic work in the fields of journalism, media, 
development and democracy, and brings a practical perspective to the role of media 
assistance in the current technological era.  Despite the techno-optimistic view of 
development, this research has revealed the continuing importance of traditional 
methods of support for media interventions in development.   
The events around the Arab Spring created excitement and optimism about social 
media and what it could do for political change but the subsequent events in the region 
show how complex this link is.  The results of this research imply that theoretical 
frameworks such as the ICT for Accountability model are simplistic and the 
relationship is not linear.  
Media Assistance operates in a complex ecosystem. As highlighted in the Media 
Development Theory of Change (Figure 2), media development operates on several 
levels of influence:  populations and citizens; journalists and producers; media and 
academic organisations and the ultimate aim is to create change on a societal level and 
a political level.  As Stremlau notes “media assistance is highly political and is, in 
itself, a form of political engineering” (Stremlau, 2019:69). 
It has been difficult to agree a successful working model for media assistance for 
precisely this reason.   
In Media Assistance the process of change is not linear, in particular when trying to 
create positive change on several levels. There are many challenges to creating 
independent, free and unfettered press for development ends. But there are also 
367 
 
complexities for using technologies to these ends. This thesis provides an evidence-
based account that reflects this.  
 
What was also noted in the research, and supported by the data, was the growth in the 
“hybrid model” of media assistance. This is the merging of ‘media sector support’ and 
‘media for development’ approaches.   
This is a noteworthy contribution to the story of media assistance, how it has evolved 
to take account of the local needs of media projects. The data from this research 
supports the case for Scotts’ “hybrid model” (Scott, 2014) and underscores how the 
model for media assistance changes to take account of local media needs, local 
audience habits, donor project objectives – what is known by practitioners as a ‘needs 
analysis’.   
The data illustrated that in an East African context, media development practice often 
takes this hybrid form.   Within the sample of NGOs which participated in this 
research, very few were focused solely on media sector support or reform.  Within the 
sample, there were several projects which had media for development activities but 
which also contained elements of capacity building or training as captured in the 
notion of the ‘media development hybrid’ (Scott, 2014).   
Kumar (2009) noted in his book One Size does not fit all that the international 
community should tailor media assistance to meet the unique needs of the societies 
being helped. He notes:  
If one looks at the history of media assistance during the past two decades, one finds that 
policymakers and media practitioners have fashioned media interventions that take into 
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consideration the distinctive social and political structures of a country and its level of 
economic development, which affect the nature of political openings (Kumar, 2009).  
 
This research study emphasises how the media assistance model is a responsive 
model, and the project data from this research reflects that model.  Media Assistance 
continues to evolve in this complex technological infosystem. Perhaps that is why is 
has been difficult for the media assistance sector to agree on a final working model 
that fits all interventions.  
 
Policy Implications 
The outcomes of this investigation help frame the relevance of media assistance in the 
current information system. With the swift penetration of digital technologies such as 
mobile phones and social media as information sources, and with global citizens 
getting access to news and information at any time, the possibility that media 
assistance could be become obsolete is a real one.   
Public Service Media 
The previous chapter discussed the problem of increasingly polarised and political 
media environments.   The effect that these fractured and fragmented media 
environments have on politics is topical.  This subject has risen up the agenda with the 
rise of populist governments, including the election to the presidency of Donald 
Trump in the USA.  There is a growing awareness amongst global audiences of terms 
such as “fake news” (or “information disorder”) (Wardle and Derakhshan, 2017),  of 
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online hate speech, internet trolls and even the negative effect social media can have 
on mental health of users (Shakya and Christakis, 2017).  
One media development practitioner notes “the tech optimism offered by the US West 
Coast digital giants and the democratic energy of the Arab Uprisings so quickly 
turn[ed] to information-powered factionalism, confusion and hate” (Deane, 2019).   
As discussed throughout the study, there has been an expansion of the public sphere in 
developing countries in recent years.  Most of this has been seen as positive for 
democracy. But due to media’s increasing fragmentation and polarisation and co-
option of media in particular interests, there is now a need for more trusted, balanced 
sources of information.   
A possible solution to these fragmented media environments and a possible response 
from the media development sector in Sub Saharan Africa is to focus on strengthening 
national broadcasters or Public Service Broadcasting.  In a report called Rethinking 
Public Service Broadcasting, Abbott urged “international donors who support the 
development of free and independent media around the world would be well-served to 
pay attention to the role – and the potential – of public service broadcasting” (Abbott, 
2016:1).  She suggests that “PSB has a huge effect on social cohesion, democratic 
understanding and social development” (Abbott, 2016).   
 
The lack of trusted sources of information that people consider to be credible and 
reliable, and the lack of platforms for public debate means the importance of national, 
as well as local, public service broadcasting has become important again.   
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Support for public service broadcasting has long been part of the range of Media 
Development interventions that donors can support.  The review of literature noted 
that early examples of such support were led by Allied forces in Germany during the 
Marshall plan in the aftermath of the Second World War.  Foreign aid was used to 
create what are now “arguably … most successful examples of PSB in the world – 
Germany’s ARD and ZDF” (Abbott, 2016:10).   
Lublinski argues that that media development should focus on transformation of state 
departments of information as well as state broadcasters into public broadcasters 
(Lublinski et al., 2014).  However as noted by Harding (2015) “most state 
broadcasters are little more than government propaganda machines owned and 
controlled by the government. They are widely distrusted by large sections of the 
population” (Harding, 2015:8). 
Nevertheless, Bussiek notes that in particular in Africa: 
As things stand, only national, state-controlled broadcasters have the potential to 
provide news, education and entertainment to the broad majority of the population in 
most countries in Africa. They dominate radio and TV services in all aspects: with 
regard to technical reach, diversity of languages and popularity in terms of audience 
ratings (Bussiek, 2016) 
And Simon Derry, Regional Director for Africa and the Middle East at BBC Media 
Action notes that the “behemoth state broadcaster… is becoming increasingly 
irrelevant, and unless they are reformed they are going to die” (Harding, 2015:8) 
The implication is that donor support for public service broadcasting or public interest 
media could take a place higher up the agenda again.  Deane refers to “public interest 
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institutions capable of generating journalism and other media content capable of 
underpinning informed public debate” (Deane, 2018).  
Certainly, the need for reliable information and a public sphere where ‘rational 
debate’ can occur seems more important than ever.  As Papacharissi argued, just 
because a virtual space has been created, this does not mean it is a democratic one -  
“a virtual space enhances discussion; a virtual sphere enhances democracy” 
(Papacharissi, 2002:11). 
It may seem ironic that when public service broadcasting is on the retreat in western 
societies it is the subject of donor support.  In some countries, governments have in 
fact cut funding for public broadcasters saying licence fees are too high and that they 
represent too great an interference in the operations of the free market.  In 2018, the 
UK government insisted the BBC take over the funding of free licence fees for those 
over 75 years of age and the BBC has faced considerable unpopularity from making 
pensioners pay the licence fee.  In the case of DK, the Danish public service 
broadcaster, a 20 per cent budget cut imposed by the Danish government led to the 
closure of three of the organisation’s six television stations plus three radio stations.  
The Irish broadcaster, RTE, has been forced to sell off land and cut some 
programming in an effort to remain viable. 
However, the research suggests that in this current political environment, where 
information spaces are vulnerable to manipulation and distortion, and public debate is 
subject to polarisation and echo chamber effects, that this could be an important 
avenue of support for media assistance.   Canadian academic, Mark Starowicz, argues 
“public broadcasting institutions are even more crucial today as we see the 
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disappearance of public space and the atomization of audiences into special interest 
constituencies” (Starowicz, 2000). 
Harding (2015) argues that public service media have special characteristics relevant 
in particular to divided societies. These media can contribute to social cohesion and 
political stability where much of the rest of the media (both traditional and social) may 
be fragmented along factional, religious, ethnic or other lines.  He maintains that 
public service media “can help people in divided societies to find common cause with 
each other, enabling them to transcend the politics of identity to rebuild their often 
fractured nations” (Harding, 2015). 
For citizens of Kenya and Tanzania, access to information that people can trust, that 
supports informed democratic debate, and can hold power to account would be a 
valuable addition to the media landscape. But the survival of public interest media will 
need donor support.  As Abbot argues “capture of the private media means that simple 
privatization is not a cure-all for creating a diverse media sector that promotes a 
variety of views and opinions” (Abbott, 2016:1).   
This does not have to be done exclusive of newer technologies however.  For 
example, some of the social media platforms that BBC Media Action have supported 
are playing the same role as a public service broadcaster:  The long running Al Mirbad 
radio station in Iraq (which it helped to establish in 2005) now has almost 1.4 million 
followers on Facebook and 1.8 million subscribers on YouTube. 
The process of reforming state broadcasters is not easy however, and requires the buy-
in of the political class. There have been efforts in the past to transform the Tanzanian 
State broadcaster, TBC, but this programme was stopped after the 2010 elections, 
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when the government there interfered in the reform project. However, reforming state 
broadcasters is still seen as a worthwhile endeavour and in recent years there have 
been extensive reform projects launched in more than 25 countries (Harding, 2015). 
Values 
The research also has implications for the UN Sustainable Development Goals90.  The 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) suggest ways in which independent, 
professional, diverse and pluralist media can contribute to development.  Key SDG 
targets that are relevant for media include: 
 16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels 
 16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representation decision-
making at all levels 
 16.8 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms 
Goal 16 centres on peace, justice and strong institutions and the UN states that 
“without peace, stability, human rights, and effective governance based on the rule of 
law we cannot hope for sustainable development”.  The UN suggests that independent 
and professional media sectors have the potential to be actors for peace and 
development through:  
 avoiding and reducing the spread of hate speech and disinformation leading to 
violence;  
 providing conflict-sensitive reporting, informing on root-causes of conflicts 
and peaceful solutions;  
 
90 The Sustainable Development Goals are a collection of 17 global goals set by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 2015 for the year 2030.   
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 offering a platform for dialogue and, as a trusted infomediary, supporting 
broad-based social cohesion, rather than being a vehicle for reinforcing 
identity politics.   
These are themes that were noted throughout the thesis and this research suggests that 
traditional media assistance approaches have a role in contributing to these 
development goals.   The implications for media development practice are that donor 
interventions should focus on strengthening communities against these threats.   
This research noted the technological and financial forces that are creating difficult 
challenges to journalism’s traditional values, and this impacts on media assistance.  
However, perhaps it is more important than ever to return to these values.  Richard 
Sambrook, Professor of Journalism and Director of the Centre for Journalism at 
Cardiff School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies, maintains: 
Over the past few years, traditional broadcasting and traditional newspapers looked 
rather old fashioned and tired compared to the energy, vibrancy and enthusiasm of 
social media. But after a few years, we have now reached the stage where people are 
actually saying that some of the ethics, the processes, the traditions and values of 
traditional journalism still do matter. (Sambrook, 2012) 
 
The literature revealed the challenges with exporting a Western journalism model in 
Media Assistance programmes and how there may not be a universal model that can 
be imposed by western journalism trainers - this should be inculcated naturally and 
emerge organically.  
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But there are values, as opposed to practices, that are universal for journalism that 
could contribute to social-cohesion and reducing conflict that are core to the 
Sustainable Development Goals.   
For instance, Kovach and Rosential argue in The Elements of Journalism that the 
purpose of journalism is “to provide people with the information they need to be free 
and self-governing” (Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2014:12).  They maintain that the 
essential elements of journalism are as follows:  its first obligation is to tell the truth; 
its first loyalty is to citizens;  its essence is a discipline of verification; its practitioners 
must maintain an independence from those they cover; it must serve as an independent 
monitor of power; and it must provide a forum for public criticism and compromise 
(Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2014). 
The authors of course represent a western perspective of journalism, but media 
assistance was founded on these principles of the press as a trusted source information 
and a check on those in power.  These core values must still be taught but could be 
done to reflect African or other cultures where it is carried out.  In addition, media 
trainers could transfer an understanding of what media can do for communities and to 
strengthen communities.   
This thesis investigates the uptake and relevance of digital technologies to media 
assistance. However, what is notable with regards to the environment in which media 
assistance currently takes place is not just the technological changes but political 
changes and especially polarisation of politics. Media has been fragmented and 
fractured but so have communities.    
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In his reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, Benedict Anderson referred 
to “imagined communities” in the sense of nations as a socially constructed 
community, imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group. 
The media can perpetuate stereotypes through certain images and vernacular. He 
defined a nation as "an imagined political community" (Anderson, 2006). So, whereas 
media has had a role in the polarisation of communities (in the West and elsewhere), 
can it now serve a role as a unifying force?  Journalism and media trainers could train 
in community, ethics, trustworthiness but on any platform, these values are platform 
neutral. 
So, perhaps in this highly networked and connected and fragmented information 
ecosystem, media assistance and media development programmes need to revert to 
core values, irrespective of which medium, to serve as a unifying force.   Colonial 
Africa created divided communities; indigenous tribes split by the drawing of borders 
by the empires.  But, given direction and support and focus, media might serve as a 
facilitator in communities, as outlined in the SDGs: “offering a platform for dialogue 
and, as a trusted infomediary, supporting broad-based social cohesion, rather than 
being a vehicle for reinforcing identity politics” (UNDP Oslo Governance Centre, 
2019).   Effective, balanced journalism could help calm public discourse. 
As noted in Chapter 6 and as illustrated by the research data, traditional media 
assistance methods provide positive results for engagement and participation by 
citizens.  Chapter 6 discussed the particular need for reliable news sources and a 
platform for a national debate in countries that are in conflict or transition.    There are 
many African countries like Kenya and Tanzania (and elsewhere) that are home to a 
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number of ethnic groups, often with tension “bubbling just below the surface” (O 
Neill, 2015), and in which identity politics plays a large role.    
As was noted therefore, it is becoming especially important that there are trusted 
platforms for a national public conversation, which represents the views of the whole 
of society and reflects a range of views and political opinions.   This was discussed in 
reference to some of the projects in this research data.  The need for rational 
discussion and debate was noted, to assist peaceful resolution and combat conflict and 
violence. But this must be done in a balanced and measured manner, with skillful 
mediating. This is another core value that could be transferred in media development 
programmes – the capacity for journalists to preside and arbitrate debate and 
discussion without being inflammatory and incendiary.  
Consequently, media has the potential to serve as a unifying, rather than fracturing, 
force in communities, but this would have to be done independent of the market and 
for that reason will need continued donor support.   
 
Hate Speech 
A further implication for policy and practice is in the area of hate speech and how to 
counter it. This issue was raised in the research, as during the post-election violence in 
Kenya in 2007 reports alleged that ethnically-based radio stations in Kenya were 
partly responsible for inflaming ethnic hatred (Allen and Gagliordone, 2011).  But this 
is a growing problem globally both online and offline, and exacerbated by the rapid 
growth in mobile technologies and social media platforms.  
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The media assistance sector is starting to address this issue in Africa and other 
regions.  In Myanmar, for instance, there are a number of organisations undertaking 
programmes to counter hate speech.  There has been a sharp rise in hate speech in 
Myanmar, aggravating the ethnic and religious tensions in that country.  In particular, 
anti-Muslim statements are widespread on social media, which has contributed to the 
escalation of violence across the country.   
Myanmar is an interesting case study as it has seen massive growth in internet 
penetration, mobile phone adoption and social media usage in the past few years, 
spurred by the lifting of censorship and rapid opening up of its telecoms and media 
market.  Experts have expressed concern that this sudden access to the internet is not 
being accompanied by discussions about how to critically read content.  Myanmar has 
a “low media and information literacy rate”, according to the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Myanmar office. 
Clare Lyons of BBC Media Action in Myanmar concurs that “media literacy is not 
high here.  You have a country that for decades has been fed the news … they haven't 
been exposed to that much in the way of real, critical news” (Lyons, in interview, 
2017).91   Htaike Htaike Aung, Executive Director of Myanmar ICT for Development 
Organization (MIDO) confirms “many Burmese with little education easily fall prey 
to fake news and propaganda. Some users believe whatever they see on Facebook and 
share it without first finding out if the post is true or false”3.  There are also too few 
trained journalists and insufficient media infrastructure to facilitate quality coverage 
of the country’s most pressing issues (Foster, 2018).   
 
91 This interview took place as part of a separate project 
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This is a problem that has been created by the rapid growth in digitisation but one that 
could be ameliorated by the media assistance sector. For instance, to counter hate 
speech in Myanmar, BBC Media Action are running a project called the Tea Cup 
Diaries (La Pe’ Ye Ta Kwe Ye Diari), a radio drama that hopes to increase 
understanding and tolerance between different ethnic and religious communities.  This 
is a format that could be replicated in other countries. 
The Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) has also worked on hate speech in 
Myanmar, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, all countries emerging from autocratic 
rule or war which saw similar trends of hate speech. IWPR started the ‘No Hate 
Speech Project’ in Myanmar in 2016 to promote greater tolerance of ethnic, religious 
and marginalised groups.   Alan Davis from IWPR insists “not all hate speech is 
deliberate and a lot of hate speech comes from a lack of understanding or awareness”.  
Davis argues: “The way to beat hate speech is not through silencing people, but via 
education, information, debate and getting all points of views, listened to and engaged 
upon”.  
Social media can be criticised for being a medium for hateful speech, but is in reality a 
mirror of much deeper divides that exists in ethnically diverse countries.  The rise in 
digitisation, mobile phones and internet access have created new and exciting ways 
for people to connect globally but there are also downsides as noted throughout this 
research. These are familiar trends and hate speech is a global phenomenon. 
For instance, Internews Kenya reported that since 2016, observers have noted a 
resurgence of hate speech in community and local language media in Kenya.  They 
argue that this is mainly due to lack of capacity of journalists, and political 
interference or ownership. This is particularly true for media houses based at the 
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county level, where media is under resourced and susceptible to control of local 
political interests (Internews, 2017). The area of most concern is the rise of hate 
speech on radio talk shows on local-language stations, a primary source of news and 
information for many citizens. 
These are issues on which future media assistance projects might focus, returning to 
and reiterating the values, ethics and “elements of journalism” (Kovach and 
Rosenstiel, 2014).  Aidan White, founder of the Ethical Journalism Network, argues 
that to combat hate speech journalists need “to tell the truth, to respect the facts, to be 
independent, to be responsible and, above all, to show humanity – oblige us to avoid 
becoming propagandists and foot soldiers in political campaigns that nourish hatred 
by feeding on the insecurities of people” (White, 2014). 
This research suggests that media assistance should be confident in its core values 
which are still necessary throughout the developing world as elsewhere.   As Nelson 
argues, “quality content is the ultimate goal of media assistance” (Nelson, 2009:22). 
Thus, in summary, this research suggests that media assistance policy and 
programmes could: 
 Serve as a unifying force for communities and be a facilitator in communities, 
by providing a trusted platform for communities, and journalists who can 
arbitrate over debates (in particular on-air radio discussion) in a balanced and 
impartial manner. 
 Focus on its core values and ethics of journalism that can contribute to social 
cohesion and reducing conflict, in line with the SDGs 
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 Work to counter hate speech and disinformation through media and 
information literacy interventions, in addition to supporting the training of core 
values and balance in journalism 
 Focus on reforming state broadcasters and strengthening public interest media, 
to provide independent spaces for national and cross-ethnic debate 
 
 
Limitations of the research 
The results reported here should be considered in the light of some limitations.  The 
first is with regards to the long-term validity of the findings. With the speed of 
technological change, and uptake and affordability of technologies in the region and 
the wider world, what the current research found may not be applicable in five years’ 
time.  However, this research offers a picture of the practice of media development at 
a most interesting time.   
Interview participants spoke of how Kenya and Tanzania may be at a “tipping point” 
of the potential of mobile phones and internet with regards to access to information for 
the broader population. Kharas and Rogerson reported that “by 2025 there could be 
near-universal mobile phone coverage” (Kharas and Rogerson, 2012:11).  Smartphone 
penetration and access to the internet will certainly increase for Kenya and Tanzania 
in the next years and media development interventions may change. 
However, this is still not a guarantee that audiences and citizens will engage more in 
politics.  One reason offered for this is lack of agency. Another is the lack of belief in 
their governments to act on information that citizens have communicated.  
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Donor policies should support media development initiatives based on the realities of 
media use by audiences and citizens in this region. Donors should consider how 
citizens really engage and interact with these digital technologies and for what ends 
they use them. Therefore, the potential benefits for media development goals should to 
be continually assessed.    
A second limitation is with regards to access to data. The researcher approached a 
selection of organisations, and representatives of those organisations, that were 
operating in the region and for the most part they were available and consented to 
participate.  The research findings presented in Chapter 6 were based on interview 
data with stakeholders from 10 media organisations that were available to contribute 
to the study. However, not all interviewees who were approached were responsive and 
it is possible that data from other organisation may have produced different results.   
The data from this research study provides a snapshot of media development activity 
taking place in Kenya and Tanzania, and as such represents the variety of media 
assistance in the region.  Using a different sample of organisations may have produced 
different results. Additionally, a sample of projects from other regions, whether in 
Africa or elsewhere on the globe, might produce different outcomes with regards to 
assessing the relevance of digital technologies for achieving media development 
goals. 
But as noted, media development is not linear, has many objectives and outcomes, and 
the Case Studies and projects examined here provide a view of the sector at a most 
fascinating time. 
A third limitation could be in the data collection methodology. In this case face-to-
face semi-structured interviews were chosen for the method of collecting details of the 
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stakeholder’s media development projects and also their perspectives on the media 
landscape and the impact of digitisation in Kenya and Tanzania.  Qualitative, semi-
structured interviews could be considered a less scientific and less precise method of 
data collection, for instance, the researcher could have simply emailed the interview 
schedule to the participants.  However, the researcher believes the rate of response 
was much higher, and faster, from the face to face interviews than would have been 
from an email or survey methodology.  Research has shown that in-person methods 
get higher responses that other survey methods. Additionally, and as noted in Chapter 
4, the semi-structured interview can lead to more open, honest and detailed responses 
that more structured or written surveys.  
Lastly, a limitation might be in the timing of the primary data collection. The face to 
face interviews took place in Kenya and Tanzania in 2014 and 2015.  Undoubtedly, 
diffusion of digital technologies and social media have changed since those 
participating projects were initiated, new projects have started and others have been 
completed. However, in a sense this timeframe has made the study more relevant.  In 
the years since the explosion of mobile technologies and social media in the region 
there has been a shift in the narrative relating to these technologies, and this study 
reflects those changes. From initial exuberance about technologies and the potential 
for development, to more recent balance about what ICTs can do for social and 
political change, the time-frame means that the study has tracked the cycle of 
emerging technologies, excitement about their potential and then the move to a more 
evidence-based assessment of what technology can do for global citizens.  As noted 
by O’ Maley, initial cyber-optimism has “quickly given way to growing pessimism as 
the internet has also been used for mass surveillance and the political mobilization of 
non-democratic actors” (O’ Maley, 2019). 
384 
 
In fact, the more harmful and disruptive aspects of social media and the internet, for 
journalism, news, information and democracy, have only become apparent in recent 
years which gives even more significance to the research. 
 
Future Research Directions 
This research investigates the impact of digital technologies on media development 
practice in East Africa.  It examines whether the methods and approaches of this 
sector are still relevant in an increasingly connected technological global information 
system.   As part of the investigation the research looked at changing information 
systems in Africa and the impact of new ICTs on the region. It was found that digital 
technologies have not impacted on media development practice to a great extent.  
However, other interesting aspects of the current media assistance landscape were 
noted which could provide opportunities for further research. 
This focus of this thesis was the relevance of media development assistance in a 
changing media landscape. This is a question that the sector itself reflects on.  There 
are many conferences, round-tables and blog posts on whether media assistance has 
the impact it intends to have and the difficulty of measuring its impact.  Susman-Pena 
calls it “the existential crisis” of media development (Susman-Peña, 2019). 
Furthermore, as media assistance is such a politically sensitive development 
intervention, it is susceptible to many external factors that can impact on programme 
success.   As remarked by Stremlau (2019), “media assistance is highly political and 
is, in itself, a form of political engineering” (O’ Maley, 2019). 
This research analysed a sample of programmes being undertaken in East Africa and 
the extent to which ICTs were in use in project activities. The research did not 
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evaluate whether these programmes were successful in their long-term objectives nor 
whether they were deemed successful on completion. This is a possible avenue for 
further research.  More analysis of media development programmes which do use 
ICTs (possibly in other regions with higher mobile and internet diffusion) might 
produce interesting further research. 
This research took a practice-based perspective to whether digital technologies are 
impacting on the media assistance sector and its work. The reason for this is that the 
researcher wanted the study to be grounded in the realities of working on the ground. 
This could be a research approach for other research into media assistance going 
forward. Often academic literature is theorised and written many miles away from 
whether the work actually takes place. Presenting practitioners’ perspective on the 
tools they use, the approaches that work, and sometimes more importantly those do 
not work, gives a grounded view of work in the media development sector.   Providing 
Case Studies brings the data alive and gives more context to the underlying data. This 
mixed methods approach could be replicated for research in other regions. 
Another possible avenue for further research could be around the issue of fake news 
and hate speech.  The fragmentation and polarisation of media and the growth in so-
called fake news and disinformation was noted.  This is one area of potential focus for 
media development practice to combat misperceptions, prejudices and hate speech.  
Media literacy programmes are being implemented to help develop a critical approach 
to news coverage by media consumers and to promote media awareness.   
However, Bulger and Davison (2018) note that there is a lack of comprehensive 
evaluation data of media literacy efforts.  
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Media literacy has become a center of gravity for countering “fake news,” and a diverse array 
of stakeholders–from educators to legislators, philanthropists to technologists–have pushed 
significant resources toward media literacy programs. Media literacy, however, cannot be 
treated as a panacea”(Bulger and Davison, 2018:1) 
 
This is one area that is a current focus for media assistance efforts and donor funds but 
it might be worthwhile to focus resources on researching evidence for its effectiveness 
and what actually works to counter hate speech.  For instance, media literacy efforts 
are being focused on young people and school curricula, but recent research by Guess 
et al. (2019) shows that people aged over 65 are much more likely than younger 
people to share fake news on Facebook. That research found that just over 11% of 
people aged 65 or over shared links to fake stories. By contrast, only 3% of those aged 
18-29 actively passed on similar links (Guess et al., 2019).  
As diffusion of mobile technologies, internet access and smartphones become greater 
in these countries it is likely that these problems will become more widespread. What 
can Media Assistance do to address these problems? And have any interventions to 
date been successful?  As hate speech and fake news are such topical and important 
subjects there is certainly value in further research on these issues in the context of 
media development assistance.   
 
A final recommendation for future research relates to the political economy of the 
funding for development and ICT4D.  As was noted throughout the research, media 
development activity is naturally tied to and shaped by the funding streams from 
which it originates. As a result, media development and its focus over the decades has 
387 
 
reflected the foreign policies of government donors and the ideological leanings of 
non-government donors.  Miller (2009) noted that media development during the Cold 
War was “unavoidably influenced by the political self-interests of North America and 
Western Europe, which were then engaged in a ‘war of ideas’ with the USSR” (Miller, 
2009:12).   
Chapter One outlined how not all the donors have the same priorities and do not 
follow the same strategies. Europeans have a more rights-based reasons for supporting 
media development, the US follows a more liberal, free market-model. Both are 
different to the motivation behind Chinese media development activity in Africa, 
which has been called “soft-power” (Mano et al., 2016). The motivation and ideology 
of these donors, and the subsequent activities and programmes they fund, take 
different forms and produce different outcomes. Freedman and Obar refer to “donor-
led initiatives” (Freedman et al., 2016). 
As recorded, a trend in the media development sphere in recent years has been the 
emergence of donors emerging from technology firms from Silicon Valley, who often 
emphasise technological solutions for development.  As Deane confirmed “if a 
proposal didn’t include some form of digital app it was unlikely to be supported” 
(Deane, 2018).   
But as Manji (2008) asks regarding this widespread technological determinism: “Why 
are we not holding conferences about the role of the pencil in development? Or the 
role of paper? There is more evidence of social progress made by these humble 
instruments than all the information and communication technologies (ICTs) over the 
last 20 years” (Manji, 2008). 
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Just as McChesney (2008) suggested a decade ago that a process of global media 
mergers had concentrated control in the hands of a few multinational corporations 
(McChesney, 2008), the same process is happening today with the technology 
companies with regards to the grab for developing markets. Whether in Africa, Latin 
America or the Middle East, technology companies are funding development projects 
with an emphasis on digital solutions, to expand their “digital media empires” (Boyd 
Barrett, 2014).   
This research questioned the focus on digital technologies for media development.  
Where did this techno-determinism originate?  It was suggested that providing access 
to new technologies in the Third World as part of development Aid could be a 
mechanism of allowing corporations to establish new channels of market entry into 
these developing commercial markets.  Susman-Pena (2019) calls these “technical 
solutions in search of problems” (Susman-Peña, 2019:252). 
What is beginning to become apparent therefore is that these are not necessarily the 
correct solutions.  As an avenue for further research, it could be worthwhile to 
undertake a more forensic analysis of ICT4 development activities and funding in 
developing countries, using a political economy lens.  As Gumucio-Dagron (2008) 
claimed “in the name of the ‘digital divide’, great business is being made” (Gumucio-
Dagron, 2008:77).   
 
These themes are touched upon in this current research but could be interesting 
avenues for further research. These would be worthwhile and interesting studies in the 
area of media assistance donor support. 
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Conclusion 
This research set out to ascertain the relevance of media assistance in today’s 
increasingly connected and technological information environment.  It explored the 
changes that digital technologies have brought to the field of Media Development 
Assistance in sub-Saharan Africa.  Due to rapid changes in the amount and type of 
information available to citizens, and the fractured and fragmented media environment 
resulting from digital technologies and social media platforms, reliable and 
trustworthy journalism and news is more important than ever, especially for local 
populations.  Media that provide this type of information, and supports “rational” 
dialogue across broad populations are more crucial than ever. 
This research concludes that within the current ‘post-truth’ information ecosystem, 
Media Assistance is important and relevant.   In a global environment of growing 
divisiveness, populism and extremism in politics, donor-funded media assistance 
could work to support the creation of reliable and trustworthy content and provide a 
space where cross-societal debate, discussion and deliberation can occur.  It can 
contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals of maintaining peace and reducing 
conflict and violence. 
Hence, Media Assistance remains a significant and relevant part of the support that 
donors can give for enhancing transparency, accountability, and good governance. 
This is because of its potential role in helping journalists produce reliable and 
trustworthy information, by providing platforms for citizens to discuss and debate 
important issues, for them to hold those in power to account, engage and participate 
and contribute to how they are governed. 
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What citizens of Kenya and Tanzania, and elsewhere, need is a trusted news source to 
turn to, to rely upon and with which to make sense of all the other sources of 
information available to them in the new fractured information ecosystem. A source of 
news that is balance, unbiased, fact based and independent of the editorial influence of 
owners, or the market, would appear to be increasingly necessary.   
As noted by Tim Berners Lee, the inventor of the World Wide Web, “even though we 
have a new technology where information comes to us instantly over the wires… the 
art and science of journalism is still really important” (Parkinson, 2015:5). 
Despite the speed of technological change, and perhaps because of it, media assistance 
remains a relevant tool for donors to use for democratic objectives.   The research 
concludes that media assistance is not obsolete, and in fact, may be more important 
than ever.   
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